No Subject Line Found
Filename:081bda.91p
DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
BDA-81-91
22 March 1991
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Biological and Chemical
Prior to the war, Iraq had the most extensive and
sophisticated chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programs in
the Middle East. The objective of the Coalition air campaign was
to prevent production of additional chemical and biological
weapons and to destroy as many stored weapons as possible.
The bombing campaign against the CBW target set progressed in
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
three overlapping stages. The first stage
targeted both biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW)
research and development (R&D) and production and the CW
munitions-filling capability. The second stage targeted BW and CW
storage. During the second stage, most of the remaining CBW R&D
and production capabilities were restruck and destroyed. The third
stage targeted delivery systems in the field as well as targets
not destroyed in the first two stages. These stages were not
clearly delineated or distinct. For example, the BW-associated
bunkers at Salman Pak were destroyed before the R&D and production
buildings at that facility, and at least one significant CW
production bunker at Samarra survived the entire bombing campaign.
Biological. The BW program was at five facilities at Salman
Pak, Taji, Abu Ghurayb (two plants), and Latifiyah. Collectively
the facilities were capable of BW R&D and production of anthrax
spores and botulinum toxin.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Munitions are believed to have been filled with these agents, but
the precise types and numbers are unknown. Prior to the war, Iraq
was assessed to have at least 1 metric ton of dried anthrax spores
and 20-30 kilograms of botulinum toxin in its arsenal. The
location of munitions-filling equipment is unknown. Two
environmentally controlled storage bunkers at Salman Pak were the
most likely candidates for BW storage, whereas 19 other similar
bunkers
scattered throughout Iraq were capable of storing BW as well as
other heat-sensitive materials; the Coalition attacked all of
these bunkers.
Initially four facilities were associated with BW R&D and
production - the Salman Pak Chemical and Biological Warfare
Production Facility, the Abu Ghurayb Suspected BW Production
Facility, the Abu Ghurayb Suspected BW Production Facility
(Vaccine Plant), and the Taji BW Production Facility. A fifth
facility, the Latifiyah Suspected BW Plant Storage Facility, was
identified in February 1991. Thirteen buildings at these five
facilities were assessed to be associated with BW R&D and
production. As a result of Coalition bombing, 11 of the 13
buildings were destroyed and 2
were severely damaged. All five facilities are assessed to be
unable to support
BW R&D or production. Activities during the bombing campaign at
suspected BW production facilities indicate that Iraq made a
deliberate attempt to salvage BW related equipment after the
attacks. Some equipment probably was removed before the bombing
campaign.
Potential BW storage facilities initially consisted of 19
12-frame refrigerated bunkers at 11 locations and the Taji
Suspected BW Storage Facility. In February 1991,2 additional
12-frame refrigerated bunkers were identified, bringing the total
to 21 such bunkers. Of these targets, the original 19 refrigerated
bunkers and the Taji Suspected BW Storage Facility all were
destroyed. The final two refrigerated bunkers were identified too
late in the campaign to be attacked. DIA cannot confirm whether BW
material was stored in any of the bunkers, which also were
suitable for storing chemical weapons, electronics, smart weapons,
or fuel-air explosives.
All known BW R&D/production and storage facilities were
destroyed with the exception of 2 12-frame refrigerated bunkers.
Reproducing the entire BW system as it existed on 15 January 1991,
including the facilities at Salman Pak, Abu Ghurayb, Taji, and
Latifiyah and all the destroyed
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
bunkers, would require $100-200 million and 5-8 years. However,
Iraq's complete BW system had multiple, redundant R&D and
production facilities. In addition, not all the refrigerated
bunkers would be required to store a militarily significant amount
of BW agents. Therefore, without duplicating the prewar system,
Iraq could reestablish a significant BW capability with dedicated
laboratories, containment facilities, and a storage and filling
ca-
pacity within 3-4 years for less than $100 million. [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. A BW agent production capability technically
could be established in a matter of weeks to months using
equipment at pharmaceutical facilities such as Samarra Drug
Industries; however, production would be at a much reduced
capacity and would be less safe than production at dedicated BW
plants.
Chemical. Iraq's prewar CW capability included production of
nerve and mustard agents deliverable by aerial bombs, spray
devices, air-to-ground rockets, tube and rocket artillery, and a
limited number of missile warheads. CW agents were synthesized at
the only known production facility at Samarra, where munitions
also were filled and stored. The Iraqis were striving aggressively
for a self-sufficient CW production capability by building three
CW agent precursor plants at Habbaniyah. By early 1990 one of the
plants was producing the nerve agent precursor phosphorus
trichloride. The only missing link in attaining self-sufficiency
was a white phosphorus plant that was contracted for but never
built. Overall, the Iraqi CW infrastructure consisted of 10 CW
agent production plants with a combined production capacity of
2,500-3,000 metric tons per year. In addition, there were 3
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
munitions-filling lines at Samarra, 3 precursor plants at
Habbaniyah, and 30 storage bunkers scattered throughout the
country.
Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions
filling; all three were destroyed. At least one of these buildings
may have been empty at the time of its destruction, raising the
possibility that Iraq has retained at least part of its chemical
munitions filling capability. All three precursor production
facilities were destroyed at Habbaniyah. To produce CW agents,
Iraq now must import almost all of its precursor chemicals.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Iraq is believed to have stored its CW munitions in 8
cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22 S-shaped bunkers at 14 other
locations. Of the eight cruciform bunkers, one was destroyed and
the remaining seven sustained apparently only superficial damage.
Of the 225-shaped bunkers, 16 were destroyed and 6 suffered
serious damage. Iraq does not need to reproduce the 225-shaped
bunkers to reconstitute a CW storage capability because chemical
weapons can be stored in virtually any secure building or bunker.
The objective of preventing production of chemical agents and
additional chemical weapons was not totally achieved.
Nevertheless, CW
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
agent production has been severely degraded, with about 70 percent
of Samarra's production capacity destroyed. The equipment
necessary to produce 50-70 metric tons of nerve agent per month
and about 5 metric tons of precursor material or mustard agent per
month remain intact at Samarra - assuming electric power,
precursor chemicals, and personnel are available.
Iraq would need at least 3-5 years and several hundred
million
dollars to restore the Samarra facility to its prewar status. To
rebuild the three Habbaniyah facilities would take $200-400
million and 3-5 years, assuming Iraq has access to the required
materials on the international market.
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