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International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference (Unofficial electronic version)	GC(41)/20 9 September 1997 GENERAL Distr. Original: ENGLISH
Forty-first regular session Item 23 of the provisional agenda (GC(41)/1)

1. On 20 September 1996, the General Conference adopted a resolution in operative paragraph 8 of which it requested the Director General to report to the Board of Governors and the forty-first regular session of the General Conference on his efforts to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) relating to Iraq (GC(40)/RES/21).

2. Since the adoption of the resolution by the General Conference, the Director General has kept Member States of the Agency informed on the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions by means of the semi-annual reports addressed by him on the subject to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for submission to the Security Council.^1/

3. The report in the attachment provides information on the Agency's inspection activities in Iraq covering the period 1 September 1996 - 31 August 1997 and includes as an Annex the chronology of the major events that occurred during this period.

I. Introduction
1. Documents GOV/INF/801, dated 31 October 1996, and GOV/INF/810, dated 22 April 1997, contained, respectively, the texts of the second and third consolidated six-monthly reports submitted by the Director General to the United Nations Security Council in accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996). These documents reported on the Agency's activities, related to Iraq, during the period April 1996 through April 1997 and covered such topics as the review of Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete Declaration", the IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) activities, Iraq's six-monthly declarations under the OMV Plan, analysis of Iraqi documentation, processing of Iraq's requests for the release or change of use of materials, equipment and facilities and the matters addressed in high level talks with the Iraqi counterpart.

2. Document GOV/2931 of 5 June 1997 contains summary information on the above topics which is updated in this report.

   II. Discussions with the Iraqi Counterpart

   A. Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete Declaration"

3. On 7 September 1996, Iraq submitted what it considered to be the definitive version of the "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD-F) of its clandestine nuclear programme, as required by paragraph 3 (i) of UN Security Council resolution 707 (1991). This version was produced following discussions between the IAEA and the Iraqi counterpart in May and June/July 1996 and included annexes detailing equipment and procurement-related matters. FFCD-F was reviewed by the IAEA, in consultation with Member State experts, and by letter of 13 January 1997, the Iraqi counterpart was notified of the need for a number of additions and revisions to the declaration.

4. The Iraqi counterpart's response, by letter of 27 January 1997, was discussed in a series of meetings held in Iraq in February 1997. In these meetings it was agreed that the Iraqi counterpart would provide a consolidated list of additions and revisions which, after review by the IAEA, would be incorporated into the text of FFCD-F. By letter of 26 February 1997 Iraq provided such a "consolidated list" which was reviewed, again in consultation with Member State experts, and was discussed with the Iraqi counterpart during an IAEA technical team visit to Iraq from 16 - 22 May 1997. In addition to the discussion of specific technical matters, the Iraqi counterpart was advised that, while FFCD-F set out to describe in detail what had been constructed, procured and operated within Iraq's nuclear programme, the document would benefit greatly from the inclusion of a section summarising actual achievements and hence, a description of Iraq's capabilities.

5. As a result of these discussions, the Iraqi counterpart provided, on 9 July 1997, a number of revisions and additions which were further discussed during an IAEA technical team visit to Iraq from 19 - 24 July 1997. The revisions and additions resulting from the July discussions were received by the IAEA during the period 3 through 14 August 1997 and are currently being reviewed with the assistance of Member State experts. They do not include the summary of achievements referred to above.

6. The Iraqi counterpart has been courteous and professional during the conduct of the discussions. The counterpart has provided answers to Action Team questions. However, from the IAEA perspective, the answers are often construed as narrowly as possible and respond only to inaccuracies or omissions that the IAEA has specifically identified in the text. This minimalistic approach has resulted in the expenditure of considerable additional time and effort to produce the necessary improvements to FFCD-F.

   B. Technical Team Visit 16 - 22 May

7. As reported above, a technical team of IAEA personnel and Member State experts visited Iraq from 16 - 22 May 1997 to review Iraq's additions and revisions to FFCD-F. The discussions with the Iraqi counterpart addressed a number of technical questions and the role of the General Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat) in clandestine procurement. However, it focused primarily on presentations which the Iraqi counterpart had been asked to make on three subjects which continued to be of concern to the IAEA, namely:

   a. the evolution of Iraq's strategy for the protection, concealment, salvaging and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment, documents and buildings related to its clandestine nuclear programme.

   The counterpart was asked to cover the details of the actual removal, transfer, concealment, destruction and redistribution of materials and equipment as outlined in their annex to FFCD-F.

   b. the progress in the design and development of the Iraqi nuclear weapon after the version reported in Petrochemical Project 3 (PC-3) Report 821, Revision 5, dated 14 July 1990 and the post-war plan to misrepresent the mission of the Al Atheer nuclear weapons development and production facility.

   c. the evolution of the abandonment of the former nuclear weapons programme.

   The IAEA had previously asserted that official documentation must exist recording the dissolution and reassignment of the facilities and resources of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. In response, the Iraqi counterpart had provided a number of documents to this effect and were asked, through this presentation, to provide fuller explanation and additional documentation to support its declared abandonment of the programme.

   In this latter regard it had also been expected to obtain an understanding of the objectives, scope and duration of the assumed attempts by the late Lt. General "Hussein Kamel and his group" to sustain the nuclear programme. However, the Iraqi counterpart claimed to be unable to provide additional information in this regard.

8. In discussions on clandestine procurement, the Iraqi counterpart initially stated that Mukhabarat had played no role in these activities. However, when presented with documented examples of the Mukhabarat's involvement, the Iraqi counterpart agreed to investigate the matter and provide a further response. In returning to the subject in later discussion, the counterpart explained that the Mukhabarat had been involved in clandestine procurement activities but that their role had been so minor that it had been forgotten. The counterpart further explained that out of a total of some thirty procurement contracts routed through the Mukhabarat's front company "Technical Consultations Company" only seven had been fulfilled. Summary information on these consignments was provided to the IAEA.

9. In associated discussions about the handling of solicited and unsolicited offers of foreign assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, including the role played by the Mukhabarat, the Iraqi counterpart stated that PC-3 had adopted a policy of avoiding foreign assistance, believing that the risk of exposure (e.g., through "sting" operations) far outweighed the likely technical benefits. The counterpart stated that it was unable to recall any offers of significant assistance and was told that this matter would be raised again in the future.

10. The presentations resulted in considerable discussion although little new information was forthcoming. Nonetheless, the Iraqi counterpart undertook to use the input from the discussions to expand and correct the addenda to FFDC-F describing the movement, concealment and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment, buildings and documentation. In addition, the IAEA was provided with copies of additional orders and decrees establishing and defining the mission of the facilities which resulted from the dissolution of PC-3.

11. Following from the discussions on the presentations and other technical matters, the Iraqi counterpart agreed to provide further modifications to the text of FFCD-F and also undertook to make a serious attempt to locate and make available: the equipment formerly assigned to departments 40B and 40G of Group 4 (weaponisation); PC-3 reports relating to indigenously produced uranium melting furnaces and the study on the feasibility of falsely representing the Al Atheer weapons plant as a materials characterisation centre; facility-specific inventories of materials and equipment handed over to and recovered from military authorities in connection with concealment and unilateral destruction activities; and data indicating the stage of development of weapons components at the time the programme was abandoned.

12. Additionally, the counterpart was asked to provide information regarding the inauguration, mandate, membership, authority and duration of operation of the Governmental Committee that had been referred to, during the first presentation, as having been established, inter alia, "to reduce the effect of NPT violation to the minimum".

    C. Technical Team Visit 19 - 24 July

13. In its communication of 9 July the Iraqi counterpart provided written responses in partial fulfilment of the aforementioned agreed actions, and indicated its readiness to discuss the remaining items. Consequently, a technical team of IAEA personnel and Member State experts visited Iraq from 19-24 July. The technical team had two objectives. The first was to seek clarification of the additions and revisions to the FFCD-F that had been provided by the counterpart. The second was to seek to ascertain:

    (a) that Iraq had abandoned, rather than merely interrupted, its clandestine nuclear programme;

    (b) that Iraq had provided comprehensive information with respect to its gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programme, its nuclear weapon design and its achievements in associated technologies;

    (c) that Iraq had explained the extent of foreign assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme, including the role of intelligence services in procuring assistance, information, materials, and equipment;

    (d) that Iraq had provided a comprehensive explanation of the extent and objectives of its concealment practices; and

    (e) that Iraq is no longer concealing equipment, materials and documentation from the IAEA.

14. The Iraqi counterpart had achieved a significant measure of success in completing its undertaking, made in May, to locate the equipment formerly assigned to Departments 40B and 40G of PC-3 Group 4 (weaponisation). The equipment located was made available for IAEA inspection at the Al Shakili store, where it had been accumulated having been retrieved as a result of an extensive search at many facilities. The IAEA agreed to give priority to its assessment of the equipment recovered and to indicate remaining items which need to be found.

15. On the other hand, the Iraqi counterpart reported lack of success in locating the requested PC-3 reports. However, the counterpart provided a verbal explanation of the report relating to the planned indigenous production of a uranium melting furnace based on electron-beam technology. The counterpart expanded upon its earlier explanation of the pamphlet that had been produced to support the misrepresentation of the Al Atheer facility which had resulted from the feasibility study recorded in the missing PC-3 report. The Iraqi counterpart stated that the pamphlet provided an accurate summary of the missing report "Feasibility of the Material Centre".

16. The Iraqi counterpart was able to produce a 62 page computer print-out detailing the items of material and equipment, essentially from PC-3 Group 2 and Group 3, that had been handed over to the Special Guard in early 1991 and those items (approximately 70% of the total) which had been subsequently recovered from the destruction, evacuation and storage sites and made available for inspection by IAEA teams following the visit of the high-level mission in June 1991. These data substantiate the summary information contained in a letter dated 1991-09-13 from Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar, in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Industry and Military Industrialisation, to his supervising Minister Lt. General Hussein Kamel, a copy of which was provided to the IAEA by the Iraqi counterpart in November 1995. These data do not however cover the fate of materials and equipment formerly belonging to PC-3 Group 4 located in Al Atheer and that of the uranium centrifuge enrichment group (EDC).

17. With respect to the achievements of the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programme, the Iraqi counterpart maintained that its primary objective had been to exploit the tested, prototype single cylinder model, and that all resources had been directed toward this objective. The counterpart reiterated that the small amount of work that had been done with a view to exploiting the design drawings of super-critical two-cylinder and multi-cylinder centrifuge designs had been a "spare time" study, which had achieved little of consequence. It was explained that this study had been biased towards the more complex, multi-cylinder, design simply because there were more design details available for that machine. The Iraqi counterpart reaffirmed that, although it would have eventually sought to exploit higher efficiency centrifuge designs, the primary goal had been the large-scale exploitation of the single cylinder machine, which it considered to be a proven design. The counterpart further stated that the modifications which had been made to buildings at Al Furat and EDC Rashdiya were very much forward-looking and should not be taken to imply that hopes of early exploitation of multi-cylinder centrifuge designs had been seriously entertained.

18. The Iraqi counterpart stated that it had been unable to locate any additional documentation that might have indicated the extent of development of the nuclear weapon and associated technologies at the time of programme abandonment. The counterpart volunteered an explanation of the sequence of drawings of moulds for the casting of explosive lens components, but was unable to provide a verifiable explanation of the missing drawings. Attempts made by the counterpart, during the visit of the technical team, to locate the drawing register, which should have recorded the title of each drawing, were also declared to be unsuccessful.

19. A summary, prepared by the IAEA, of information previously provided by the Iraqi counterpart relating to the re-assignment of facilities formerly belonging to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme was discussed and the counterpart undertook to provide copies of further orders and decrees that were necessary to substantiate the stated re-assignments.

20. A revised chronology prepared by the Iraqi counterpart of the actions taken by Iraq in connection with the collection, concealment, unilateral destruction and eventual relocation of material and equipment was discussed in detail and the Iraqi counterpart undertook to further clarify the information. The draft of a similar chronology regarding documentation was also tabled. It was agreed that this document would be further reviewed by the counterpart before it was provided to the IAEA.

21. During the meeting concluding the technical talks in July the IAEA identified some 15 technical matters, of varying significance, requiring action by the Iraqi counterpart. Responses have already been received to most of these matters and are currently under review. One such matter concerned certain materials and equipment which had been procured in 1990 for the centrifuge enrichment programme. The Iraqi counterpart has now provided to the IAEA the authority for disposal of these materials and equipment, which are currently located in Amman, Jordan.

22. On 1 August 1997 a letter was sent to the Iraqi counterpart listing five areas of concern with respect to which further information should be made available, namely: the development, over time, of Iraq's strategy for concealment and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment and documentation, including the role of the Governmental Committee; the extent of external (foreign) assistance to the clandestine nuclear programme; the final achievements in the design of the nuclear weapon and associated technologies; the chronology of the abandonment of the clandestine nuclear programme; and post cease-fire covert procurement activities. Iraq has provided a written response to some of these areas of concern and an evaluation of the responses will be included in the Agency's October report to the Security Council.

23. In parallel with the activities described above, the IAEA is undertaking a detailed review of the information provided by Iraq on its clandestine nuclear programme in order to examine its consistency with the coherent picture of that programme that has been developed through IAEA inspections and investigations.

    III. Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Activities

    A. Operations

24. In the period under review (1 September 1996 - 31 August 1997), the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) carried out 400 monitoring inspections at some 130 locations, of which 43 inspections were carried out at locations not previously inspected. The total number of OMV inspections carried out to date now exceeds 1,000. The majority were carried out with no prior announcement and a number of them were conducted in co-operation with UNSCOM monitoring groups. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities was detected during these inspections.

25. NMG activities also involved the completion of the eighth and ninth radiometric surveys of Iraq's main water bodies, which were carried out in October 1996 and April 1997, respectively. The results of the April survey are still being evaluated but results from previous surveys show no indication of Iraq having carried out any proscribed nuclear activities and confirm the sensitivity of the technology through detection of Iraq's legitimate use of radioisotopes in medical applications.

26. Other NMG activities included interviews of key personnel formerly employed in Iraqi clandestine nuclear programme, the equipping of the NMG environmental sample screening laboratory, located in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and, with the support of the Governments of France, Chile and Germany, the reintroduction of aerial radiometric surveys. The aerial radiometric survey was carried out in May over a period of 17 days and included more than 20 locations covering an area of more than 140 square kilometres. With the assistance of Member States the IAEA continues to improve the capabilities of its OMV activities by the introduction of improved technology with particular regard to improved equipment for aerosol sampling and fixed-point and land-vehicle-based radiometric surveys.

27. The IAEA and UNSCOM have continued their implementation of a joint programme of inspection of Iraqi sites which, in the judgement of IAEA/UNSCOM, are deemed to have capabilities suitable for conducting work on some aspect of weapons of mass destruction, notwithstanding the lack of evidence or indication of such work. The carrying out of joint IAEA/UNSCOM multi-disciplinary inspections at "capable" sites on a regular basis continues to contribute to the effectiveness of the OMV Plans to detect any attempt by Iraq to conduct activities proscribed by Security Council resolutions. Since the adoption of this IAEA initiative, in 1996, 39 inspections at "capable" sites - mostly co-ordinated by the IAEA - have been conducted by joint IAEA/UNSCOM teams. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities have been detected. Other joint UNSCOM/IAEA activities have included inspections of procurement-related matters and document examination.

28. The NMG has also participated in verification activities in connection with Iraq's declared destruction and concealment of material and equipment related to its former clandestine nuclear programme. The first phase of these verification activities involved searches at three sites to the south of Lake Tharthar, using sub-surface sensing technologies, provided and implemented by a supporting Member State, which facilitated the location and excavation and identification of buried items (particularly metallic items). The material and equipment recovered at the Tharthar sites originate from Iraq's past gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programmes. The number and nature of items found appear to be consistent with the statements made in the FFCD. The bulk of the recovered equipment had, consistent with Iraq's declaration, been destroyed; however, there was also a large number of specialised, high-value, corrosion resistant valves which were in "as new" condition and which, according to the Iraqi counterpart, had been speculatively purchased for potential use in centrifuge cascade circuits.

29. The second phase of the search and excavation activity was completed in May when nine sites were surveyed. The activity at three sites consisted of post-excavation surveys to verify that no materials remained buried at the sites. The principal site in this category was the Tuwaitha Fire Station burial site. The material and equipment at this site were removed in April 1997 and identified by the Iraqi counterpart as ancillary equipment belonging to EMIS development projects. The consistency of the recovered equipment with Iraq's previous declarations is under evaluation. The activity at the six other sites consisted of both survey and excavation. At one of these sites (Al Amil Liquid Nitrogen Plant), the excavation revealed a small number of previously undeclared EMIS components.

    B. Declarations under the OMV Plan

30. Paragraph 22 and Annex 2 of the OMV Plan (Document S/22872 Rev.1 and Corr.1 (1991)) require Iraq to provide semi-annual declarations - in January and July - on the current use of facilities, installations and sites, including those formerly involved in its covert nuclear programme and on changes during the previous six months regarding the inventory and location of materials, equipment and radioisotopes identified in Annexes 3 and 4 of the Plan.

31. Further progress has been made regarding the content and accuracy of these declarations. In particular, the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) has responded to the IAEA request to include supplementary information on current activities at certain sites involved in the production of materials, equipment and components, as well as sites involved in design and in research and development work. The supplementary information, which also relates to detailed descriptions of the current usage of the declared equipment and materials, is intended to improve the efficiency of IAEA monitoring and verification activities in Iraq.

32. The IAEA is evaluating the declarations received in July 1997 and will bring to Iraq's attention any requirements for further improvements to the accuracy and completeness of the declarations.

    C. Release, Relocation and Change of Use of Equipment Material and Facilities

33. In the period under review, the NMD submitted 29 requests to the IAEA concerning the release/relocation of equipment and materials or change of use of monitored buildings. Such requests are processed in consultation with the Special Commission and 27 have been approved. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verification at a frequency commensurate with their significance.

    D. Export/Import Mechanism

34. The export/import mechanism, called for in paragraph 7 of UNSCR 715 (1991), is a regime for the timely provision of information by exporting states regarding contemplated sales or supplies to Iraq of items covered by ongoing monitoring and verification. The mechanism, which was approved by UNSCR 1051 (1996), became operative for Iraq on 26 May 1996 and became operative for United Nations Member States other than Iraq, on 1 October 1996.

35. The export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq, jointly administered by UNSCOM and the IAEA, has, since October 1996, received notifications of some 50 transactions involving the intended export to Iraq of items identified in the annexes to the respective OMV Plans. None of these notifications involved items identified in annex 3 of the IAEA OMV Plan.

    IV. High Level Talks

36. During discussions on the occasion of the visit of Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, on 7 March 1997, the Director General expressed his grave concern about Iraq's obstruction of the right of the IAEA and UNSCOM to operate fixed-wing aircraft in Iraq and encouraged Foreign Minister Sahaf to bring his influence to bear to resolve the issue without delay^2/.

37. The Director General also raised the subject of Iraq's requirement to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the NPT. In a letter, addressed to the Director General and dated 1 May 1997, Iraq's Foreign Minister, wrote:

    "... I am pleased on this occasion to reaffirm once again the obligations of the Republic of Iraq without limitation or condition under the NPT and full compliance with the agreement signed with the IAEA on the safeguards regime."

38. The communication from Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs is understood by the IAEA to reflect not only Iraq's unconditional reaffirmation of its obligations under the NPT, but its acceptance of its obligations, as interpreted by the IAEA, under Iraq's Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.

    V. Summary and Conclusions

39. Progress continues to be made in the review of Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD). Clarifications, resulting from the July discussions in Iraq, have recently been received from the Iraqi counterpart and are under evaluation.

40. The IAEA is undertaking a detailed review of the information provided by Iraq on its clandestine nuclear programme in order to examine its consistency with the coherent picture of that programme that has been developed through IAEA inspections and investigations.

41. The IAEA has notified the Iraqi counterpart of five areas with respect to which it considers that further information should be made available, namely: the development, over time, of Iraq's strategy for concealment and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment and documentation, including the role of the Governmental Committee; the extent of external (foreign) assistance to the clandestine nuclear programme; the final achievements in the design of the nuclear weapon and associated technologies; the chronology of the abandonment of the clandestine nuclear programme; and post cease-fire covert procurement activities. Iraq has provided a written response to some of these areas of concern and an evaluation of the responses will be included in the Agency's October report to the Security Council.

42. The IAEA continues the rigorous implementation of its OMV Plan and has embarked upon an active programme to update the technological content of its monitoring activities. This programme has already resulted in the implementation of sub-surface sensing techniques and the further development of routine aerial and land based radiometric surveys. Work in other areas of technology is being actively pursued with the help of Member States.

43. Further progress has been made regarding the content and accuracy of Iraq's six-monthly declarations under the OMV. In particular, the July 1997 declarations include supplementary information, requested by the IAEA, on current activities at certain sites involved in the production of materials, equipment and components, as well as sites involved in design and in research and development work. The IAEA is evaluating these recently received declarations and will identify requirements for further improvements.

44. In discharging the tasks assigned to it by the UN Security Council, the IAEA continues to benefit from the assistance of Member States through the secondment of cost-free experts, access to advanced technologies and the provision of information.

1. In the period under review - 1 September 1996 through 31 August 1997 - the IAEA has maintained a continuous presence in Iraq of its Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) to implement the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) Plan called for in UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and approved in UN Security Council resolution 715 (1991). The Plan's main purpose is to monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and paragraphs 3 and 5 of UN Security Council resolution 707 (1991).

2. Since 1 September 1996, some 400 monitoring inspections - most of them unannounced - have been conducted, by the NMG, including more than 40 at sites not previously inspected. This brings the total number of OMV inspections since the start of the OMV Plan implementation in August 1994 to more than 1000. This figure of 1000 includes almost 40 capable site inspections - multi-disciplinary IAEA/UNSCOM inspections of sites judged capable of conducting some aspect of work regarding weapons of mass destruction - for the most part co-ordinated by the NMG. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities has been detected.

3. On 7 September 1996 in Baghdad Iraq delivered what it considered to be the definitive version of the "Full, Final, and Complete Declaration" (FFCD-F) of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear programme. The IAEA with the assistance of technical experts from Member States undertook a comprehensive review of the document. On 13 January 1977 the Iraqi counterpart was notified of the need for a number of additions and revisions to the FFCD-F. The counterpart's response dated 27 January 1977 was discussed from 3-10 February 1997 in Iraq, and on 26 February 1977 the counterpart provided a consolidated list of revisions and additions. The IAEA undertook the review of this consolidated list as a high priority task. After review by the IAEA, assisted by technical experts from Member states, a technical team of IAEA personnel and Member State experts held discussions with the counterpart in Iraq from 16-21 May 1997. As a result of these discussions Iraq undertook to amend the consolidated list of additions and revisions. The Nuclear Monitoring Group received the further amendments on 9 July 1997. These amendments were the subject of discussions between the Iraqi counterpart and a technical team of IAEA personnel and Member State experts in Iraq from 19-24 July 1997. The result of these discussions was a commitment by the counterpart to provide additional information. The additional information was provided by the counterpart between 31 July and 14 August 1997 and is under review by IAEA personnel and Member State experts.

4. At its fortieth regular session, on 20 September 1996, the IAEA's General Conference adopted resolution GC (40)/RES/21 commending the Director General and the Agency's Action Team for their strenuous efforts to implement Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715 and requesting them to continue their efforts; inviting the Director General and the Action Team to continue to pursue vigorously the implementation of the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Plan; welcoming the establishment of an export/import monitoring mechanism under United Nations Security Council resolution 1051; urging Iraq to co-operate fully with the Agency in achieving the complete and long-term implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions; urging Iraq to resolve remaining ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the revised draft of the Full, Final and Complete Declaration; demanding that Iraq hand over to the Agency without further delay any currently undisclosed nuclear-weapon-related equipment, material or information and allow the Action Team immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted rights of access in accordance with Security Council resolution 707; stressing that the Agency's Action Team will continue to exercise its right to investigate further any aspects of Iraq's past nuclear weapons capability, in particular as regards any further relevant information that Iraq may still be withholding from the Agency; requesting the Director General to report the views of the General Conference to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to report to the Board of Governors and to the forty-first regular session of the General Conference on his efforts to implement Security Council resolution 687, 707 and 715; and deciding to remain seized of this issue.

5. As requested in operating paragraph 8 of General Conference resolution GC (40)/RES/ 21, by letter dated 27 September 1996 the Acting Director General, David B. Waller, reported the views of the General Conference to the Security Council of the United Nations.

6. On 1 October 1996 the export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq became operative for United Nations Member States other than Iraq. The mechanism had already become operative for Iraq on 26 May 1996.

7. On 11 October 1996, the Director General submitted the second consolidated report on the implementation of the Agency's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687(1991). The second consolidated report covered:
   • the IAEA inspection mission to clarify ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the FFCD-F;

   • progress in executing an ongoing monitoring and verification task in Iraq;

   • examination of the document cache;

   • efforts to improve the quality and content of Iraqi declarations;

   • procurement matters; and

   • Iraqi requests for release and use of equipment, materials, and facilitites.

   In addition, the report discussed the Director General's meeting with General Amer Rashid Al Ubaydi on 7 June 1996.

8. The Director General addressed the fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly on 28 October 1996. In presenting the IAEA's annual report, he summarised the results of the IAEA's activities in Iraq as follows:

   The Agency's verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolutions has, since August 1994, involved more than 600 inspections, the majority of which were conducted without prior notice. These inspections, plus analysis of the vast amount of documentation handed over to the IAEA and UNSCOM after the departure of the late Lt. General Hussein Kamel Hassan Al-Majid and the follow-up of procurement transactions, are part of the review of Iraq's re-issued "full, final and complete declaration" of its former nuclear weapons programme. The carrying out of joint IAEA-UNSCOM multi-disciplinary inspections at weapons capable sites contributes to the effectiveness of the ongoing monitoring and verification programme for the detection of any attempt by Iraq to conduct activities proscribed by the Security Council resolutions.

9. The eighth periodic radiometric survey of Iraq's main water bodies was completed on 22 October 1996. The survey involved the collection of samples of water, sediments and biota from 16 sites selected from the more than 50 locations for which baseline data had been established in the original survey completed in November 1992.

10. From 12-15 November 1996 the Nuclear Monitoring Group, assisted by Member State experts equipped with underwater search equipment, spent three days investigating Member State information regarding the possible dumping of nuclear waste containers in Lake Razzaza. The underwater search was supplemented with extensive radiometric sampling of the lake. Neither the underwater search nor the radiometric sampling showed any indication of nuclear waste containers having been dumped in the lake.

11. From 3-10 February 1997 a technical team of IAEA personnel and Member State experts discussed Iraq's 27 January 1997 response to the IAEA's request for additions and revisions to FFCD-F. This was the third in a series of technical discussions involving FFCD matters since May 1996.

12. From 1-10 March 1997 the Nuclear Monitoring Group conducted the first of two Sub-Surface Search (SSS) campaigns at sites where Iraq had declared it buried equipment and materials related to its clandestine nuclear programme or where the IAEA suspected such equipment and materials had been buried. The second campaign took place from 7-20 May 1997. The March and May 1997 SSS campaigns searched nine declared or suspected burial sites with ground penetrating radar, magnetometers, and reflectometers and enabled the IAEA to direct excavation of the precise locations where equipment and materials had been buried. The excavations unearthed equipment and materials allowing the IAEA to verify some, and to challenge other, Iraqi assertions of unilateral destruction and burial.

13. On 7 March 1997, H.E. Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, visited the Director General. The Director General raised the subject of Iraq's requirement to unconditionally reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and to comply fully with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Director General also broached the subject of the difficulties in the use of fixed wing aircraft encountered by UNSCOM, stating that Iraq's obstruction of rights established by Security Council resolutions and the OMV plans of both UNSCOM and the IAEA, raised serious concerns. Minister Sahaf raised the issue of when the IAEA would be in a position to report the Security Council's requirement for a "full, final and complete disclosure" had been met and requested that the Director General provide him with a list of the outstanding issues, so that the Minister could direct all necessary resources to their urgent resolution. The Director General declined to provide the requested list and stated that progress was being made in the resolution of outstanding matters. To Minister Sahaf's statement that his country's nuclear programme was completely transparent, the Director General noted that the Agency would report its progress to the Security Council whose responsibility it would be to determine how the Agency's report contributed to the basis for implementing paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section C of UNSCR 687 (1991). The Director General added that the Agency's report would review the information provided by Iraq on its clandestine nuclear programme and would contain statements of matters that were unresolved. One such matter mentioned was the conviction that Iraq had kept a set of documentation and possibly samples of critical components relating to its past programme. Minister Sahaf replied that his country had hidden nothing of its past programme and that Iraq would continue to co-operate fully with the Agency regardless of the status of paragraphs 21 and 22 of UNSCR 687, and he reiterated his request for a list of outstanding issues to be resolved.

14. The ninth periodic radiometric survey of Iraq's main water bodies was conducted from 11-21 April 1997. The survey involved the collection of samples of water, sediments and biota from 16 regular sites selected from the more than 50 locations for which baseline data had been established in the original survey completed in November 1992.

15. On 1 May 1997 in a letter addressed to the Director General, H.E. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, reaffirmed Iraq's obligations under the NPT and its compliance with its safeguards agreement.

16. From 16-21 May 1997 a technical team of IAEA personnel and Member State experts visited Iraq to discuss matters related to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and the need for revisions and additions to FFCD-F. This was the fourth in a series of technical discussions involving FFCD matters since May 1996.

17. In June 1997, the Nuclear Monitoring Group with Member State assistance, reintroduced airborne gamma mapping and surveyed some 20 sites formerly associated with Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. The detailed analysis of the airborne gamma mapping is under evaluation. The use of advanced technologies in Iraq is designed to strengthen the OMV programme.

18. From 19-24 July 1997 a technical team of IAEA personnel and Member State experts visited Iraq to discuss matters related to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and the need for revisions and additions to FFCD-F. This was the fifth in a series of technical discussions involving FFCD matters since May 1996. During the period 3-14 August 1997 several responses were received from the Iraqi counterpart.

19. On 1 August 1997 the IAEA notified the Iraqi counterpart of five areas where additional information should be made available, namely: the development of Iraq's strategy for concealment and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment, and documentation, including the role of the Governmental Committee; the extent of foreign assistance to the clandestine nuclear programme; the final achievements in the design of the nuclear weapon and associated technologies; the chronology of the abandonment of the clandestine nuclear programme; and post cease-fire covert procurement activities.

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^1/ See documents GOV/INF/801 dated 31 October 1996 and GOV/INF/810 dated 22 April 1997.

^2/ In February 1997, Iraq refused to provide facilities at the former Basrah International airport to facilitate UNSCOM's use of the L-100 fixed-wing transport airport to provide logistical support for OMV inspections in southern Iraq. It is relevant to note that in June 1997 UNSCOM brought to the attention of the Security Council four serious incidents in which the lives of the crews of the Commission's helicopters and aircraft themselves were endangered through the actions of Iraqi personnel on board the aircraft or through the manoeuvres of the accompanying Iraqi helicopters. In response, the President of the Security Council issued a statement, inter alia, deploring the incidents and underlining that Iraq must immediately take effective steps to put an end to all such actions.