SUBJECT: Middle East Postcrisis Issues Middle East Postcrisis Issues (U) Number 1 This edition of Middle East Postcrisis Issues, the first in the the series, has three topics:I ù Military/Scientific and Tcchnical Issues. ù Political/Intecrnal Stability Issues ù Economic,/Industrial Issues. This edition will focus primarily on Iraqi mi1itary and political development and postwar reconstruction. Future editions will high1ight othcr key regional military, cconomic, and politlcal concerns. Articles in this issue include information as of 22 March 1991. [b.2.] Iraq's Chemical Warfare Capability: Lack of Use Durmg the War The major factors that precluded lraqi chemical wafare use wcre fear of Coalition retaliation and fundamental miscalculations the Iraqi Ieadership madc regarding how the Coalition would prosecute the war and how effechvely Iraqi forces could respond DIA has no evidence that chemical weapons were deployed to the Kuwaiti Theater of Oprations (KTO). Iraq probably feared Coalition retaliation and most likely bclieved that both Israel and thc Coalition would use chemical or nuclear weapons if provoked by Iraqi chemical attacks. Baghdad probably concluded that, since these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq, the cosequenccs of any chemical attack would be too severe to justify CW use; this may have led to an early dccision not to use chemicals. Equally likely, the Iraqis probably believed they would have days or even weeks to move chcmical wcapons into the KTO once the war began. Thus, the Iraqis miscalculated the Coalition speed of advance; the degree to which their Air Force, artillery assets, and surface-to-surface missile systems would bc attrited; and the degree to which their resupply capability would bc degraded. The Coalition air campaign eliminated Iraq's preferred means of chemical delivery (its Air Force) and made timely ammunition supply impossible. The air campaign also destroyed all known and suspctod CW storage in Iraq. In addition, Coalition bombing heavily damaged Iraq's command, control, cornmunications, and intelligence (C3I) systems. Iqaqi commanders could not control their forces, in part because of an intelligence system failure to evaluate the developing situation. Allied air superiority established at the start of the air campaign denied Iraq information on Coalition force dispositions, making fire planning practically impossible. The limitcd information available may have resulted in a decision not to disperse chernicals within the theater until the ground battle began and Coalition force dispositions became better defined. Destruction of Iraqi chemical weapon production facilities quite likely swayed the decision not to use chemicals. Chemical agents Iraq had produced earlier might have deteriorated in storage, or Iraq might have miscalculatod that its defenses would allow it time to produce and deploy chemicals later in the conflict. Loss of its production facilites would have prevented Iraq from making agents as necded, which was the practice during the Iran-Iraq war. Also likely, Saddam Husayn probably retained personal control of CW during DESERT STORM to allow more complete military evaluatins. In such a case, the speed of the Coalition ground offensive together with C3I problems would have complicated and slowed chemical release further. [b.6.]
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