Desert Storm: Iraq's chemical and Biological Warfare Facilities
Filename:059pgv.00p
SUBJECT: Desert Storm: Iraq's chemical and Biological Warfare
Facilities
PURPOSE: To assess the bomb damage that has occurred to date to
Iraq's chemical and biological warfare production and storage
facilities and to prioritized targeting of remaining facilities to
reduce Iraq's capacity to use chemical and biological weapons in
the Desert Storm conflict.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE With the destruction of all processing
capability at the Abu Gharib BW Production Facility, along with
the complete neutralization of the Taji BW Production Facility,
Iraq's biological production capacity has been reduced by 40 to 50
percent. The production capability at Salman Pak and at the Abu
Gharayub Clostridium Vaccine Plant remains intact. It has [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that some of the equipment at Salman Pak
has been moved to the Najaf area. Countrywide, seven of nineteen
(37 percent) known refrigerated 12-frame bunkers capable of
storing biological agents and other heat sensitive materials have
been destroyed.
CHEMICAL WARFARE Countrywide, chemical agent production
capability has been reduced by 40-50 percent and two-thirds of the
filling capacity has been eliminated. Four of 10 production
buildings at Samarra have been destroyed. The above ground P10
(high capacity mustard) production building and above ground P7
(low capacity mustard or sarin) production building at Samarra
should be targeted along with the P3, P4, P5, and P6 production
bunkers to negate Iraq's chemical agent production capability.
Chemical precursor production buildings at two of the Habbaniyah
facilities (II and III) have probably sustained moderate damage.
Habbaniyah I and II are recommended for re-strike. One (Mosul
Airfield) of the 22 known S-shaped chemical storage bunkers has
been destroyed to date. It is likely that iraq has dispersed its
chemical weapons to increase their survivability.
TARGET PRIORITIES Elimination of CW delivery means are now most
critical because there has been time and good reason to disperse
CW munitions. Destruction of the SCUD launchers would eliminate
the possibility of chemical attacks from missiles. Interdiction
of airfields will effectively negate the threat of air delivered
bombs. Helicopter-delivered 90-mm rockets, however, would remain
a threat. MRL's and 155-mm field artillery are the most likely
means of delivering binary CW agent by ground troops. As unitary
CW agents deteriorate, binary munitions will become increasingly
important. Attacks on the Iraqi chemical and biological
production facilities should be continued. This will prevent
replenishment of Iraqi stocks. The remaining CW production and
filling facilities at Samarra and the chemical precursor plants at
Habbaniyah should be given priority for destruction.
Additionally, the production areas at Salman Pak and Abu Gharib
(Clostridium Vaccine Plant) need to be destroyed.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] "S-shaped" bunkers at
airfields should be attacked to eliminate aerial bombs. This
should be followed by attacks on bunkers at ground force depots to
eliminate artillery and MRL ammunition. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] Destruction of the twelve remaining 12-frame
refrigerated bunkers capable of storing biological weapons and
other heat sensitive materials should likewise be given high
priority.
POC: [ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ]
A. THE FOLLOWING CBW FACILITIES ON THE TARGET LIST ARE NO LONGER
FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD NOT BE RESTRUCK:
1. QABATIYAH SPECIAL 12 FRAME STORAGE BUNKER. THIS BUNKER
IS COMPLETELY DESTROYED AND IS NON-OPERATIONAL. NO RE-STRIKE
NEEDED.
2. ABU GHURAYB SUSPECT BW PRODUCTION FACILITY. BOTH
PRODUCTION BUILDINGS AT THIS FACILITY ARE DESTROYED AS ARE SUPPORT
FACILITIES. THIS FACILITY IS INCAPABLE OF PRODUCING BW AGENTS.
FURTHERMORE THREE EIGHTEEN WHEEL TRUCKS WERE PRESENT A DAY AFTER
THE ATTACK ON 22 JAN 91 PROBABLY REMOVING ANYTHING SALVAGEABLE.
3. THE TAJI SUSPECT BW PRODUCTION PLANT HAS BEEN SEVERELY
DAMAGED AND HAS BEEN INOPERABLE SINCE THE FIRST STRIKE ON 17JAN91.
4. MOSUL AIRFIELD, THE S-SHAPED CW BUNKER HAS BEEN
DESTROYED. NO FURTHER STRIKES REQUIRED.
B. THE FOLLOWING TARGETS HAVE SUFFERED PARTIAL OR NO DAMAGE, OR
HAVE NOT YET BEEN STRUCK. TARGETING RECOMMENDATIONS IN PRIORITY
ORDERS FOLLOW.
1. SAMARRA CHEMICAL WARFARE PRODUCTION AND STORAGE
FACILITY.
A. TWO OF THREE FILLING BUILDINGS ARE DESTROYED BUT THE
THIRD BUILDING REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND NEEDS TO BE ATTACKED.
B. PRODUCTION FACILITIES P-1/2, P-8, P-9, AND P-11/12
SUSTAINED MODERATE TO SEVERE DAMAGE AND ALL ARE ASSESSED AS
NONFUNCTIONAL. THEY DO NOT REQUIRE RE-STRIKE.
CRITICAL ELEMENTS TO RETARGET AT SAMARRA [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
]:
A. PRODUCTION FACILITY P-10 AT [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
HAS CRATERS NEARBY BUT IS STILL FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE
RETARGETED.
B. THE FILLING AREA HAS ONE FUNCTIONAL BUILDING THAT NEEDS
TO BE TARGETED . [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
C. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-6, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
D. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-4, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
E. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-5, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
F. PRODUCTION FACILITY P-7, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
G. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-3, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
H. EIGHT CRUCIFORM BUNKERS LOCATED IN [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] HAVE NOT BEEN STUCK TO DATE. THESE BUNKERS HAVE
BEEN USED EXTENSIVELY IN THE PAST TO STORE CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. IT
IS NOT KNOWN IF THESE BUNKERS STILL CONTAIN CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
2. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THE ABU GHURAYB CLOSTRIDIUM
VACCINE PLANT. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
3. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SALMAN PAK BW RESEARCH,
PRODUCTION AND STORAGE FACILITY
A. ALL FOUR 12-FRAME BUNKERS IN THE STORAGE AREA HAVE BEEN
DESTROYED AND SHOULD NOT BE RETARGETED.
B. PRIME TARGETS FOR THE SALMAN PAK FACILITY [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ] IN THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY: [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
C. THIS IS A POSSIBLE PRODUCTION BUILDING WITH ASSOCIATED
DRYING TOWER. THE BUILDING WAS BERMED JUST PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF
HOSTILITIES INDICATING IT WAS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE IRAQIS: [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
D. REFRIGERATION UNITS ACQUIRED BY IRAQI'S BW FRONT
ORGANIZATION AND A ORGANIZATION INVOLVED AT LEAST IN PART WITH THE
IRAQI MISSILE PROGRAM ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO THIS
AREA AND SOME INSTALLED AT THIS BUILDING. BW ASSOCIATION LIKELY
BUT EXACT NATURE OF BW INVOLVEMENT IS UNKNOWN. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
E. RATIONALE SAME AS "D". [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
F. RATIONALE SAME AS "D". [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
G. BUILDING PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CHEMICAL AGENTS TO POSSIBLY
INCLUDE BINARIES. PILOT SCALE CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION MAY HAVE
OCCURRED IN THIS BUILDING. BUILDING WAS CAMOUFLAGED JUST PRIOR TO
HOSTILITIES INDICATING THAT IT IS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE IRAQIS. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
H. BUILDING PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CHEMICAL AGENTS TO POSSIBLY
INCLUDE BINARIES. BUILDING WAS CAMOUFLAGED JUST PRIOR TO
HOSTILITIES INDICATING THAT IT IS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE IRAQIS. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
4. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HABBANIYAH POSS CW PROD FAC II.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] STORAGE TANKS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED.
EASTERN END OF THE PRODUCTION BUILDING WAS DAMAGED. NEED TO RE-
STRIKE THE CENTER OF THE PRODUCTION BUILDING [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ], CHLORINE PRODUCTION [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
AND FOUR DRIVE THROUGH WAREHOUSES [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
5. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HABBANIYAH POSS CW PROD FAC I.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THIS FACILITY HAS NOT SUSTAINED ANY
DAMAGE AND NEEDS TO BE RESTRUCK. HOWEVER THIS FACILITY IS OF A
LOWER PRIORITY THAN HABBANIYAH II. RECOMMEND RE-STRIKE OF
PRODUCTION BUILDING [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AND AGAINST THE
FOUR WAREHOUSES: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
6. THE FOLLOWING 12-FRAME REFRIGERATED BUNKERS CAPABLE OF
STORING BW AGENTS AND "S"-SHAPED BUNKERS PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED
WITH CW MUNITIONS STORAGE ARE LISTED IN RECOMMENDED PRIORITY ORDER
FOR ATTACK.
A. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], ASH SHUAYBAH AMMO STOR DPT
NE, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] REFRIGERATED BUNKER [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ], S-SHAPED BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
B. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TALLIL AFLD [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] ONE S-SHAPED BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
C. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRAH AFLD,
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TWO S-SHAPED BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ].
D. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AL TAQQADUM AFLD [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ] ONE S-SHAPED BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
].
E. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] BAGHDAD AMMO DPT TAJI, ONE
S-SHAPED BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
F. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] H-3 AIRFIELD [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] ONE S-SHAPED BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
G. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] H-3 AMMO STOR FAC, [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] FOUR S-SHAPED BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ].
H. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STOR FAC
SW, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] FOUR REFRIG BUNKERS [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AND ONE S-SHAPED BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
].
I. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STOR FAC
SW [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TWO REFRIG BUNKERS ALREADY
DESTROYED AND DO NOT REQUIRE RESTRIKE. ONE REFRIG BUNKER REQUIRES
STRIKE [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
J. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] KARBALA DPT AND AMMO STOR
FAC, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TWO; REFRIG BUNKERS ALREADY
DESTROYED AND DO NOT REQUIRE RESTRIKE. ONE REFRIG BUNKER REMAINS
AND REQUIRES STRIKE [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
K. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HABBINIYAH AMMO DPT, ONE
REFRIG BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
L. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] FALLUJAH AMMO DPT S, TWO
REFRIG BUNKERS, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
M. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TIKRIT AMMO DPT, ONE REFRIG
BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
N. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], KIRKUK AMMO DPT W, ONE
REFRIG BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] ALSO THREE S-SHAPED
BUNKERS BUT DO NOT HAVE GRID REFERENCES.
Q. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] QAYYARAH WEST AMMO, FOUR S-
SHAPED BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
R. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] KIRKUK AIRFIELD, ONE S-
SHAPED BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
S. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] QAYYARAH W AIRFIELD, ONE S-
SHAPED BUNKER, NEVER OPERATIONAL, NO STRIKE REQUIRED.
T. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] MOSUL AIRFIELD, ONE S-SHAPED
BUNKER DESTROYED. NO ADDITIONAL STRIKES REQUIRED.
7. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HABBANIYTAH POSSIBLE CW PROD FAC
III. ALTHOUGH THIS FACILITY RECEIVED ONLY MINOR DAMAGE, IT IS
STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND HAS NEVER BEEN OPERATIONAL AS A
RESULT, IT SHOULD HAVE A LOWER PRIORITY AND NOT BE RESTRUCK.
8. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AL HADRE POSS CW TEST FACILITY,
FACILITY PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH POSSIBLE CW TESTING. NO
STRIKES NECESSARY. NOTHING REALLY TO DESTROY.
9. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] BANI SAD BARRACKS AREA. THIS IS
A CBW TRAINING AREA THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE STRIKE. NOTHING OF
VALUE.
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