 United |
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/1994/1422/Add.1
15 December 1994 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH |
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
Addendum
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council
an addendum to the report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General, pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), issued as
document S/1994/1422, annex.
94-49931 (E) 201294 /...
*9449931*
Annex
Addendum to the eighth report of the Executive Chairman of the
Special Commission, established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution
687 (1991), on the activities of the Special Commission
Appendix I
A. Missiles
1. The Special Commission has continued its activities in the missile area
under the mandate established by Security Council resolutions 687 (1991),
707 (1991) and 715 (1991). During 1994, the Commission will have conducted
15 missile inspections, more than the combined number of inspections
undertaken in 1992 and 1993.
2. In order to provide the Council with an assessment of Iraq's compliance
with the obligations set out under section C of resolution 687 (1991), the
Commission intensified its endeavours to resolve outstanding issues in
respect of Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes. In parallel, major
efforts have been exerted to establish ongoing monitoring and verification
of Iraq's missile-related activities and dual-purpose capabilities. As a
result of these efforts, the essential elements of the monitoring system were
in place as from the middle of August 1994. The system has been declared
provisionally operational and is currently undergoing testing for
thoroughness, reliability and the integrated operation of the system's
components.
1. Past programmes
(a) Information
3. Iraq is required, under the terms of Security Council resolutions
687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), to provide full, final and complete
disclosures on all aspects of its proscribed programmes and to respond fully,
completely and promptly to questions and requests from the Commission. As a
result of inspections, lengthy discussions with Iraq's authorities and other
bodies and detailed analysis, the Commission now possesses a much fuller and
more accurate picture of Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes than that
presented by Iraq in its official "full, final and comprehensive report"
submitted in May 1992.
4. During the reporting period, the Commission has intensified its
investigations into issues related to past proscribed missile programmes.
Special emphasis has been placed on verification of information provided by
Iraq concerning foreign acquisition of proscribed missiles, their components
and related production capabilities. Validation of this, and other
information provided by Iraq, has been energetically pursued by the
Commission. Specific assistance to facilitate this process has been
requested from a number of countries. While some Governments were unable or
unwilling to confirm or deny details of supplies of equipment or assistance
given to Iraq prior to the imposition of sanctions, the Commission has
received many positive responses. Some 14 different bilateral meetings have
been held during the reporting period on this matter.
5. The resulting information obtained from Governments and the Commission's
own intensive analysis has, in some cases, revealed contradictions or
highlighted omissions in Iraq's declarations. This has necessitated new
rounds of discussions with Iraq in order to establish the true facts. Major
issues related to past programmes were discussed with Iraqi representatives
during a round of high-level talks in September 1994. Several inspection
teams addressed in detail relevant issues with Iraqi officials and experts.
However, there continues to be a proclivity for Iraq to fail to volunteer
information and to confirm specific information only when a preponderance of
evidence is produced by the Commission. This inevitably undermines the
confidence the Commission can have in the completeness of Iraq's
declarations. Furthermore, in some instances repeated statements by Iraq
that equipment was not procured for proscribed programmes have proved to be
incorrect. Iraq's continued insistence that all documents related to its
past proscribed activities have been destroyed has also proved to be
incorrect.
6. Some explanations and clarifications from Iraq are, as a consequence,
still pending. The major outstanding issues relating to past proscribed
missile programmes include accounting for certain missile components;
identification of all equipment and items procured for, or used in,
proscribed activities; and full disclosure of foreign assistance received by
Iraq from a number of countries. The resolution of these and other remaining
issues would be greatly expedited if Iraq provided documentation or other
supporting evidence which would allow independent verification. The
Commission has repeatedly called upon Iraq to adopt an attitude of full
openness and cooperation on matters relating to its past programmes
consistent with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions.
(b) Inspection activities
BM25/UNSCOM 81
7. BM25/UNSCOM 81 was in Iraq from 14 to 22 June 1994. The objectives of
this team were twofold. First, to discuss unresolved issues related to past
prohibited activities in Iraq, including missile production, modification
projects and foreign supplies. Secondly, to elaborate, to Iraq's experts,
definitions of the dual-purpose items and technologies contained in annex IV
to the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.
8. As a special task, related to verification of Iraq's compliance with
resolution 687 (1991), the team was requested to continue investigation into
the alleged use of a high precision tracking radar to support launches of
prohibited missiles in December 1990. Iraq's officials strongly denied that
the radar had been used during those tests, or that it had been procured to
support activities related to prohibited missiles. These denials
contradicted information available to the Commission which indicated that the
radar had been used in proscribed activities.
9. The Commission recently informed Iraq that, unless specific evidence were
provided to prove clearly that the radar was not used in support of
proscribed activities, the Commission, in accordance with its mandate to
destroy or render harmless items prohibited under resolution 687 (1991),
would proceed with the destruction of the radar. In response, Iraq has now
acknowledged that the radar was intended to be used in both proscribed and
non-proscribed activities. At the time of the writing of this report,
discussions on this matter were continuing.
BM28/UNSCOM 98
10. The mission of BM28/UNSCOM 98 was to begin the process of compiling, in a
single document, a coherent and detailed description of past proscribed
missile programmes based on Iraq's statements and declarations. This mission
was necessitated by the fragmentary nature of Iraq's declarations concerning
its past missile programmes. It is using information obtained by the
Commission from its own inspection activities and other sources. The effort
was initiated by the Commission to assist Iraq in clarifying its reporting on
past activities. It does not relieve Iraq of its obligations to provide to
the Commission a full, final and complete accounting of its proscribed
programmes as required by relevant Security Council resolutions.
11. BM28/UNSCOM 98 visited Iraq from 2 to 6 October and from 23 to
28 October 1994 to present to Iraq's experts the Commission's draft papers on
past programmes. During its visits, the team reviewed these drafts with
Iraq's authorities and interviewed a number of persons responsible for
relevant activities. A follow-up team, BM30/UNSCOM 102, in Iraq from 9 to
16 December 1994, is continuing this effort.
12. This task will continue until the past programmes are clearly understood
and properly documented. The Commission will evaluate all data obtained from
Iraq with information obtained from a number of other sources in order to
gain confidence, through analysis, in the completeness of Iraq's
declarations.
2. Ongoing monitoring and verification
(a) Inspection activities
13. The current monitoring programme in the missile area constitutes a
multi-layered system to accomplish the tasks of the plan for ongoing
monitoring and verification in an efficient and practical manner. It covers,
inter alia:
(a) A variety of sites and facilities currently engaged in missile
activities or having relevant capabilities. At this moment, more than 30
facilities are being monitored;
(b) Activities crucial to reacquiring prohibited missiles. The focal
points for monitoring include missile propellant mixers/extruders, equipment
for liquid engine production and gyroscope balancing, missile/warhead
assembly lines, a wind tunnel and static test stands. Special modes of
monitoring, i.e., camera systems, were established to monitor these
activities. The cameras' recordings are analysed to extract information
relevant for monitoring objectives;
(c) Specialized and dual-purpose equipment. Appropriate inventory
control was established to monitor these items. For example, nearly 200
items have been tagged by the Commission. Many more are covered by facility
protocols. Iraq's use of this equipment is checked by monitoring teams;
(d) Operational missiles designed for use, or capable of being
modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50
kilometres. More than 1,300 missiles have been tagged by the Commission and
are regularly checked for non-modification. In some instances, subsystems or
components have been separately tagged.
BM26/UNSCOM 82
14. The Commission decided to use cameras and other sensors to increase the
effectiveness of monitoring activities at a number of missile-related
facilities. The task of BM26/UNSCOM 82 was to install the monitoring camera
systems. The team operated in Iraq from 3 to 28 July 1994, and installed
some 50 cameras with associated equipment at 15 sites being monitored. The
team also placed tags and inventory labels on equipment identified for
monitoring.
15. After a period of initial operation of the camera systems, a special
sensor testing team was dispatched to Iraq from 8 to 16 August 1994. The
team's mission was to validate the operational capabilities of the camera
monitoring systems (through tests of sensor and communication technologies),
operation and maintenance procedures, and processing modalities. The team
provided recommendations for improved use of sensor monitoring systems in the
missile area.
16. The product from the missile monitoring cameras is reviewed in three
stages. First, each site is called up on a daily basis to check that the
link is working. Secondly, the tape is reviewed by the resident missile
monitoring team. Thirdly, the tape is dispatched for detailed expert
analysis. The tapes are retained by the Commission for future comparative
work.
BM27/UNSCOM 85
17. This team was in Iraq from 15 to 24 July 1994 with the primary mission of
collecting updated information on and, by extension, updating the
Commission's assessments of missile research and development activities in
Iraq. Such updates are based on Iraq's declarations, special reports by Iraq
and data collected by inspection teams. They are undertaken by the
Commission on a biannual basis. BM27/UNSCOM 85 was the second team to
perform such a task.
18. Extensive discussions were held with Iraqi officials and missile experts
to obtain information relevant to the team's mission. Iraq submitted a
detailed report on current missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface
missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres. The team reaffirmed
limitations established by the Commission on some missile design features so
as to preclude any development of missiles capable of exceeding a range of
150 kilometres.
19. BM27/UNSCOM 85 also continued investigations into a number of issues
related to research and development activities carried out by Iraq relating
to past proscribed missile programmes.
Missile monitoring group 1
20. Upon completion of the baseline process in the missile area, in August
1994 the Commission dispatched the first missile monitoring group of resident
inspectors to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. Such groups
now operate continuously from the Centre and are a core element in the
ongoing monitoring and verification system in Iraq. Monitoring groups have
to perform a variety of missions, including:
(a) Execution of monitoring inspections on a regular basis at all
missile-related sites being monitored;
(b) Checks of the tagged operational missiles;
(c) Initial assessment and verification of Iraq's declarations and
reports;
(d) Maintaining a current inventory of items being monitored;
(e) Initial screening of the output of the sensor monitoring system;
(f) Specific short-notice tasks as directed by the Commission.
21. The first monitoring group (MG1) arrived in Iraq on 17 August and
completed its mission on 9 October 1994. The group was composed of four
experts specializing in various areas of missile development and production.
During the mission, the group carried out 48 inspections of sites on a no-
notice or short-notice basis. The group provided detailed reports on the
progress of permitted missile programmes in Iraq and Iraq's current use of
its dual-purpose capabilities.
Missile monitoring group 2
22. The second monitoring group (MG2) entered Iraq on 14 October 1994, and is
scheduled to maintain the continuous missile monitoring presence until early
February 1995. The personnel on the team will be rotated at staggered times
to ensure that an experienced cadre of personnel remain in Iraq during the
turnover to the next monitoring team in February. As at 8 December 1994, the
second monitoring group had conducted 60 visits to facilities being
monitored.
Missile monitoring groups 2A and 2B
23. Special groups (MG2A and MG2B) were sent to Iraq to supplement the
expertise of monitoring group 2 to verify the non-modification of operational
missiles covered by the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, which
were originally tagged by UNSCOM 80 in June 1994. Monitoring group 2A was in
Iraq from 19 to 22 October 1994 and monitoring group 2B carried out its
mission from 2 to 6 December 1994. Iraq brought forward all the missiles
requested for verification by the Commission. The teams verified all tags
and compared the operational missiles with technical reference material to
ensure that Iraq had performed no modifications to increase the range of
those missiles.
(b) Ongoing monitoring and verification declarations
24. In general, declarations in respect of ongoing monitoring and
verification have been adequate in the missile area over the reporting
period, most anomalies having been detected and corrected during the earlier
baseline inspections. Nevertheless, omissions continue to be discovered, but
it is anticipated that these will be corrected during the current phase of
monitoring.
B. Chemical weapons
25. Since the last report on its activities the Commission has pursued in
tandem the development of chemical monitoring and its implementation. At the
same time, clarification of outstanding aspects of the past chemical weapons
programmes continues to be a major concern.
1. Past programmes
(a) Information
26. Full knowledge and accounting of Iraq's past programmes is the key to
ensuring that proscribed programmes have been eliminated and to confirming
that the monitoring regime encompasses all equipment, technology and material
in Iraq with potential for use for chemical weapons purposes.
27. The Commission has continued its efforts to fill gaps in Iraq's
declarations on its past chemical weapons programmes, particularly those
relating to suppliers and quantities of items and materials imported. In
addition, strenuous attempts have been made to find ways to verify
independently Iraq's accounting of the past programmes. During the reporting
period, some 10 bilateral discussions with supporting Governments have taken
place and a considerable amount of data on Iraq's imports has been obtained
by the Commission.
28. The Commission considered that a major breakthrough had been achieved in
verifying Iraq's declaration on imports of proscribed materials as a result
of the CW15/UNSCOM 74 inspection in April 1994. That team was sent to Iraq
specifically to address the issue of verification of past imports. During
the inspection, the team was given a list of letters of credit which the
Iraqi side claimed to cover all items imported in support of the chemical
weapons programmes. The Commission energetically pursued this issue with the
Governments of the suppliers concerned in order to verify the quantities
supplied and the dates of supply. However, as a result of detailed analysis
of the list of letters of credit and of the information from supporting
Governments, the Commission has concluded that the list is not complete and
contains errors. The consequence of the inconsistencies is that
uncertainties remain, inter alia, about the amount of chemical agent
produced, the amount of precursors imported and consumed, and the amount of
production equipment imported. The Commission is actively endeavouring to
resolve these inconsistencies and uncertainties with Iraq and supplier
Governments.
(b) Inspection activities
CW21/UNSCOM 95
29. CW21/UNSCOM 95 was sent to Iraq from 23 to 27 October 1994 to address
anomalies in the list of letters of credit and outstanding information from
Iraq on its past programmes. It also sought to collect such data as it could
in order to improve the Commission's understanding of the past chemical
weapons programmes.
30. During initial discussions, Iraq maintained that the list of letters of
credit was complete. However, the team cited general examples of areas of
omissions in Iraq's declarations. The incomplete nature of the list was
further underlined during interviews with persons associated with the past
programmes who referred to imported items of equipment not included in
declarations.
31. In the course of the discussions and questioning, the team collected
sufficient information and evidence to conclude that Iraq's previous
declarations contained significant inconsistencies concerning purchases of
precursor chemicals and equipment, equipment utilization and supplier
companies. Iraq admitted that the list of letters of credit was not 100 per
cent complete, but claimed that it was 90 to 95 per cent complete. The
resultant uncertainties, together with other information available to the
Commission, potentially translate into several hundred tons of unaccounted-
for chemical warfare agents.
32. Iraq has therefore been asked to supply a new full, final and complete
declaration, with supporting evidence for its past programmes. Once this has
been received, the Commission will undertake a further verification exercise.
In order to clarify inconsistencies in Iraq's declarations referring to
chemical weapons-related munitions, an inspection will take place in January
to address this particular issue.
2. Ongoing monitoring and verification
33. Monitoring in the chemical area has been addressed in four interrelated
ways. The first is through the Commission's continued investigations into
past Iraqi chemical weapons programmes. A complete understanding of Iraq's
technical capabilities, manufacturing equipment, precursor suppliers and past
chemical weapon production activities are essential if the Commission is to
be confident that it is monitoring from a solid base. Secondly, the
Commission conducted a site sweep and hand-over of the Muthanna State
Establishment which is now being monitored. This facility was the hub of
Iraq's past chemical weapons programmes, and contained the bulk of the
declared and discovered chemical agent, filled munitions, and munition case
production and filling equipment. The site survey and hand-over teams
established that the site was free of prohibited materials and that all dual-
use equipment at the site had been destroyed or properly tagged and recorded.
Thirdly, protocol-building missions were conducted at a variety of chemical
sites. Finally, the chemical monitoring group was established in Iraq as
part of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and commenced
monitoring activities.
(a) Inspection activities
CW19/UNSCOM 89
34. The second chemical protocol-building team operated in Iraq from 10 to
23 August 1994. Its task was to build protocols for 22 chemical facilities
associated with the oil and petrochemical industry. These sites are of
relevance to the monitoring regime because of the potential presence of
either equipment or raw chemicals which could be used in the production of
chemical warfare agents, or equipment which could be used to store such
chemicals.
35. The team verified declared equipment and activities at the sites declared
for monitoring. It also collected the information required for the building
of protocols for each of the sites.
CW20/UNSCOM 91
36. This team conducted its activities in Iraq from 13 to 24 September 1994.
Its principal task was to conduct protocol-building inspections at 12 sites
associated primarily with Iraq's chemical fertilizer industry. The
inspections were undertaken in order to identify possible dual-purpose
equipment, facility or equipment redundancies, plant capacity and normal
utilization, unusual chemical processes, and waste disposal methods and to
resolve anomalies in Iraq's declarations concerning the sites. In the course
of the inspection, the team was able to obtain the information required to
build protocols.
Chemical monitoring group 1
37. The first chemical monitoring group (CG1), comprising four chemical
experts, arrived in Iraq on 2 October 1994. As the first monitoring team in
the chemical area, it is refining the chemical monitoring process and the
information requirements for facility protocols and baseline inspections.
38. Under the guidance of the Commission in New York, the chemical group
undertakes the following tasks:
(a) Revision of site protocols;
(b) Tagging and monitoring of dual-use chemical processing equipment;
(c) Conducting inspections of newly declared and undeclared sites of
potential relevance to the chemical monitoring regime;
(d) Collection, assessments and recording of monitoring sensor data;
(e) No-notice tasks as directed by the Commission.
39. In addition to conducting inspections at sites for which monitoring and
verification protocols have been prepared, the monitoring group will visit
various chemical-related organizations to assess their relevance to ongoing
monitoring and verification.
40. The team also investigates outstanding anomalies in Iraq's declarations
concerning its current dual-purpose capabilities. Minor adjustments have
been made by the Commission to the formats under which Iraq reports such
capabilities in order to facilitate both the collection of data by Iraq and
its analysis by the Commission. The team explains these changes to its Iraqi
counterparts and provides further clarifications, as necessary, to enable
Iraq to provide full and consistent declarations.
41. In support of future ongoing monitoring and verification in the chemical
area, the Commission intends to install further sensors. A team is currently
in the country preparing for the installation in January of an additional 20
air-sampling devices at four additional chemical production facilities of
particular importance to the monitoring regime. In addition, it is planned
to install flow meters at key points in the production equipment at at least
one site. Several sites will be monitored by remote-controlled cameras.
42. Analysis of the samples taken by air samplers is currently being
conducted in laboratories outside Iraq. However, when the Baghdad Monitoring
and Verification Centre has been completely equipped, it is intended that
analysis of the samples will be undertaken at the chemical laboratory in the
Centre. Only those samples which deviate from the normal background levels
will be sent to approved international laboratories in order to obtain a
cross-checking result from an independent source. From time to time,
calibrating exercises will be undertaken to ensure the accuracy of analysis
at the various laboratories. The presence of this analytical equipment will
also enable other analytical questions to be dealt with at the Centre.
(b) Ongoing monitoring and verification declarations
43. Information provided by Iraq in respect of ongoing monitoring and
verification in the chemical field has generally been reasonably accurate.
Thus far no major inconsistencies have been encountered during the reporting
period.
C. Biological weapons
1. Past programmes
44. Iraq has declared having undertaken biological research for military
purposes at the Salman Pak site operated by Iraq's Technical Research Centre.
During the first biological inspection in 1991, Iraq stated that the research
could be used for defensive or offensive purposes, and concentrated on three
agents, namely, Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Clostridium botulinum
(botulinum toxin) and Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene).
45. Owing to the lack of supporting data, verification of Iraq's accounting
for the storage and disposal of equipment, storage of organisms, personnel,
relationships between the declared biological weapon research site and other
organizations, and the acquisition of biotechnology has proved difficult. An
accurate and verified account of these is essential if the Commission is to
be certain that it is indeed monitoring the full extent of Iraq's dual-
purpose biological capabilities. Furthermore, it will enable the Commission
to focus its main monitoring efforts on key sites. The Commission has
therefore continued to investigate past programme-related activities. Given
the claimed destruction of all documentation related to the programme,
verification of Iraq's account has, as in other areas, had to rely in large
measure on interviews with personnel directly involved in the programme and
indirect means of substantiation.
BW15/UNSCOM 104
46. BW15/UNSCOM 104 took place from 15 to 22 November 1994. Its prime
activity was the interviewing of Iraqi officials who may have been associated
with the past programme, in order to clarify the following points:
(a) Links between the Salman Pak site and other organizations;
(b The logic of the programme, including doctrine, practice, priorities,
achievements, acquisition of biotechnology and know-how, protection and
medical aspects, storage and rationale for location of the programme;
(c) A material balance for equipment, cell stocks and complex media
acquired by Salman Pak or the programme;
(d) The real extent and intentions of the programme.
47. During the inspection, the team held discussions with 28 persons, many of
whom had never been in contact with the Commission's experts before,
including 9 of the 10 employees at Salman Pak. Access to personnel, whose
identity had not previously been disclosed, therefore, constituted a major
step forward. While the Commission remains unconvinced that Iraq's account
of its past programme is either complete or accurate, this team did obtain
new information, the significance of which requires further examination.
48. UNSCOM 104 continued the discussions with Iraq initiated during UNSCOM 96
on various direct and indirect means to substantiate Iraq's accounts in the
absence of supporting documents or proof. Iraq agreed to try to provide such
substantiation shortly after UNSCOM 104 left the country. In addition,
various outstanding questions related to ongoing monitoring and verification
declarations were addressed. Revised declarations were submitted, as
requested by UNSCOM 96, and were further revised in the light of the team's
comments.
2. Ongoing monitoring and verification
49. In preparation for the monitoring of Iraq's biological activities, the
Commission has proceeded with the evaluation of the sites or facilities
concerned by assessing the various elements which constitute Iraq's
capability.
BW7/UNSCOM 86
50. Biological technical talks (BW7/UNSCOM 86) were held in Baghdad from 5 to
8 June 1994. The purpose was to try to clarify inconsistencies and anomalies
between declarations concerning biological issues submitted by Iraq in
January and April 1994 and the findings of BW4/UNSCOM 72, which visited many
of the sites covered by their declarations for the first time.
51. During those talks, Iraq agreed to provide declarations and supplementary
information regarding 24 sites. With respect to declarations, discussions
focused on universities, breweries, facilities indigenously producing or
modifying declarable equipment and import facilities. It was reiterated to
Iraq that it was required to provide declarations for all dual-purpose
capabilities covering the period from January 1986 to February 1994,
including any facility related in any way to biological weapons activities.
The form for 30-day prior notification of movement or modification of dual-
use equipment, discussed during an earlier inspection, was provided to the
Iraqi side. No such notification has yet been received by the Commission.
BW6/UNSCOM 84
52. BW6/UNSCOM 84 was in Iraq from 25 June to 5 July 1994. Its task was to
survey 35 biological sites, some of which had not been declared by Iraq, in
order to assess whether they should be monitored. Several sites were
selected to test the practicality of the concept of the draft biological
protocol. The sites chosen had been visited previously and covered four
different activity areas, namely vaccine production, supplier company,
research and development laboratory and single-cell production facility.
53. Eight of the undeclared sites were determined by the team to require
monitoring as dual-purpose equipment was present or because of the nature of
the activities conducted.
54. The team provided Iraq with a format for the provision of additional
information required to complete the protocols and reiterated previous
unfulfilled requests for information.
BW8/UNSCOM 87
55. BW8/UNSCOM 87 was in Iraq from 25 July to 7 September 1994 to create
protocols for 55 sites which had been identified for monitoring.
56. However, the team observed inconsistencies and anomalies between its
findings and those of previous inspection teams and the information contained
in Iraq's various declarations. These related largely to equipment which had
either been moved to the sites since the previous inspection or not been
previously declared as being at those sites. Information on personnel,
previously absent from declarations, was obtained during this inspection.
None the less, queries concerning personnel present at sites, relationships
between sites, and relationships to the past military biological programme
were not fully clarified. During the course of the inspection, Iraq declared
to the team the names of further sites at which biological equipment or
activities were present, and the team inspected those sites.
Technical talks held in New York in July
57. Technical talks held in New York during July 1994 concentrated upon the
full provision of information requested during BW7/UNSCOM 86 and which
remained outstanding, such as documentation concerning the import of
biological materials by import company and information on relevant university
activities.
BW9/UNSCOM 88
58. The team was in Iraq from 20 to 25 August 1994 and visited five
biological facilities. Its objectives were to perform a feasibility study of
remote monitoring in the biological area and, for the sites where this was
deemed feasible, to establish the scope, foundations and requirements for the
installation of remote monitors at biological sites. It concluded that, at
those sites, remote monitoring equipment could constitute an effective means
of supplementary on-site inspections.
BW10/UNSCOM 92
59. The team was in Iraq from 29 August to 3 September 1994. Its objectives
were to complete the protocol-building process at certain sites and to
inspect additional sites in order to assess whether they should be monitored.
60. The team visited a total of seven sites. On the basis of its results,
two further sites were deemed as requiring monitoring.
BW11/UNSCOM 94
61. BW11/UNSCOM 94 was in Iraq from 29 September to 14 October 1994. Its
main objective was to continue the inventorying and tagging of dual-use
biological equipment started in May 1994 with BW5/UNSCOM 78 in order to
address the anomalies in the equipment inventories observed during BW8/UNSCOM
87. UNSCOM 94 also determined the reasons for damage to or loss of tags
noted during past inspections.
Technical talks held in New York in September
62. The discussions held in New York in September were in preparation for
BW12/UNSCOM 96. They covered activities since 1986, monitoring, and Iraq's
biological capability. The Commission presented the various steps taken so
far in preparation for monitoring, and the difficulties encountered in
certain areas in gathering the information required, especially in the field
of research. It was agreed that a list of additional information required
would be discussed and provided during BW12/UNSCOM 96.
BW12/UNSCOM 96
63. BW12/UNSCOM 96 held discussions with Iraqi officials at the National
Monitoring Directorate from 23 to 26 September 1994. The main topics of
discussion were discrepancies between inspection findings and declarations;
the difficulties encountered in reconciling information from both sources;
declarations or additional sites previously requested; movement or
modification of equipment; indigenous production of fermenters; import
activities; the relationship between various biological sites; storage of
equipment; work with certain micro-organisms; damaged or lost tags;
management structure at the sites; future biological activities; declarations
for activities conducted between January 1986 and February 1994; and past
biological weapons work.
64. During the discussions, the scope of the monitoring effort and of the
reporting requirements under the plan was reiterated, and the link between
past activities and ongoing monitoring and verification outlined. Throughout
the discussions, examples of indirect means of substantiation were explored
as an alternative to the provision of supporting documentation, given Iraq's
claim to have destroyed all relevant documentation. The need for the site
managers to be familiarized with their reporting obligations was also
addressed.
BW13/UNSCOM 99
65. BW13/UNSCOM 99 started its activity in Iraq on 2 December 1994. Its main
purpose is to continue the inventorying of research, development and
production equipment recently declared by Iraq.
BW16/UNSCOM 105
66. This inspection, which started on 2 December 1994, initiated interim
monitoring of a key production site. The interim monitoring will, in the
first instance, undertake an in-depth analysis of the activities of the site
in order to redress the inadequacy of and inconsistencies in Iraq's previous
declarations concerning this site.
67. By actively pursuing the data through interim monitoring, the Commission
is relying less on Iraq's openness and more on inspection findings to obtain
the baseline information for this site. However, this is a very time-
consuming process and so can only be performed for a limited number of sites.
The interim monitoring process does not remove the requirement for Iraq to
declare accurately all its relevant dual-purpose biological activities.
D. Nuclear
68. The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is
reporting separately on the activities of the action team set up to implement
paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991).
69. The Commission continues, in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (iii) of
resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 715 (1991), to assist
and cooperate with the IAEA action team through the provision of special
expertise and logistical, informational and other operational support for the
carrying out of the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. In
accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4
(a) of resolution 715 (1991), it continues to designate sites for inspection.
In accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 707 (1991), it continues to
receive and decide on requests from Iraq to move or destroy any material or
equipment relating to its nuclear weapons programme or other nuclear
activities. Furthermore, it continues, in accordance with paragraph 4 (c) of
resolution 715 (1991), to perform such other functions, in cooperation in the
nuclear field with the Director-General of IAEA, as may be necessary to
coordinate activities under the plans for ongoing monitoring and
verification, including making use of commonly available services and
information to the fullest possible extent, in order to achieve maximum
efficiency and optimum use of resources.
Gamma survey
70. A presentation on the final results of the gamma surveys undertaken in
September and December 1993 was made to the Commission on 22 September 1994.
The capability of the helicopter-borne detection system has been discussed
not only as a means of detecting previously undeclared sites for designation
by the Commission but also in respect of its future use as a major tool in
the ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq.
71. The results of the gamma missions have shown the ability of the system to
provide the Commission and IAEA with the capability to conduct survey
missions for detection of certain nuclear activities through the detection of
trace radioactive materials over designated sites and to execute current
monitoring missions over declared sites. The system is also useful in
mapping the level and isotope distribution of radioactive sources over a
significant surface area. Use of the gamma mapping in association with the
current environmental sampling being undertaken by IAEA could improve
detection capabilities significantly and strengthen the overall monitoring
system.
72. For some sites the results of the gamma mission have shown unidentified
radioactive emissions from unidentified sources which will be investigated
during future inspections.
Status of nuclear fuel removal
73. In the period under review, the reprocessing of the irradiated nuclear
fuel assemblies removed from Iraq under the contract between IAEA and CIR
Minatom has been completed at the Mayak facility in the Russian Federation.
The uranium oxide resulting from the reprocessing is being moved to the
Elektrostahl facility, also in the Russian Federation, where it will be
placed under IAEA safeguards. Vitrification of the waste resulting from the
reprocessing is also near completion. In Vienna, at the beginning of
December, preliminary discussions were held between the IAEA action team and
CIR Minatom regarding procedures for the sale of the reprocessed uranium
oxide. As operations under the fuel removal and reprocessing contract are
nearly complete, the final payments due from the United Nations under
contract in the amount of some US$ 3,900,000 will have to be made early in
1995. This will constitute a further drain on the funds available to the
Commission and IAEA in the carrying out of their mandates.
E. Aerial surveillance
74. The aerial inspection team continues to undertake aerial inspections at
sites being monitored and at new facilities considered to be of possible
relevance to the Commission's mandate. Where required, the team also
provides support to ground inspections. All aerial inspections continue to
be conducted on a no-notice basis, utilizing the Commission's three CH-53G
helicopters. To date over 500 aerial inspections have been undertaken by the
team.
75. In response to the evolving requirements of ongoing monitoring and
verification, the aerial inspection team has made a number of changes to its
method of operations. As the expert monitoring groups have become
established at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, members of
those groups are accompanying the aerial inspection team on relevant aerial
missions. This allows the experts to advise the aerial inspectors to focus
on particular areas or activities of importance at the facilities.
76. It is planned to move the aerial inspection team's film development
laboratory from its present location in the Commission's Bahrain field office
to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The team's photographic
library will also move. This contains copies of all imagery and reports
prepared by the team since the commencement of aerial inspections in June
1992. Immediate access to this historical imagery will enhance the aerial
and ground teams' operations by allowing them to study sites in advance of
inspections and thus readily to detect any external changes which have taken
place at a facility since the previous inspection. Additional equipment has
also been procured for the team to assist in refining and improving the
product from the aerial inspections.
77. The Commission's high altitude surveillance aircraft, the U-2, continues
to undertake an average of one to two flights a week. As at 6 December 1994,
229 missions have been flown. The imagery obtained from these missions is
crucial to the Commission's operational planning.
Appendix II
A. Export/import monitoring mechanism
1. During the period covered by the present report* progress has been made
towards the presentation to the Security Council of a proposal for a
mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to
Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687
(1991) and other relevant resolutions once the sanctions on those items have
been lifted. Paragraph 7 of Council resolution 715 (1991) requires such a
mechanism to be developed in cooperation between the Security Council
Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) (the Sanctions Committee),
the Special Commission and the Director-General of IAEA.
________________________
* For developments up to mid-June 1994, see S/1994/750, paragraphs 26
to 28. For developments from mid-June to the beginning of October 1994, see
S/1994/1138, paragraphs 26 to 31.
________________________
2. A concept paper for the mechanism, prepared by the Commission and IAEA,
has been submitted to the Sanctions Committee. Informal discussions in that
Committee appeared to reveal that a consensus could be reached on the
proposal in the paper, once the Sanctions Committee had before it a more
detailed list of items to be reported under the mechanism by exporting
Governments and Iraq than was available in the annexes to the Commission's
and IAEA's plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.
3. Accordingly, revisions to the annexes in the chemical, biological and
missile areas were prepared, and these were submitted, together with the
previously revised annex in the nuclear area (S/24300), to an informal
meeting of international experts, held in New York on 18 and 19 October 1994,
in order to determine the adequacy of the revisions for purposes of
implementing an export reporting procedure. While the lists were in large
measure approved, proposals were made for some further changes. These
changes have now been made and the lists circulated to the participants in
the meeting for comments, most of which have been received. It is intended
to reconvene the informal meeting at the end of the first week of January
1995, to receive the final drafts of the lists, to consider the draft
reporting forms to be submitted by Governments pursuant to the mechanism, and
to discuss the practical implementation of the mechanism. Immediately after
that meeting, it is hoped to be able to resubmit to the Sanctions Committee
the concept paper, with the draft revised annexes to the plans for ongoing
monitoring and verification. When the concurrence of the Sanctions Committee
is obtained in the course of January 1995, the proposal for the mechanism
will be put before the Security Council for approval in a resolution to be
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. The revisions to the annexes to
the plans will also be brought to the attention of the Council, in accordance
with the procedures for revision of the annexes already approved by the
Council and contained in the Commission's and IAEA's plans for ongoing
monitoring and verification (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22871/Rev.2 and Corr.1,
paras. 26 and 41).
B. Resource implications
4. The number of personnel and material resources required to support the
export/import mechanism derives from the volume of data which the mechanism
will generate. This figure, in turn, is derived from the volume of dual-use
items which will be imported by Iraq. The Commission is currently engaged in
analytical studies to acquire broad outline figures for the likely level of
reportable items.
5. Dual-use items imported into Iraq before the imposition of sanctions
should have been either destroyed or consumed, or should be currently
subjected to the monitoring regime. In the missile, chemical, biological and
nuclear fields, the numbers of items of dual-use equipment destroyed under
United Nations supervision or currently being monitored ranges from 500 to
1,000 separate pieces. Assuming that these items were imported during a
period of approximately two to five years, the number of shipments of dual-
use items could be expected not to exceed 2,000 during a normal year.
Assessments of export patterns from Western countries into countries similar
to Iraq confirm these figures. Further analysis and refinement of the
figures will take place over the coming months as further data becomes
available.
6. Notwithstanding the absence of precise figures relating to the volume of
material anticipated under the export/import mechanism, the broad framework
under which the regime will operate is currently being established. When
operational, the export-import mechanism will constitute one of the main
pillars of the ongoing monitoring and verification regime, and the Commission
and IAEA's experts in New York, Vienna and Baghdad will be heavily involved
in reviewing and assessing the information provided by Iraq and exporting
Governments under the mechanism.
7. To administer the mechanism there will be export/import units staffed by
customs experts and data entry personnel in Baghdad and New York. These
units will be responsible for receiving the notification forms, ensuring
their timely and efficient processing by the Commission's and IAEA's experts
as may be the case, and the dissemination of information. In Iraq, the
customs experts, in conjunction with the monitoring experts, will also
undertake no-notice inspections at, inter alia, points of entry into Iraq, in
order to verify that all relevant items are being declared. In view of the
commercial sensitivity of data supplied under the export/import regime,
special measures will be taken to ensure the security of this data.
8. On the basis of the figures set out above, the Commission currently
envisages recruiting six to eight additional experts for its New York staff
to process and analyse the data generated by the mechanism.
Appendix III
Information Assessment Unit
The Information Assessment Unit is in the process of developing a new
computer system which will form the key analytical tool for ongoing
monitoring and verification and future export/import operations and analysis.
The system will hold computerized versions of the site protocols, including
declarations, inspection reports, imagery and maps. Work has already begun
on creating a database to support export/import operations, which will be
linked to the computerized site protocols, thus allowing the analysts to
review items on order or being imported for each facility being monitored.
In addition, the database will permit manipulation of information to allow
assessments to be made on the total volume of items, such as dual-use
chemicals, being imported into Iraq. In this manner, experts will at any
time be able to make assessments about Iraq's potential capabilities to
produce banned items, either at an individual site or throughout Iraq, and so
will be better able to direct the Commission's monitoring of sites and
imports to focus on the most significant issues.
Appendix IV
Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre
A. Concept and background information
1. On 1 August 1994, the Commission established the Baghdad Monitoring and
Verification Centre. In part, its establishment enabled the Executive
Chairman to declare the ongoing monitoring and verification system
provisionally operational.
2. The Centre provides offices, laboratories, and operational support for
Commission and IAEA resident inspectors. The resident staff includes
professional specialists in biological, chemical, and nuclear issues;
missiles; aerial photography and interpretation and camera and other sensor
technology. In the near future, it will include experts in export/import
control of dual-use items. The resident and visiting inspectors are
supported by a small staff led by the Director of the Centre. It should be
noted that the Centre not only offers office space and common support for the
inspectors, but also affords the opportunity for inter-disciplinary analysis
of the data available to experts. This opportunity has become increasingly
evident during inspections conducted in November and December 1994.
3. The Centre is located in the Canal Hotel, a building made available by
the Government of Iraq for the exclusive use of the United Nations in the
mid-1980s. The facility is managed by the United Nations Administrative
Unit, Baghdad, for a variety of United Nations organizations. At the
proposal of the Executive Chairman of the Commission, Iraq agreed that the
Canal Hotel should serve as the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.
B. Engineering support
4. Immediately prior to the beginning of the reporting period, the
Commission undertook a survey of the engineering support required to
reconfigure the designated area in the Canal Hotel in a manner suitable for
the tasks of the Centre.
5. The survey also indicated that the Centre would require extensive
engineering support in a number of areas:
(a) Reconfiguration of a large number of the rooms;
(b) Rewiring of the electrical circuits and repair of the plumbing
for the offices;
(c) Physical barriers and control points needed to be installed at
the numerous access points to ensure the security of the Centre.
6. In mid-July, the Al-Fao Construction Bureau was designated to perform the
work. The indifferent quality of the workforce, the lack of qualified
supervisors and the need for remedial repairs delayed the completion of the
work.
7. The Iraqi renovation project was observed by construction engineers
provided by a contributing Government. Their assessment of the facility and
of the many requirements within the Centre indicated that the scope of
engineering support must be enlarged to correct the deficiencies of the
initial renovation and to engage in other projects to complete the facility.
At the same time, efforts were made to arrange for engineering support for
the long term. A fundamental consideration for these arrangements was the
establishment and maintenance of a secure facility. This important factor
made it necessary for the Commission to approach several Member States for
both near- and long-term engineering support.
8. As the current reporting period closes, contributing Governments have
provided craftsmen in response to specific requests for assistance, namely,
installing locks; surveying the electric power system; completing a two-stage
electric rewiring project; building the work surfaces and shelving in the
operations room, the aerial inspection team offices and the laboratories; and
designing the electrical system for the biological laboratory.
C. Security measures
9. Concerns about Centre security arise from many sources. Security of
information, analyses and deliberations within the Centre is an essential
element of the efficacy of ongoing monitoring and verification. Information
security must encompass not only the findings of inspectors, but also the
proprietary data of the notifications submitted to the Commission by Iraq and
by the exporting Governments concerning dual-use items. Physical security
must provide assurance of control over all possible access points. A number
of contributing Governments have made available technical experts and
equipment to assist the Commission with its security programme.
D. Equipment and furniture donations
10. Contributing Governments of four States and the Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) have provided, and continue to provide
equipment, including furniture, for the Centre. Two Governments donated
furniture and expendable supplies from their former embassy compounds in
Baghdad. ESCWA is lending large quantities of office furniture, which was in
storage at the former ESCWA headquarters in Baghdad. A third Government is
providing the internal security camera system, an important component to the
security programme for the Centre, and a fourth Government has donated
computers and associated equipment for use in Baghdad.
11. The monitoring systems that have been installed at sites selected for
that purpose and that support the efforts of the resident and visiting
inspectors have been donated by a Member State, and installed and maintained
by its technicians with assistance from technicians from other Governments.
Most of the camera systems include real-time transmission from the remote
sites so that the Centre may monitor system performance. It is expected that
all remote cameras will incorporate this feature in the coming months. The
Centre also receives data from associated sensors and from alarm devices that
record interference with the monitoring. The contributing Governments have
established an initial, periodic maintenance schedule, continually to ensure
that the remote site systems are in working order.
E. Personnel of the Centre
12. The establishment of the Centre on 1 August was signified by the arrival
of the first Director. The continuous presence of inspectors from a variety
of disciplines has created new, and in many ways unforeseen, opportunities to
enhance the Commission's capabilities and performance.
13. The Centre provides support for approximately 50 personnel in residence
as well as support for a 31-person detachment of the German Army brigade that
operates the Commission's three CH-53G helicopters. The number of resident
experts will increase with the advent of the export/import mechanism.
Visiting teams will temporarily expand the presence of the Commission and
IAEA.
14. Recruitment of personnel for the Centre takes a variety of forms. Some
Member States have made an ongoing commitment to make available a particular
expertise. Most of the monitoring group inspectors are recruited through the
Permanent Missions in New York. This continuous process of recruitment
commenced formally with a presentation to over 20 Member States in late
May 1994, and has worked well to provide personnel for all required positions
in a timely manner during the reporting period.
F. Future developments
15. The complete establishment of the Centre will be but one factor in the
full implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification. Plans are in
hand to install all the currently envisaged equipment and laboratories
required to support the full operation of the Centre by the end of February
1995. When the staff arrives to operate and maintain the new equipment, the
Centre should be fully staffed and equipped. Adjustments to staffing levels
will be made in line with requirements and in the light of experience gained
in operating the ongoing monitoring and verification regime. The prime
expansion currently envisaged will be the arrival of export/import experts at
the appropriate time, in preparation for the operation of the export/import
mechanism.
Appendix V
Administrative and financial issues
A. Organizational and administrative issues
1. Since the last report, there have been no further changes in the
composition of the Special Commission.
2. The organizational structure remains essentially as reported previously.
Currently there are 41 staff in the office of the Executive Chairman, 23 in
the Bahrain field office, and 69 in the Baghdad field office.
3. Governments have continued to support the operation of the Commission
through the contribution of personnel, services and equipment. These
contributions have been essential to the work of the Commission in every
area.
B. Status, privileges and immunities
4. The status, privileges and immunities of the Commission, IAEA and the
specialized agencies involved in the implementation of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991) continue to be regulated by the relevant agreements and
Council resolutions and decisions.
5. The Commission and IAEA on the one hand and the Government of Bahrain on
the other have extended for a further six months, until 31 March 1995, the
agreement provided for in the earlier exchanges of letters relating to the
facilities, privileges and immunities of the Commission and IAEA in Bahrain.
C. Finance
6. A full account of the financial difficulties which have confronted the
Commission is contained in annex III to the report contained in S/1994/1138
and Corr. 1. The financial situation of the Commission remains an area of
great concern in view of the difficulties in ensuring proper funding for the
operations in a planned manner. At this time, the only commitments received
from Member States for additional contributions have been $2.5 million from
Kuwait and $40,000 from Switzerland. Other Member States in the Gulf region
have expressed their continuing support for the work of the Commission and it
is hoped that cash contributions will follow. It is also expected, as was
the case in the past, that a portion of the matching transfer of frozen Iraqi
assets from the United States of America to the escrow account will be made
available to the Commission to cover some of its 1995 requirements. In the
best possible circumstances, at this point, funds can be identified only for
the first three months of 1995. Beyond that, there are no identified funds
in the escrow account to cover the Commission's operations. Obviously, if
further funds are not identified in the near future, the incremental shut-
down of the Commission's operations, as indicated in the Commission's letter
to the President of the Security Council of 3 November 1994, will ensue.
Appendix VI
INSPECTION SCHEDULE
(In-country dates)
Nuclear
15-21 May 1991 IAEA1/UNSCOM 1
22 June-3 July 1991 IAEA2/UNSCOM 4
7-18 July 1991 IAEA3/UNSCOM 5
27 July-10 August 1991 IAEA4/UNSCOM 6
14-20 September 1991 IAEA5/UNSCOM 14
21-30 September 1991 IAEA6/UNSCOM 16
11-22 October 1991 IAEA7/UNSCOM 19
11-18 November 1991 IAEA8/UNSCOM 22
11-14 January 1992 IAEA9/UNSCOM 25
5-13 February 1992 IAEA10/UNSCOM 27
7-15 April 1992 IAEA11/UNSCOM 33
26 May-4 June 1992 IAEA12/UNSCOM 37
14-21 July 1992 IAEA13/UNSCOM 41
31 August-7 September 1992 IAEA14/UNSCOM 43
8-19 November 1992 IAEA15/UNSCOM 46
6-14 December 1992 IAEA16/UNSCOM 47
22-27 January 1993 IAEA17/UNSCOM 49
3-11 March 1993 IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
30 April-7 May 1993 IAEA19/UNSCOM 56
25-30 June 1993 IAEA20/UNSCOM 58
23-28 July 1993 IAEA21/UNSCOM 61
1-9 November 1993 IAEA22/UNSCOM 64
4-11 February 1994 IAEA23/UNSCOM 68
11-22 April 1994 IAEA24/UNSCOM 73
21 June-1 July 1994 IAEA25/UNSCOM 83
22 August-2 September 1994 IAEA26/UNSCOM 90
7-29 September 1994 NMG 94-01
14-21 October 1994 IAEA27/UNSCOM 93
29 September-21 October 1994 NMG 94-02
21 October-9 November 1994 NMG 94-03
8-29 November 1994 NMG 94-04
29 November-16 December 1994 NMG 94-05
16 December 1994-13 January 1995 NMG 94-06
Chemical
9-15 June 1991 CW1/UNSCOM 2
15-22 August 1991 CW2/UNSCOM 9
31 August-8 September 1991 CW3/UNSCOM 11
31 August-5 September 1991 CW4/UNSCOM 12
6 October-9 November 1991 CW5/UNSCOM 17
22 October-2 November 1991 CW6/UNSCOM 20
18 November-1 December 1991 CBW1/UNSCOM 21
27 January-5 February 1992 CW7/UNSCOM 26
21 February-24 March 1992 CD1/UNSCOM 29
5-13 April 1992 CD2/UNSCOM 32
15-29 April 1992 CW8/UNSCOM 35
18 June 1992-14 June 1994 CDG/UNSCOM 38
26 June-10 July 1992 CBW2/UNSCOM 39
21-29 September 1992 CW9/UNSCOM 44
6-14 December 1992 CBW3/UNSCOM 47
6-18 April 1993 CW10/UNSCOM 55
27-30 June 1993 CW11/UNSCOM 59
19-22 November 1993 CW12/UNSCOM 65
1-14 February 1994 CW13/UNSCOM 67
20-26 March 1994 CW14/UNSCOM 70
18-22 April 1994 CW15/UNSCOM 74
25 May-5 June 1994 CW16/UNSCOM 75
31 May-12 June 1994 CW17/UNSCOM 76
8-14 June 1994 CW18/UNSCOM 77
10-23 August 1994 CW19/UNSCOM 89
13-24 September 1994 CW20/UNSCOM 91
2 October 1994-15 January 1995 CG 1
23-27 October 1994 CW21/UNSCOM 95
Biological
2-8 August 1991 BW1/UNSCOM 7
20 September-3 October 1991 BW2/UNSCOM 15
11-18 March 1993 BW3/UNSCOM 53
8-26 April 1994 BW4/UNSCOM 72
28 May-7 June 1994 BW5/UNSCOM 78
24 June-5 July 1994 BW6/UNSCOM 84
5-8 June 1994 BW7/UNSCOM 86
25 July-7 September 1994 BW8/UNSCOM 87
20-25 August 1994 BW9/UNSCOM 88
29 August-3 September 1994 BW10/UNSCOM 92
29 September-14 October 1994 BW11/UNSCOM 94
23-26 September 1994 BW12/UNSCOM 96
15-22 November 1994 BW15/UNSCOM 104
2-10 December 1994 BW16/UNSCOM 105 (IMT)
2-14 December 1994 BW13/UNSCOM 99 (IMT)
9-19 December 1994 BW17/UNSCOM 106 (IMT)
28 December 1994-31 January 1995 IBG 1
Ballistic missiles
30 June-7 July 1991 BM1/UNSCOM 3
18-20 July 1991 BM2/UNSCOM 10
8-15 August 1991 BM3/UNSCOM 8
6-13 September 1991 BM4/UNSCOM 13
1-9 October 1991 BM5/UNSCOM 18
1-9 December 1991 BM6/UNSCOM 23
9-17 December 1991 BM7/UNSCOM 24
21-29 February 1992 BM8/UNSCOM 28
21-29 March 1992 BM9/UNSCOM 31
13-21 April 1992 BM10/UNSCOM 34
14-22 May 1992 BM11/UNSCOM 36
11-29 July 1992 BM12/UNSCOM 40A+B
7-18 August 1992 BM13/UNSCOM 42
16-30 October 1992 BM14/UNSCOM 45
25 January-23 March 1993 IMT1a/UNSCOM 48
12-21 February 1993 BM15/UNSCOM 50
22-23 February 1993 BM16/UNSCOM 51
27 March-17 May 1993 IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
5-28 June 1993 IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
10-11 July 1993 BM17/UNSCOM 60
24 August-15 September 1993 BM18/UNSCOM 62
28 September-1 November 1993 BM19/UNSCOM 63
21-29 January 1994 BM20/UNSCOM 66
17-25 February 1994 BM21/UNSCOM 69
30 March-20 May 1994 BM22/UNSCOM 71
20 May-8 June 1994 BM23/UNSCOM 79
10-24 June 1994 BM24/UNSCOM 80
14-22 June 1994 BM25/UNSCOM 81
3-28 July 1994 BM26/UNSCOM 82
15-24 July 1994 BM27/UNSCOM 85
17 August-9 October 1994 MG 1
2-6 October 1994 BM28/UNSCOM 98A
23-28 October 1994 BM28/UNSCOM 98B
14 October 1994-2 February 1995 MG 2
19-22 October 1994 MG 2A
2-6 December 1994 MG 2B
1-6 December 1994} BM29/UNSCOM 101
9-14 December 1994}
9-16 December 1994 BM30/UNSCOM 102
Computer search
12 February 1992 UNSCOM 30
Special missions
30 June-3 July 1991
11-14 August 1991
4-6 October 1991
11-15 November 1991
27-30 January 1992
21-24 February 1992
17-19 July 1992
28-29 July 1992
6-12 September 1992
4-9 November 1992
4-8 November 1992
12-18 March 1993
14-20 March 1993
19-24 April 1993
4 June-5 July 1993
15-19 July 1993
25 July-5 August 1993
9-12 August 1993
10-24 September 1993
27 September-1 October 1993
1-8 October 1993
5 October-16 February 1994
2-10 December 1993
2-16 December 1993
21-27 January 1994
2-6 February 1994
10-14 April 1994
24-26 April 1994
28-29 May 1994
4-6 July 1994
8-16 August 1994
15-19 September 1994
21-25 September 1994
23-26 September 1994
3-6 October 1994
4-20 November 1994
7-12 November 1994
14-17 November 1994
4-18 December 1994
14-20 December 1994
-----
.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
