Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
DIA MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA INTSUM 37-91/13 JAN 91. (U)
Filename:72928819
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 28819
GENDATE: 950605
NNNN
TEXT:
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX284 MCN = 91014/00948 TOR = 910140113
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7775 0140111- --RUEALGX.
ZNY
HEADER P 140111Z JAN 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 131850Z JAN 91
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//JSI-6C//
TO AIG 947
AIG 11841
RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT//CCJ2//
RUDCHAA/ARCENT MAIN//G2//
RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT//IN//
RHIPAAA/NAVCENT RIYADH SA//N2//
RHIHDAA/SOCCENT DEPLOYED//G2//
RHIIMAA/COMUSMARCENT//G2//
RUAJMAJ/COMNAVFORJAPAN POST YOKOSUKA JA
[ (b)(2) ]
BT
[ (b)(2) ]
SECTION 01 OF 04
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY SUBJ: DIA MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA INTSUM 37-91/13 JAN 91. (U)
))
[ (b)(2) ]
))
IRAQ: AIR FORCE CAPABILITY TO DELIVERY CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
AS OF 4 JAN 91
))
MAJOR POINTS
))
1. SHOULD SADDAM HUSAYN DECIDE TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST
DESERT SHIELD FORCES, THE IRAQI AIR FORCE WOULD PLAY A CRITICAL
ROLE. IT WOULD USE PRIMARILY SU-22/FITTERS AND MIG-23/FLOGGERS TO
DELIVER 250- AND 500-KG BOMBS, SUPPLEMENTED BY
HELICOPTER-DELIVERED
ROCKETS AND AEROSOL SPRAYS.
2. PERSISTENT AND NONPERSISTENT AGENTS WOULD BE USED AGAINST
KEY MILITARY TARGETS, SUCH AS AIRFIELDS, COMMAND POSTS, AND
LOGISTIC/TROOP CONCENTRATIONS NEAR THE FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS. THE
AIR FORCE ALSO MIGHT ATTEMPT TO STRIKE KEY MILITARY OR ECONOMIC
TARGETS IN REAR AREAS WITH PERSISTENT AGENTS.
))
DISCUSSION
))
3. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE GAINED VALUABLE EXPERIENCE IN CHEMICAL
WARFARE DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, WHEN IT CONDUCTED NUMEROUS
CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST IRANIANS AND KURDS. THE FIRST KNOWN USE
OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY THE AIR FORCE OCCURRED IN AUGUST
1983,
WHEN SU-22/FITTERS ATTACKED IRANIAN TROOPS IN THE NORTHERN
IRAN-IRAQ BORDER AREA. BETWEEN 1983 AND 1988, THE AIR FORCE
CONDUCTED AT LEAST 10 MAJOR INCIDENTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPON USE,
INVOLVING MORE THAN 100 AIRCRAFT SORTIES. ALTHOUGH AIRCRAFT ARE
JUST ONE OF SEVERAL CHEMICAL DELIVERY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE
IRAQIS, AIRCRAFT ARE IRAQ'S ONLY MEANS OF ACCURATELY DELIVERING
CHEMICAL WEAPONS BEYOND ARTILLERY RANGE.
))
4. AIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND MUNITIONS. IRAQI SU-22/FITTERS
AND MIG-23/FLOGGERS CONDUCTED MOST OF THE AIR-LAUNCHED CHEMICAL
ATTACKS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IRAQ ALSO USED SEVERAL OTHER
AIRFRAMES, FIXED-WING AND HELICOPTER, FOR DELIVERING CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. A COMPLETE LIST FOLLOWS AND SHOWS THE ORDNANCE USED TO
DELIVER AGENTS.
))
AIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS
AIRCRAFT BOMBS ROCKETS SPRAY TANKS CANISTERS
--FIXED WING
SU-17/22/FITTER X
MIG-23/FLOGGER F X
SU-25/FROGFOOT X
MIRAGE F-1(PROB EQ5/16) X
PC-9(AND POSSIBLY PC-7) X
TUCANO X
--HELICOPTERS
MI-26/HALO POSSIBLY POSSIBLY
MI-8/HIP C POSSIBLY X POSSIBLY
MI-24/25/HIND(POSSIBLY) POSSIBLY POSSIBLY POSSIBLY
))
5. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE ALSO COULD EMPLOY OTHER AIRCRAFT IN ITS
INVENTORY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
6. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, 250- AND 500-KG BOMBS WERE THE
PREFERRED CHEMICAL ORDNANCE IRAQI AIRCRAFT DELIVERED. FLOGGER F'S
AND FITTERS DELIVERED 250-KG BOMBS FILLED WITH MUSTARD AND TABUN.
FITTERS, AND PROBABLY FLOGGERS, DELIVERED 500-KG MUSTARD-FILLED
BOMBS. IRAQ MAY HAVE DEVELOPED THE CAPABILITY TO USE CLUSTER
BOMBS,
SOME OF WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH CHEMICALS SINCE THE END OF
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IRAQI HELICOPTERS DROPPED 55-GALLON DRUMS
FILLED
WITH UNKNOWN CHEMICAL AGENTS (PROBABLY MUSTARD) ONTO FORCES FROM
ALTITUDES OF 3,000-4,000 FEET. SPRAY SYSTEMS MOUNTED ON THE MI-
8/HIP HELICOPTERS ALSO WERE USED AGAINST TROOP CONCENTRATIONS.
IRAQ
OUTFITTED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF HIPS WITH TWO SPRAY TANKS ON THEIR
UNDER SIDE, EACH WITH A VOLUME OF 1,000 LITERS. A BO-105, REPORTED
NEAR BASRAH IN APRIL 1988, CARRIED A PROBABLE CHEMICAL SPRAY TANK
ATTACHED TO THE EXTERIOR NEAR THE COCKPIT; HOWEVER, BO-105 USE FOR
DELIVERING CHEMICAL ORDNANCE REMAINS UNCONFIRMED. FINALLY, IRAQ
USED 90-MM AIR-TO-SURFACE ROCKETS FILLED WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS,
POSSIBLY FIRED BY MI-24/25/HINDS, AGAINST IRANIAN TROOPS.
))
POSSIBLE AIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS
AIRCRAFT BOMBS SPRAY TANKS CANISTERS
--FIXED WING
SU-24/FENCER X
MIG-25/FOXBAT X
TU-22/BLINDER X X
TU-16/BADGER X X
L-29/39/ALBATROS X
IL-76/CANDID X X
AN-24/COKE X X
AN-26/CURL X X
AN-12/CUB X X
AN-2/COLT X
--HELICOPTERS
SA-342/GAZELLE X X
MI-2/HOPLITE X X
BO-105 X X
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
7. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE'S EARLY USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROVED
INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF POOR EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES AND UNFAVORABLE
WEATHER. IRAQ INITIALLY EMPLOYED THE SAME TACTICS IT USES FOR
DELIVERING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND DID NOT FACTOR IN TERRAIN AND
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION,
HUMIDITY, AND TEMPERATURE. PILOTS DELIVERED CHEMICAL ORDNANCE AT
ALTITUDES TOO HIGH TO BE EFFECTIVE OR TOO LOW FOR BOMB FUSES TO
FUNCTION PROPERLY, PREVENTING BOMBS FROM DETONATING. THE IRAQIS
LATER CORRECTED THESE PROBLEMS BY IMPROVING DELIVERY TECHNIQUES
AND
BY USING IMPACT FUSES.
))
IRAQI AIR-DELIVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
TYPE BOMB TABUN SARIN GF MUSTARD DUSTY MUSTARD
100-KG GENERAL-PURPOSE X
250-KG GENERAL-PURPOSE X X X X X
500-KG GENERAL-PURPOSE X X X X X
90-MM ROCKETS X X
SPRAY TANK POSS. POSS. POSS.
))
8. AIR FORCE CHEMICAL USE OPTIONS AGAINST DESERT SHIELD
FORCES. IRAQ MIGHT USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEFENSIVELY IN IRAQ OR
NORTHERN KUWAIT IF AN ALLIED OFFENSIVE FORCED THEM TO LOSE GROUND.
DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IRAQ INITIALLY EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
IN CONJUNCTION WITH DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH, BY LATE 1987,
SADDAM HUSAYN EXTENDED THEIR USE TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. SADDAM
HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AGAINST
CIVILIANS AS IRAQ CONDUCTED CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE KURDS IN
NORTHERN IRAQ IN MARCH 1987.
9. SINCE THE 2 AUGUST 1990 INVASION OF KUWAIT, POSSIBLE
CHEMICAL MUNITION HANDLING HAS BEEN REPORTED AT SEVERAL IRAQI
AIRFIELDS. THIS ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE POSSIBLE POSITIONING OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AIRBASE ORDNANCE BUNKERS FOR AIRCRAFT
STATIONED
THERE TO USE. NO ACTIVITY HAS BEEN REPORTED SINCE OCTOBER 1990. AS
MOST OF THE AGENTS HAVE A SHORT SHELF LIFE, RENEWED PRODUCTION AND
SUBSEQUENT DISTRIBUTION TO MAIN OPERATING BASES SHOULD TAKE PLACE
SOME TIME IN JANUARY 1991.
))
POSSIBLE CHEMICAL ACTIVITY
AIRFIELD MONTH (1990)
KIRKUK OCTOBER
QAYARRAH WEST OCTOBER
TALLIL OCTOBER
MOSEL SEPTEMBER
TAQADDUM SEPTEMBER
SHAIBAH AUGUST
UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRAH AUGUST
))
10. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE MOST LIKELY WOULD DELIVER CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS AGAINST DESERT SHIELD FORCE TARGETS BEYOND ARTILLERY
RANGE (24-32 KM). LIKELY TARGETS INCLUDE NORTHERN SAUDI AIRFIELDS,
TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES, AND LARGE TROOP
CONCENTRATIONS AND LOGISTIC AREAS WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT BASED IN SOUTHERN IRAQ. IRAQ QUITE LIKELY WOULD
STRIKE SHORTLY AFTER SUNRISE, WHEN LOW TEMPERATURES AND LOW WINDS
MAKE THE EFFECTS OF CHEMICALS STRONGEST. BASED ON RECENT GROUND-
ATTACK TRAINING AND TACTICS EMPLOYED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE
IRAQIS ARE LIKELY TO ATTACK WITH ONE TO FOUR TWO-SHIP OR FOUR-SHIP
FORMATIONS SPACED 1 TO 5 MINUTES APART, POSSIBLY SUPPORTED BY AIR
INTERCEPTORS AND ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURE AIRCRAFT. CHEMICAL AIR
STRIKES WOULD AIM TO LIMIT ALLIED OPERATIONS FROM KEY MILITARY
FACILITIES, INFLICT LARGE NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES IN A SHORT TIME,
AND BREAK THE WILL OF DESERT SHIELD FORCES TO FIGHT.
11. LIKELY AIRFIELD TARGETS INCLUDE DHAHRAN, KING FAHD, AND
KING ABDUL AZIZ, AS EACH HAS LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT. THESE AIRFIELDS ARE LOCATED ALONG THE PERSIAN GULF COAST
WITHIN 300 NAUTICAL MILES OF IRAQI FORWARD-DEPLOYMENT BASES IN
SOUTHERN IRAQ. IRAQI STRIKE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT REQUIRE AERIAL
REFUELING AND COULD INGRESS AND EGRESS OVER THE PERSIAN GULF AT
LOW
ALTITUDES TO AVOID DETECTION, USING THE COASTLINE FOR VISUAL
NAVIGATION. STRIKE AIRCRAFT ALSO COULD ATTEMPT TO INGRESS OVER THE
PERSIAN GULF, USING CIVILIAN FLIGHT CORRIDORS OVER IRANIAN
AIRSPACE
TO PROVIDE MASKING. A STRIKE PACKAGE AGAINST SAUDI AIRFIELDS MOST
LIKELY WOULD CONSIST OF TWO TO FOUR FITTERS OR FLOGGER F'S, EACH
UPLOADED WITH FOUR OR SIX 500-KG BOMBS. THE AIRCRAFT WOULD ATTEMPT
TO ATTACK BELOW 1,000 FEET, IN LEVEL FLIGHT, AND AT SLOW SPEEDS TO
ENSURE ACCURACY. TWO MIRAGE F-1E'S, CARRYING MAGIC 1 AND R530 AIR-
TO-AIR MISSILES WOULD PROVIDE ESCORT. THE PACKAGE ALSO PROBABLY
WOULD INCLUDE TWO F-1'S CARRYING CAIMAN JAMMERS, AND AS-37 MARTEL
ANTIRADIATION MISSILES FOR SUPPRESSION OF AIR DEFENSES NEAR THE
AIRFIELDS. PERSISTENT OR SEMIPERSISTENT AGENTS WOULD BE AIMED AT
DISRUPTING ALLIED FLIGHT OPERATIONS, AS EQUIPMENT EXPOSED TO
AGENTS
WOULD REQUIRE DECONTAMINATION PRIOR TO USE, AND ALLIED GROUND-
SUPPORT PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE TO WORK IN PROTECTIVE CLOTHING.
12. TACTICAL COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
ALSO WOULD BE LIKELY TARGETS. IRAQ CONDUCTED CHEMICAL ATTACKS WITH
FITTER AIRCRAFT ALONG THE CENTRAL IRAN-IRAQ BORDER AND AT AL FAW
IN
1988 AGAINST IRANIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS. IRAQ PROBABLY
WOULD EMPLOY TWO TO FOUR TWO-SHIP FORMATIONS OF FITTERS AND
FLOGGERS, EACH CARRYING UP TO SIX 500-KG CHEMICAL BOMBS, AGAINST
SUCH TARGETS. DELIVERY WOULD BE AT ALTITUDES BELOW 1,000 FEET AT
LEVEL FLIGHT AND SLOW SPEEDS. NONPERSISTENT AGENTS, WHICH ARE MORE
VOLATILE THAN PERSISTENT AGENTS, WOULD INFLICT EXTENSIVE
CASUALTIES
IN COMMAND FACILITIES AND DEGRADE DESERT SHIELD COMMAND AND
CONTROL
AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.
))
PERSISTENCE OF BOMB-DELIVERED CHEMICAL AGENTS
AGENT TEMPERATURE (DEGREES C) DURATION (MINUTES)
MUSTARD 25 2,040 (1.4 DAYS)
10 8,310 (5.7 DAYS)
-5 40,800 (28.3 DAYS)
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
SARIN 25 30
10 75
-5 270
))
13. IRAQI AIRCRAFT ARE LIKELY TO TARGET LARGE TROOP
CONCENTRATIONS AND LOGISTIC AREAS. IRAQI FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND
HELICOPTERS CONDUCTED SUCH ATTACKS DURING THE WAR, MOSTLY IN SMALL
FORMATIONS OF TWO TO FOUR AIRCRAFT. ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS,
IRAQI FLOGGER AIRCRAFT, WHILE CONDUCTING CHEMICAL BOMBING MISSIONS
AGAINST IRANIAN TROOP FORMATIONS, RELEASED THEIR BOMBS IN A RANDOM
PATTERN AT AN ALTITUDE OF 9,000-12,000 FEET. IRAQ WOULD USE
PERSISTENT AGENTS AGAINST FORCE CONCENTRATIONS AND LOGISTIC AREAS
IN THE REAR, AND NONPERSISTENT AGENTS WOULD BE USED AGAINST
TARGETS
CLOSER TO THE FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS (FLOT). THE AIR FORCE WOULD
USE HIP HELICOPTERS FOR LOW-ALTITUDE CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST
DESERT SHIELD FORCE CONCENTRATIONS AND LOGISTIC AREAS CLOSE TO THE
FORWARD EDGE OF THE BATTLE AREA, WHILE IRAQI FLOGGERS, FITTERS,
FROGFOOTS, AND F-1'S WOULD OPERATE AGAINST TARGETS BEYOND
ARTILLERY RANGE.
14. ALTHOUGH LESS LIKELY, IRAQ COULD ATTACK DISTANT AIRFIELDS
OR OTHER DEEP MILITARY TARGETS. TARGETING AIRFIELDS AT TAIF,
TABUK,
AS WELL AS KEY MILITARY FACILITIES, SUCH AS HEADQUARTERS IN
RIYADH,
WOULD REQUIRE SUCCESSFULLY PENETRATING SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES INTO
SAUDI AIRSPACE AND COMPLETING A SOPHISTICATED CHEMICAL WEAPON
STRIKE. THIS WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT FOR THE IRAQI AIR FORCE,
ALTHOUGH SUCH AN ATTEMPT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED, ESPECIALLY IF IRAQ
WERE ON THE VERGE OF DEFEAT. A STRIKE PACKAGE WOULD BE SIMILAR TO
THAT NOTED ABOVE FOR NORTHERN SAUDI AIRFIELDS, ALTHOUGH A FORCE OF
F-1 BUDDY REFUELERS PROBABLY WOULD BE ADDED TO PROVIDE INFLIGHT
REFUELING TO THE FLOGGERS AND F-1'S EQUIPPED WITH REFUELING
PROBES.
IRAQ HAS AT LEAST 15 GROUND-ATTACK FLOGGERS MODIFIED WITH F-1
REFUELING PROBES FOR LONG-RANGE STRIKE MISSIONS.
))
IRAQI AIRCRAFT AND CHEMICAL WEAPON LOADS
MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD NORMAL BOMB LOAD
AIRCRAFT 500-KG 250-KG
SU-17/FITTER H 8 10 4 250-KG
MIG-23/FLOGGER F 6 8 4 250-KG
SU-25/FROGFOOT 8 16 4 250-KG
SU-24/FENCER 10 28 4 500-KG
MIRAGE F-1E4 4 (400-KG) 5 4 250-KG
))
15. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE'S CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL
ATTACKS AGAINST AREA TARGETS, SUCH AS TROOP ASSEMBLY AREAS, CLOSE
TO THE FLOT IS GOOD. ITS CAPABILITY TO ATTACK POINT TARGETS, SUCH
AS COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES, IS POOR TO MODERATE BECAUSE OF
THE NEED FOR ACCURATE LOW-ALTITUDE ORDNANCE DELIVERY. DEPENDING ON
SADDAM'S WILLINGNESS TO LOSE AIRCRAFT, IRAQ COULD MASS A LARGE
STRIKE PACKAGE OF OVER 40 GROUND-ATTACK AIRCRAFT IN AN ATTEMPT TO
PENETRATE DESERT SHIELD FORCE FORWARD AIR DEFENSES, ALTHOUGH NO
SUCH TRAINING HAS BEEN REPORTED AND THE IRAQIS RARELY EMPLOYED
MASSIVE ATTACKS IN THE PAST. FORWARD-DEPLOYED FORCES MIGHT HAVE
VERY LITTLE WARNING TIME BEFORE AN IRAQI AIRCRAFT CHEMICAL STRIKE.
WHILE DESERT SHIELD AIR DEFENSES WOULD SUCCEED IN DOWNING IRAQI
AIRCRAFT, SOME MIGHT PENETRATE BEYOND THE FORWARD DEFENSES. IRAN
ALREADY HAS DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING CHEMICAL
ATTACKS TO SOUTHERN IRAQI AIRBASES. CHEMICAL ORDNANCE MAY BE
STORED AT SEVERAL IRAQI AIRFIELDS SO IRAQI AIRCRAFT CAN BE
UPLOADED WITH CHEMICAL BOMBS QUICKLY ONCE SADDAM HUSAYN HAS GIVEN
THE AIR FORCE RELEASE AUTHORITY.
16. IRAQI CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT DEEP-STRIKE AIR ATTACKS
AGAINST DISTANT AIRFIELDS OR MILITARY HEADQUARTERS ARE LOW. AS
IRAQ
LACKS AIR SUPERIORITY UNDER VIRTUALLY ANY CONFLICT SCENARIO,
AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A VERY HIGH RATE OF ATTRITION FROM
DESERT SHIELD FORCES. SADDAM MIGHT NOT BE WILLING TO RISK LOSING
SEVERAL AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS; INSTEAD, HE MAY OPT TO USE LESS
ACCURATE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS. THE
AL
HUSSEIN AND AL ABBAS, IRAQ'S LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES
BELIEVED
TO BE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING CHEMICAL AGENTS, HAVE AN OPERATIONAL
RANGE OF 600 KM AND CIRCULAR ERROR PROBABILITY OF 2(PLUS) AND
3(PLUS) KM, RESPECTIVELY; THIS PROBABLY WOULD NOT ENSURE ADEQUATE
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATION AGAINST A POINT TARGET. NEVERTHELESS,
SADDAM
PROBABLY WOULD BE WILLING TO SUBJECT HIS AIRCRAFT TO THE RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH A DEEP STRIKE ONLY IF COALITION FORCES ARE ON THE
VERGE OF VICTORY.
17. IRAQI AIRFIELDS WITH SUSPECTED CHEMICAL MUNITION BUNKERS.
THE NUMBER IN PARENTHESES WITH THE AIRFIELD NAME INDICATES THE
NUMBER QF [ (b)(1) sec 1.3 (a)(4) ] BUNKERS AT THE AIRFIELD:
--MOSEL (1)
--QAYARRAH WEST AIRFIELD (1)
--KIRKUK AIRFIELD (1)
--AL TAQADDUM AIRFIELD (1)
--H-3 AIRFIELD (5)
--UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRAH AIRFIELD (2)
--TALLIL AIRFIELD (1)
))
OUTLOOK
))
18. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE'S SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCE IN EMPLOYING
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN MAKES IT LIKELY THAT IT WILL CONDUCT
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGAINST DESERT SHIELD FORCES, AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS
ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF IRAQI COMBAT DOCTRINE. THE AIR FORCE MOST
LIKELY WILL ATTACK TARGETS NEAR IRAQ TO MAXIMIZE THE PROBABILITY
OF
SUCCESS AND HELP ENSURE AIRCREW AND AIRFRAME SURVIVABILITY. EVEN
SO, IRAQI AIRCRAFT PROBABLY WILL BE SUBJECT TO A HIGH RATE OF
ATTRITION FROM DESERT SHIELD FORCES' SOPHISTICATED AIR
INTERCEPTORS
AND GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. NONETHELESS, IF SADDAM IS
DETERMINED TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, HE WILL RISK LOSING
AIRCRAFT
TO DELIVER THEM, AS AIRCRAFT PROVIDE IRAQ ITS ONLY MEANS FOR
ACCURATELY DELIVERING AGENTS AGAINST TARGETS BEYOND ARTILLERY
RANGE.
[ (b)(2) ]
))
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
ADMIN [ (b)(2) ])
BT
#7778
INFODATE: 0
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
