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DTG: 281240Z NOV 90 [b.2.] SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO RII-1021; IZ CHEMICAL MUNITIONS 1. This assessment represents the best judgement of the most experienced and knowledgable CW analysts in the Intelligence Community. Realizing the potential implications of this assessment, it was not taken lightly. 2. DIA, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community believes that Iraqi unitary chemical munitions have a short shelf life -- a duration of 3-6 weeks is considered the norm. [b.1. sec. 1.5.c.] Iraq has been unable to produce high quality chemical agent in its production plants due to poor operating practice. [b.1. sec. 1.5.c.] nerve agent produced at Samarra is of poor quality. Sarin produced at Samarra has a purity of between 20 and 50 percent due to poor quality control of the chemical process as well as the precusor chemicals which are used. (By contrast, the extremely small amount of Iraqi labaratory produced Sarin has a purity level of 90 percent and retains its potent toxicity. 3. Due to the deficiencies of Iraqi chemical processes and the impurity of their chemical precursors, DIA continues to believe that all stock piles of Iraqi unitary chemical agents have a limited shelf life. 4. DIA has no information to substantiate the claim that the Soviets assisted the Iraqis with their chemical weapons production program. assistance [b.1. sec. 1.5.c.] rendered to the Iraqis would be contravened by poor operating practice. 5. Probably the majority of Iraqi chemical agents are filled into munitions, with a small reserve stockpile retained in bulk chemical form. 6. We believe the Iraqi binary agents are most likely the nerve agent sarin (GB) and GF. [b.1. sec. 1.5.a., e.] [b.1. sec. 1.5.c.]
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