 United |
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/1994/489
22 April 1994
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH |
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE STATUS OF
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN FOR THE ONGOING
MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE
WITH RELEVANT PARTS OF SECTION C OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present report is the fifth submitted pursuant to
paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), adopted on
11 October 1991, which requests the Secretary-General to submit a
report to the Council every six months on the implementation of
the Special Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and
verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of
section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It updates
the information contained in the first four reports (S/23801,
S/24661, S/25620 and S/26684).
2. Further information concerning developments relating to the
implementation of the plan is contained in the reports to the
Security Council of the high-level talks, held in November 1993
and March 1994, between the Special Commission and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the one hand and
Iraq on the other (S/26825 and Corr.1 and S/1994/341). The
attachment to document S/1994/341 contains an outline of the
activities planned by the Special Commission to implement ongoing
monitoring and verification of Iraq's obligation not to reacquire
the weapons banned to it under section C of resolution
687 (1991). Document S/1994/151 contains the text of a joint
statement made by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the
Executive Chairman after the February 1994 round of high-level
talks in Baghdad.
II. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PERIOD
10 OCTOBER 1993-10 APRIL 1994
A. Acknowledgement of resolution 715 (1991)
3. The major development in the period under review was Iraq's
acceptance of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), received in
the form of a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr.
Tariq Aziz, to the President of the Security Council (S/26811,
annex). This came at the end of a round of
94-18971 (E) 250494 /...
high-level talks held in New York between the Special Commission
and IAEA, on the one hand, and Iraq, on the other, reported in
documents S/26825 and Corr.1.
B. Provision of information
4. At that time, Iraq declared that its previous declarations
concerning its current dual-purpose capabilities should be
"considered to have been made and submitted in conformity with
the provisions of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and the
plans approved thereunder". The Commission responded to Iraq
that those previous declarations were deficient in many regards
and could not be considered as initial declarations under the
plans, nor did they constitute a sufficient basis for the proper
planning and implementation of ongoing monitoring and
verification.
5. To assist Iraq in the preparation of adequate declarations,
the Commission prepared formats in which such declarations should
be made. The first of these, covering ballistic missiles and
chemical weapons, were provided to Iraq in late December 1993.
The Commission received in Baghdad Iraq's first declarations on
16 January 1994. While these new declarations were a
considerable improvement on Iraq's earlier reporting, they still
were incomplete, particularly those relating to chemical
facilities. In some instances, Iraq not only failed to answer
some of the questions contained in the formats, but unilaterally
rewrote the formats to delete those questions.
6. In parallel with its efforts to elicit full information on
current dual-purpose capabilities, the Commission continued its
efforts to obtain a complete account of Iraq's programmes banned
under the terms of section C of resolution 687 (1991). Only with
full information about these programmes and complete information
on current dual-purpose capabilities would the Commission be in a
position to plan and implement an effective ongoing monitoring
and verification system.
7. Efforts here concentrated on information relating to the
supply of precursor chemicals, chemical agent production capacity
and its utilization, expenditure of SCUD-derivative missiles and
suppliers of components for missile production. Discussions on
chemical issues took place in the framework of the high-level
talks held in Baghdad in February 1994 and in New York in
November 1993 and March 1994. Ballistic missile issues were also
addressed in the New York meetings. The outcome of these
discussions was reported in documents S/26825 and Corr.1 and in
the enclosure to document S/1994/341. In the absence of
documentation that would assist in the verification of the latest
data provided on chemical programmes, the Commission intends to
send a team of experts to Iraq in May 1994 in order to interview
former senior personnel associated with the programmes.
C. Operations
8. The concept of how the Commission intends to conduct ongoing
monitoring and verification is contained in the plan approved by
Security Council resolution 715 (1991) (S/22871/Rev.1). It was
summarized in the attachment to document S/1994/341.
9. In parallel with the above efforts to elicit further
information, the Commission has continued its assessment of
Iraq's capabilities, in terms of sites, activities, equipment and
materials, which will need to be monitored under the plan for
ongoing monitoring and verification. Planning and identification
of means for such monitoring is well advanced. These efforts
have drawn upon international expertise through the holding of
topic-specific seminars in the Commission's headquarters in New
York. Trials have been conducted on certain of the tagging and
sensor techniques to be deployed for ongoing monitoring and
verification purposes. Several inspections focused primarily on
ongoing monitoring and verification have already been launched or
completed. Details of activities undertaken are contained in
annex I to the present report.
10. Plans for further ongoing monitoring and verification
activities remain as detailed in the attachment to document
S/1994/341 with the following updates:
(a) The ballistic-missile protocol-building team planned to
start its tasks on 30 March 1994, is now in Iraq and working
smoothly, with good Iraqi cooperation;
(b) The chemical sensors referred to in paragraph 8 of the
attachment have now, with the assistance of Iraq, been installed
and their performance is being assessed;
(c) The biological protocol-building team started its
mission in Baghdad on 8 April 1994;
(d) A team to assess plans for establishing a monitoring
centre in Baghdad arrived there on 10 April 1994.
D. Export/import monitoring mechanism
11. Paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) requires the
Commission, in cooperation with the Committee established under
resolution 661 (1990) and the Director General of IAEA, "to
develop a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies
by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the
implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other
relevant resolutions, including the plans approved hereunder".
The Commission and IAEA have prepared a concept paper outlining a
mechanism which, in their view, would fulfil the requirements of
resolution 715 (1991). It is the intention of the Commission and
IAEA to present the paper formally to the Committee established
under resolution 661 (1990) before the end of April 1994.
Thereafter, the three bodies will need to submit their joint
recommendations to the Security Council for its consideration.
Prospects for the future
12. As indicated in the attachment to document S/1994/341, the
Special Commission is mobilizing its resources and those of
supporting Governments to ensure that an effective ongoing
monitoring and verification system will be implemented as soon as
feasible. However, in reaching that stage, the Commission is, in
large part, dependent on the actions of others, foremost among
which is Iraq itself. Without the cooperation of the Iraqi
authorities, both in the provision of relevant information and in
undertaking the many actions required of them to establish the
system, effective implementation of the plan cannot be assured.
13. Iraq has, on several occasions and most notably in the joint
statement (S/1994/151) issued at the end of the high-level talks
held in Baghdad in February 1994, stated its intention to so
cooperate in order to expedite the establishment of ongoing
monitoring and verification, thereby enabling the Commission and
IAEA to report Iraq's fulfilment of the terms of paragraph 22 of
resolution 687 (1991). The Commission hopes and expects this to
be the case. However, during the latest round of high-level
talks between the Commission and Iraq held in New York in March
1994 and reported in document S/1994/341, Iraq expressed a lack
of confidence in the impartiality of the Commission and implied
that, unless the Commission reported immediately under paragraph
22 of resolution 687 (1991), cooperation might be withdrawn.
14. It was in the light of these statements that the Commission
viewed with great concern an incident involving one of its
helicopters, in which a crowd threw stones at the helicopter as
it was taking on board two injured soldiers from the United
Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq for medical evacuation. A full
account is contained in annex II to the present report.
15. This incident placed the aircraft and those on board in
severe danger. Iraq is required, under its obligations in
respect of United Nations operations in Iraq and, in particular,
under the status arrangements through which the Special
Commission operates in Iraq, resolution 707 (1991) and the plans
for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by resolution
715 (1991), to ensure the safety and security of Special
Commission personnel and property. Iraq's failure in this
instance to provide adequate security was strongly protested by
the Commission to Iraqi authorities in both Baghdad and New York.
16. In response, the Iraqi Government has firmly denied any
involvement in the attack, blaming the Commission for the alleged
last minute change in landing site. However, the Commission has
noted Iraq's assurances that this incident should not be seen as
being in any way politically motivated and its undertaking to
ensure that similar incidents do not recur.
Annex I
Ongoing monitoring and verification activities
I. BALLISTIC MISSILES
1. Iraq's acceptance of its obligations under Security Council
resolution 715 (1991) led to intensive work to establish a
monitoring mechanism of missile-related activities and dual
purpose capabilities in Iraq pursuant to the plan for ongoing
monitoring and verification in the non-nuclear area
(S/22871/Rev.1). These efforts included a number of inspections,
assessment of Iraq's declarations submitted under the plan,
identification of focal points for monitoring and appropriate
monitoring techniques including their field trials, preparation
of draft ongoing monitoring and verification protocols, and
in-depth discussions with the Iraqi side of monitoring issues,
including during the rounds of high-level talks both in New York
and in Baghdad. In parallel, the Special Commission continued
its investigation into the past prohibited missile programmes of
Iraq and of Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991).
A. UNSCOM 66
2. UNSCOM 66 carried out an inspection in Iraq over the period
from 21 to 29 January 1994. In view of Iraq's acceptance of
resolution 715 (1991), UNSCOM 66 was tasked to accomplish the
following missions:
(a) To update data collected by previous inspection teams on
Iraq's missile research and development (R&D) programme;
(b) To examine issues related to Iraq's reporting on
facilities to be monitored under the ongoing monitoring and
verification plan in the missile area as approved by resolution
715 (1991);
(c) To conduct a preliminary survey for possible application
of appropriate monitoring sensors and technologies.
3. UNSCOM 66 visited a number of R&D and industrial facilities
to be monitored under the ongoing monitoring and verification
plan. Iraq provided the team with a detailed update of its
current missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface
missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres.
4. UNSCOM 66 carried out extensive work related to Iraq's
reporting obligations under the ongoing monitoring and
verification plan. This included discussions of Iraq's reporting
on facilities to be monitored, examination of declarations
submitted by Iraq in January 1994 pursuant to the ongoing
monitoring and verification plan and practical on-site
investigation of relevant issues. This work resulted in a draft
format for Iraq's reporting on those missile R&D and production
facilities that would be under the most intensive monitoring
regime. During inspection and soon after it, Iraq submitted to
the Special Commission reports under this format for all relevant
facilities. As a result of UNSCOM 66, Iraq also provided
corrections to its January declarations under the ongoing
monitoring and verification plan in the missile area.
5. UNSCOM 66 started a survey of sites where installation of
sensors and use of other technologies might be appropriate for
monitoring purposes. This survey addressed issues of inventory
control of dual-purpose equipment, non-removal of equipment from
declared facilities and monitoring of activities at facilities.
Use of a variety of sensors and recording devices could be an
important part of monitoring procedures under the ongoing
monitoring and verification plan.
B. UNSCOM 69
6. UNSCOM 69 was in Iraq from 17 to 25 February to accomplish
the following missions:
(a) To assess Iraq's dual-purpose missile industrial
capabilities that might be used in support of missile production;
(b) To continue compiling the database on Iraq's machine
tools and equipment usable for missile production;
(c) To carry out an assessment of possibilities to install
sensors and use other technologies to monitor missile-related
activities.
7. UNSCOM 69 visited 15 facilities in Iraq, identified a number
of focal points for monitoring activities at those sites and
carried out a survey for the use of sensors. The machine tool
database built by the previous inspection team (UNSCOM 57) was
updated, new machines were recorded and some items were tagged.
8. The results of UNSCOM 69 provided the Commission with the
necessary background data to refine a scope of facilities for
ongoing monitoring and verification under the ongoing monitoring
and verification plan.
C. UNSCOM 71
9. Based on the results of UNSCOM 66 and 69, UNSCOM 71 was
organized to prepare draft ongoing monitoring and verification
protocols for facilities identified so far by the Commission as
needing to be subject to ongoing monitoring and verification. A
monitoring and verification protocol would incorporate detailed
procedures for monitoring activities utilizing a variety of
different means at sites in Iraq covered by the ongoing
monitoring and verification plan. It would also contain
systematized collection of information known about a specific
site essential for effective monitoring and verification. Once
created, the protocol for a given site would be updated as a
result of monitoring and verification activities at that site.
10. UNSCOM 71 started its activities in Iraq on 30 March. The
team will continue its work through a succession of rounds of
visits to Iraq until the accomplishment of all its tasks. It is
anticipated that this will take at least two months.
11. At the time of writing, UNSCOM 71 has completed its first
round of activities in Iraq. During this round, the team visited
nine facilities to be placed, depending on the nature of their
activities, under different regimes of monitoring. UNSCOM 71
also verified on-site Iraq's declarations and reports for
monitoring and verification protocols on facilities visited by
the team. The team is currently working on the draft protocols
for those facilities. UNSCOM 71 will return to Iraq on 18 April
to start the second round of its inspection activities. In
total, it will visit more than 30 sites.
D. Other activities
12. In support of its efforts to establish a mechanism for
ongoing monitoring and verification, the Commission held a number
of meetings with international experts. During these meetings,
issues were discussed related to the assessment of Iraq's
declarations, identification of focal points for monitoring
missile-related activities and appropriate monitoring techniques,
including sensors, to ensure effective monitoring. Lists of
dual-purpose equipment, technologies and other items that could
be used for the development, production, modification or
acquisition of ballistic missiles with a range greater than
150 kilometres were also discussed.
E. Past prohibited activities
13. The Commission continued its investigation of the
outstanding issues related to the past missile programme
proscribed under resolution 687 (1991). This work is essential
to establish a solid and verified baseline for ongoing monitoring
in accordance with resolution 715 (1991). In particular, this
will allow the Commission to have a full and comprehensive
picture of the knowledge and know-how Iraq obtained in the
missile area through its past activities.
14. Issues related to programmes proscribed under section C of
resolution 687 (1991) were discussed with Iraq on a continuous
basis, especially during the rounds of the high-level talks in
November 1993 and March 1994 in New York. Iraq has furnished
additional details on foreign acquisition of critical ballistic
missile items as well as its expenditure of ballistic missiles
with a range greater than 150 kilometres.
15. The Commission continued to reiterate its request that Iraq
provide original documentation that would substantiate the
declarations made by Iraq concerning its past prohibited missile
programmes. During the February visit of the Executive Chairman
of the Special Commission to Baghdad, Iraq finally agreed to hand
over to the Commission documentation on the expenditure of
prohibited missiles. This documentation covers the period from
1977 to December 1990 and accounts for nearly three quarters of
the missiles covered by resolution 687 (1991) and declared by
Iraq. Currently, the Commission is conducting an in-depth
investigation of these documents and information contained
therein. The results of this investigation will be critical for
the Commission's reporting to the Security Council under
paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).
II. CHEMICAL
A. Data collection
16. In parallel with the various rounds of high-level political
talks, UNSCOM experts have held three technical meetings with
Iraq on chemical weapons issues.
1. Past programmes
17. In the course of the meeting held in New York in November
1993, Iraq stressed that it had tried to meet all the
requirements put forward by the Commission on the provision of
information. However, Iraq agreed to endeavour to address any
questions that might arise during the Commission's verification
activities. The Commission, for its part, informed Iraq that it
had assessed as credible the information provided in the talks
held in Baghdad in October 1993 regarding Iraq's past chemical
weapons programme. However, in the absence of documentation,
independent verification of the data remained problematic. The
Commission suggested that Iraq, in order to address that problem
in part, hold seminars of the officials involved in the chemical
weapons programme aimed at stimulating their collective memory to
remember details that might facilitate independent verification.
The issue of equipment and chemicals left at the Muthanna State
Establishment was also discussed. It was agreed that the
Commission should send a mission to Baghdad in January 1994 to
mark equipment in order to prepare an inventory as to the release
or disposal of this equipment. Further discussion was reserved
on the release or disposal of chemicals remaining at the site.
18. During the meeting held in Baghdad in February 1994, Iraq
informed the Commission of the results of its seminar with senior
Iraqi personnel formerly involved in the chemical weapons
programme. Additional data on outstanding issues, e.g. the
research and development programme and imports of precursor
chemicals, were provided.
19. During the meeting held in New York in March 1994, the
Commission asked Iraq for additional details to fill in gaps in
previously provided information. In response, Iraq presented the
results of another seminar it had convened, this time involving
retired former officials. These included a breakdown of the
quantities of imported precursor chemicals by year and contract.
In addition, Iraq was able to present a correlation, on an
annual basis, between produced quantities of agents, available
precursor chemicals, stored and consumed agents, and available
chemical production capacity. A complete overview of its
chemical weapons research and development programme, including
time-frames, was also provided.
20. The additional information obtained during the course of
these meetings was essential to the Commission's efforts to
obtain as full a picture of Iraq's chemical weapons programme as
possible. For example, in October 1993 Iraq declared 13,221 tons
of traceable imported precursor chemicals; in February 1994,
15,037 tons; and in March 1994, 17,657 tons. The declared
quantities of produced agents, however, remained unchanged at
4,340.5 tons.
21. The picture created by this additional information is more
internally consistent than previous accounts given by Iraq. The
order of magnitude of the declared figures appears credible.
However, in the absence of supporting documentary evidence, the
issue of independent verification remains. In this context, the
Commission plans, in April 1994, to interview the personnel
involved in Iraq's data recollection seminars.
2. Declarations of dual-purpose facilities
22. In December 1993, the Commission provided Iraq with model
formats for the latter's initial declarations, required under the
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, of dual-purpose
chemical facilities. On 16 January 1994, Iraq delivered to the
Commission's field office in Baghdad partially completed formats.
At subsequent meetings of the two sides, Iraq was informed by
the Commission of the inadequacies of these returns and of what
was required to bring them into conformity with the Commission's
requirements. Iraq was told that full initial declarations were
one of the main prerequisites for the protocol-building procedure
and hence for the initiation of ongoing monitoring and
verification.
B. Inspections
23. In the period from 1 to 11 February 1994, UNSCOM 67/CW 13
inventoried and tagged approximately 240 pieces of dual-use
chemical production equipment. This equipment had been procured
under the auspices of Iraq's chemical warfare programme. On 14
March 1994 Iraq was informed that 44 pieces that had been used
for the production of agents and precursor chemicals would have
to be destroyed. Iraq was provided with precise descriptions of
those items. In addition, Iraq was asked to provide, by 30 April
1994, a detailed description of the intended permitted future use
of the remaining tagged equipment for a final decision on their
disposal. Those items not destroyed would then be subjected to
ongoing monitoring and verification.
24. In the course of UNSCOM 67/CW 13, the team also visited the
Ibn al Baytar facility in order to create a monitoring and
verification protocol for that site. The purpose of this was to
assess whether the general model for monitoring and verification
protocols developed in the Commission's headquarters in New York
was indeed applicable in practice to dual-purpose chemical
facilities.
25. During the period from 20 to 26 March 1994, UNSCOM 70/CW 14
installed four air samplers at the Muthanna site. These samplers
are designed to determine the types and levels of chemicals in
the air at that site. The team also employed portable samplers
that took additional samples for gaining an even more
comprehensive survey of the air at Muthanna. The samplers were
installed in a pattern that would cover air quality on the site
from all wind directions. An Iraqi maintenance and construction
crew prepared the mounting poles for the samplers. The samplers
were programmed to sample the air around the clock in a
discontinuous mode for a 30-day period. The sample tubes are to
be removed, replaced with fresh tubes every 30 days and sent to
laboratories for analysis. The sampler mechanism is
microprocessor-controlled and is powered by a storage battery
charged by a solar panel. A microprocessor-driven meteorological
station is mounted on one of the samplers to record hourly wind
speed, wind direction, temperature and humidity. The
meteorological data are to be down-loaded each time the sampler
tubes are changed and will become a part of the permanent record
of the sample set.
III. BIOLOGICAL
26. The first biological inspections in the baseline process
started with the arrival in Iraq of the fourth biological
inspection team on 8 April 1994. The team is scheduled to
conduct its activities over a three-week period. The main
purpose of this inspection is to verify the declarations
submitted by Iraq in January 1994, pursuant to the plan, approved
by Security Council resolution 715 (1991), for the ongoing
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance not to reacquire
items prohibited under resolution 687 (1991). Other objectives
of this inspection are to provide an assessment of the work being
undertaken and of the equipment present at those biological
facilities declared by Iraq, many of which have never been
visited by the Special Commission; to establish an inventory of
said equipment for future tagging; and to draft a format for
Iraq's regular reports under the monitoring and verification
plan.
A. Talks with Iraq to fill in data gaps
27. In November 1993, discussions that had started in October
1993 regarding formats for reporting under the plan continued.
The purpose of these discussions was to provide the Government of
Iraq with a frame that would facilitate reporting under the plan
by the drafting of limited-text answers, yes/no answers or
multiple-choice answers.
28. Following the presentation of Iraqi declarations in January
1994, high-level talks were conducted with Iraqi officials in
February and March 1994. These discussions focused upon the
information to be provided by Iraq for an efficient and effective
monitoring of the biological area. The outcome of these
discussions was the provision by Iraq of a new version of the
declarations required under the plan in a form that would allow
completeness and clarity of the information to be analysed.
B. Seminars of experts in New York
29. In March 1994, a seminar of international experts was held
in New York to prepare for inspections connected with
establishing the biological baseline. Further seminars to
discuss past programmes, Iraq's declarations under the biological
provisions of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification,
sensors and other monitoring technologies, monitoring modalities
and requirements for training of monitoring inspectors are
planned.
C. Protocol-building efforts
30. Efforts to build the protocols for each biological site are
under way. The information relating to geographic location has
been compiled or will be gathered during the first visit
inspection to take place in April 1994. The remaining
information will be assembled throughout the baseline process. A
draft of the format for information to be provided by Iraq under
the protocol will be developed during the inspection in April
1994.
D. Sensor/tagging trials
31. A feasibility study of monitoring by cameras will be
conducted during the April inspection. Further efforts in this
field will be effected by way of seminars in the coming month.
Tagging technologies have already been identified and deemed
appropriate with respect to biotechnological equipment.
IV. NUCLEAR
32. Activities in the nuclear area since 10 October 1993 are
reported in the IAEA report (S/1994/490, appendix). In support
of its obligation to designate sites, including in the nuclear
area, the Special Commission conducted one gamma survey in the
period under review.
33. The second gamma aerial survey mission performed its mission
from 2 to 15 December 1993. During this mission, the team
surveyed six sites. It obtained detailed gamma spectra at
radioactive disposal areas at Tuwaitha as well as two areas at Al
Atheer. In addition, gamma surveys were conducted at Rashdiya,
Al Hadre, a site near Tikrit and Salah al-Din State Establishment
(SAAD-13). While the data are still being analysed, early
indications show the power of this capability to survey a
relatively large area rapidly and to pinpoint particular sites
for more detailed investigation. This system is still being
developed, and evident improvements are under way.
V. AERIAL INSPECTIONS
34. The Commission's aerial inspections, using both helicopters
and high-altitude surveillance aircraft, continued over the
period under review. The Commission's high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft (U-2) now flies once or twice a week,
having flown a total of 201 missions since the inception of its
use in support of the Commission's operations. The Commission's
helicopters have now flown 273 missions, covering some 395 sites.
The aerial inspection team currently conducts three to four
flights a week.
Annex II
Helicopter-stoning incident
1. While it was undertaking a humanitarian mission to evacuate,
at the request of the United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq,
two United Nations soldiers shot in the north of Iraq during an
ambush, a Special Commission helicopter was stoned by a crowd
that had gathered at the landing site used to take on board the
injured.
2. For this operation, the Commission had followed normal
procedures, informing the Iraqi authorities first orally and, at
1100 hours on the morning of the mission, in writing of the
flight plan and landing site to be used (a playing field adjacent
to the Mosul Saddam Hospital). Iraq had officially expressed
agreement to these plans. 1/
3. Upon landing at the hospital at 1600 hours, the helicopter
was surrounded by a crowd. When the ambulance arrived with the
two guards, the crowd sought to hinder its passage to the
aircraft and started to throw stones. Only a few of the Iraqi
military personnel on hand sought to intervene, ineffectively.
4. Once the injured had been loaded onto the helicopter, the
Iraqi soldiers gave up their efforts to control the crowd, who
pelted the helicopter with stones. Damage was sustained to all
six rotor blades and stones that went into the air intakes
damaged the motor bearings and turbine. Further damage was
sustained to windows and the fuselage. This damage grounded the
aircraft for a period of three weeks while repairs, costing
around $1.5 million, were undertaken.
5. The pilot of the helicopter decided that, regardless of the
damage sustained by the helicopter, immediate departure was the
surest way to safeguard the lives of the crew and passengers and
to escape a dangerous situation.
Notes
1/ Contrary to an Iraqi press release dated 29 March 1994, there was no
last minute change of flight plan or landing site. Indeed, Iraqi personnel in
Mosul had assisted in the preparation of the landing site at 1130 hours and in
Baghdad had received a written flight plan containing flight path and landing
site details.
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