FYI, CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS/ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ BW
Filename:0514rept.91
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
DATE: 18 FEB 1990
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
SUBJ: FYI, CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS/ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ BW
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that the Iraqis where in the
process of removing crates, and possibly undamaged equipment from
what is left of the Latifiya Suspect BW facility which has been
struck on two occasions. A large number of crates are located on
the perimeter of the facility and at least four fork lifts, one in
the facility, and three scattered along the road adjacent to the
facility, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. In addition, at least one
cargo truck was parked on the road, and a sedan possibly providing
security was near the intersection of the main highway. Some of
this activity was first [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. the
activity coincides (in time) with probable attempts to salvage and
remove BW related components from the Salman Pak BW facility, [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
2. A new release by TASS, with a byline Cairo, FEB 10, quoted
the Cairo based newspaper AL-HAQIQA as reporting that an Egyptian
physician working in Baghdad stated that a number of guards at a
BW facility not far from Baghdad became ill, and died, shortly
after an airstrike on the facility [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] described the Egyptian newspaper as
being somewhat akin to the National Enquirer as far as
reliability. An AFMIC analysis of the report (enclosure 3) for
the most pard debunked the article for the reasons noted in the
enclosure. However, two Physicians who were part of the
interagency group, and read the AFMIC analysis, called and urged
caution in dissemination the report. While they agreed that --
the symptoms described, their rapid onset, and the general
description of the highly contagious nature of the condition --
was inconsistent with Anthrax or botulinum toxin, two agents
believed to be capable of weaponization, they independently
suggested that some other agent, possibly Staphylococcus
Entherotoxin B (SEB), could not be ruled out. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]that the Iraqis may have been working with this
agent, along with a number of others, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
that this work was as advanced as that of Anthrax or bot tox. The
two physicians also noted that the symptoms reported would not be
inconsistent with a massive dose of SEB, or for that matter some
other agents, since massive exposures to a particular agent would
cause widespread symptoms not necessarily characteristic of a
nominal lethal dose. They do not mean to suggest that this
incident could reflect a widespread outbreak of disease as a
result of the airstrike and agree wit the
AFMIC analysis in this respect. Rather, they think it possible
that the individuals in question may have had direct exposure to a
toxin, which would not result in contagen, but which could cause
additional illness/death as a result of secondary transmittal
(handling of infected individuals cloths, direct contact with
individuals, contaminated medical instruments, etc.). They
indicated that in such a case the death rates would not be in the
hundreds, but would only involve those directly exposed to the
agent. They also agreed that it is likely that the so called
widespread outbreak at the various locations noted which the mixed
symtomologies, if even true, would be a result of a number of
different conditions such as exposure to chemicals near chemical
plants, as well as endemic diseases which are quite likely as a
result of the breakdown of sanitation and hygiene. The reason for
their concern insofar as this incident was the possibility they
cited that Saddam has a BW agent in his arsenal that we have not
credited him with, and that poses a threat to coalition forces. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
There [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that the Iraqis have been
attempting to develop BW, and possibly CW submunitions (bomblets),
for a variety of weapons including the SCUD using plastic material
for the submunition. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] are that they
have various size plastic container in their possession for this
purpose.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ b.2. ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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