Statement of IAEA Director General to the UN Security Council on Inspections in Iraq
UN Security Council on Inspections in Iraq
New York, NY, USA
23 November 1992
Mr. President,
Under paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency was directed to carry out three tasks with a view to dismantling Iraq's nuclear capability:
- First, to identify through on-site inspections, Iraq's nuclear capabilities;
- Second, to destroy, remove or render harmless all nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapons-usable material, any sub-systems or components, or any related research, development, support or manufacturing facilities;
- Third, to develop and implement a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the requirement not to acquire or develop a nuclear-weapon capability.
On 11 March of this year, I reported to the Council that after ten Agency inspection missions to Iraq much progress had been made in the first two tasks laid upon me by the Council, while implementation of the plan for long-term monitoring had not yet started. Since March, five more Agency missions have taken place and considerable further investigative and other work has been carried out. As a result important parts of the first two tasks have been fulfilled and the Agency has begun implementing elements of the third task - that of long-term monitoring and verification.
The first task, the complete mapping of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, requires that we identify all Iraq's nuclear-relevant resources and the foreign sources of supply and technology. In the course of the 15 missions undertaken to date in Iraq, our teams have visited more than 70 sites and gradually mapped a broadly-based secret nuclear programme aimed at the production of enriched uranium and at the development of nuclear weapon capabilities. In the course of these inspection visits, the IAEA has held numerous discussions with the Iraqi authorities.
Already in March I reported to the Council that a fairly consistent and coherent picture of Iraq's nuclear programme was emerging. What we have seen and learnt since March has not modified that picture but added to it. Although the picture is comprehensive and detailed, we cannot be certain that it is complete. Iraq's unwillingness so far to reveal foreign sources of equipment, material and technology makes it difficult to ascertain whether all nuclear-related imported equipment and material has been identified. New information, positively evaluated by the Special Commission and the Agency, could also point to sites which would require inspection - after designation by the Special Commission. We therefore see a need for continued on-site inspection.
Since March much work has been devoted by the Agency to the second task assigned to it, that of ensuring the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, of facilities and equipment related to the clandestine nuclear programme. Key buildings, equipment and material have been destroyed or rendered harmless. The installations at Al Atheer, Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat can no longer be used for the nuclear purposes for which they were intended. The Iraqi authorities have actively co-operated in these operations under the direction of the IAEA inspection teams and we would expect that they would continue to be co-operative in these matters.
The only nuclear-weapons-usable material known to remain in Iraq at present is the highly enriched uranium in irradiated reactor fuel assemblies. Removal of this material awaits conclusion of the necessary arrangements with recipient countries. The material has been verified by the Agency's teams and is being kept under its control until it is removed.
Mr. President,
The IAEA now has begun to phase in elements of the third task - the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the Security Council resolution. As may be concluded from my remarks, the steps taken are without prejudice to the continued investigative activities by the IAEA.
The implementation of long-term monitoring meets some co-operation and also some resistance from the Iraqi side. The Iraqi authorities continue to challenge the legitimacy of the plans approved by the Security Council under resolution 715. It is of particular concern that the letter of 28 October 1992 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq (document S/24726) has restated Iraq's non-acceptance of resolutions 707 and 715 in strong terms. I wish to reiterate the remarks I made last March before the Council that the lack of full and explicit acceptance of resolutions 707 and 715 ignores the binding nature of those resolutions. It appears also to ignore Iraq's own explicit acceptance of resolution 687, which in paragraph 12 lays upon Iraq the obligation to accept the plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification in the nuclear sphere. Acceptance of resolutions 707 and 715 is essential in order to establish an effective and reliable system of ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq.
Mr. President, I must also report that the Iraqi authorities continue to delay their compliance with our repeated requests that they provide clear and complete information concerning the items which are to be reported to the Agency under the plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification. They have still to provide information on all relevant items, including those which they have said were destroyed during and after the armed conflict, that is to say, all nuclear relevant items existing in Iraq as of 1 January 1989. Iraq has only very recently indicated its readiness to submit before the end of this year information concerning all these items.
Mr. President, while Iraq has provided much information to the IAEA under resolution 687, some on its own initiative, much prompted by discoveries made by the inspection teams, decisions have been taken at a political level in Iraq not to provide key procurement information. This information is needed to dispel existing suspicions that more equipment and material may remain in Iraq than what has been identified. These procurement data, which the Agency is now trying to acquire through the co-operation of a number of Governments, are needed to permit independent verification of the completeness of the disclosures made so far by the Iraqi authorities. They are also needed to ensure that all nuclear relevant material, equipment and machine tools existing in Iraq are submitted to effective long-term monitoring. Furthermore, data about past procurements may be critical to the establishment of a meaningful mechanism for import control, as called for in paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991). Lastly, detailed information on the Iraqi procurement network would help to ensure that previous channels used to obtain proscribed items would not remain available to Iraq to resume prohibited programmes. In the important area of procurement information there is no full, final and complete disclosure. There is hardly any disclosure.
Mr. President,
I must therefore report to the Security Council that I cannot conclude that Iraq has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions, as these resolutions relate to tasks laid upon the IAEA.
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