Iraqi BW Capabilities
Filename:0628rpt.91
Subject: Iraqi BW Capabilities
SUMMARY
The Iraqis have two confirmed biological warfare (BW)
agents, anthrax and botulinum toxin, both of which are
believed to be weaponized. Thus far, there is only one
confirmed BW facility in Iraq [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] -
the Salman Pak Chemical and BW (CBW) Research, Production, and
Storage Facility. However, three suspect research or
production facilities have recently been identified [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]are involved in the Iraqi BW program.
In addition, 17 specially designed, refrigerated bunkers,
possibly constructed to store or fill BW agent, have been
confirmed.2 Two of these bunkers are at Salman Pak; the other
15 are at general-purpose ammunition storage depots throughout
the country.
Refrigerated trucks, identified in July 1990 at Salman
Pak, could be used to transport BW material from the
production facility. Iraq also possesses several potential
delivery systems and platforms for dispersing BW agent. They
are known to have acquired custom-built aerosol generators in
the spring of 1990 which could effectively deliver a range of
BW agents.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ b.2. ] 2-frame bunkers equipped with environmental
control refrigeration will be referred to as special.
(Reverse Blank)
iii
Iraqi BW Capabilities
INTRODUCTION
The Iraqis have expressed a desire to acquire BW weapons
since at least the late 1970s. Since that time they have
established the most extensive BW program in the Arab world,
which gives them an operational capability on the battlefield.
The Iraqis have two confirmed BW agents, anthrax and botulinum
toxin, both of which are believed to be weaponized. The Iraqis
are also known to be investigating Vibrio cholerae,
Clostridium perfringens, plague, and staphylococcal
enterotoxin B as potential BW agents.
RESEARCH AND/OR PRODUCTION
Four facilities have been identified [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] that have been reported to be involved in the Iraqi BW
program (figure I and table 1). Currently, there is only one -
Salman Pak CBW Research, Production, and Storage Facility - [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] reinforcing a BW association. The
remaining three facilities - Taji Suspect BW Facility, Abu
Ghurayb Vaccine Plant, and Abu Ghurayb Infant Formula Plant -
are candidate facilities that have been identified through
collateral reporting. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Salman Pak CBW Research, Production, and Storage
Facility
This facility is on a peninsula formed by a bend in the
Tigris River. approximately 32 km southeast of the center of
Baghdad and 3 km SSE of the town of Salman Pak (figure 2). It
covers an area of about 3 square km and consists of five
functional areas. The entire facility is double and/or triple
fenced with entrances in the northeast and northwest corners.
Salman Pak Unconventional Military Training Facility is
collocated with the CBW facility; [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
]
The BW lab/processing area of Salman Pak is triple fenced and
was constructed between 1980 and 1984. The wall-within-a-wall
construction of the lab building [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
]
[ b.2. ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Name
Abu Ghurayb Infant
Formula Plant
2 Abu Ghurayb Vaccine
Plant
3 Salman Pak CBW
Rsch, Prod, & Stor Fac
4 Taji Suspect BW Fac
Al Badre Poss Chem
Wpns Test Fac
[ (b)(2) ]
required in a P4 facility [ b.2. ]. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
Just west of the BW lab/processing area is the bunkered
storage area. This area is triple fenced and contains 4 12-
frame storage bunkers, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] and
protected on three sides by earth mounding. Each also has a
concrete T-shaped entrance, probably equipped with an airlock;
four lightning arresters, one in each corner; a small guard
shack at the entrance; and stairs to the top of the bunker. A
small, revetted, probable fuze/detonator storage building and
a security building are also in the storage area.
Two of these are special bunkers [ b.2. ]. The bunker
in the southeast corner of the storage area has been equipped
with a three-fan refrigeration unit since at least July 1983;
the bunker in the southwest corner was similarly equipped in
August 1989. The conversion of this second bunker in 1989
could mean that the Iraqis are producing BW agents on a larger
scale, requiring more refrigerated storage space for the heat-
sensitive BW agents/materials. The purpose of the other two
bunkers is uncertain, but they also may be converted if
further BW agent/material storage capacity is required.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Taji Suspect BW Facility
Taji Suspect BW Facility is in the northeast corner of the
Baghdad Military Complex Taji. The suspect facility is
separately fence secured and consists of an
administration/support area and a lab/processing area. The lab
building has numerous vents/stacks and a probable
incineration/waste disposal system.
A pilot-scale fermentation plant was reportedly built at Taji
several years ago. This facility is also reportedly equipped
with a 450-1iter fermentation vessel. The lab building at the
Taji Suspect BW Facility could easily house a fermenter of
that size. A definite link has also been made between the
reported Taji facility and an Iraqi BW front (cover)
organization. Based on its location, the extensive security,
and the presence of a lab building, the Taji Suspect BW
Facility is the best candidate to be the Taji facility
referred to in reports.
Abu Ghurayb Vaccine Plant
An innocuous vaccine plant, with 10 1,200-1iter fermenters,
has been reported on the outskirts of Baghdad in the Abu
Ghurayb area. Although the Abu Ghurayb Vaccine Facility has
reportedly been active in recent years, its status and
location are unknown.
[ b.2. ]
Abu Ghurayb Infant Formula Plant
The Abu Ghurayb Infant Formula Plant, approximately 21 km west
of the center of Baghdad, contains two large processing
buildings and an unidentified building connected by catwalk to
the processing buildings. An air-handling/filtration system
and several vents are visible on the largest processing
building. Heavy security, inconsistent with a facility
producing infant formula, is maintained at this plant.
In 1982, an infant formula plant was reportedly completed at
Abu Ghurayb, about 25 km west of Baghdad. Reportedly,
equipment in the plant includes 15 industrial fermenters and
high-efficiency particulate filters used for the containment
of biologically hazardous material. This equipment could
easily be used for BW R&D and production. This facility has
not been confirmed[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
STORAGE
12-Frame Storage Bunker
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
. Fifteen additional special 12-frame bunkers (like those at
Salman Pak) have been identified [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] at 8 other locations. These bunkers received their cooling
units sometime after 1982.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
There currently are 35 12-frame storage bunkers in Iraq.
Seventeen of the 35 have probable refrigeration equipment and
ductwork near/on the entrance. These are suspected of being
associated with the Iraqi BW program and are discussed in this
report (figure 9 and table 2). It should also be noted that
these special bunkers could store chemical weapons, fuel-air
explosives, or "smart weapons."
Bunker Construction Sequence
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Table 2
Locations of Iraqi Special 12-Frame
Storage Bunkers
Ad Diwaniyah Ammo Stor
Fac SW
An Nasiriyah Ammo Stor
Fac Sw
Ash Shuaybah Ammo Stor
Depot NE
Falluja Ammo Depot S
Karbala Depot & Ammo Stor
Fac
Kirkuh Ammo Depot W
Salman Pak CBW
Research Prod & Stor Fac
8 Tikrit Ammo Depot
9 Qababyah Special 12-Frame
Stor Bkr
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Table 3
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Cardoen cluster bomb units are known to have been
successfully deployed in Iraq. Thev are one of the best
candidates for disseminating BW agents because they provide
wide-area coverage. The CBU-130 Ib releases 50 bomblets and
the CBU-SOO Ib, 240 bomblets (Appendix 2); both can be carried
on all modern tactical aircraft (Appendix 3). The bomblets
cover an elliptical surface area of 10,000 to 45,000 square
meters, depending on bomb size and operational employment. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
LOGISTICS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
DELIVERY SYSTEMS
The Iraqi BW agents have both tactical and nontactical uses.
Biologically derived toxins, such as botulinum toxin, act in
about the same time as mustard gas and could be used in
tactical situations near the forward edge of the battleline.
Botulinum has the added advantage of being relatively
nonpersistent (several hours), thereby allowing attacking
troops to occupy terrain shortly after its use. Artillery,
aerial bombs, and spray devices are suitable for delivering
toxins. Toxins could also be used by special forces or
terrorists to selectively attack troop concentrations to the
rear, command centers, or civilian populations. Infectious
agents, such as anthrax, are more useful against large-area
targets since they are more resistant to environmental
factors. Anthrax can cover very large areas, especially when
disseminated by aerosol generators or aerial spray devices.
Cluster and unitary munitions and missile warheads can also be
used to deliver BW agents.
The Iraqis are known to have acquired 40 custom-built
Mistral-2 aerosol generators [ b.2. ] in the spring of
1990. This device, with 10 different nozzle settings,
Device/Munitions
Chart
Potential BW Delivery
Systems
Platforms
Fighter/Bomber
(Su-24/FENCER, Su-22/FlTTER,
MiG 28/FLOGGER, Tu-22/BLlNDER
Mirage F-l, Su-25/FROGFOOT
Light Aircraft/Helicopters
(PC-7, Mi-24/HlND, Mi-8/HlP)
Naval Vessels
(Osa I and 11, Bogomol, LCPA Hoverr
Kuwaiti FFB-57, TNC-45 PTG,
Winchester LCPA)
Ground
(Wheeled or tracked vehicles)
Ground
(MRL -122 mm; Artiller,v -180 mm,
152 mm, 155 mm; Mortars - 82 mm,
1 20 mm
.
10
could be used to effectively deliver a range of BW agents.
This apparatus consists of a motor, a pump, a cannon-type
blower assembly, and storage areas for liquid and solid
materials. This generator, also equipped with a hand-
controlled spreader for manual application, can be mounted in
an aircraft, on a boat, or on a flatbed truck [ b.2. ].
It should also be noted that personnel who might deliver such
a weapon could be vaccinated to protect themselves against
potential infection.
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