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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

b_0001.txt
               [DECLASSIFIED 10 OCT 1995]
STATUS OF ACTION VIEW
Combined Action Number: 00495
Originator:              J4
Subject:                 CBR INFO IN SUPPORT OF                      
                         DESERT SHIELD                      
    on Agency:           J-4
Coordinating Agency:     J-2
					J-5
                         SVCS
Action Assigned Day:     04
Action Assigned Hour:    2230
Action Assigned Month: 	SEP
Action Assigned Year:    90                                  
Suspense Day:            05
Suspense Hour:           1600 Local                  
Suspense Month:          SEP
Suspense Year:           90
Available Field
Keyword Field:                              
Implementer:             INFO PAPER
Implementer Day:         00
Implementer Hour:        0000
Implementer Month:
Implementer Year:        00
Classification:          
Remarks:                 J-4 ASSIMILATE CBR INFORMATION FROM 					J-2/J-5 AND SERVICES AND SUBMIT TO 					VCCAT AS INFORMATION PAPER.
                         DATA REQUIRED AS IDENTIFIED IN 						ATTACHED J-4 MEMO.
ID:                      CA2
CURRENT DATE:            09/04/90
TIME OF DAY:             18:35
CREATION ID:             CA2
CREATION DATE:           09/04/90
CREATION TIME:           18:35
			[DECLASSIFIED 17 NOV 95]
4 SEP 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR CAT:
Subject: CBR Information in Support of Desert Shield
1. Request the following information be provided to the J-4 LRC via the CAT:
	a. For J-5: "Status of Chemical Decontamination 				capability in AOR. Are there shortages in 				equipment/chemical units?
		If so, what are they?"
	b. For J-5/J-2: "What would be the most viable work-			around for key local national logistical workers 			(civilian port operators - air & sea, truck 				drivers and fuel depots) if hit by chemical 				attack? Is there a range limit where certain 			facilities are considered vunerable and others
		safe? Does CINCCENT or Saudi Arabia have a plan 			for continuity of operations for key civilian 			facilities in case of chemical attack?
2. It is requested that the information be provided to the J-4 LRC by 1200, 5 September 1990.
[  EXEMPTION (b)(6)  ]
J-4 LRC Team Chief
			[DECLASSIFIED 17 NOV 95]
          THE JOINT STAFF
       LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE              
      WASHINGTON DC 20318-4000 
6 SEPTEMBER 1990
VIA DDPAR
VDL
TO: DL
SUBJ: Desert Shield Chemical/Biological
Warfare Information
1. This responds to your question about
chem/bio warfare capability for Desert
Shield.
2. Enclosed is an information paper
summarizing inputs we received from J-2
(Atch l) and J-S (Atch 2).
Very Respectfully,
[  EXEMPTION      
     (b)(6)   ]
Team Chief, J-4 LRC
Attachments
  [DECLASSIFIED 10 OCT 1995]
5 September 1990
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject: Desert Shield Chemical/Biological Warfare Information
1. Purpose: Provide DL requested information on US/Saudi
chemical/biological (CB) warfare capability.
2. Key Points:
DIA says all civil/military logistics nodes in Saudi
Arabia (ports, airfields, fuel depots, troop bases,
industries) [  EXEMPTION (b)(1)   ].
Iraqi uses bombs, artillery, rockets, and ballistic
missiles. Effective area saturation with SCUD missiles
questionable due to poor accuracy, no operational
testing, limited number of warheads. Aerial delivery
depends on ability to penetrate US/Saudi defenses.
US forces have adequate personnel and area decon
capability.
Personnel have individual decon kits.
Services have variety of area decon equipment--use
	mainly hot, soapy water and decon agents (DS2, STB,
	Chlorine Bleach). Army and Marines use some of same
	equipment. Air Force and Navy have specialized
	equipment.
Saudi Arabia has [  EXEMPTION (b)(1)  ].
They're asking nations for equipment and help (i.e., UK sending 20K protective suits and 20 instructors for training, ordered 450K masks from Germany).
Civilian workers/facilities [  EXEMPTION (b)(1) ].
Saudi developing civil defense plan to get equipment, decon stations, and training--to protect water/power plants, hospitals.
Prepared By: [  EXEMPTION (b)(1)   ]
Sustainability Desk, J4-LRC
INTERNAL STAFF PAPER                      Classified By: J5, J2
RELEASE COVERED BY JCS MOP 39             Declassify On: OADR
[DECLASSIFIED 19 OCT 95]
JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM
TO 		CLASSIFICATION 		ACTION NUMBER       ORIG 										  SUSPENSE
 J-4 						00495
											CJCS 							ACTION		  SUSPENSE
THRU							APPROVAL
       VCCAT					SIGNATURE			SJS 								INFORMATION	  SUSPENSE
SUBJECT
Chemical Information in Support of Desert
Shield
ACTION SUMMARY
1. (U) Purpose. To respond to the CAT tasking for an information paper* on chemical information in support of Desert Shield.
2. (U) Discussion
a. (U) Decontamination capabilities of US forces are in two main areas: personnel and area.
b. (s) All Air Force and Army units deployed have individual decontamination kits. This kit is for individual and personal equipment decontamination.
c. (S) Various area decontamination units are available for US forces which use both decontaminants and hot soapy water.
d. (S) Protection of workers at civilian facilities and contamination workarounds are the responsibility of the Saudi Arabian government. [  	EXEMPTION  (b)(1)                           		].
3. (S) Bottomline: Decontamination capability for US forces is available. [  EXEMPTION (b)(1)  ] Saudi
Arabia is making inquiries to the US and other countries concerning the purchasing of individual protection.
4. (U) Recommendation. None. information onlv_
.
CAT DTC
J-5
ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE   [  EXEMPTION (b)(1)          ]
DATE PREPARED	CLASSIFICATION  Classified by Director, J-5
05 Sep 90 					Declassify on OADR
[DECLASSIFIED 19 OCT 95]
INFORMATION PAPER            
Subject: US Decontamination Capability for DESERT SHIELD
1. (U) Purpose. To provide information to the J-4 Crisis
Action Team on the US decontamination capability for DESERT
SHIELD.
2. (U) KeY Points
a. (U) Decontamination capabilities of US forces are in
two main areas: personnel and area.
b. (U) All deployed personnel are provided with personnel
decontamination kits, M258Al. This kit is for individual
and personal equipment decontamination.
c. (U) Area decontamination has a wider range of equipment
available to each Service.
(l) [
			EXEMPTION (b)(1)
									]
(2) [
			EXEMPTION (b)(1)
									]
(3) [
			EXEMPTION (b)(1)
									]
d. (U) Concept of decontamination is to use hot soapy
water to wash the contamination off large pieces of
equipment._ Decontaminants, DS2 and STB, are used by the
Army; these solutions are corrosive. Chlorine bleach
(household bleach) is an effective alternative for DS2 and
STB and is used with hot soapy water for many deconning
situations.
e. (U) Another effective deconning method is weathering;
the desert heat enhances any decontamination operations.
Classified by Director, J-S
Declassified on OADR
f.    Workarounds for key local national logistical sites
in the AOR are many and are being reviewed. These include
the use of coverings such as tarps and plastic sheeting,
which will reduce liquid contamintion.
g.     Civilian workers at key civilian facilities are
provided individual chemical protection and training by the
Saudi Arabian government. Basic personnel protection is
available [      EXEMPTION (b)(1)       
											].
Prepared by: [ EXEMPTION (b)(6)   ]
Nuclear/Chemical Div, J-5
[ EXEMPTION (b)(1) ], 5 September 1990
[        DECLASSIFIED 19 OCT 95           ]
TASKER1.047					 SUSPENSE: 09/05/90-1200                           
SERVER: CRISISl
Background Paper for J4
SUBJECT: CBW Threat and Saudi Arabian Civil Defense 
1. PURPOSE:  To provide the J-4 background information on the chemical and biological warfare (CBW) threat to Saudi Arabia and Saudi civil defense.
2. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:
a. [
				EXEMPTION (b)(1)
											]
[
			EXEMPTION (b)(1)
										]
[
			EXEMPTION (b)(1)
											]
b. [
			EXEMPTION (b)(1)
										] the [EXEMPTION (b)(1)] is sending Saudi Arabia 20,000 chemical and biological warfare (CBW) protective suits and 20 personnel to train Saudi forces.  In late August, the Saudis ordered 450,000 CBW masks from [EXEMPTION (b)(1)  ].  Suits, masks, and other protective equipment are likely to come from [                  
                 EXEMPTION (b)(1)      
                                                    ]. According to a recent Arab news article, the general in charge of Saudi Civil Defense has promised to supply gas masks to the general public as soon as possible.
c.  [                                                       
                    EXEMPTION (b)(1)                    ]
The plan includes obtaining protective equipment, decontamination stations, as well as training. The MOI CD is developing a plan to protect water desalination plants, electrical power plants, hospitals, and other public service organizations. They are also developing plans for decontamination stations, decontamination/filtration for water and other means to protect the public. A massive training program will also be required.                                                
3. (U) EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS:                                          \
   Specific information on Saudi Arabian contingency plans for a chemical attack against their logistical facilities is not available.[                                           
			EXEMPTION (b)(1)					].
COORDINATION: None.
PREPARED BY: [EXEMPTION (b)(6)]
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