SUBJECT: IRAQI BATTLEFIELD DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Department of the Army
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
Iraqi Battlefield Development Plan
Publication date: January 1994
Information cutoff date: June 1993
National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Preface
The regional battlefield Development Plan (BDP) series of
publications are being developed to serve as baseline threat
documents to support Army force modernization programs. The BDP is
produced in response to US Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) intelligence production requirements (IPR) CAC-91-C646-
001, CAC-93-C639-003, Headquarters Department of Army IPR DA-92-
C763-001, Army Materiel Command AMC-92-EJ-S-013. The BDP have four
basic purposes:
- To define the threat environment for combat developers and
training and doctrine efforts
- To serve as approved, authoritative, and standardized
baseline documents for preparation of System Threat Assessment
Reports
- To serve as a starting point and reference for preparing
high- and low-resolution scenarios
- To serve as a baseline reference in developing unclassified
threat studies.
This volume will present a current and forecasted estimate of
Iraqi strategy, operations, and tactics in 10, 15, and 20 year
increments, where possible. Trends in weapons acquisition and
force modernization also will be addressed for the same time
periods.
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
Four key assumptions were made at the beginning of the BDP
production effort. These assumptions were necessary to set
realistic limits to the subsequent analytical effort. it is
imperative that the reader understand these assumptions so as to
better appreciate our force modernization trends and projections.
The assumptions are:
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
An extremely important data source used in preparation of this
document was Iraqi military literature captured during the Gulf
War. This included manuals and copies of unit orders. Analysts
will continue to exploit this material, as it becomes available,
and will incorporate pertinent information into follow-on updates.
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
For purposed of clarity and conciseness, we have elected to use
a modified version the Decision Support Template (DST) and the
Synchronization Matrix to illustrate battlefield operating system
(BOS) integration in different tactical situations. These are
described in detail in Chapter 4 of FM 34-3, "Intelligence
Analysis." Because of time constraints, this particular iterations
of the IDBP has only one DST, and it is in section 7-2. As this
document evolves, however, more DSTs will be included to cover the
rest of the tactical scenarios, both current and projected.
For timely updating, the IBDP is organized in stand-alone
chapters. Each chapter will be updated on a yearly basis.
This study was prepared by the Iraq Team, Africa/Middle
East Division, Research and Analysis Directorate, US Army
Intelligence and Treat Analysis Center. It has been coordinated
with FSTC, AFMIC, HQ-TRADOC, MSIC, and the Army Staff. Informal
coordination has been done with DIA. Interpretation of
intelligence information in this publication represents the views
of USAITAC and may be subject to modification as a result of
subsequent information.
All comments and suggestions should be addressed to Commander,
US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, ATTN: IAITAC-RMC,
Building 213, Washington Navy Yard, Washington DC 20374-5085. Use
of DA Form 2028 is required when identifying corrections or
additions. Requests for copies of this document should be
coordinated as directed in AR 381-19. Intelligence Dissemination
and Production Support.
Executive Summary
Framing the Future
Predictions made for future military developments beyond 5
years cannot rely on a mere extension of current weapons
procurement practices or mainlining the existent force structure
with minor adjustments. A country's security environment changes
in response to evolving threats to its national interests. As it
adapts to the new threats, or makes changes to meet evolving
national security objectives, the military will alter its internal
structure and enhance different branches of its armed forces. To
provide a framework for assessing how the Iraqi military will
evolve, three distinct security environments were developed. The
security environments have the necessary flexibility to reflect
Iraqi adaptations of its defense policies to cope with a more
capable Iranian military and to develop the necessary forces for
the regaining of Kuwait and selected areas of Saudi Arabia. the
Treat environments are outlined below:
- From 1993 to 1997, the Iraqi military will be preoccupied
with containing Kurdish and Shiia insurgencies and repairing the
immediate damage done by the Gulf War; economic sanctions will be
lifted in 1994; since the insurgencies are currently ongoing, a
scenario was not developed to establish requirements; Iraq was
adjudged to be capable of eliminating the Kurdish insurgent
movement once the UN removes its protection over the sanctuary
areas
- From 1997 to 2006, the Iranians will be the threat benchmark
that Iraq will have to measure its capability against; the priority
for defense monies and scientific talent will be allocated or the
development of nuclear weapons and SSM delivery systems; Iraq will
have to establish, as a minimum, a deterrent capability to prevent
Iran from being the sore, Persian Gulf nuclear power; secondary
areas for modernization will include improving the quality of the
air force, an enhanced national and tactical air defense
capability, and ground force modernization focused on the
republican Guard (RGFC) and Regular Army heavy divisions; the
Iranian threat and the Iraqi response will have many of the same
characteristics of the war they fought in the 1980s.
- The Iranians will have improved capability for fire support
and more heavy divisions
- The Iraqis will exploit every geographic advantage to aid in
the construction of defensive obstacles and fighting positions; the
engineer effort to improve defensive works along the border is an
economy of force measure to help free Iraqi forces to conduct
counterattacks and to defend key areas in depth; area defense ill
be used to control, stop, or channelize the attacker and mobile
defenses to strike and defeat the enemy's committed forces
- Iraq will benefit from interior lines and being able to fight
from well constructed defensive positions in depth
- The iraqis will exploit the inherent mobility of their RGFC
and the Regular Army heavy divisions to contain and push back any
Iranian penetrations
- From 2006 to 2013, the Iraqis will concentrate their
modernization efforts on attaining the capability to retake Kuwait
and on seizing the northern portion of Saudi Arabia that includes
King Khalid Military City, the Tapline Road, and Rash al Khafji;
once gains are consolidated. Iraq will move quickly to seize the
coastal region south to Dahran and threaten Riyadh; modernization
efforts will be focused on the ground forces with particular
attention on tactical air defense, logistics, C3I, tanks, and
armored personnel carriers; the intent to regain Kuwait and render
Saudi Arabia unsuitable for coalition reinforcement represents the
most dangerous future; this extreme view was developed to establish
a series of signposts that identify the necessary force adjustments
needed to be undertaken to adopt this step; a detailed scenario was
developed to portray the Iraqi attack.
Recovery From Failure
Background. the Iraqi's military performance in the Gulf War,
thankfully, did not live up to pre-conflict assumptions that it was
an efficient, battle-hardened force. At the end of the war we were
left with resonant images of long columns of disheveled, Iraqi
prisoners and the material wreckage along the rad north of Kuwait
City, known as the "highway of death." The key question is the
Iraqi Armed Forces a poisoned chalice that is incapable of
effectively using the weapons they have or of conducting effective
combined arms operations? To help answer that question it is
useful to revisit the june 1967 War between Israel and its
principle protagonists--Egypt, Syria, and Jordan--and then contrast
that conflict with the greatly improved Arab performance in the Yom
Kippur War of 1973.
Similarities to the Past. Like the Gulf War, the june 1967 War
left the observer with powerful images of Arab military ineptness.
The wreckage of Egyptian columns caught by Israeli aircraft in the
Mitla Pass and soldiers throwing their boots away and fleeing into
the desert are remarkable similar to the scenes of the Iraqi Army
in defeat. Both ground campaigns were brief, lasting approximately
100 hours, and both left similar questions over the ability of Arab
armies to cope with the modern battlefield. Prior to the June 1967
War and the Gulf War, the Egyptian and Iraqi armies were rapidly
expanded without the time for any meaningful training to take place
or the establishment of internal unit cohesion. This expansion
seemed to be more of a political statement than a reasoned military
response. Iraqi units were sent to the Kuwait Theater of
Operations (KTO) with tanks with the wrong kind of ammunition and
vague guidance over whom to report to, or what their mission was.
Interrogations of captured Iraqi senior and junior officers
indicated that they did not believe that the war would occur and
that Sadddam would emerge with a cheap victory. In the case of
both wars, the Iraqis and Egyptians entered into them carried more
by emotion and faith in big numbers tan with a carefully crafted
plan.
Reform and Retribution. the results of the 1973 Yom Kippur War
presented another image of the Arab soldier. The Egyptians
surprised the Israelis by not only being able to cross the Suez
Canal, in broad daylight, but also by withstanding Israeli armor
counterattacks using infantry armed with ATGMs and RPGs. the
innovative engineering techniques used by the Egyptians allowed
them to quickly breach the 60-foot sand berm built on the bank of
the canal and move heavy armored formations across the 100-meter
wide Suez Canal. Although the Egyptians would later have their
bridgehead int he Sinai flanked by the Israelis and the Third
Army's bridgehead in danger of being cutoff, the improvement in
combat efficiency between the army of 1967 and the one of 1973
makes for an interesting case study in a Arab army's ability to
adapt. Listed are some of the major reasons for this improvement
in performance.
- Appointment of a charismatic and dynamic leader to prepare
the army for the retaking of the Sinai: LTG Saad El Shazly;
appointed as Chief of Staff to the General Headquarters, LTG Shazly
focused a great deal of effort on rebuilding the trust between
officers an soldiers and laid particular emphasis on ensuring his
subordinate commanders trained and developed the individual
soldier; he than constantly moved among his subordinate units
checking on progress
- tough realistic training with numerous live-fire exercises
and extensive use of training simulators, particularly for the
SAGGER ATG gunners; soldiers were encouraged to offer suggestions
for improvements in techniques and equipment; one imaginative
suggestion, provided by a junior officer, critical to the initial
success of the operation was the use of fire hoses and high-
pressure water pumps to breach the sand berm along the Suez Canal
- Undertaking an objective assessment of the weaknesses
associated with the army vis-a-vis the capabilities of the Israelis
and modifying plans and training accordingly.
The key component of the initial successes of the Egyptian Army
was not based on technology but rather on the efforts of well-
trained and motivated soldiers. Subsequent failure occurred when
the Egyptians were unable to adapt to changing battlefield
circumstances. They had planned for the Canal crossing, but were
not properly prepared to exploit their success.
Nonlethal Force Improvements
Components of Combat Efficiency. Acquisition of improved or
more capable armored vehicles, fire support systems, attack
helicopters, etc., will not result in a substantial improvement in
Iraqi battlefield performance unless accompanied by a
corresponding commitment to increase their efficient use on the
battlefield. The coefficients of greater battlefield effectiveness
needed to exploit the improved capabilities of new weapons
acquisitions include: improved tactical communications, target
acquisition and battlefield surveillance systems that can see
beyond 60km, realistic field exercises, increased use of training
simulators, and greatly improved logistical procedures including
the procurement of transport vehicles with high mobility. The most
significant reform necessary is the rebuilding of unit cohesion,
with particular emphasis on the establishment of trust and mutual
respect among the officers and soldiers. This will be most
difficult to attain because it engenders suspicion among the ruling
elite.
Impact of Geography. the Iraqis possess a very distinct
geographic advantage for the conduct of operations against Kuwait
City and the Saudi Arabia. They are not limited to an attack form
the area of Bashra, south to Kuwait City and the Saudi Arabian
border. They may attack form the west and then continue the
assault in a southeasterly direction toward Ras al Khafji. And
additional option is a supporting attack on Hafar al Batin and King
Khalid Military City. The Iraqis can introduce forces more quickly
onto the battlefield than can the Coalition. The combination of
these two factors make improvements in the Iraqis' ability to
surveil the battlefield in depth, visibility out beyond 50 to 60
km, and to logistically support heavy corps operations that
facilitate the conduct of nonlinear deep operations more dangerous
to regional foes. they will be better able to efficiently use
their heavy forces on the battlefield. Material acquisitions that
support improvements in either of these areas need to be carefully
monitored.
Two Armies. Maintaining two separate organizations, the RGFG
and Regular Army, to conduct ground offensive operaitons has a
corrosive ijpact on reform and military effectness. The creation
of an elete, loyal force armed with the best weapons is
characteristic of totalitarian regimes. However, in the case of
Iraq the number of divisions in the RGFC is excessive. The higher
pay, better equipage and presitve haracteristic of the RGFC puts
the main body of the Iraqi military, the Regular Army, in second-
class status. Concentrating the most capable systems and personnel
in units whose primary pupose is regime protection helps limit the
circumstances in which they would be committed to battle because if
the elite units were defeated, the regime would fall. Reducing the
size of the RGFC would be a significant step toward increasing the
overall cpapbility of the ground forces.
Weapons Procurement
Systems Mix. the Iraqi military has a wide varieity of
equipment from several different countries. forexample, their
artillery park has a mix of 11 differnet towed 152mm and 155mm guns
that use different ammunition, spare parts, and most importantly,
have varyuing capabilites. This one example hlps illustrate a
larger porblem the Iraqis currently have: a wide mix of sustms
within each battlefield operating system, each with different
capabilites and oerational limitations. This also makes miataining
the equipment trainig operators, and providing logistic support
complicated. Outlined are the general characteristics of their
weapons procurement process:
- Additional equipment is procured rather than establishing
support programs to keep existing systems operational and fully
functional on the battlefield
- Procurement is focused on acquisitions rather than on
developing programs that integrate existing systems with more
modest aquisiitons
- Buying a wide array of systems from different countries makes
training, maintenenace, and the keeping of suffiicent sapre parts
inventories difficult and cumbersome
- Equipment is procured with little regard to how its
capabilities or limitaitons affect current doctrine.
Impact of National Programs. the desire of Saddam to crate a
nuclear weapons program, extended-range ballistic missiles, and
chemical and biological weapons absorved a large percentage of
Iraq's available material and intelliectual cpapbility. The return
on the Gulf War battlefieid was minimal. regime concern wover the
Iranian nuclear effort will continue to give impetus to
continuation by the Iraqis of their own program. However, the
resources devoted to it will slow modernization in other areas.
Use of Objective Requirements
The arms procurement practices and continued emphasis on the
muclear program descrived help mitigate against the Iraqis making
the most out of monies invested defense. Arms procurement policies
need to be changed. Rather than replicate the the ratyher chaotic
Iraqi alpproach to procurment, objective requirements for
chateristics of weaposn systme, or specific shtems, are identified
int he BDP that meet thier requirtements for each battlefield
oeprqaing system. Objectiviety was introdu ed by placing thge
Iraqi military in a series of threat enviroments agains t specific
opponents throughout the develpement plans' period of coverage.
The Iraqis may choose to follow the path projected or not address
it at all. If a deficieny identified by the study is not fixed
then it becomes an explitable weakness. The use of objective
requirements hleps establish some relative values to Iraqi
procurements. The money and the bureaucratic skill needed to
refurbish the military is not inexhaustible and real improvements
will have to be the result of a more sophisticatged approach to
force modernization.
-----------------------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Executive Summary
List of Illustrations
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
List of Place Names
Chapter 1. National Military Policy and Military Doctrine
Key Judgements
1-1. Introduction
1-2. Threat Perceptions
1-3. National Policy Development and Effects on
the Military
1-4. Military Doctrine
1-5. Future Developments
1-6. Strengths and Vulnerabilities
Endnotes
Chapter 2. Force Structure
Key Judgements
2-1. Introduction
2-2. Ground Forces
2-3. Air Force
2-4. Air Defense Forces
2-5. NavaL and Coastal Defense Forces
2-6. Future Developments
2-7. Strengths and Vulnerabilities
Endnotes
Chapter 3. Force Generation
Key Judgements
3-1. Introduction
3-3. National Military Objectives and Reserve Units
3-4. Mechanics of Mobilization
3-5. Reconstitution of Army Reserve Component Units
3-6. Forecast Reserve Unit Organization and Equipment
3-7. Methods of Mobilization
3-8. Mobilization Timeliness
3-9 Conscription
3-10. Manpower Mobilization Pool
3-11. National-level Alert System
3-12. Civil Defense Training
3-13. Strengths and Vulnerabilities
Endnotes
Chapter 4. Special Topics: Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Warfare
Key Judgements
4-1. Introduction
4-2. Nuclear
4-3. Biological
4-4. Chemical
Endnote
SPECIAL TOPICS: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
Key Judgements
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the War with Iran and against the
Kurds shows it is willing to use this cpapbility as a combat
multiplier.
4-1. Introduction
a.
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
b. Following the Gulf War, UN inspection teams conducted
inspections of the Iraqi NBC programs in support of UN Resolution
687. The multinational UN inspection teams have been harassed,
intentionally deceived, and in several instances, denied access to
facilites or documents deemed essential to detgermining the extent
of Iraqi resarch and development.
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
c. [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
4-2. Nuclear
a. Background
(1) General. Iraq estrablished its program in the late
1960s when it acquired its first nuclear facilites. Later, in the
1970s, Iraq was unsuccessful in negotiations with France to
purchase a plutonium production reactor similar to the one used in
France's nuclear weapons program. In addition to the reactor, Iraq
also wanted to purchase the reporcessing plant needed to recover
the plutonium produced in the reactor. Even through these requests
were denied, France agreed to build the Osirak research reactor
along with associated laboratories. The Osirak reactor was
destroyed by an Israeli air strie in 1981.
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(2) Future Prospects
(a) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(b) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(c) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
b. Possible Delivery Options
(1) Missiles
(a) Background.
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(b) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
The Iraqis are expected to acquire a SSM capability to deliver a
nuclear warhead, but serious efforts cannot begin until UN
inspections are ended at an unknown future date
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(c) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(2) Aircraft
(a) Background.
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(b) [ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(3)
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
c. Future developments
(1) 10-Year Forecast
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
(2) 15-Year Forecast
[ (b) (1) sec 1.5 (c) ]
4-3 Biological
a. Background
(1) General
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)]
revealed an extensive fermentation capability, a
sophisticated biological weapons research effort, and a network of
facilities with the capabiolity for dual use.
(2)
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)]
(3) [ (b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)]
b. Utility. Biological agents, though generally slower
acting, van be effective in smaller doese than chemical agents.
Bolulinum toxin can kill with a few milliionths of a gram.
Symptoms do not occur for at least 12 hours, with death occuring
days later. The idsadvantage with using this toxin is that it
degrades within hours in sunlight. Bacillus anthracis dispersed as
spores, can cause pulmonary anthrax after inhalation. The spores
are hardy and can remain viable in the soil for years. These two
agents can be defeated by protective makss, vaccines, and
sanitiation measures. However, field detection devices are not
available for BW agents and samples need to be subjected to
examination to determine the presence of a toxin or pathogen. The
combination of the general characteristics discussed makes BW an
excellent weapon to use against a target population that does not
possess protective equipment or has not been inoculated. To have
use on the battlefied, the time between exposure and the onset of
dilapidating affects needs to be carefully integrated into the
overall scheme of maneuver. Three practical advantages exist for
the Iraqis to continue investing in developing and maintaining a
credible BW capability:
-- Fear of retaliation makes it possible to deter BW use
against Iraq by another regional power
-- BW weapons serve as an alternative to nuclear weapons
-- Having BW requires potential oppponents to expend resources
into taking appropriate countermeasures.
c. [(b) (1) sec. 1.5.(c)]
d. Future Developments
(1) 10-Year Forecast
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5.(c)]
(2) 15-Year Forecast
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)]
(3) 20-Year Forecast
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)]
4-4 Chemical
a. Background
(1) General
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5.(c)]
(2) The Iran-Iraq War. In 1982, early in the war, the
Iraqis used riot control agents to rpel Iranian attacks. In mid-
1983, mustard agents were used and , im March 1984, Iraq was the
first country to use a nerve agent in war, "tabun." Subsequently,
the Iraqis used the nerve agents sarin and GF.
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)]
b. Types of Agents
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5.(c)]
After the Gulf War, in compliance with UN R4esolution 687, the
Iraqis admitted to having sulfur mustard blister agent and nerve
agents: sarin (GB), tabun (GA) and GF. They admitted having done
research on the nerve agents soman (GD) and VX and acknowledged a
phosgene production facility used for conventional military
explosives production.
[(b) (1) sec 1.5. (c)]
c. [(b) (1) sec 1.5 (c)]
d. [(b) (1) sec 1.5.(c)]
e. Employment of Chemical Weapons
[(b) (1) sec 1.5. (c)]
(3) Agent Delivery Capability
[(b)(1) sec. 1.5. (c)]
f. Projected Capability
[(b) (1) sec. 1.5. (c)]
Endnote
1. On 3 April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
687, which outlines the requirments that Iraq must meet so that the
formal ceasefire can continue. A key component of the resolution
is the requirement that Iraq agree unconditionally to the
internationally supervised elemination of its weapons of mass
destruction. This includes all chemical and biological weapons,
stocks of agents, and all research, development, support, and
manufacturing facilities associated with thrse programs. A similar
prohibition exists for thre acquisituion and development of nuclear
weapoins. All ballistic missiles with ranges greater that 150 km
are also prohibited.
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