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Statement of IAEA Director General at informal consultations in the Security Council regarding Iraq and Resolutions 687 and 707 (1991)

informal consultations in the Security Council regarding Iraq and Resolutions 687 and 707 (1991)

New York, USA

8 October 1991

Mr. President,

Security Council resolution 687 did not foresee any reporting to the Council on the results of the IAEA's immediate on site inspection of Iraq's nuclear activities. As I have the privilege today, for the third time, of briefing the Council, it is mainly because the task of mapping Iraq's nuclear activities has proved to be much larger and much more arduous than expected.

Up to the present time the six teams sent to Iraq by the IAEA have devoted over 2000 man days to inspection tours to Iraq under the direction of the Action Team in Vienna and our own laboratories have devoted many man months to analysing samples taken in Iraq. Despite this considerable effort and the uncovering and mapping of large nuclear programmes we cannot report that we have yet mapped the total programme.

One would have hoped that when explicitly accepting resolution 687, Iraq would have been determined fully and sincerely to comply with the duty to declare "any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities" related to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons usable material". Yet, it was only after the IAEA team in dramatic circumstances obtained pictures revealing the EMIS enrichment programme, that Iraq began to provide information about the enrichment programmes. And although it would seem evident that designing and experimenting for the production of nuclear weapons constitute "research and development" in the language of resolution 687, Iraq chose not to declare the activities which produced the documentary material discovered by the Agency team on 23September. It would evidently save much time, effort and pain if Iraq took a new look at resolutions 687 and 707, decided to make a clean break with the past, declare all that there is to declare and co operate with the IAEA in destroying, removing or rendering harmless what cannot be retained. On Friday last week 4 October I sent a letter to the Foreign Minister of Iraq urging that such an attitude be at last taken.

Failing such an attitude the patient compilation of facts through mission after mission will continue. The seventh team will be on its way this week.

I should like to report today on the results of the fifth and sixth IAEA nuclear inspections, on some questions they have given rise to, on the plan submitted by the Agency for future ongoing monitoring and verification and on our work to prepare for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items which are in contravention of resolutions 687 and 707.

May I preface these remarks by telling the Council that the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 13 September concluded a second time that Iraq was in non compliance with its nuclear non proliferation obligations and the General Conference of the IAEA adopted a resolution to the same effect GC(XXXV)/RES/568. These actions have been reported to the United Nations.

The fifth inspection team, consisting of 11 IAEA staff members and four non IAEA experts, had an uneventful but productive visit, adding to our knowledge about the Iraqi nuclear programme. It had barely left Iraq when the sixth team went in and, in dramatic circumstances, during its first two days, uncovered documentary material showing, inter alia, that an advanced and sophisticated nuclear weapons programme was underway.

I shall not dwell on the violations by Iraqi authorities of the rights of the inspectors, e.g. in forcibly taking back documents, and in denying the inspectors freedom of movement. The Chief Inspector of the sixth team, Mr.David Kay, is with me and can answer any questions you may wish to put to him. The Council was itself very actively involved in protecting the security and release of the team. I should like to express the appreciation of the IAEA for the effective backing given to the team by the Security Council and the Chairman of the Special Commission.

The report is self explanatory, but a few comments may be appropriate.

This was the first time that a team went to examine documents in order to map the programme. The results show that the approach was amply justified. Although much documentation had been removed from the first inspection site before the inspectors arrived and although some documents and microfiches forcibly taken from the inspectors on Monday, 23 September were not returned to them, enough material remained to offer dramatic revelations.

The sixth inspection team had 45 members: 44 men and one woman. Owing to its special task of scanning documents in Arabic in search of evidence regarding the nuclear programme, the composition was somewhat special. There were three members from the IAEA: Mr. Kay and two Arab speaking staff members with nuclear training. One member came from UNSCOM, namely its Deputy Executive Chairman, Mr. Robert Gallucci. The 41 other members were recruited from the outside, many from the United States, others from Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, UK and other countries.

The next point I should like to make is that the report submitted to you through the Secretary General is a first report. The results which were uncovered by scanning of documents and by the translation and analysis of some documents were such that a delay in reporting to the Council was not deemed acceptable. A vast amount of documentary material in Arabic is now collected and must be more closely scanned and, in part, translated and analysed. When this is done a full report will be drafted. We must also insist that Iraq provides relevant documents, including those which we have not succeeded in securing. I have been informed that the Chairman of the Special Commission during his visit to Baghdad a few days ago has transmitted such a request, on behalf of UNSCOM. This parallels my letter of 4 October to Iraq's Foreign Minister, which I mentioned a moment ago. I hope Iraq will fully and speedily respond to our respective requests by an additional declaration directed in accordance with resolution 687 to the Secretary General and the Director General of the IAEA.

The key result of the sixth inspection is the uncovering of documents that show conclusively that Iraq was very well advanced in a programme to develop an implosion type nuclear weapon and that links existed to a surface to surface missile project. Indeed, so advanced has the programme been deemed to be that the time needed to reach bomb making capacity seems to have been determined by the time required for the enrichment activities rather than the weapons design activities. A significant document secured on 23September and translated into English is now appended to the report of the sixth inspection. The document is available also in the Arabic original. I have requested that both the report and the appended document should be circulated as a Security Council document. Other documents will undoubtedly provide further insights. One such document shows that an effort was underway to produce Lithium 6, a substance that has only one use namely, in thermo nuclear weapons.

The sixth inspection has also found evidence of broad based Iraqi international procurement efforts. It is possible even probable that some of the procurement that has taken place, e.g. of sensitive equipment or material, has occurred in violation of laws of States from which the export originated. However, much, if not most of the procurement of which evidence will be available, will be found to pertain to equipment and material not subject to export controls anywhere. The material must therefore be handled responsibly. The IAEA and UNSCOM are consulting on guidelines for the handling of this documentary material and other such material that may be secured in Iraq. Some time will be needed simply for translation and analysis. As the inspections take place under a mandate from the Security Council, it goes without saying that any directive which the Council may adopt, would be followed.

Just as the evidence concerning a broad based Iraqi international procurement programme raises questions regarding the effectiveness of various international efforts to prevent trade in nuclear weapons relevant equipment, the uncovering of the undeclared facilities for uranium enrichment has led to public criticism of the safeguards system linked to the NPT, as presently organized.

The lessons from Iraq are almost written on the wall. No inspection system can blindly grope for undeclared facilities. In the case of Iraq information secured by Member States has been made available to the inspecting teams, thereby leading them with great success to sites deserving inspection.

At the request of the Board of Governors of the IAEA I am now preparing a proposal for a mechanism and a procedure in the IAEA through which Member States may make information available to a special secretariat unit in the IAEA regarding the possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in NPT States. If such information is deemed credible, the Secretariat may request a special inspection to verify it. Should the State in question decline such an inspection, the Board of Governors could, in the last instance, submit the matter to the Security Council. The inspectorate cannot force its way to an inspection and even the Board of Governors does not dispose of powerful sanctions. If enforcement were to be needed, the right to bring it about is vested in this Council.

In a world of accelerating nuclear disarmament and universal or near universal adherence to non proliferation agreements, regional or global, it becomes even more important that confidence can be placed in the non proliferation pledges. Truly effective verification is indispensible. The procedure and mechanism which I have described would draw on the vast nuclear inspection experience and capacity which exists in the IAEA and which has been successfully used in Iraq. They would build on already existing rights of inspection under safeguards agreements and they could, in the last resort, be backed up by the Security Council.

With your permission, I would like now to make a few comments on the IAEA's plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of nuclear activities in Iraq. A great deal of consultation has taken place between the Agency and UNSCOM to ensure that the two plans are consistent. The far reaching provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 and 707 have necessitated correspondingly far reaching rights for the monitoring and verification. Indeed, so long as it is not absolutely certain that immediate on site verification has successfully uncovered and mapped all nuclear facilities, it will be vital to apply continuous extensive and intensive monitoring and verification.

On one minor point I should like to introduce a correction in the Agency's draft. In paragraph 18 it is stated that the "Agency will continue to provide information concerning the conduct and results of Agency inspections and related activities in order to assist the Special Commission in carrying out this task." It should be corrected to read "its tasks under resolution 687, in particular the task to designate sites for nuclear inspection." It is obviously especially important that results from nuclear inspections under Agency authority should be fed back to the Commission to assist it in its task of making further designations.

The last point I should comment on is the duty of the IAEA under resolution 687 to prepare for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items which Iraq is forbidden to retain under resolutions 687 and 707. In compliance with paragraph 13 of resolution 687 a plan was submitted to the Council on this matter on 16 May 1991 (document S/22615). In implementation of this plan, which we have assumed is acceptable to the Council, arrangements are underway for the removal from Iraq of its declared nuclear weapons usable material. I expect that the fresh fuel will be removed from Iraq within the next month and the irradiated fuel provided that funds are available toward the end of the year. Arrangements are also underway for the destruction under Agency supervision of equipment and material which is evidently and directly linked to the items prohibited under paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). This includes equipment such as that covered in the electromagnetic isotope separation programme, the centrifuge programme, weaponization activities, etc. Plans regarding destruction or rendering harmless of buildings of the facilities related to the programme may be submitted to the Council as a supplement to the Agency May plan.

One nuclear capacity that remains in Iraq are the many well trained scientists and engineers, and this was part of the reason for the effort during the sixth inspection to identify the scientific and technical cadres involved in the clandestine Iraqi nuclear programme. However, it should be possible to ensure through close future ongoing monitoring of nuclear activities in Iraq that this wealth of talent and skill will be used only for peaceful purposes.