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Statement of IAEA Director General Hans Blix to the UN Security Council on IAEA Inspections in Iraq

UN Security Council on IAEA Inspections in Iraq

New York, USA

11 March 1992

Under a series of Security Council resolutions beginning with Resolution 687 (1991) the IAEA has been mandated, working together with the Special Commission, to map nuclear programmes and facilities in Iraq intended for, or susceptible of being used for nuclear weapons production or the production of weapons-usable material; to remove, destroy or render harmless proscribed items; and, to plan and perform future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with all the Security Council resolutions. I propose to focus on the IAEA's work in these three areas.

In the 11 months that have passed since the adoption of Resolution 687 the IAEA has sent ten inspection missions to Iraq, removed 12 kilograms of highly enriched unirradiated uranium from Iraq, ordered and supervised the destruction or rendering harmless of a considerable amount of proscribed equipment and prepared a plan for the long term monitoring of permitted nuclear activities. This considerable activity would not have been possible without a certain amount of cooperation by Iraq, but the results would have come much faster and with much less pain if Iraq had fully and spontaneously complied with its obligation under the resolutions of the Council and the exchange of letters with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

As deseribed by the IAEA in the report submitted by the Secretary General on 25 January 1992 (S/23514), Iraq has often followed a pattern of denial of clandestine activities until the evidence is overwhelming, followed by cooperation until the next case of concealment is revealed. The denial of activities have in many eases been accompanied by active concealment and deception. In a number of cases serious confrontation occurred when Agency inspection teams were denied the right to unrestricted access to sites or the removal of pertinent documents.

It is perfectly clear that in the face of these attitudes the IAEA could not have carried out the inspection programme and the mapping of the Iraqi nuclear programme but for the firm and consistent support of the Security Council. I should like to express the appreciation of the IAEA for this support. The present meeting of the Council is testimony to the continuation of this support in view of concrete difficulties which the Special Commission and the IAEA are currently encountering. Like several speakers this morning I hope that this meeting will contribute to a solution of these difficulties. I shall describethese difficulties but also briefly point to the results which have been achieved.

Important results have been obtained in the identification and mapping of Iraq's extensive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability. After ten months of work, including ten inspections, after many sessions of intense questioning of Iraqi technical teams, after the screening of masses of documents and after assessment of the analytical investigations of many hundreds of samples taken in Iraq, a fairly consistent and coherent picture is emerging of the Iraqi nuclear programme. Information supplied by Iraq, often after prior lack of cooperation, has been of great importance in several ways but the picture that we draw is by no means a simple reflection of this information. It is based on direct observation and inspection of nuclear facilities, equipment and material, on authentic documents and proven information from other countries and on our own experts' considerable experience of nuclear programmes. There are, however still some gaps or "grey areas". In view of these gaps and Iraq's track record of non revelation, inspections need to continue. Further information obtained about sites having possible clandestine nuclear facilities must also be followed by inspection. Indeed we do not exclude that the need for further inspections can arise even as future ongoing monitoring and verification begin.

A general shortcoming in Iraq's attitude has been the lack of full and explicit acceptance of the Council Resolutions 707 and 715. I fear this is an expression not only of reluctance but also of resistance which is incompatible with the binding nature of these resolutions. In raising this matter during his recent visit to the Government in Baghdad, the Chairman of the Special Commission, Ambassador Ekeus, was speaking not only for the Commission but also at the request of the IAEA. The Security Council's insistence on the matter is important not only as a question of the authority of the Council but as a matter that underlies the many specific points of non compliance that we noted. A detailed list of such points was prepared by the IAEA in document 8/23514, now supplemented by updated information in document 8/23687.

While, as the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq said, the IAEA noted some improvement in the attitudes of the Iraqi authorities in the course of the recent IAEA inspections, lack of cooperation and non compliance still persist in the provision of information concerning sources of procurement of critical material and equipment. This information is of great significance since in many cases it is the only means for independent verification of the correctness of Iraqi statements and is basic to future monitoring. Further, the initial information needed to establish the future on going plan for monitoring and verification, required to be supplied by Iraq under Resolution 715, has been provided only in a partial and incomplete way. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq referred this morning to the readiness of his Government to cooperate to solve current difficulties. A statement by Iraq of readiness to provide procurement information and to complete information required under Resolution 715 would eliminate important hurdles.

Mr. President, I now turn to the question of removal, destruction or rendering harmless of proscribed nuclear items. A large part of the Iraqi nuclear facilities, including most of the facilities known to us to have been used in the nuclear weapon development programme, were either fully destroyed or heavily damaged in the course of the Gulf War.

This has been true in the case of:

Tuwaitha, the main research and development centre of the Iraqi nuclear programme (total destruction of critical buildings);

Tarmiya, the industrial complex for EMIS enriched uranium production (total destruction of some of the critical buildings);

Ash Sharqat, the intended second site for EMIS industrial scale activities (total destruction of basic building);

Al Jesirah, the large chemical complex, where the natural uranium feed material for enrichment activities was produced (total destruction);

- Al Quaim, where uranium concentrates from indigenous uranium bearing phosphate ores were produced (total destruction of the uranium plant);

In addition, by admission of the Iraqi authorities, a number of items such as components and equipment, were subsequently damaged or destroyed by the Iraqi military in an attempt to remove evidence of the clandestine nuclear programme. In spite of this extensive destruction there are still sites, facilities, equipment and materials which suffered little or no damage and therefore fall in the category of items requiring destruction, removal or rendering harmless under resolution 687.

This is the case of the Al Atheer site, specifically designed for weaponization activities, and of some buildings in Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat. In addition some of the equipment, machine tools and materials with little or no repair or modification might be useful to Iraq should it seek to resurrect its nuclear weapons programme.

The issue of destruction, removal and rendering harmless has been discussed at length between the IAEA and the Special Commission and we are agreed to implement these activities on the basis of a common approach.

Progress to date in this area of destruction, removal or rendering harmless can be summarized as follows:

The removal of highly enriched uranium, suitable for direct use in nuclear weapons, has been given high priority. This material, in the form of fresh and irradiated fuel elements for the Iraqi research reactors has been in the custody of the Agency since the first inspection in May 1991; all the fresh fuel was removed from Iraq last November. Negotiations are being held with French and British companies to remove the remaining irradiated fuel for which adequate funding is still required;

A large number of components of calutrons and ultracentrifuges relevant to the production of enriched uranium have been assembled and destroyed under the supervision of the Agency;

Hot cells, glove boxes, remote handling manipulators and other equipment used in research activities for laboratory scale separation of plutonium from irradiated fuel have been destroyed or rendered harmless;

Dedicated equipment and machine tools used in the manufacturing of these components have also been destroyed; Dual use items i.e. equipment and machine tools which, in principle could be utilized in non prohibited as well as prohibited activities, are being inventoried and placed under Agency seal. The destruction or release of these items is being dealt with on a case by case basis. Obviously, release of any such items will only be made provided that there can be effective future monitoring of their agreed upon use;

Buildings such as laboratories, plants and other facilities, where research and development, production or testing directly relevant to activities prohibited under resolution 687 were conducted, are currently being assessed for destruction. This is for instance the case of Al Atheer. A complete inventory of such facilities is being prepared. Any requests for use in non proscribed activities would have to be evaluated in the light of the possibility of effective monitoring of agreed upon use.

Although the Agency has not so far met with resistance on the part of Iraq to its request for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of proscribed material, facilities or equipment, we are keenly aware that the Special Commission has encountered such resistance. The Security Council's support for the authority of the Commission and of the IAEA to determine what is to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless and Iraq's corresponding duty to accept and to implement such requests is, therefore, much appreciated. The elimination of facilities and equipment that would be of use in a resurrection of the clandestine nuclear programme is clearly of great importance.

Mr. President,

Large facilities and large amounts of equipment required for the production of nuclear weapons usable material and nuclear weapons by Iraq have been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. New facilities cannot easily be built without detection and the import or production of new relevant equipment will meet great obstacles. What certainly remains in Iraq, however, is a large number of highly trained scientists and engineers who were engaged in its nuclear programme. Information supplied to our inspection teams suggests that these people are currently engaged in the civilian reconstruction of the country. Needless to say, it is important that these highly qualified cadres remain engaged in non proscribed activities.

Mr. President,

It is essential that the measures prescribed by the Couneil for Iraq succeed, not only to allay fears about Iraq reviving a programme of weapons of mass destruetion, notably nuclear weapons, but also to demonstrate that international verification is a viable measure to create confidence. That experience is necessary if actions taken in Iraq are to represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, as envisaged in paragraph 14 of Resolution 687.

The IAEA is committed to a successful implementation of the Council's resolutions on Iraq and looks to the Security Council for guidance and support in its effort to contribute to this result.