REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (U)
Filename:71520880
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 20880
GENDATE: 950605
NNNN
TEXT:
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX064 MCN = 91102/12717 TOR = 911020907
RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS8990 1020907- --RUEALGX.
ZNY
HEADER R 120907Z APR 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
R 111845Z APR 91
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DI-6B//
TO RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR//FKJ2-CM-O/FKJ2-PL-S-F//
INFO RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J22/DIA REP//
BT
[ (b)(2) ]
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (U)
REFS: [ b.2. ]
1. [ b.2. ] and [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
2. PARAGRAPH 1A. IRAQ'S MAIN DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR CW ARE:
-- MISSILES: SCUD-B, AL HUSAYN, AL ABBAS (LIMITED NUMBERS OF EACH).
-- AIR DELIVERED: 250 KG BOMB, 500 KG BOMB, 90MM ROCKET.
-- ARTILLERY: 130MM, 152MM, 155MM.
-- ROCKETS (MRL): 122MM.
-- MORTARS: 82MM, 120MM.
-- LAND MINES: PROBABLE.
3. PARAGRAPH 1B. AN ASSESSMENT OF WHY IRAQ DID NOT USE CW
DURING THE WAR IS PROVIDED BELOW:
IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES: SURVIVING
ASSETS AND LACK OF USE DURING THE WAR
KEY JUDGMENTS.
IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN SEVERELY
DEGRADED BUT NOT ELIMINATED. TO RECONSTITUTE THE BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE SYSTEM TO PREWAR LEVELS COMPLETELY WOULD REQUIRE A MINIMUM
OF 5-8 YEARS, ALTHOUGH A MINIMAL CAPABILITY COULD BE ESTABLISHED
MUCH QUICKER. RECONSTITUTION OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SYSTEM TO
PREWAR LEVELS WOULD REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF 3-5 YEARS, ALTHOUGH SOME
AGENT PRODUCTION MAY BE POSSIBLE ONCE THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM IS
OPERATIONAL.
TO DATE, DIA HAS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE
DEPLOYED TO THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS. FEAR OF COALITION
RETALIATION WITH UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS PROBABLY PREVENTED IRAQ
FROM USING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS. EQUALLY LIKELY, IRAQ MADE
FUNDAMENTAL MISCALCULATIONS ABOUT HOW THE COALITION WOULD
PROSECUTE THE WAR AND HOW EFFECTIVELY ITS OWN FORCES WOULD BE ABLE
TO RESPOND. WHY IRAQ DID NOT USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WILL NOT BE
UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT A FULL ACCOUNTING OF THE IRAQI MILITARY AND
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP'S PREWAR PLANNING.
BACKGROUND
COALITION AIR FORCES STRUCK BIOLOGICAL WEAPON RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND STORAGE FACILITIES AND CHEMICAL WEAPON RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, FILLING, AND STORAGE FACILITIES. THE
BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THESE TARGETS GENERALLY PROGRESSED IN
THREE STAGES, WITH GREAT OVERLAP BETWEEN THE STAGES. THE FIRST
STAGE TARGETED BOTH BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
(CW) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) AND PRODUCTION AND THE CW
MUNITION-FILLING CAPABILITY. THE SECOND STAGE TARGETED BW STORAGE,
FOLLOWED BY CW STORAGE. DURING THE SECOND STAGE, MOST OF THE
R&D/PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES THAT SURVIVED THE FIRST STAGE WERE
RESTRUCK AND DESTROYED. THE THIRD STAGE TARGETED DELIVERY SYSTEMS
IN THE FIELD; TARGETS NOT DESTROYED IN THE FIRST TWO STAGES ALSO
WERE RESTRUCK.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND
STORAGE.
INITIALLY, COALITION FORCES IDENTIFIED AND TARGETED FOUR BW
R&D/PRODUCTION FACILITIES THE ABU GHURAYB SUSPECT BW PRODUCTION
FACILITY, THE ABU GHURAYB CLOSTRIDIUM VACCINE PLANT, THE TAJI
SUSPECT BW PRODUCTION FACILITY, AND THE SALMAN PAK BW
R&D/PRODUCTION FACILITY. A FIFTH FACILITY, THE LATIFIYAH SUSPECT
BW PRODUCTION FACILITY, WAS IDENTIFIED IN FEBRUARY 1991. COALITION
BOMBING DESTROYED 11 OF THE 13 BUILDINGS ASSOCIATED WITH BW
R&D/PRODUCTION AND SEVERELY DAMAGED THE OTHER 2 BUILDINGS. ALL
FIVE FACILITIES ARE ASSESSED TO BE UNABLE TO SUPPORT BW R&D OR
PRODUCTION.
BW STORAGE INITIALLY INCLUDED 19 12-FRAME REFRIGERATED
BUNKERS AT 11 LOCATIONS. IN FEBRUARY 1991, 2 ADDITIONAL 12-FRAME
REFRIGERATED BUNKERS WERE IDENTIFIED, BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 21 SUCH
BUNKERS. OF THESE TARGETS, ALL OF THE ORIGINAL 19 REFRIGERATED
BUNKERS WERE DESTROYED. THE FINAL TWO REFRIGERATED BUNKERS WERE
DISCOVERED TOO LATE IN THE CAMPAIGN TO BE ATTACKED.
CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION,
FILLING, AND STORAGE
CW PRODUCTION INCLUDED THE SAMARRA CHEMICAL WEAPONS RESEARCH,
PRODUCTION, AND STORAGE FACILITY AND THREE SEPARATE PRECURSOR
PRODUCTION FACILITIES AT HABBANIYAH. PRODUCTION AT SAMARRA OCCURRED
IN 10 BUILDINGS, 6 OF WHICH WERE DESTROYED. OF THE SURVIVING
PRODUCTION BUILDINGS, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT IS P-6, WHICH IS CAPABLE
OF PRODUCING 50-70 METRIC TONS OF SARIN PER MONTH' ABOUT 70 PERCENT
OF SAMARRA'S TOTAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY WAS DESTROYED, AND ALL THREE
HABBANIYAH FACILITIES WERE DESTROYED.
ALL THREE BUILDINGS AT SAMARRA DEDICATED TO CW MUNITION
FILLING WERE DESTROYED. AT LEAST ONE OF THESE BUILDINGS MAY HAVE
BEEN EMPTY AT THE TIME OF ITS DESTRUCTION, RAISING THE POSSIBILITY
THAT IRAQ HAS RETAINED AT LEAST PART OF ITS CHEMICAL MUNITION-
FILLING CAPABILITY AND POSSIBLY OTHER CHEMICAL-RELATED EQUIPMENT.
CW STORAGE CAPABILITY CONSISTED OF 8 CRUCIFORM BUNKERS AT
SAMARRA AND 22 S-SHAPED BUNKERS AT 13 LOCATIONS. ONE DF THE 8
CRUCIFORM BUNKERS WAS DESTROYED, AND THE REMAINING 7 SUSTAINED ONLY
SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE. OF THE 22 S-SHAPED BUNKERS, 16 WERE DESTROYED
AND 6 SUFFERED SERIOUS DAMAGE. HOWEVER, BUNKER ARCHITECTURE IS NOT
RELATED TO ABILITY TO STORE AGENTS OR WEAPONS, AND IRAQ DOES NOT
NECESSARILY NEED TO REPRODUCE THE 22 S-SHAPED BUNKERS TO HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT CW STORAGE CAPABILITY.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
FACTORS DETERRING IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
IRAQ'S FAILURE TO USE ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CANNOT BE
COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT A FULL ACCOUNTING OF THE IRAQI
MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP'S PLANS IN PREPARATION FOR THE
WAR AND THE EXECUTION OF THOSE PLANS. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
FOLLOWING IS AN ESTIMATE OF THE INFLUENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS THAT
MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO IRAQ'S FAILURE TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
MAJOR FACTORS
TO DATE, DIA HAS NO EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ DEPLOYED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS TO THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS (KTO). IF IRAQ DID NOT
DEPLOY ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TWO POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS ARE LIKELY.
FIRST, IRAQ BELIEVED THAT BOTH ISRAEL AND THE COALITION HAD
CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD USE THEM IF PROVOKED. IRAQI
LEADERS QUICKLY REALIZED THAT THESE WEAPONS COULD BE DELIVERED
ANYWHERE IN IRAQ AN IMPRESSION REINFORCED BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF
ALLIED AND ISRAELI LEADERS. IRAQ PROBABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
CONSEQUENCES OF ATTACKING WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE TOO
SEVERE TO JUSTIFY THEIR USE, AND THIS MAY HAVE LED TO AN EARLY
DECISION NOT TO USE THEM. SADDAM ALSO MAY HAVE BELIEVED THAT IRAQI
USE OF CW WOULD CAUSE COALITION FORCES TO SEEK HIS REMOVAL FROM
POWER AS A TOP PRIORITY IN ADDITION TO LIBERATING KUWAIT.
SECOND, IT IS EQUALLY LIKELY THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP MADE
FUNDAMENTAL MISCALCULATIONS ABOUT HOW THE COALITION WOULD PROSECUTE
THE WAR AND HOW EFFECTIVELY ITS FORCES WOULD BE ABLE TO RESPOND.
POSSIBLY EXPECTING COALITION FORCES TO FIGHT LIKE THE IRANIANS
(ATTACKING FIRST WITH INFANTRY FOLLOWED BY MOBILE ARMOR) THE IRAQIS
APPARENTLY FELT THEY WOULD HAVE DAYS OR EVEN WEEKS TO MOVE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS INTO THE KTO ONCE THE WAR BEGAN. GIVEN THIS, THE IRAQIS
MOST LIKELY MISJUDGED THE COALITION SPEED OF ADVANCE, THE DEGREE OF
ATTRITION TO THEIR AIR FORCE AND ARTILLERY, AND THE DEGREE OF
DEGRADATION TO THEIR RESUPPLY ABILITY.
THE SPEED AND VIOLENCE OF THE COALITION ADVANCE, WHICH
REACHED ITS OBJECTIVES DEEP INSIDE IRAQ IN ONLY 4 DAYS, PROBABLY
WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL FACTOR IN PRECLUDING CHEMICAL
USE. IRAQI FORCES WERE CONSTANTLY OFF BALANCE, AND COALITION AIR
SUPREMACY MADE EFFECTIVE CONCENTRATION OF ARTILLERY AGAINST
COALITION GROUND FORCES VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.
WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, IRAQ DID NOT TAKE THE MILITARY
INITIATIVE DURING DESERT STORM AND WAS CONSTANTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
COALITION FORCES DETERRED IRAQ FROM REPEATING THE SUCCESS IT HAD
ENJOYED WITH CW DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.
IRAQ'S COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WAS
HEAVILY DAMAGED BY COALITION BOMBING. IN ADDITION, IRAQI COMMANDERS
COULD NOT CONTROL THEIR FORCES, IN PART BECAUSE OF THEIR
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM'S COMPLETE FAILURE TD EVALUATE THE DEVELOPING
SITUATION. THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF ALLIED AIR SUPERIORITY
DENIED IRAQ INFORMATION ON THE DISPOSITION OF COALITION FORCES,
MAKING FIRE PLANNING EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. THE LIMITED INFORMATION
AVAILABLE MAY HAVE RESULTED IN A DECISION NOT TO DISPERSE CHEMICALS
WITHIN THE THEATER UNTIL THE GROUND BATTLE BEGAN AND COALITION
FORCE DISPOSITIONS BECAME BETTER DEFINED.
DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI CW PRODUCTION VERY LIKELY HAD A
SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON A DECISION NOT TO USE CHEMICALS. THE
CHEMICALS MADE EARLIER MAY HAVE DETERIORATED IN STORAGE, OR IRAQ
MAY HAVE MISCALCULATED THAT ITS DEFENSES WOULD ALLOW TIME TO
PRODUCE AND DEPLOY CHEMICALS LATER IN THE CONFLICT. LOSS OF
PRODUCTION FACILITIES WOULD HAVE PREVENTED IRAQ FROM MAKING AGENTS
AS NEEDED, WHICH WAS THE PRACTICE DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.
SADDAM HUSAYN MAY HAVE RETAINED PERSONAL CONTROL OF CW DURING
THE WAR TO ALLOW A MORE COMPLETE EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY
SITUATION. HOWEVER, THE SPEED OF THE GROUND OFFENSIVE TOGETHER WITH
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS MAY HAVE MADE THIS
RETENTION A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR, SINCE RELEASE OF CHEMICALS THEN
WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE COMPLICATED AND SLOWER. MISTRUST OF ANY UNITS
BUT REPUBLICAN GUARD FORCES ALSO COULD HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN THIS
HIGH-LEVEL RETENTION.
OTHER FACTORS
ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE WAR IRAQ LOST ITS ABILITY TO DELIVER
CHEMICALS BY AIR, THE METHOD OF CHEMICAL DELIVERY PREFERRED DURING
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS THEN
BECAME THE ONLY SUSTAINABLE MEANS OF DELIVERING CHEMICALS. HOWEVER,
ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER LOSSES WERE HEAVY DURING THE
ALLIED AIR CAMPAIGN. IRAQ ALSO HAD A LIMITED NUMBER OF SCUD AND
SCUD-TYPE MISSILE WARHEADS AVAILABLE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO
DELIVER CHEMICAL AGENTS. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE EXTENDED RANGE
SCUD CW WARHEAD MAY HAVE PREVENTED ITS USE AGAINST ISRAEL AND
RIYADH, WHILE COALITION SPEED OF ADVANCE MAY HAVE PREVENTED USE OF
THE SCUD-B DURING THE GROUND OFFENSIVE.
IRAQ WAS NOT ABLE TO SUPPLY ITS GROUND FORCES IN THE KTO
FULLY DURING THE WAR. DEPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL AMMUNITION WOULD HAVE
HAD TO COMPETE FOR SCARCE TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES WITH ALL THE
OTHER NEEDS OF THE IRAQI FORCES. LARGE CHEMICAL MUNITION TRANSFERS
TO THE KTO MAY HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AS TOO RISKY. THE AIR CAMPAIGN
ALSO DESTROYED MOST KNOWN AND SUSPECTED CW STORAGE FACILITIES IN
IRAQ.
WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING THE GROUND OFFENSIVE WERE POOR FOR
CHEMICAL USE. WINDS WERE STRONG, GENERALLY OUT OF THE SOUTH, AND
THERE WAS SOME RAIN IN THE AREA, WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE THE EFFECTS
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS UNPREDICTABLE AND THEREFORE LESS DESIRABLE.
(U) OUTLOOK
4.[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
ADMIN [ (b)(2) ]
BT
#8992
INFODATE: 0
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
