BUGS AND THINGS
Filename:0me004.90d
DATE: 03 DEC 1990
TO: [ (b)(6) ]
FROM: CA-SIO
SUBJ: BUGS AND THINGS
1. After a number of meetings, briefings, and
conversations, as well as a review of a sample of intelligence
community studies and reports, the following judgements/statements
on BW can be made with some confidence:
o The IRAQIs have a viable BW program that is beyond the R&D
phase. A significant amount of agent is probably available and can
be used if Saddam so chooses.
o There is uncertainty as to what degree they have been able to
weaponize their BW agents. At a minimum, they have the capability
to deliver using a simple aerosol dispensing device, or the
proverbial terrorist with a vial. In regard to the former, members
of the Intelligence Community have looked at several airborne and
waterborne dispensing scenarios and found them viable, if not
somewhat unpredictable. It is the position of the Intelligence
Community, [ b.2. ] that the Iraqi variant of the SCUD may
have a BW capability. Further, there is evidence of Iraqi interest
in cluster warheads for delivering Botulin toxin.They do have a
number of different weapons capable of delivering CW agents, and
theoretically at least, weapons systems that are capable of
delivering CW could be made capable of delivering BW.
o Insofar as the BW agents of concern, all of the evidence would
indicate Anthrax spore and Botulin Toxin. Additionally,
Staphylococcal Enterotoxin, Tularemia, and Brucellosis are also
possibly at least in the BW research phase.
o There are four suspect BW production facilities. We are unsure
of the role of three, but they would certainly merit targeting
consideration. The fourth facility, Salman Pak, is virtually a
certainty.
o Insofar as storage, there are 17 facilities which contain 34 [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers which are candidates for BW
storage/fill facilities. Some of the bunkers (16 at 8 locations)
are air conditioned/refrigerated, the remaining 18 are not. Four
of these special bunkers, two of each type are located at Salman
Pak. At least in that facility, there is a high likelihood of, at
a minimum, storage at the bunkers. There is far less certainty as
to exact nature of the bunkers at the other facilities, all ammo
depots which appear to be for general explosives storage.
o If the BW agents have been weaponized, we are uncertain as to
where the weapons fill takes place. Again, the [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers are a candidate, however, the internal
layout of the bunker does not appear to be conducive due to the
lack of maneuvering room. On the other hand, there is sufficient
space to handle smaller weapons components, for example, the
warhead section of a missile vice the entire missile.
o There is uncertainty as to doctrinally driven dispersal
considerations. Following the Soviet model the Iraqis would
disperse these agents, first to insure their survival for future
use/ deterrence, and secondly, for safety reasons. Mitigating
against dispersal is the requirement for special handling. On
balance the various considerations might tip slightly in favor of
dispersal, but this is by no means a certainty. A point to be made
here, is that once the agent has been filled in a warhead/weapon,
and then later sealed, the amount of special handling required is
minimal.
o The greatest uncertainty by far, as would be expected, is when,
and if, they would resort to the use of BW weapons. Needless to
say any number of scenarios and excursions could be envisioned for
an Iraqi use of BW agents in a precursor, preemptive, retaliatory,
or desperation role. As with any weapon, the benefit vs. risk
(from Hussein's perspective) would have to be weighed, with
considerable insight into the thought processes at work (his). For
example, the loss of Kuwait might not be considered sufficient for
resorting to BW, where as any action that posed a threat to
Hussein himself or his regime might. Another scenario might be an
excursion of the DT small waterborne craft BW agent dispensing
scenario. Under such a scenario BW agents could be dispersed from
aerosol devices carried on small boats upwind from U.S. amphibious
forces in the Gulf several days prior to January 15, or upon
indication that these forces are massing for an amphibious
assault. The various scenarios that can be envisioned must be
looked at analytically to test their viability.
2. The above provides an overview of what is known
and what is not known, and thus the intelligence uncertainties,
insofar as Iraqi BW and its threat to DESERT SHIELD. In conducting
an informal survey of the community to determine what might be
available in the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], in the way of
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], as well as other
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] against the BW problem, the
following observations can be made:
o [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
3. As an aside, in undertaking this effort a
limited, albeit cursory [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
to determine what was being accomplished
in these areas that might aid in the BW effort. In [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] the overall problem is probably being addressed at a
feasible level, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Salman Pak
and the other facilities where the special bunkers are located [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] particularly if tensions escalate. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] would be particularly useful to determine
if the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers are in fact
active. Efforts were made [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
but due to the
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] this effort was unsuccessful. It is
unlikely [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] would be much better. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] would certainly be useful
but [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] this would be [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] Again, even if we were able to determine that the
bunkers were in fact active, that would not necessarily confirm
that they were BW associated. It would however provide a
supporting point for [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] effort against
them.
4. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] we have been
hampered by our inability to have [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
. However, we deem it unlikely, due to
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
would be particularly
helpful in this area. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
.
In this regard, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] are
essential. For example, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
medicines that the Iraqis are continuing to obtain, both
as fulfillment of contractual obligations (recent dealings with
the Swiss, $15,000,000 contract, as reported in news media), as
well as the reported barter for hostages. Procurement of unusually
large amounts of antibiotics [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
. Further, large amounts of certain types [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] bacteriological strains and resistance. The same
would hold true for immunizing and prophylactic agents.
Additionally, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
We deem it extremely important. Finally certain proteins,
antibodies, and other telltale traces of immunization, or
exposure, to various agents remain present in the blood, body
fluids, and waste products of individuals after such exposure or
immunization. It is likely that only Hussein, his inner circle,
workers at facilities where agents are produced, and key members
of the military to include high ranking members of the Republican
Guard and his personnel guard have been pre-immunized. [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
5. Finally, by way of observation, a number of
factors need to be considered by U.S. planners. A debate is
apparently underway as to the wisdom of targeting BW/CW
facilities. It is clearly understood that the decision is a
planning/policymaking decision weighing the risk versus gain.
Leaving the weapons in the hands of Hussein through a period of
conflict leaves him the option of invoking BW blackmail at any
time he decides to do so. Further, his past history of employing
chemical weapons, in both tactical and operational situations,
could suggest that given the alternative of defeat, and the
potential for the fall of his regime, he would employ BW weapons,
the desperation scenario. Conversely, it must be noted that his
employment of CW against both the Iranians and Kurds, unlike what
would be the case against the U.S. was a relatively risk free
operation on his part since neither had the capability to respond
massively to such use. In any case, his history shows a
demonstrated willingness to use weapons that are deemed unsuitable
and banned by treaty. If the suspect BW facilities are struck by
air, even with the most precise execution, planners must make
allowances for the possibility that some agent may be released.
The amount would depend on the method and precision of the attack,
and the Iraqis own safety precautions. Available information
indicates that U.S. and Allied aircraft are "leaky", and thus any
aircrews that would be at risk of coming into contact with
contaminated plums should be protected by MOPP 4 gear. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Further, it is our understanding that
insufficient antibiotics and inoculation material is available to
protect U.S. forces where protection is available. Again, we
recommend, based on Hussein's history, that every effort be made
to get as much protection forward, even if marginal at best.
[ (b)(6) ]
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