Statement of IAEA Director General Hans Blix in informal meeting of the UN Security Council (Inspections in Iraq)
informal meeting of the UN Security Council (Inspections in Iraq)
New York, USA
30 July 1991
I appreciate the opportunity again informally to provide the Security Council with some information concerning the fulfilment by the IAEA of tasks given to it by the Council under Resolution 687 (1991).
On 15 July, Professor Zifferero, the Leader of the Agency's Action Team reported to the Council on what we had learnt about the Iraqi nuclear capability through our first two inspection missions. Today, Mr. Perricos will tell you about the considerable amount of knowledge which was gained by the third team, which he headed and which came to Baghdad one day before the Iraqi declaration of 7 July. With Mr. Perricos today is Mr. Thorne, who has been on several missions to Baghdad and who was one of the inspectors involved in the shooting incident. The fourth member of the IAEA Action Team is. Mr.Kay, who headed the team which was denied access at the Falluja site and which identified the caravan of trucks. He is again in Baghdad now, leading the fourth inspection mission.
The Action Team of the IAEA for activities under Resolution 687 (1991) consists of only these four full time professionals and two secretaries. However, our Safeguards Department provides many inspectors to the teams and the participation of some experts is arranged through the Special Commission in New York or through governments. To date we have performed altogether around 1000 inspection man days.
The fourth team is expecting to stay aabout two weeks, following up on the findings of the third team and inspecting further sites designated by the Special Commission. A list, which was promised in a letter to Mr. Perricos on 24 July and which has now been given to Mr. Kay of nuclear material and equipment, some of which was found after Mr. Perricos' departure, does not seem to provide anything dramatically new, but adds to the picture that Mr.Perricos will give you.
I think you will find that the picture of the EMIS programme is now a rather detailed one. This, of course, is not to say that it is a full picture. We are not, for instance, in a position to confirm Iraq's statements that only about half a kilogram of uranium at an average enrichment level of 4% had been produced.
At the informal meeting of the Security Council on 15 July I said I could not see any peaceful purpose in Iraq's enrichment programme. The method used for enrichment, EMIS, was extremely expensive and it would be uneconomic to produce enriched uranium by this method, when enriched material for peaceful purposes is abundant in the world market. Moreover, Iraq's nuclear power programme was not very advanced.
In the report of the third inspection team, it is recorded that the leader of the Iraqi enrichment programme, Dr. Jaffar, explained that the primary aim of the programme was to develop a technological and industrial infrastructure. Secondly, it was suggested, enriched uranium was needed for the research reactors and for a future nuclear power programme. Neither explanation is convincing. A technological and industrial infrastructure may be a spin off of a programme of enrichment but hardly the primary aim of it. As regards fuel for research reactors and a future power programme, I must reiterate the comment that low enriched uranium is available at a much lower production cost than that which could have been achieved in Iraq. The third inspection team report notes another detail that seems of interest in this context, namely the combination in the Iraqi EMIS programme of high capacity/modest separation and low capacity/high separation would be particularly useful if the goal was to produce highly enriched uranium.
With your permission, I shall report today on two important matters. First, the action by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 18 July to declare Iraq in non compliance with the safeguards obligations of the country. Secondly, the plan which has just been submitted by the IAEA concerning the future ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq as required in paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).
An examination by the IAEA of the lists that were attached to Iraq's declaration of 7 July showed that some of the nuclear material should have been reported to the Agency under the safeguards agreement concluded by Iraq pursuant to the country's adherence to the Non Proliferation Treaty. This conclusion was communicated by me to Iraq, which made two principal points in reply. First, that the quantities of material which should have been declared were insignificant. Secondly, that having now declared them, Iraq was no longer in non compliance with its safeguards agreement but had taken requisite corrective action.
This correspondence was reported to the Board of Governors of the IAEA with the comment that the duty to report nuclear materials exists regardless of what the quantities are. When the Board met, it had furgher been made clear that the Tarmiya site had been in operation and that some uranium had, in fact, been enriched there. Accordingly, design information about Tarmiya should have been given to the Agency.
As reported to the Security Council, in accordance with Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute and Article III:2 of the Agreement governing the relationship between the United Nations and the Agency, the Board of Governors of the IAEA found that Iraq had not complied with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency. It condemned this non compliance and called on the Government of Iraq to remedy its non compliance and to place all nuclear material, regardless of quantity and location, under Agency safeguards.
Subsequent to the action by the IAEA Board, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, in a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the Unted Nations
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
