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Filename:0902pgv.91
[ (b)(2) ]
15 MAR 91/1202 HOURS/SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability:
Surviving Assets and Non-Use During the War
KEY JUDGMENTS
Iraq's biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW)
production capability has been severely degraded, but not
eliminated. To completely reconstitute the BW system to pre-war
levels would require a minis of 5-8 years, although a very minimal
capability could be established much quicker. Reconstitution of
the CW system to prewar levels would require a minimum of 3-5
years, although some agent production may be possible once the
electrical power system is operational.
Chemical weapons were not made available to Iraqi units to
use against coalition forces. While a full accounting of the plans
of Iraq's military and political leadership is not known, they
made fundamental miscalculations about how the coalition would
prosecute the war, and how effectively their own forces would be
able to respond. These miscalculations, together with the fear of
coalition unconventional retaliation likely influenced the non-use
of chemical weapons.
Background
Coalition air forces struck biological weapons research,
development and storage facilities, as well as chemical weapons
research and development, production, filling and storage
facilities. The bombing campaign against these targets progressed
generally in three stages, although with a great overlap
between the stages. The first stage targeted both BW and CW
R&D/production and CW filling capability. The second stage
targeted BW storage, followed by CW storage. During the second
stage, much of the R&D/production capability that survived the
first stage was restruck and destroyed. The third stage targeted
delivery systems in the field and targets not destroyed in the
first two stages were also restruck.
Biological Warfare Research and Development, Production and
Storage
Initially, four BW R&D/Production facilities--the Abu
Ghurayb Suspect BW Production facility, the Abu Ghurayb
Clostridium Vaccine Plant, the Taji Suspect BW Production
facility, and the Salman Pak R&D/Suspect Production and Support
facility--were identified and targeted by coalition forces. A
fifth facility,
the Latifiyah BW Production facility, was added in February 1991.
As a result of coalition bombing, 11 of the 13 buildings
associated with BW R&D/production at these facilities were
destroyed and two were severely damaged. All five facilities are
assessed to be unable to support BW R&D and/or production.
BW storage initially included 19 12-frame refrigerated
bunkers at 11 locations. During February 1991 two additional
12-frame refrigerated bunkers were identified, bringing the total
to 21 such bunkers. Of these targets, the original 19 refrigerated
bunkers were all destroyed. The final two refrigerated bunkers
were discovered too late in the campaign to be attacked.
Chemical Warfare Research and Development, Production, Filling
and Storage
CW production included the Samarra Chemical Weapons
Research, Production and Storage Facility, and three separate
precursor production facilities at Habbaniyah. Production at
Samarra occurred in 10 buildings, five of which were destroyed. Of
the five surviving production buildings the most significant is
P-6, which is capable of producing 50-70 MT of sarin per month.
About 70% of Samarra's total production capacity was destroyed.
The three Habbaniyah facilities were destroyed.
Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions
filling and all three buildings were destroyed. At least one of
these buildings may have been empty at the time of its destruction
raising the possibility that Iraq has retained at least part of
its chemical munitions filling capability and possibly other
chemical related equipment.
CW storage capability was in the form of 8 cruciform
bunkers at Samarra and 22 "S"-shaped bunkers at 14 locations. Of
the 8 cruciform bunkers one was destroyed and the remaining 7
sustained only superficial damage. Of the 22 "S"-shaped bunkers 16
were destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(2) ]
architecture is not relevant to its ability to store agent or
weapons, and Iraq
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[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
Iraq's failure to use its chemical weapons cannot be
completely understood without a full accounting of the plans made
by the Iraqi military and political leadership in preparation for
the war, and the execution of those plans. Intelligence
information on this subject remains limited and analysis of the
reasons for deterrence is still preliminary. However, the
following is an
estimate of the influence of several factors which may have
contributed to a decision not to use chemical weapons.
Major Factors
The reason chemical weapons were not used during the war
was that they were not made available to the Iraqi troops. To
date, we have no evidence that chemical weapons were deployed to
the KTO. Iraqi leadership made fundamental miscalculations about
how the coalition would prosecute the war, and how effectively
they would respond. Possibly expecting the coalition forces to
fight like the Iranians, i.e. attacking first with infantry
followed by mobile
armor, it appears the Iraqis felt they would have days or even
weeks to move chemical weapons into the KTO once the war began.
Given the above, it is likely the Iraqis misjudged coalition speed
of advance, the degree to which their air force and artillery
assets would be attrited, and the degree to which their ability to
resupply would be degraded.
It is equally likely Iraq believed that both Israel and the
coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons, and would use them if
provoked. They quickly realized that these weapons could be
delivered anywhere in Iraq. This impression was reinforced by
public statements of allied and Israeli leaders, and probably
led Iraq to conclude the consequences of any chemical attack would
be too severe to justify their use and may have led to an early
decision not to use them.
The speed and violence of the coalition advance which
reached its objectives deep inside Iraq in only four days was
probably the most significant tactical factor in precluding
chemical use. Iraqi forces were constantly off balance, and
coalition air supremacy made effective concentration of artillery
for use against coalition ground forces virtually impossible.
With minor exception, Iraq did not take the military
initiative during the DESERT STORM operation, and was constantly
on the defensive. Coalition forces deterred Iraq from repeating
the success it had enjoyed with CW during the Iran-Iraq war.
Iraq's C3 system was heavily damaged by coalition bombing.
In addition, Iraqi commanders could not control their forces in
part because of a complete failure of their intelligence system to
evaluate the developing situation. The immediate establishment of
allied air superiority denied Iraq information on the disposition
of coalition forces, making fire planning extremely difficult. The
limited information available may have resulted in a decision not
to disperse chemicals within theater until the ground battle began
and coalition force dispositions became better defined.
Destruction of Iraqi CW production likely had a significant
effect on a decision not to use chemicals. The chemicals made
earlier by Iraq may have deteriorated in storage, or Iraq may have
miscalculated that their defenses would allow them time to produce
and deploy chemicals later in the conflict. The loss of their
production facilities would have prevented Iraq from making agent
as needed, which was its practice during the Iran-Iraq war.
It is also likely that Saddam Husayn retained personal
control of CW during the war, in order to allow a more complete
evaluation of the military situation. However, the speed of the
ground offensive, together with C3 problems, may have made this
retention a significant factor, since release of chemicals would
then have been more complicated and slower. It could-be that
mistrust of any units but Republican Guard forces was a factor in
this high level retention.
Other Factors
Iraq lost their air ability to deliver chemicals on the
first day of the war, one method of chemical delivery preferred
during the Iran-Iraq war. Artillery and MRLs then became the only
sustainable means of delivering chemicals. Iraq also had a limited
number of SCUD and SCUD-type missile warheads available that could
have been used to deliver chemical agents. However, artillery,
MRLs and SCUDs were attrited heavily during the allied air
campaign.
Iraq was not able to fully supply its ground forces in the
KTO during the war. Deployment of chemical ammunition would have
had to compete for scarce transportation resources with all the
other needs of the Iraqi forces. Large transfers of chemical
munitions to the KTO may have been evaluated as too risky. The air
campaign also destroyed most known and suspect CW storage in Iraq.
The weather conditions during the ground offensive were
poor for chemical use. Winds were strong, generally out of the
south and there was some rain in the area, which would have made
the effects of chemical weapons unpredictable and therefore less
desirable.
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[ (b)(6) ]
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