IRAQ: POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE.
Filename:71726882
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 26882
GENDATE: 950605
NNNN
TEXT:
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX140 MCN = 91032/13061 TOR = 910321012
OTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2674 0321010- --RUEALGX.
ZNY
HEADER O 011010Z FEB 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
O 010600Z FEB 91
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//IRAQ REGIONAL ITF//
TO DIACURINTEL
RUDPMAX/FAISA FT BRAGG NC
RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STA VA
RUDPTOC/XVIII ABN CORPS INTEL CEN FT BRAGG NC
RUWJHRA/CDRUSAEPG FT HUACHUCA AZ
AIG 7011
AIG 7046
AIG 7033
RHMPOSP/SEVENTHFLT OSP
RHWZOSP/OSP EASTPAC
RHTMMCC/MMCC BCST
RHFTAAA/39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE
RHSEACR/CDR 2D ACR MAIN FWD
XMT CTF SIX ZERO
BT
CONTROLS
SECTION 01 OF 04
PASS: [ (b)(2) ]
SERIAL: DIM 37-91
BODY SUBJ: IRAQ: POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE.
DOI: 25 JAN 91
KEY JUDGMENTS
1. COALITION ATTACKS ARE STEADILY ELIMINATING IRAQ'S CHEMICAL
WEAPON PRODUCTION AND FILLING CAPABILITIES. BASED ON BOMB DAMAGE
ASSESSMENTS, A 40- TO 50-PERCENT DEGRADATION IN IRAQ'S CHEMICAL
PRODUCTION AND FILLING CAPABILITIES HAS BEEN REALIZED TO DATE.
2. IRAQ IS LIKELY TO RETAIN A SIGNIFICANT CHEMICAL WEAPON
STOCKPILE FOR SOME TIME, ALTHOUGH 1TS NERVE AGENT STOCKS ARE BEING
REDUCED BY SPOILAGE AND PROBABLY WILL BE MILITARILY INEFFECTIVE
AFTER 31 MARCH. IRAQ'S BINARY STOCKS AND BLISTER AGENTS WILL
REMAIN
TOXIC FOR A LONGER TIME.
3. THE PRINCIPAL THREAT OF CHEMICAL ATTACK IS FROM ARTILLERY
AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER FIRE AGAINST COALITION GROUND FORCES.
THE LIKELIHOOD THAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WOULD BE AIR DELIVERED HAS
BEEN REDUCED BY ALLIED AIR SUPERIORITY. IRAQ HAS TOO FEW SCUD
CHEMICAL WARHEADS TO SUSTAIN THEIR USE.
4. ATTACKS ON IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION AND WEAPONS
FILLING CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE CONTINUED. ELIMINATING FIRE SUPPORT
ASSETS AND CHEMICAL STORAGE AREAS AT GROUND FORCE DEPOTS IS THE
MOST EFFICIENT MEANS TO PREVENT TACTICAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
BACKGROUND
5. IRAQ HAS A SIGNIFICANT PRODUCTION CAPABILITY FOR BOTH NERVE
AND BLISTER AGENT WEAPONS. THE IRAQI CHEM1CAL WEAPON PRODUCTION
FACILITY AT SAMARRA HAS BEEN DAMAGED SERIOUSLY BY COALITION
AIRSTRIKES; THE LOSS OF TWO OF THE THREE FILL BUILDINGS AND THE
PARTS WAREHOUSES WILL GREATLY REDUCE IRAQ'S POTENTIAL TO REPLENISH
ITS CHEMICAL MUNITIQN STORES. FURTHER STRIKES AGAINST SAMARRA WILL
BE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE THIS CAPABILITY.
6. IRAQ IS NOT ABLE TO MAKE GOOD-QUALITY CHEMICAL AGENTS.
TECHNICAL FAILURES HAVE REDUCED THEIR PURITY AND CAUSED PROBLEMS
IN
STORAGE AND HANDLING. THIS IS A PARTICULAR PROBLEM FOR THE SARIN-
TYPE NERVE AGENTS (GB AND GF). THESE BOTH CONTAIN HYDROFLUORIC
ACID
(HF), AN IMPURI1.Y THAT ATTACKS METAL SURFACES AND CATALYZES NERVE
AGENT DECOMPOSITION. THIS LEADS TO METAL FAILURE AND LEAKS IN THE
AMMUNITION, INCREASING HANDLING HAZARDS. MUSTARD IS ALSO JUDGED TO
BE OF POOR QUALITY, BUT IT HAS LESS CORROSIVE IMPURITIES. LOWER
PURITY SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITS SHELF LIFE AND REDUCES TOXIC EFFECTS
WHEN THE MUNITION IS EMPLOYED.
7. IN WEAPONS WITH RELATIVELY SMALL FILL WEIGHTS, THE REDUCED
PURITY AND LOSS OF TOXICITY THROUGH DILUTION PROBABLY WOULD NOT
HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON THE WEAPON'S AREA OF COVERAGE. IN MUNITIONS
WITH LARGER FILL WEIGHTS (AERIAL BOMBS AND MISSILE WARHEADS), THE
WEAPON'S LOSS OF POTENCY COULD REDUCE CONTAMINATED AREAS
CONSIDERABLY. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS INCLUDING WEATHER AND TERRAIN
ALSO INFLUENCE THE EXTENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTAMINATION.
8. RECENT PRODUCTION. A CHEMICAL AGENT-WEAPONS PRODUCTION RUN
PROBABLY WAS CONDUCTED AT SAMARRA FROM MID-DECEMBER 1990 THROUGH
MID-JANUARY 1991. PERIODIC PRODUCTION RUNS ARE NEEDED TO REPLENISH
DETERIORATED NERVE AGENT STOCKS. THE IRAQI STOCKPILE'S TOTAL SIZE
IS NOT KNOWN, BUT IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED AT 300 TO 2,000 TONNES.
THE
LARGER STOCKPILE SIZE IS BASED ON A LARGE PROPORTION OF MUSTARD IN
THE INVENTORY.
9. THE NERVE AGENT RECENTLY PRODUCED SHOULD HAVE ALREADY BEGUN
TO DETERIORATE, AND DECOMPOSITION SHOULD MAKE MOST OF THE NERVE
AGENT WEAPONS UNSERVICEABLE BY THE END OF MARCH 1991. IRAQ'S
BINARY
STOCKS AND BLISTER AGENTS WILL REMAIN TOXIC FOR A LONGER TIME. THE
RECENT PRODUCTION RUN AT SAMARRA COULD HAVE RESULTED IN NEW STOCKS
OF BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS.
10. PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THE SAMARRA PRODUCTION COMPLEX,
CONTAINED IN AN AREA OF ABOUT 25 SQUARE KILOMETERS, IS THE WORLD'S
LARGEST CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION FACILITY. IT HAS FIVE
RESEARCH/PRODUCTION BUILDINGS, SIX PRODUCTION BUILDINGS, FOUR
PRODUCTION BUNKERS, THREE FILLING BUILDINGS, AND NUMEROUS SUPPORT
BUILDINGS. A STORAGE AREA HAS EIGHT CRUCIFORM BUNKERS WHERE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE HELD FOR SHIPMENT TO BUNKERS THROUGHOUT IRAQ
OR TO DEPLOYED FORCES. ALLIED BOMBING HAS DESTROYED SEVERAL OF THE
PRODUCTION AND MUNITION-FILLING FACILITIES.
11. SAMARRA IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING NERVE AND BLISTER AGENTS,
BINARY COMPONENT CHEMICALS, AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.
12. THREE PLANTS FOR PROBABLE CHEMICAL AGENT PRECURSOR
PRODUCTION HAVE BEEN BUILT NEAR THE HABBANIYAH-AL FALLUJAH AREA.
SOME OF THE HABBANIYAH PLANTS ALSO MAY BE ABLE TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL
AGENT OR BINARY COMPONENTS.
13. OTHER FACILITIES. OTHER CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION
FACILITIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED, BUT THE REPORTS ARE NOT CONSIDERED
CREDIBLE. IT IS POSSIBLE IRAQ HAS ESTABLISHED CLANDESTINE
PRODUCTION SITES INSIDE LARGE PRODUCTION COMPLEXES, SUCH AS THE AL
QAIM FERTILIZER PLANT, OR AT REMOTE OR EVEN UNDERGROUND LOCATIONS.
THESE POSSIBILITIES ARE CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. HIDING A CHEMICAL
AGENT PLANT IN A LARGE COMPLEX RISKS ITS DISCOVERY BY VISITORS.
THERE IS ALSO A RISK OF ACCIDENTALLY EXPOSING FACTORY WORKERS TO
CHEMICAL AGENTS. CLANDESTINE LOCATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO
ESTABLISH AND OPERATE WITHOUT DISCOVERY BECAUSE OF THE ACTIVITY
EVEN MINIMAL MAINTENANCE WOULD REQUIRE. ADDITIONALLY' THE IRAQIS
DEPEND ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR THEIR TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, AND
IT IS LIKELY THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD ADD TO THE RISK OF
DISCLOSORE.
14. CHEMICAL STOCKPILE. DIA ESTIMATES THAT MOST OF THE IRAQI
CHEMICAL STOCKPILE IS IN MUNITIONS, WITH A MODEST AMOUNT OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS STORED IN BULK. DIA ASSESSES THAT MOST OF IRAQ'S
CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE UNITARY; THEY HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH A
FINISHED CHEMICAL AGENT. BINARY WEAPONS ARE BEING INTRODUCED, BUT
THEY ARE BELIEVED TO BE A SMALL PART OF THE CURRENT STOCKPILE. THE
STOCKPILE INCLUDES NERVE AND BLISTER AGENT WEAPONS. BLOOD AGENTS
CANNOT BE RULED OUT.
15. MISSILE WARHEADS. IRAQ IS ASSESSED TO HAVE A LIMITED
NUMBER OF CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR ITS SCUD-B MISSILES AND POSSIBLY
FOR THE AL HUSAYN AND THE AL ABBAS MISSILES. A CHEMICAL WARHEAD
WOULD IMPROVE THE VALUE OF THESE INACCURATE MISSILES BY GIVING
THEM THE POTENTIAL TO CONTAMINATE LARGE AREAS. THE CHEMICAL FILL
WEIGHT FOR THE MISSILES HAS BEEN ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 550 KG FOR THE
SCUD-B, 80 TO 1U0 KG FOR THE AL HUSAYN, AND 200 TO 3U0 KG FOR THE
AL ABBAS.
THE EXTENDED-RANGE SCUD MISSILES GAINED RANGE IN PART BY REDUCING
THE MISSILE PAYLOAD. SIGNIFICANT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN GUIDANCE,
FUSING, AND AGENT STABILITY WILL CONTINUE TO LIMIT THEIR
EFFECTIVENESS, BUT THEY COULD BE USED AS TERROR WEAPONS AGAINST
CIVILIANS.
16. THE MOST EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL AGENT FILL FOR A MISSILE
WARHEAD IS A PERSISTENT AGENT. THE VX NERVE AGENT OR A THICKENED
AGENT OF ANY TYPE COULD BE USED TO ATTACK HIGH-VALUE DEEP TARGETS.
IRAQ'S BEST AGENTS FOR MISSILE WARHEADS ARE THE PERSISTENT BLISTER
AGENT MUSTARD AND THE SEMIPERSISTENT NERVE AGENT GF. VX IS A
POSSIBLE AGENT IN THE IRAQI INVENTORY.
17. AERIAL WEAPONS. AIRCRAFT ARE IRAQ'S ONLY MEANS TO DELIVER
CHEMICAL AGENTS ACCURATELY AT DISTANCES IN EXCESS OF ARTILLERY
RANGE. DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, ALL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING
HELICOPTERS, WERE USED TO DELIVER CHEMICALS.
18. IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED 90MM ROCKETS FOR ITS HELICOPTERS.
THESE PROBABLY ARE FILLED WITH MUSTARD, BUT THEY COULD CONTAIN ANY
AGENT.
19. AERIAL BOMBS ARE ESTIMATED TO BE THE MAJOR PART OF THE
IRAQI STOCKPILE. ABOUT 65 TO 75 PERCENT OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AGENT
STOCK IS ASSESSED TO BE IN BOMBS BECAUSE BOMBS CONTAIN LARGER
AMOUNTS OF AGENT THAN DO ARTILLERY SHELLS. IRAQI AERIAL BOMBS ARE
ESTIMATED TO HAVE 100 KG OF NERVE AGENT OR 120 KG OF MUSTARD IN
THE
500-KG BOMBS AND 50 KG OF NERVE AGENT OR 60 KG OF MUSTARD IN THE
250-KG BOMBS. ARTILLERY SHELLS CONTAIN AN ESTIMATED 1.5 TO 3.4 KG
OF AGENT.
20. GROUND DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IRAQ HAS DELIVERED CHEMICALS
USING ITS 130MM, 152MM, AND 155MM TUBE ARTILLERY AND 122MM
MULTIPLE
ROCKET LAUNCHERS. OTHER FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEMS COULD BE USED TO
DELIVER CHEMICALS. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF CHEMICAL
EMPLOYMENT BY ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES AND MINES.
21. OTHER AGENTS AND WEAPONS. IRAQ PROBABLY HAS FILLED
MUNITIONS WITH PARTICULATE CARRIERS IMPREGNATED WITH MUSTARD, ALSO
CALLED "DUSTY MUSTARD." WITH THE PARTICULATE CARRIER GROUND TO A
PREDETERMINED SIZE, THE "DUSTY" AGENT CAN PENETRATE THE NATO-TYPE
PROTECTIVE ENSEMBLE. OTHER POSSIBLE ITEMS IN THE IRAQI ARSENAL ARE
AEROSOL GENERATORS FOR AGENT DISSEMINATION AND SPRAY TANKS THAT
COULD SPREAD CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION FROM HELICOPTERS OR FIXED-WING
AIRCRAFT.
22. CONSEQUENCES OF BINARY INTRODUCTION. IRAQ IS CAPABLE OF
PRODUCING THE COMPONENTS AND CHEMICALS FOR BINARY CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS, BUT THE NUMBER OF BINARY WEAPONS IN INVENTORY IS
BELIEVED TO BE LIMITED. UNITARY MUNITIONS REMAIN THE PRIMARY
CHEMICAL WEAPON TYPE IN THE IRAQI INVENTORY. ONE OF IRAQ'S
MOTIVATIONS FOR DEVELOPING BINARY WEAPONS WAS TO MAKE CHEMICAL
AGENTS THAT ARE MORE STABLE IN STORAGE. BINARIES COMBINE TWO OR
MORE CHEMICALS IN A MUNITION TO PRODUCE A CHEMICAL AGENT. THE
CHEMICALS USED IN THE BINARY WEAPON ARE NOT CHEMICAL AGENTS AND
HAVE LOWER TOXICITY, SO THEY ARE EASIER TO PRODUCE WITH GOOD
QUALITY THAN UNITARY CHEMICAL AGENTS AND ARE SAFER TO HANDLE.
23. THE MOST LIKELY IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS TO BE USED IN BINARY
WEAPONS ARE THE NERVE AGENTS GB AND GF. BOTH ARE MADE BY THE
REACTION OF AN ALCOHOL WITH THE CHEMICAL DIFLUOROMETHYLPHOSPHONATE
(DF). GB IS PRODUCED BY THE REACTION OF ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL
(ISOPROPANOL) WITH DF; GF IS PRODUCED BY THE REACTION OF
CYCLOHEXYL
ALCOHOL (CYCLOHEXANOL) WITH DF. GF PRODUCTION IS MORE DIFFICULT IN
THE BINARY CONFIGURATION SINCE CYCLOHEXANOL IS LESS REACTIVE THAN
ISOPROPANOL. THE REACTION WILL TAKE LONGER AND MAY NEED TO BE
HEATED.
24. THE MOST LIKELY TYPES OF IRAQI BINARY WEAPONS ARE
ARTILLERY, MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MRLS), AND MISSILE WARHEADS,
ALTHOUGH ANY WEAPON CARRYING A CHEMICAL FILL CAN BE CONVERTED TO A
BINARY. GB IS THE MOST LIKELY FILL FOR THE ARTILLERY AND MRL
AMMUNITION. GF IS MORE LIKELY TO BE USED IN LARGER MUNITIONS, SUCH
AS MISSILES OR AERIAL BOMBS.
25. BINARY WEAPONS HAVE DISADVANTAGES THAT WOULD REDUCE THEIR
VALUE TO THE IRAQIS. A LARGE PART OF THE BINARY'S INTERIOR IS
FILLED WITH NONLETHAL COMPONENTS THAT HELP MIX THE CHEMICALS WHEN
THE WEAPON IS DELIVERED. THESE COMPONENTS ALSO HELP KEEP THE
CHEMICALS SEPARATED PRIOR TO USE. BECAUSE THE REACTION MUST TAKE
PLACE WHILE THE WEAPON IS EN ROUTE TO THE TARGET, THE REACTION
DOES
NOT CONVERT ALL THE DF TO A CHEMICAL AGENT WHEN THE ROUND HITS ITS
TARGET. THE ROUND CONTAINS A MIXTURE OF AGENT, UNREACTED DF,
UNREACTED ALCOHOL, HF, AND OTHER IMPURITIES WHEN IT REACHES THE
TARGET.
26. AN ADDITIONAL PROBLEM FOR THE IRAQIS MAY BE THE POOR
QUALITY OF THE DF THEY PRODUCE. THE SAME CHEMICAL ENGINEERING
PROBLEMS THAT HAVE LIMITED THE PURITY OF CURRENTLY PRODUCED AGENTS
ALSO COULD LIMIT THEIR DF QUALITY. DF IS MADE FROM AN
ORGANOPHOSPHORUS CHEMICAL AND HF. REMOVING THE HF IS DIFFICULT: IT
IS LIKELY THAT IRAQI DF CONTAINS HF, WHICH COULD CATALYZE
DECOMPOSITION.
27. DISTRIBUTION OF THE STOCKPILE. THE CHEMICAL STOCKPILE'S
LOCATION IS NOT KNOWN WITH CONFIDENCE. LIKELY STORAGE SITES ARE
THE
22 S-SHAPED BUNKERS DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT IRAQ AND THE 8
CRUCIFORM
BUNKERS AT SAMARRA. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ALSO COULD BE STORED IN THE REFRIGERATED BUNKERS LOCATED
THROUGHOUT IRAQ. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] VIRTUALLY ANY
IRAQI BUNKER LARGE ENOUGH TO ALLOW MUNITIONS THROUGH THE DOOR
COULD BE USED, AND, IF NECESSARY, CHEMICAL MUNITIONS SIMPLY COULD
BE STORED IN THE OPEN.
28. DIA ASSESSES THAT IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS,
THE STOCKPILE PROBABLY HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL SUPPORT
AMMUNITION DEPOTS WITH CHEMICAL STORAGE BUNKERS AND FIELD SUPPLY
AREAS FOR THE DEPLOYED UNITS. THE NORTHERN S-SHAPED BUNKERS
ASSOCIATED WITH AIRFIELDS STILL MAY CONTAIN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
29. DOCTRINE FOR CHEMICAL USE. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, THE
IRAQIS LEARNED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPDNS IN WAYS THAT MAXIMIZED
EFFECTIVENESS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY DISSEMINATED CHEMICAL AGENTS IN
THE MORNING RATHER THAN LATER IN THE DAY, WHEN HIGH TEMPERATURES
WOULD ACCELERATE EVAPORATION. TYPICALLY, THE IRAQIS WOULD DEPOSIT
PERSISTENT MUSTARD AGENT IN AN IRANIAN FORCE'S REAR AREA AND THEN
BOMBARD THE FRONT WITH A NONPERSISTENT NERVE AGENT (SARIN). TROOPS
FLEEING THE SARIN-CONTAMINATED AREA THEN WOULD BE EXPOSED TO
MUSTARD AS WELL.
30. IRAQ MIGHT ATTEMPT TO USE AIR ASSETS TO ATTACK TARGETS
BEHIND THE LINES, SUCH AS LOGISTIC STOCKPILES, PORTS, AND
AIRFIELDS. AIRFIELDS, IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BE CRITICAL TARGETS
BECAUSE OF COALITION AIR POWER. PERSISTENT CHEMICALS WOULD BE
EMPLOYED TO SUPPRESS AIRFIELD OPERATIONS. ATTACKS AGAINST NAVAL
SHIPS MIGHT BE ATTEMPTED BUT WOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EFFECT.
31. IRAQ USED CHEMICALS EFFECTIVELY IN THE 1988 OFFENSIVES
AGAINST IRAN. DURING THIS TIME, IRAQ EMPHASIZED SELECTIVE
SATURATION OF TARGETS WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS. BECAUSE IRAQ HAD THE
OPERATIONAL INITIATIVE, ITS FORCES COULD CHOOSE THE BEST WEATHER
AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS TO SELECT CHEMICAL TARGETS.
32. LATE IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, SADDAM HUSAYN DELEGATED THE
AUTHORITY TO USE CHEMICALS TO CORPS COMMANDERS, WHICH IMPROVED
RESULTS. THE DISCRETION OF THE GROUND FORCE COMMANDER MADE IT
POSSIBLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION FAVORED
CHEMICAL WEAPON USE, AND COMMANDERS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS
AUTHORITY.
33. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
34. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
35. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
36. IN RECENT DAYS, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HOWEVER,
IRAQ'S DIPLOMATIC
REPORTING REPEATEDLY WARNS OF THE INTENTION TO USE CHEMICALS
AGAINST THE COALITION, AND IRAQI RADIO RECENTLY ANNOUNCED ALLIED
CHEMICAL ATTACKS IN THE BASRA VICINITY. IT APPEARS THAT IRAQ MAY
BE LAYING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUNDWORK FOR ITS USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS.
37.[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
38. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
39.[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
40.[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
41.[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
42. PROSPECTS FOR CHEMICAL USE. IRAQ'S CHEMICAL CAPABILITY
REMAINS SIGNIFICANT. THIS CAPABILITY WILL DETERIORATE OVER TIME,
BUT IT WILL NOT BE ELIMINATED COMPLETELY. IRAQ RETAINS THE ABILITY
TO LAUNCH CHEMICAL STRIKES AT ANY TIME WITH ARTILLERY AND AIR
POWER, AND IT COULD USE CHEMICALS ON SOME OF ITS REMAINING SCUD-B
MISSILES.
43. IRAQ MAY BE SAVING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO LAUNCH A STRIKE
WITH ALL AVAILABLE ASSETS TO KILL AND INJURE COALITION FORCES.
SUCH
AN ATTACK MIGHT ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT AN ALLIED ATTACK OR MIGHT BE
PROMPTED BY IRAQ'S CALCULATION THAT IT IS FACING IMMINENT DEFEAT
AND HAS LITTLE TO LOSE. THESE OPTIONS COULD BE COUNTERED BY
DIMINISHING IRAQ'S CAPABILITY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS:
ELIMINATING ITS AIRFIELDS, MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND FIRE SUPPORT
ASSETS.
44. SADDAM EVIDENTLY BELIEVES THE US HAS BOTH A CHEMICAL AND A
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE THEATER, BUT DIA ASSESSES THAT THIS
WOULD
NOT DETER HIM FROM EMPLOYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION
FORCES. DIA JUDGES THAT SADDAM VALUES THE FORCE-MULTIPLICATION
CAPABILITY OF CHEM1CAL WEAPONS TOO HIGHLY TO FORGO THEIR USE IN
ANY
IMPORTANT COMBAT SITUATION WHERE THEY WOULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL
TACTICAL BENEFITS. CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE INTEGRAL TO IRAQ'S
MILITARY
DOCTRINE. CONSEQUENTLY, DIA ESTIMATES THAT:
--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
IN ANY DEFENSIVE SITUATION IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT WHERE THEY ARE BEING
PUSHED BACK BY AN ALLIED OFFENSIVE AND THEIR DEFEAT IS IMMINENT.
--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE VERY LIKELY TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTO TERRITORY DEFENDED BY US OR
OTHER ALLIED FORCES.
--IRAQ MAY USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO DISRUPT AN IMMINENT ALLIED
ATTACK.
--ONCE IRAQI FORCES BEGIN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST ALLIED
FORCES, DIA ANTICIPATES THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO USE THEIR ENTIRE
CHEMICAL ARSENAL, INCLUDING MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS.
--SPECIAL FORCES OR OTHER GROUPS ALSO COULD DELIVER CHEMICAL
WEAPONS TO SELECTED TARGETS.
45. (U) THIS MEMORANDUM CONTAINS INFORMATION AS OF 25 JANUARY
1991.
ADMIN PREP: [ (b)(2) ]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
