Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
IIR 6 899 0076 91/IRAQI NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL
Filename:68990076.90r
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 33265
GENDATE: 950504
NNNN
TEXT:
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX561 MCN = 90292/19842 TOR = 902921126
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS1300 2921127- --RUEALGX.
ZNY
HEADER P 191127Z OCT 90
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEDADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
RUFTAKA/CDR USAINTELCTRE HEIDELBERG GE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE
RUETIAQ/MPCFTGEORGEGMEADEMD
[ (b)(2) ]
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL //CARA//
RUWSMXI/MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RHEPAAB/TAC IDHS LANGLEY AFB VA//IDHS//
[ (b)(2) ]
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
RUFTAKA/USA INTEL CENTER HEIDELBERG GE
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N24/N22//
RHFPRWO/RWO RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN/IV/SP//
RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 191021Z OCT 90
FM [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
TO TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//OICC/ITF/DAT-6// PRIORITY
RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT//CCJ2// PRIORITY
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/JIC// PRIORITY
BT
CONTROLS
SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 899 0076 90.
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY COUNTRY: IRAQ (IZ); [ (b)(2) ]
SUBJECT: IIR 6 899 0076 91/IRAQI NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL
ACTIVITY AND DELIVERY/DESERT SHIELD (U)
WARNING: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
-
- --------------------
-
- DEPARTENT OF DEFENSE
-
- --------------------
-
DOI: (U) 901011.
REQ: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
SOURCE: A. (U) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
B. (U) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
SUMMARY: IRAQI CHEMICAL CAPABILITY REPORTEDLY MAY
NOT/REPEAT MAY NOT HAVE OVERCOME PROBLEMS OF AGENT
DELIVERY, AND IRAQ IS ASSESSED TO BE AT LEAST TWO YEARS
FROM DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR DEVICE.
TEXT: 1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SAID THAT IRAQ HAD
NOT USED
CW NOR MISSILES SINCE LATE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. THOUGH
CAPABLE OF PRODUCING AGENS LIKE SARIN, SOMAN, AND TABUN,
IRAQ HAD NOT OVERCOME MANY OF THE PROBLEMS OF AGENT
DELIVEY. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] COULD NOT CONFIRM OR
DENY THAT IRAQ
HAS BINARY WEAPON. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] PERSONAL VIEW
IS THAT IRAQ
DOES NOT/REPEAT NOT HAVE THEM. EVEN IF IT DID, DUE TO
DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTRED IN BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPON
TECHNOLOGY, SOURCE ASSESSED THAT IRAQ WOULD PROBABLY HAVE
TO REPORT SPREADING AGENTS FROM CANISTERS SUSPENDED
FROM AIRCRAFT. FURTHERMORE, SOURCE THOUGHT THAT IN ORDER
TO UPLOAD SCUD MISSILES WITH ANY KIND OF CHEMICAL
WARHEAD, IT WOULD REQUIRE THE ASSISTANCE OF FOREIGN
ADVISERS.
2. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
3. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
4. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
5. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
- -
//IPSP: (U) PGW 2650//.
//COMSOBJ: (U) 211//.
ADMIN PROJ: (U) NONE.
INSTR: [ (b)(2) ]
PREP: (U) [ (b)(6) ]
ACQ: [ (b)(2) ]
WARNING: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
BT
#1300
INFODATE: 0
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