• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Statement of IAEA Director General Hans Blix in informal consultations of the UN Security Council regarding Iraq and Resolution 687 (1991)

Informal consultations of the UN Security Council regarding Iraq and Resolution 687 (1991)

New York, USA

15 July 1991

Mr. President,

I appreciate the opportunity to offer some information and comments to the Council regarding the fulfilment of the tasks laid upon the International Atomic Energy Agency in Resolution 687 (1991). Needless to say the IAEA is at the disposal of the Security Council, through the Secretary General, at any time to give information regarding the mandate which the Council has given to the Agency. With me is Professor Maurizio Zifferero, who is the Head of the Action Team for the Agency's work under the resolution. Mr. Zifferero was himself leader of the second IAEA inspection team when the first denial of access occurred at Abu Ghareb. If the Council so wishes, he will give information regarding the results of the first two inspections which were completed before Iraq made the declaration on 7 July. He can also, if so desired, analyse that document and comment on what is covered by it and what may yet be missing. Lastly he can give you an account of the findings of the third inspection team as of yesterday, Sunday. Professor Zifferero will be assisted by several experts present here.

Mr. President,

In Resolution 687 (1991) the Security Council entrusted the Director General of the IAEA through the Secretary General with four tasks in which he should have the assistance and co operation of the Special Commission:

First, to carry out immediate on site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission;

Second, to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within 45 days, i.e. 3 June, for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all nuclear related items which were proscribed by the Council;

Third, to carry out this plan within 45 days following approval by the Council;

Fourth, to develop a plan within 120 days, i.e. 1 August, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligation in the nuclear sphere under the resolution.

The plan thus established by the Council is moving to fulfilment, although we all know not without difficulties.

Although the first team of the IAEA went to Iraq in May, the phase of "immediate on site inspection" is still on, with some 35 inspectors currently working long hot days to inspect equipment and sites recently declared by Iraq or designated by the Special Commission.

The reason for the extension of the inspection phase is, of course, that the inspection task has proved to be both large and complex and that Iraqi declarations have been incomplete.

The Council did not prescribe that reports should be submitted to it on the results of immediate on site inspections, only that a plan be submitted concerning the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of proscribed nuclear items. As a result of the denial of access by Iraqi military authorities to nuclear inspection teams and incomplete Iraqi declarations, the Council has nevertheless had to intervene in order to make full inspection of the Iraq nuclear capability possible.

With increasing importance attached to the inspection process and its results, the IAEA has now submitted to the Council, through the Secretary General, a consolidated report on the first two inspection missions, which were completed before Iraq itself declared the existence of uranium enrichment programmes. Even before results are available from analysis of samples taken, the findings of these two missions point clearly, as Professor Zifferero can explain, to uranium enrichment activities and even provide an assessment of the scope of these activities.

The question is often asked whether there is any way in which through inspection we can be certain of obtaining knowledge about every gram of enriched uranium or about every relevant piece of nuclear equipment in a country. The answer to this question, whether in the case of Iraq or any other country, is negative. It is not possible for an international inspectorate to go to every building and basement in a country in search of nuclear relevant objects and material. However, the right of the inspectorate to go to undeclared locations, even at short notice, a right which is unequivocally given for inspections in Iraq, which I think would be indispensable in a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, and which I consider exists and can be used also in the safeguards system of the IAEA under the Non Proliferation Treaty, gives considerable teeth to the inspection system. This presupposes, of course, that information on relevant undeclared locations is made available. In the case of the immediate on site inspections in Iraq, the right to inspect undeclared locations is linked to designations by the Special Commission.

In the case of the long term monitoring and verification in Iraq the preservation of the right to inspect undeclared locations on the basis of relevant information and the Security Council's continued backing and support would, I trust, provide the necessary means to assure the international community that there will be no prohibited nuclear activities in Iraq in the future.

In this context let me report to the Security Council that I have concluded that the non declaration by Iraq to the IAEA until 7 July of a number of nuclear activities and of nuclear material relating to enrichment of uranium, constitutes non compliance by Iraq with its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA. I have informed the Government of Iraq of this view in two letters and I have received replies which seek to explain the absence of declarations. I have not found these explanations adequate and I have accordingly called a special meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA for Thursday, 18 July. If the Board determines, as I expect it will, that there has been non compliance by Iraq of its safeguards obligations, it will report this conclusion pursuant to Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute to the Security Council and to the General Assembly.

Mr. President,

I have already touched on important points to be dealt with in the plan which the IAEA is requested to submit to the Council before 1 August concerning the future ongoing monitoring and verification in the nuclear field in Iraq. Let me only add that the Agency's elaboration of this plan is on schedule. We are basing our proposed plan on more than two decades of IAEA inspection experience and on the novel experience which we are gaining in Iraq. We are also benefiting from comments by the Special Commission with which we are consulting about the plan. As required by the Council the plan will take into account both the rights and obligations of Iraq under the NPT. In view of Resolution 687 (1991) the plan will not allow any enrichment or reprocessing activities which are otherwise permissible under the NPT if declared and placed under safeguards. We have also sought to elaborate this verification plan in such a way that it might be susceptible for use in discussions and negotiations on a nuclear weapon free zone or zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Lastly, Mr. President, I would turn to the plan which the Security Council requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of nuclear related items prohibited under Resolution 687 (1991). A preliminary plan was submitted to the Council early in June. It could not be completed as the inspection activities were not completed and also because the removal of highly enriched uranium, especially when irradiated, is a complex task that requires extensive planning. I am pleased to report to the Council that this plan is moving forward satisfactorily. The governments of France and the United Kingdom have indicated to us that commercial nuclear enterprises in these two countries are ready to undertake the operation of removal and the further handling of the material, provided that we can give assurances about the financing. Experts from these two countries are already in Baghdad with our inspection team to assess how the operation can best be carried out. The IAEA will submit supplementary reports to the Council as it becomes clear to us what needs to be removed, destroyed or rendered harmless and how this is to be done. Our expectation is that the some 12.5 kg of non irradiated, highly enriched uranium now in Agency custody can be removed by September. Removal of irradiated, highly enriched uranium likewise under Agency custody will require a few months more of preparations.