Questions from Chairman Riegle
Filename:0riegleq.894
Aug. 94
Subject: Questions from Chairman Riegle
Ql. Was the Department of Defense intelligence apparatus aware
of the items exported to Iraq by the United States which were
converted to use in the Iraqi chemical, biological, and
nuclear programs prior to the Persian Gulf War? Provide
specific details.
Al. During the earlier years associated with Iraq's build-up
of its scientific, industrial and military capabilities, Iraq
was neither a proscribed nation to be denied military critical
technology, nor an enemy. The US intelllgence community is
forbidden from monitoring the activities of US citizens and
its companies. Consequently, very little was known by the
Intelligence Community about US exports of technology with
military potential, particularly to a non-proscribed non-enemy
nation, unless it was informed of such exports by the
Department of Congress. During 1980-1994 Commerce requested
review of only 16 dual-use export cases by the DoD. Of these,
only two were forwarded to the DIA for technical review. They
involved computers and signal processing equipment. DIA
recommended denial in both cases. DIA was aware of the illegal
export of thiodiglycol to Iraq by the Baltimore company
Alcolac. DIA assisted customs and the FBI in their
investigation and successful prosecution of that company. DIA
biological warfare (BW) analysts were aware of some of the
dual-use items purchased by Iraq for its BW program, but
generally did not know what U.S. company was supplying the
items.
Q2. Were Iraqi chemical and biological facilities among the
priority targets hit by Coalition bombers during the first
days of the air war?
A2. Yes. Some Iraqi chemical and biological (CBW) facilities
were priority targets and were among the first attacked on and
around the first days of the air war. Not every CBW target was
attacked during the first days however. CBW targets were
themselves prioritized, generally by the intelligence
community, then specifically, by the operators out of CENTCOM
and were attacked accordingly. Generally speaking, CBW targets
were attacked at the very beginning and throughout the air
campaign.
Q3. Were U.S. national laboratories contacted prior to the war
and requested to assess the danger from the fallout of bombing
Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities? What was
their advice?
A3. The Defense Nuclear Agency was tasked to assess the danger
of fallout from bombed Iraqi facilities. Their advice was
passed to CENTCOM though other than intelligence channels.
Q10. Are all biological agents lethal? Isn't it true that one
biological warfare strategy is to debilitate your adversary's
capabilities and another is to overload his medical
facilities?
A10. No, not all biological warfare agents are lethal; some
are only lethal if untreated, while others are almost always
lethal, even with medical treatment. Incapacitating BW agents
could be used to debilitate an adversary's capabilities and to
overload his medical facllities.
Q15. Were any biological agents or materials capable of being
used to cause disease or other illnesses discovered by the
U.S. or any other Coalition forces in Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi
Arabia? What were those materials?
A15. No such materials were found by U.S. or Coalition forces.
Q16. Were any Iraqi vaccines discovered or did interviews of
enemy prisoners of war, or others, reveal what biological
warfare-related materials the Iraqis had defended against?
A16. No.
Q17. Did Iraq have a biological warfare program that appeared
to be offensive in nature?
A17. Yes. See question 29.
Ql9. Were chemical munitions or binary precursor materials
capable of being used in chemical warfare discovered in any
area of Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia before, during, or after
the war by US Forces, US civilian personnel or other Coalition
participants?
Al9. The wording of this question requires a three part answer
to include responses addressing the Kuwaiti Theater of
Operations (KTO), Operation Provide Comfort, and the UN
inspections.
The Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) included southern Iraq
south of 31'00 N, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. This was the area
eventually occupied by Coalition ground forces before, during
and after Operation Desert Storm. Neither chemlcal munltions,
bulk agent, nor binary precursors were discovered in the KTO
before, during or after the war by US Forces, civilian
personnel, or Coalition participants.
On 28 May 1991, several months after the war, during Operation
Provide Comfort in Kurdish occupied northern Iraq, four Iraqi
expended, unexploded, 122mm chemical rockets were discovered
by US forces near the town of Kani Masi 37'13 N 043'26 E. This
area is in extreme north central Iraq, about five miles from
the Turkish boarder. The rounds appeared to be duds and
appeared to have been in the field for years. The rounds were
returned to the US, exploited, and found to contain no intact
chemical agent, only degradation
products of the nerve agent sarin. This information, along
with the location and condition of the rounds indicate they
were most likely fired during the reported Iraqi use of
chemical weapons against Kurds in 1988. These rounds in no way
should be associated with events of Desert Storm nor be used
as evidence in the investigation of so-called Gulf War
Syndrome. Their only slgnificance ls that, at the time, they
confirmed our assessment that such weapons existed in the
Iraqi arsenal.
Finally, it has been widely circulated that UN inspection
teams found thousands of destroyed and intact chemical rounds
in an ammunition depot at Nasiriyah, and that this discovery
contradicts our statement in paragraph one of this answer.
Nasiriyah technically is outside the KTO, being north of 31'00
N and the Euphrates River. More importantly, it was not in the
territory occupied by Coalition forces after the war.
Moreover, the following points are relevant because UN
inspectors did not really "find" the subject munitions. In
reality, the Iraqis declared the munitions to the UN and the
lnspectors eventually went to that location to check what the
Iraqis had reported:
l) the UN inspection occurred at least eight months after the
war;
2) the location of the "found" chemical rounds was 15 miles
from the widely discussed CBW bunkers bombed at Nasiriyah (the
site which was originally expected to be inspected). The
bombed bunkers were not inspected until one year later in Oct
1992 and found to contain no chemical or biological weapons;
Q20. What evidence, if any, is there concerning the forward
deployment of chemical and biological warfare agents or
weapons prior to or during the Persian Gulf conflict? What
evidence, if any, is there of Iraqi attempts to avoid the
destruction of chemical or biological warfare agents or
weapons by Coalition bombings? For example, transshipment
activity just prior to the initiation of the air war from
chemical production facilities such as Samarra Habbaniyah, or
others.
A20. There is no evidence, that Iraq forward deployed
chemical and/or biological agents or weapons prior to or
during Desert Storm. Even though at the time, many analysts
expected and warned against potential Iraqi use of CBW, it is
our position now, and has been since the end of the war, that
Iraq did not intend to use CBW because of the fear of massive
retaliation, and the conclusion that Coalition troops Were too
well prepared to fight in a CBW environment, if not, far
better prepared than Iraqi troops, thus eliminating their
advantage. This conclusion is based primarily, but not
totally, on:
- their were no indications and warnings of imminent Iraqi use
of CW i.e. heavy transshipment activity of CW transport trucks
from
Samarra to the forward areas. - not one CBW munition was found
in the captured/occupied Iraqi territory.
Even if Iraq intended to use CW against the Coalition, the
pace and ferocity of the air ahd ground campaign was such that
Iraq's ability to produce, weaponize, forward deploy, and
deliver CW on a target was virtually eliminated. The only CW
which could have been used had to be pre-positioned in
substantial amounts. The pace and ferocity of the air and
ground campaign, in our opinion, rendered it impossible to
move any CW munitions into or out of the KTO. Because the
ground campaign quickly overwhelmed the Iraqi forces, we would
expect to find abandoned CW munitions, as was the case for
conventional munitions and equipment. It is difficult to
believe that under the mass1ve bombardment levied against the
Iraqi troops that they somehow managed to move substantial
amounts of CBW munitions out of the KTO, undetected, leav1ng
not a trace of it behind. Since no CBW was found in the KTO we
believe it never was there.
There is evidence that Iraqi attempted to avoid destruction of
its CBW production equipment prior to the air war. Besides
camouflaging many of its production buildings, cargo trucks
did move an unknown amount of CW production equipment from
Samarra. Equipment-moving trucks and refrigerated trucks were
also observed at the Salman Pak BW facility prior to the onset
of bombing, suggesting that Iraq was moving equipment or
material into or out of the facility. Information obtained
after the conflict revealed that Iraq had moved BW agent
production equipment from Salman Pak to the Al Hakam suspect
BW facility.
QZl. What evidence, if any, exists of Iraqi chemical and
biological warfare defensive measures during or prior to the
Persian Gulf War?
A21. Iraq claims it did not have a dedicated BW defensive
program. Iraq distributed drugs for the treatment of nerve and
mustard exposure to at least some of its Republican Guard
Divisions. There was an effort to outfit their troops with
chemical protective gear; this usually consisted of a gas
mask, gloves, boots, simple poncho, and individual chemical
agent antidote kits. Additionally, decontamination stations
were established throughout Iraq.
Q22. What evidence, if any, exists of Iraqi command
instructions to use chemical weapons prior to or during the
war?
A22. There is no/evidence to indicate instructions or
orders to use chemical weapons were given by Iraqi command
authorities prior to or during the war.
Q23. Were any Iraqi chemical units in Iraq or Kuwait located
or reported on by US or Coalition sources during Operation
Desert Shield or Desert Storm? Explain.
A23. No. Specific locations of Iraqi chemical units
were never reported by US or Coalition sources during
Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm. See question 35.
Q24. In the Department of Defense's final report to Congress
on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, it was reported that
88 Scud launches were detected. Saddam Hussein has claimed to
have launched at least 93 Scuds. Can you explain the
discrepancy? Were any Scud missiles launched by Iraq against
Turkey or any other location other than Israel or Saudi
Arabia? Were U.S. forces and dependent personnel in Turkey
ever ordered into MOPP gear?
A24. DIA holds a total of 88 SCUD launches against Israeli and
Saudi Arabian targets only. We cannot explain the discrepancy
between Saddam's claim to have launched at least 93 SCUDs.
Q26. Did Iraq conduct test firings of Scuds or other short or
medium range ballistlc missiles during Operation Desert
Shield? What was the assessed purpose for these tests since
Iraq already had extensive knowledge of the capabilities of
Scud missiles?
A26. No. Iraq did not conduct test firings of SCUDs or other
short or medium range ballistic missiles during Operation
Desert Shield.
Q27. Did Iraq have the capability to deliver biological
weapons via ground based aerosol generators, aircraft,
helicopters, or FAW missiles? Did they have any other means of
delivering biologlcal weapons?
A27. Iraq had a capability to deliver BW agents
from missile warheads and aerial bombs. Iraq also had the
capability to disseminate biological agents from ground-based
aerosol generators; however we found no evidence that they had
attempted to do so. Other delivery systems (helicopters) and
munitions (i.e., CW munitions) could be used to disseminate BW
agents; however, we found no evidence that Iraq had loaded BW
agents into any such munitions.
Q29. What was the Defense Intelligence Agency evaluation of
Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and delivery
means, prior to, during, and after the Persian Gulf War? What
delivery means were within range of Coalition forces at the
beginning of the air war and by the end of the ground war?
A29. Prior to the Persian Gulf War Iraq was assessed to
possess roughly 1000 MT of chemical agent equally split
between the blister agent mustard and the nerve agents sarin
(GB) and GF. Small amounts (possibly tens of tons) of the
persistent nerve agent VX were assessed as possibly available
from ongoing R&D programs The nerve agent soman (GD) and the
psychochemical BZ were also assessed to be in the R&D stage.
Much of the above 1000 MT of agent was assessed
to be weaponized in the following munitions with the remainder
stored as bulk agent:
Artillery
155mm *
152mm
130mm
122mm rocket *
Mortars
82mm
120mm
Aerial
250kg bomb
500kg bomb
Cluster bombs
90 mm rocket
Note: (l) * Preferred weapon for artillery
(2) Landmines were assessed as possible.
Missiles
SCUD
Al Husayn
Al Abbas
(3) Frog missiles are capable of CW delivery but no evidence
existed for such a warhead in Iraq.
Prior to the Persian Gulf War, DIA assessed that Iraq had BW
agents weaponized in aerial bombs and Scud missile warheads,
and that Iraq was capable of disseminating BW agents with
ground-based aerosol generators. Scud missiles and alrcraft
capable of carrying aerial bombs probably were within range of
Coalition forces during the war, but we know of no BW
munitions for these systems which were ever forward-deployed.
Further, we know of no occasion when such dissemination
systems or munitions were used to disperse BW agents during
the war.
After the war, DIA assessed the CW program to be severely
degraded but not eliminated. The BW program was assessed to
have retained the infrastructure needed to reestablish itself.
UN inspections and ongoing intelligence efforts have resulted
in DIA's reassessment that although nearly all known buildings
and bunkers associated with CBW programs were destroyed, CW
and BW production equipment, precursors and munitions have
been hidden or salvaged and that both programs could be
reestablished shortly after UN inspections ceased.
Iraqi CBW delivery assets in range of Coalition troops both
before and after the war were SCUDs, aerial bombs, and
potentially any lSSmm artillery or 122mm mobile rocket
launcher within approximately 25 kilometers of Coalition
forces. One must keep in mind that during the war, Coalition
air superiority largely eliminated aircraft delivery of CBW
agents to forward areas, and that by the end of the ground
war, Iraqi air and ground forces, as well as its command and
control structure were in complete disarray.
Q30. Describe the evolution of Iraq's battlefield employment
of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, did Iraq's
ability to use these weapons improve over the course of the
war?
A30. Generally speaking Iraq's use of CW against Iran during
their war improved dramatically as the war progressed.
Essentially, Iraq learned how to use CW through on the job
training, very inefficiently at first then becoming quite
effective towards the end. Iraqi use of CW against Iran can be
divided into three distinct phases. The first phase, which
continued until 1986, involved the use of CW agents in a
strictly defensive role, to disrupt Iranian offensives. In a
transitory phase lasting from late 1986 to early 1988, Iraq
used CW preemptively against staging areas prior to Iranian
offensives. Flnally, and most significantly, Iraq used massed
nerve agent strikes as an integral part of its well-
orchestrated offensive in the spring and summer of 1988. The
success of these offensives prompted Iran to accept a cease-
fire in August 1988.
Q31. What chemical and biological agents were assessed to be
in the Iraqi operational inventory and test inventories prior
to the Persian Gulf War?
Chemical agents assessed to be in the Iraqi operational
inventory prior to the Persian Gulf War were mustard, sarin,
and GF. Tabun and dusty mustard were known to have been used
against Iran but were thought to possible have been dropped
from the 1990 inventory. Agents assessed to be in the R&D
stage were VX, BZ and Soman.
Biological agents assessed to be in the pre-war inventory were
anthrax and botulinum toxin in a limited number of missile
warheads and aerial bombs.
Q34. What evidence exists, if any, to indicate that Iraq
deployed chemical mines in the Kuwaiti theater of operations?
A34. There is no evidence that Iraq deployed chemical mines in
the KTO. In fact, over 350,000 Iraqi mines have been found and
removed from Kuwait, none of which were chemical mines.
Q35. Did Iraq deploy any chemical units or establish any
chemical decontamination sites in the Kuwaiti or Iraqi theater
of operations - or in the disputed territories?
A35. Iraqi defensive chemical units are a standard
complement of a typical Iraqi Corp and Division. Our best
information suggests that most but not all of Iraqi divisions
deployed with their standard chemical units. Dedicated
offensive chemical units were assessed to be part of
Republican Guard Divisions only, however, theoretically,
virtually any 155mm artillery piece or 122mm mobile rocket
launcher could fire CW rounds.
Yes. Iraq establish chemical decontamination sites in the KTO
as well as throughout Iraq. Similar decontamination sites are
located at known chemical training schools and therefore,
their appearance is assessed more as standard operating
procedure rather than a hard indicator of intent to use CW.
Q36. Which country provided the chemical Scud warheads to Iraq
that were later located by the UN inspections? If by another
country, how many of these warheads were initially provided?
Did Iraq also manufacture its own?
A36. Iraq manufactured all of its chemical SCUD
warheads indigenously.
Q37. Was the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] suspected of
providing chemical or biological warfare training to Iraqi
officers either in Iraq,
or any other country? Explain.
A37. there is absolutely no evidence to suggest,
that they provided offensive chemical or biological weapons
training to Iraq at any time. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
]involved in providing defensive CBW equipment and training to
the Iraqis in the early 1980's.
038. Is the Department of Defense aware of any to the Iraqis
in setting up any chemical training center or production
facility in Iraq? Explain.
A38
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]in setting up a chemical
training facility in Iraq-
constructed a CW training center
near Habbaniyah, and may have helped train Republican Gaurd
troops in field
operations in a chemical environment.
Q40. Is there any classified or unclassified information that
would indicate any exposures to or detections of chemical or
biological agents?
A40. Other than the Czech detections on 19 and 24 January 91,
which have been discussed at length during testimony and other
questions for the record, there is no information, classified
or unclassified, which would indicate any exposures to or
valid detections of chemical agents. There were many, probably
thousands, of false chemical alarms experienced by the
Coalition, however, no alarm ever was verified using follow-up
confirmation procedures. This issue has also been discussed at
length in testimony and other questions for the record.
As with the alleged CW detections, there are some
unsubstantiated reports that allege exposure to BW agents.
However, despite concerted efforts, Coalition assets were not
able to confirm any of these reports.
Q41. Is there any classified or unclassified information that
would indicate the discovery of any chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear warfare related materials by U S. or
Coalition forces before, during, or after the Persian Gulf
War?
A41. There is no information, classified or unclassified, that
would indicate the discovery of any chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear warfare related materials by the US or
Coalition forces before, during or after the Persian Gulf War.
See question 19.
Q46. What is the role of the Defense Intelligence Agency in
the investigation into the exposure of U.S. forces to
chemical, biological or radiological materials during
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm?
A46. DIA's role, as always, has been to provide intelligence
to the OSD. DIA has been deeply involved with the
investigation into alleged exposure of US forces to chemical,
biological or radiological materials during Desert Shield and
Desert Storm since the investigation began in early summer
1993. DIA has reviewed every aspect of its assessment of Iraqi
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, the
possibility of their use against Coalition troops, and the
possibility of accidental release from bombed Iraqi targets.
DIA has spearheaded the investigation into the alleged Czech
detections, making the honest assessment that the Czech
detections were likely valid. Leaving no stone unturned, DIA
traveled to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel, Czech Republic,
France and England to further investigate the issue. Likewise,
through the Defense Attache system, DIA requested information
and assessments regarding the issue from other Coalition
members and allies. To date, all of DIAs efforts and contacts
point to the unanimous conclusion that coalition troops were
not exposed to chemical or biological agents, either
accidently (as a result of downwind exposure from bombed Iraqi
facilities) or purposely (from direct Iraqi use).
[ b.2. ]
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