UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Biological Warfare (BW) Association of Abu Ghurayb "Infant 
Formula" Plant.
Filename:0901pgv.91
   [ (b)(2) ]     22 MAR 91  1615
SENT BY:  [ (b)(6) ]
	POSITION PAPER
Subject:  Biological Warfare (BW) Association of Abu Ghurayb 
"Infant Formula" Plant.
1.        Purpose: To provide the DIA position on the function of 
the Abu Ghurayb "Infant Formula" Plant.
2.       Discussion:
    a.          The Abu Ghurayb "Infant Formula" Plant has been 
carried by DIA as a suspect BW facility since April 1988 at which 
time fifteen other facilities were identified as possibly 
associated with the Iraqi offensive BW effort as well. As more 
information became available over the years, this list was reduced
to four confirmed BW facilities (Salman Pak, Taji, Latifiyah, the 
"Clostridium Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghurayb) and the suspect BW 
production facility at Abu Ghurayb (the "Infant Formula" Plant).
    b.                The plant was considered a suspect BW  
production plant due to: (i) the reported presence of high 
security, (ii) equipment suitable for BW agent production and 
processing, (iii) the fact that the plant reportedly never
had been used to produce infant formula, and (iv) camouflaging of 
the plant.
    Security:               The tight security (i.e. fence, four 
guard towers, and controlled access) [  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ]   
 was inconsistent with a commercial venture such as an infant 
formula plant. The security measures were later corroborated when 
the plant was finally located [  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ].
A [  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ] at the confirmed BW production 
facilities at Taji and the other plant at Abu Ghurayb.
    Equipment:             [  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ] the plant 
had the capacity to produce, process, and package BW agents based 
upon the presence of laboratories, five 27,000 liter processing 
tanks, drying equipment, packaging lines, and cold storage 
facilities. These are dual-use equipment items as were those at 
the confirmed BW facilities.
    Non-use:             [  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ] the plant was 
never used to produce infant formula despite the plant reportedly 
being a turnkey operation. Despite its non-use, the plant was 
reportedly maintained in perfect operating condition by teams of 
foreign nationals under strict security control.
	[  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ]
    Camouflage:          Finally, in December 1990, when war 
looked imminent, the Iraqis began to camouflage the plant. [      
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]
    c.          The overall assessment is that this plant was 
correctly identified as a suspect BW production facility with a 
back-up function. To this end, the Iraqis took good care of the 
plant, but never used it to produce infant formula or, for that 
matter, Bin agents. The clumsy attempt to place formula around a
non-functional plant to stage a media event backfired,
	[  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ]
      [ (b)(6) ]
 



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list