OFFENSIVE BW RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Filename:0512rept.00d
OFFENSIVE BW RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Iraq's biological and toxin weapons program is the most
extensive In the Middle East. Large quantities of anthrax bacteria
and botulinum toxin have likely been produced. We believe that
these agents have been weaponized and that biological and toxin
munitions already exist. Further, the deployment of biological
weapons in significant numbers will take place by the end of 1990,
if not already Implemented.
Current capabilities Include a) production of anthrax
and botulInum toxin, b) vacuum drying of agents in micron size
particle suitable for aerosol dissemination, c) testing of agents
and d) weaponization and e) refrigerated bunkers for storage. Iraq
has demonstrated a significant competency for research,
development, and production of classic Infectious agents and
toxins. Iraq also has the necessary Infrastructure to develop
recombinant organisms and other agents of biological origin if so
desired. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] claim that Iraq has already tested BW agents and delivery
systems. Generous funding, competent scientists, and construction
or expansion of facilities provide full support to the program.
In light of the unscrupulous use of chemical agents
in the Iran and Iraq War and the record of human rights In Iraq,
we postulate that given a threatening or no win circumstance, Iraq
will launch a BW attack.
BW PROGRAM
Although the Iraqi BW program has been in existence
since the 70's, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. The end of the
Iran-lraq War (August 88) triggered President Hussein to direct
Iraq to become a self supporting military power in regard to
producing conventional weapons and to boost its CBW capabilities.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
The BW program is supported at the highest level of the
government. President Saddam Hussein has direct-responsibility
for all policy issues related to the program. He has boasted that
his country has developed a secret weapon system which previously
was held by only two other countries in the world.
The Intelligence service has the responsibility for security,
procurement of material, and the general direction of the program.
The BW program is highly secure [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Despite signing the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Iraqis
repeatedly violated this agreement by their use of CW agents
during their conflict with Iran. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
PROCUREMENT
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
AGENTS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
PERSONALITIES
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
FACILITIES
At least 15 separate facilities possess the technical
capability to support the BW program. Of these, five facilities
have been [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] with the program.
Salman Pak
The Salman Pak facility [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], located
25 kilometers southeast of Baghdad, Is Iraq's leading BW research
facility. The Salman Pak site where the El Hazen Institute is
located, has been [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] as a facility for
BW R&D and production [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. These bunkers, located at Tikrit
Ammo Depo, Al Fallujah Ammunition Depot South, Ad Diwahiyah
Ammunition Storage Facility Southwest and Karbaia Depot and
Ammunition Storage Facility, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. It is
possible that such trucks could be used to transport temperature-
sensitive biological munitions or agents.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that live agents (typhus (sic)
probably typhoid and/or cholera) are produced in Salman Pak and
loaded into 122 mm shells stored in the bunkers of the area.
Taji
The facility at the Taji major military industrial complex
north of Baghdad, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], contains a
fermentation plant which is capable of scale-up production of BW
agents. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] it is producing BW agents on
a small scale. The location of the facility at Taji and its
control by the military affords the Iraqis the security necessary
for agent production. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Abu Ghriab
In 1982, an "infant formula" plant was completed at Abu
Ghurayb(sic) Ghraib [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], 25 kilometer
west
of Baghdad. Very high security is maintained at the plant, which
has barbed wire fencing and guard towers.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
The unusual security measure at the plant make it highly suspect.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that there is a possible BW
center near Mosul, where basic research and development of
biological agents is done.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
BIOTECHNOLOGIES AND BW
The technical infrastructure necessary to support an
offensive BW program exists in Iraq which is one of the few Arab
countries having a strong industrial microbiology technological
base. Little basic biological research currently is underway in
Iraq; most of the indigenous scientific expertise is
engaged in applied research for the military.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Iraq has what is claimed to be a chemical and biological
warfare test grid [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], 90 NM N/NW of
Samarra. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
The Iraqis can potentially disseminate biological and toxin
agents in a variety of conventional ways. The are reported to
have successfully tested shells which appear suitable for the
battlefield delivery of BW agents. These shells are capable of
generating and releasing aerosolized materials above the
ground prior to impact without causing heating or extreme
pressurization of the agent during dispersal.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Currently we can only surmise as to the Iraqi doctrine for
the use of BW missiles. The most likely targets for the modified
SCUDs would be cities, large industrial areas, airfields, and rear
areas. If launched from southern Iraq or Kuwait, the missiles can
reach Riyadh and Qatar.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], special groups of Iraqi were
formed and trained to deploy chemical and biological weapons. The
decision to use specific systems will likely be dependent or
strategic or tactical requirements. Weapons deployment will
likely be in the aerosol form, possibly at night or in the early
morning to take advantage of favorable military and meteorological
conditions.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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