ASSESSMENT OF REMAINING IRAQI CHEMICAL AND SRBM CAPABILITY
Filename:0615rpt.91
DATA[ (b)(2) ]
RESPOND TO [ (b)(2) ]
[ b.2. ]
06 MAR 91, 1202HRS, SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]
TO: J-2 [ (b)(6) ]
J-5 [ (b)(6) ]
J-2 [ (b)(6) ]
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF REMAINING IRAQI CHEMICAL AND SRBM
CAPABILITY
I. SRBMs
1. We are unable to accurately estimate Iraq's remaining
short range ballistic missile (SRBM) capabilities. This
results from uncertainty about Iraqi inventories of missiles
and mobile launchers at the start of hostilities, as well as
levels of destruction achieved during the war.
2. Except for the 86 SRBMs expended against Israel (40
launches) and against targets in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States
(46 launches) since 18 Jan, no other degrading of this asset
with the exception of the fixed erector/launchers -- can
presently be confirmed. Of the 28 fixed erector/launchers
estimated to be operational on 18 Jan at the SRBM launch sites
in western Iraq, only four are now assessed as capable of
launching a missile. However, there is no evidence that any
launches were carried out from these launchers, and there have
been no reported efforts at their repair. The more significant
component of the western Iraq SRBM force, the mobile launchers
-- transporter erector launchers (TEL) or mobile erector
launchers (MEL) -- likely remain operational, despite numerous
claims of destruction of launch vehicles and missiles.
However, the reduced frequency of launches in the latter days
of the war suggests that this SRBM force was experiencing
difficulties. It is not known if these were due to successful
coalitian air attacks, Iraqi attempts to avoid Coalition air
attacks, or shortages in key supplies or components. We assess
that an unknown number of operational mobile launchers and
missiles likely remain in western Iraq, nontheless, they are
probably capable of launching only the sporadic attacks which
characterized the last week of the war.
3. The key question for the Iraqi mobile SRBM force in
southeastern Iraq opposite the KTO is the status of mobile
launchers, reload missiles, and missile fueling/checkout
facilities in light of the rapid coalition ground advance.
There is still no information if these:
a. Were destroyed by allied ground forces but not reported.
b. Abandoned by their Iraqi crews and are mixed in with other
derelict equipment.
c. Escaped to the sasrah area where they are currently hidden
d. Managed to escape elsewhere, perhaps to the north.
we have no confirmation of mobile SRBMs escaping the KTO or of
reported disooveries of SRBM mobile launchers, missiles, or
support equipment destroyed by air attacks and subsequently
abandoned, or depot areas and missile fueling/checkout
facilities. In any case, the SRBM assets in the southeast
which remain operational are probably disorganized and short
of essential supplies or equipment. Consequently, they would
be of little military significance if hostilities were to
resume. Even if they were able to successfully conduct one or
even several launches, missile accuracy is likely to be below
even the previausly demonstrated standards of the past several
weeks.
4. The failure of Baghdad to employ chemical or biological
warheads with their SRBMs in the last days of the war suggests
technical problems, inability to target Coalition forces
accurately, and fear of retaliation.
5. Finally, the Iraqi capability to support and sustain their
launchers and missiles at a ready state, has been severely
degraded. The majority of the support facilities such as at
Taji and Muhammadi were successfully struck several times
during the air campaign. Additionally, the Iraqi capability to
modify their SCUD-B missiles into extended range versions has
also been severely degraded.
II. Chemical Warfare
1. Iraq's ability to produce chemical agent has been severely
degraded but not eliminated. It is assessed to have the
equipment necessary to produce 50-70 metric tons of nerve
agent per month and about 5 metric tons of precursor material
or mustard agent per month. In order to produce this agent
over time, Iraq will need to import several precursor
chemicals. It will also need to bring the system back into a
rational order, e.g. powering up production lines, getting
chemical precursors into the system, supplying casings for
weaponizing, etc. Assuming that equipment, such as the filling
lines, has been relocated and precursor chemicals are still
available in country, Iraq could be making chemical nunitions
as soon as the power grid is back in operation. Same
munitions, such as aerial bombs, could be filled using field
expedients regardless of the availability of specialized
filling equipment.
2. CW production areas included the Samarra Chemical Weapons
Production and Storage Facility, and the Habbaniyah I,
Habbaniyah II, and Habbaniyah III precursor production
facilities. Production at Samarra occurred in 6 unbunkered
buildings and 4 bunkered buildings. Five of six unbunkered
buildings and none of the bunkered buildings were destroyed.
About 70% of Samarra's total production capacity was
destroyed. Nonetheless, of the four surviving bunkered
production buildings the most significant was P-6, which is
capable of producing 60 MT of Sarin per month. The three
Habbaniyah facilities were destroyed.
3. Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions
filling and all three of these buildings were destroyed.
However, at least one of these buildings appears to have been
empty at the time of destruction. It is not clear whether this
particular building had any filling equipment before the
bombing campaign. If it did have filling equipment, this would
indicate that Iraq has preserved at least part of its chemical
munitions filling capability and probably other chemical
related equipment as well. If Iraq has relocated equipment to
preserve it, we have incomplete information on the location of
Iraq's present facilities. This cannot be confirmed, but
leaves doubt about the extent of damage to Iraq's ability to
nake chemical weapons.
4. CW storage capability was in the form of 8 cruciform
bunkers at Samarra and 22 "S-shaped bunkers at 14 locations.
Of the 8 cruciform bunkers one was destroyed and the remaining
7 sustained only superficial damage. Of the 22 "S"-shaped
bunkers 16 were destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage.
Although these bunkers were identified as CW related bunkers [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], bunker architecture is not
relevant to its ability to store agent or weapons, which would
have an important impact on Iraq's ability to reconstitute its
CW storage system.
5. In order to determine the time and expense necessary to
reconstitute the pre-war CBW system, it is necessary first to
define what is meant by reconstitution of the system. To
rebuild the system to the level where Iraq would have some
capability to produce a significant amount of biological and
chemical agent would require far less time and expense than to
reproduce the system identical to that which existed on 15
January 1991.
[ (b)(6) ]
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