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Filename:098pgv.91p
[ (b)(2) ]
SENT BY [ (b)(6) ] 1740 1/19/91
Purpose: To provide OSD an assessment of the threat
posed from striking the refrigerated bunker at Salman Pak.
Background: At approximately 0200Z 17 Jan, the two
refrigerated bunkers at Salman Pak were attacked. One bunker
sustained considerable damage i.e. 80-90% of the roof collapsed
causing concern for release of biological warfare (BW) agent
(chemical warfare (CW) agent release has been previously assessed
as not a threat). The other bunker did not sustain significant
external damage. The following assessment evaluates the
possibility for collateral damage based on existing conditions at
the time of the attack.
Discussion: The following important points must be factored into
this assessment:
1. We do not know what, if anything, was in the
bunkers. We suspect BW as a worst case, but these bunkers are also
assessed as capable of storing CW, smart munitions, electronics,
or fuel air explosives (FAE). The BW agent of concern here is
anthrax. Iraq's other confirmed agent, botulinum toxin, degrades
too quickly to be a serious collateral damage threat.
2. We do not know how much, if any, agent was
released. Based on blast effect, roof collapse and other factors
related to BW agent release, we estimate that one (1) Kg of agent
in the proper particle size represents the worst case. In all
likelihood, less agent was vented.
3. Weather conditions at the time of attack were poor
for restricting collateral damage. Inversion conditions and low
winds prevented quick dissipation of any cloud of BW agent. Winds
were from the southeast at approximately 5 knots, which would blow
any cloud directly toward Baghdad.
4. The distance to the outskirts of Baghdad is 26
kilometers, therefore the cloud would take roughly 3 hours to
reach the outskirts of the city. By that time, the cloud had been
exposed to the sunlight for 2.2 hours. This amount of sunlight
would have degraded the anthrax spores by a factor of ten, leaving
roughly 100 grams.
5. One must also take into account the natural
dispersal and thinning of the agent as the cloud travels the 26 Km
to the outskirts of the city.
Given the above factors, we estimate that a worst case
assessment of collateral damage would be on the order of several
thousand casualties. Based on incubation times, we could see
evidence of anthrax casualties within 24 hours at the earliest and
possibly as late as seven days. [ (b)(2) ] are monitoring the
situation for evidence of casualties. It should be noted that each
day that goes by without BW casualties improves the likelihood of
no significant casualties.
Regarding your question on how we track CW/BW fallout,
to the best of our knowledge, we can not do so without having
personnel with CW detection equipment in the vicinity. There is no
known detection method for BW.
DIA task force POC is [ (b)(6) ]
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