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Iraq- Damage Caused to CW Facilities
Filename:0pgv082.91p
RESPOND TO TASK 3863
PASS TO THE ITF OPS OFFICER
30 JAN 91 0155 HRS SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]
29 January 1991
Iraq- Damage Caused to CW Facilities
     Answers to questions and comments are given below.
     1.  Thank you for the most valuable information regarding the 
damage caused to CW facilities in Iraq.  To our understanding the 
production capability of nerve agent CW was severely damaged. The 
mustard gas production facility (Pl0) was not damaged.  Comment:  
As noted, the production capability for nerve agent was severely 
damaged.  The extent of damage to plant P-10 is unknown, and we 
are
still trying to get data to assess this damage.  There are still 
several production units at Samarra that could be capable of 
making chemical agent.
     2.  The filling capability was damaged but we can not 
estimate the dimensions of the damage.  COMMENT:  Two of the three 
filling buildings at Samarra have been destroyed.  DIA assesses 
that these two buildings cannot be used to fill more ammunition.  
One building remains and could still be capable of filling 
ammunition.  This will limit the amount of ammunition Iraq can 
fill.
     3.  Since the CW storage bunkers in airfields and in Samarra 
were not damaged, we assume that Iraq still maintains its chemical 
offensive capability and that it was not damaged.  COMMENT:  DIA 
concurs with this assessment.  The chemical weapons and agents in 
Iraq could be stored virtually anywhere, so the destruction of the 
bunkers gives only limited assurance that they would be out
of chemical weapons.  There is a good chance that Iraq has 
dispersed at least some of their chemical weapons, and it is only 
prudent to assume that they have done so.  DIA believes that Iraq 
will have a potent chemical arsenal at least through the end of 
March 1991.
[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]
     C.  Were the facilities mentioned above [functioning] until 
the bombings? COMMENT:  A production run was apparently in 
progress starting about mid-December 1990.  Cannot determine if 
the plants were active at the time of the attack.  No 
decontamination efforts have been noted at the facility following 
the attack, however.
     D.  Was the filling facility active when it was bombed?  
COMMENT:  Cannot determine this.  No efforts at decontamination 
have been seen at these buildings since they were attacked, but 
such efforts could have occurred without our knowledge.
     E.  Will sarin and GF be used only as binary CW?  COMMENT:  
At least in the near term, probably not.  Iraq should have unitary 
chemical nerve weapons available for the next four to six weeks.  
Any binaries should last longer.
     F.  Is there any likelihood that long range SSMs will be 
filled with mustard gas?  COMMENT:  Yes.  Mustard is a good choice 
for a missile warhead fill due to its persistence, stability, and 
ability to cause injury by action through the skin.
[    b.2.    ]