Iraqi Chemical Warfare
Filename:0504wp.90
INFORMATION PAPER
3 August 1990
TO: JS
SUBJECT: Iraqi Chemical Warfare
Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Capabilities:
1. Agents. The Iraqis possess four confirmed CW agents and are
known to be developing three others. All the confirmed agents were
used during the Iran/Iraq War and include: the nerve agents,
Tabun, Sarin and GF, and the blister agent mustard in liquid form
and impregnated on dust. CW agents in development include: the
persistent nerve agent VX, the semipersistent nerve agent Soman,
and the hallucinogen BZ. Presently Iraqi is assessed to be on the
verge of producing VX but is not known to have done so.
2. Facilities. The Samarra CW Facility is the only location in
Iraq capable of producing CW agents. This facility, located
approximately 100 kilometers northeast of Baghdad, covers 25
square kilometers and is capable of: conducting research and
development, precursor and agent production, filling of chemical
weapons, and storage of chemical agents in weapons and in bulk.
There are also three Habbaniyah facilities (I, II and III),
located about 75 kilometers west of Baghdad, which have been
associated with chemical precursor production. Twenty-one chemical
weapons storage bunkers have been associated with 12 widely
dispersed facilities (7 airfields and 5 ammunition storage
depots).
3. Weapons. The Iraqis are capable of delivering CW agents by
mortar, a variety of tube artillery, 122 mm surface-to-surface
rockets, 90 mm air-to-surface rockets, and 250 and 500 kg aerial
bombs. During the War, 122 mm rockets fired from multiple rocket
launchers were widely used, especially to deliver the non-
persistent nerve agent Sarin. Aerial bombs were also widely used.
It is not known if the Iraqis have yet developed an operational
chemical warhead for their ballistic missiles. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
During the intervening 5 years the Iraqis have had time to
develop a warhead. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] an operational
chemical warhead will be available in the September 1990 time-
frame. We believe this could very well be the case.
Indicators of Chemical Weapons Use:
1. There are several indicators of possible CW use: agent
production, weapons filling and storage, weapons transport,
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. To date, there has been evidence of
production, filling and storage at Samarra.
Agent Production: Iraqi CW agents are not pure and as a
result are inherently unstable with a shelf life of perhaps 3-5
weeks. Iraq must therefore produce chemical agent shortly before
anticipated hostilities. Agent production at Samarra is believed
to have occurred in mid-July and possibly earlier as evidenced by
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Weapons Filling and Storage: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
indicates activity at the weapons filling lines at Samarra. This
activity was also noted on 26 July [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
storage bunkers at Samarra probably indicating storage
of the filled weapons.
Weapons Transport: During the War, the Iraqis used [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ] trucks to transport chemical weapons to
airfields and the FEBA. To date, no such operations have been
detected. If such activity were noted, the prospects for CW use
would be elevated. An Nasiriyah Ammunition Storage Facility
Southwest and Ash Shuaybah Ammunition Storage Depot Northeast are
the two most southern ammo depots with the special bunkers for CW
weapons. Al Jarra airfield and Tallil airfield are the two
southernmost fields with the special bunkers. Although these two
airfields would seem the most logical sites for CW aerial bombs to
be delivered, the long trip by truck from Samarra would risk
weapons damage and/or detection.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Doctrinal: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
The decision to use CW in Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia would
certainly be made by President Husayn. Once authority for use was
granted, the same weapons systems used to deliver convention high
explosives would be used for chemical weapons. During the 1988
offensives, the Iraqis demonstrated an ability to integrate CW
into its offensive battle plans. This is now probably standard
operating procedure which would make detection of CW usage more
unlikely.
Prepared by: [ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ]
Coordination: [ (b)(2) ]
Special Chemical Warfare Storage Bunkers:
Name Number of Bunkers
MOSUL AFLD 1
QAYYARAH WEST AFLD 1
KIRKUK AFLD 1
H-3 AFLD 4
AL JARRA AFLD 2
TALLIL AFLD 1
AL TAQADDIUM AFLD 1
QAYYARAH WEST AMMO DEPOT 4
AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STOR SW 1
ASH SHUAYBAH AMMO STOR DPO NE 1
BAGHDAD AMMO DEPOT TAJI 1
KIRKUK AMMO DPO WEST 3
TOTAL . . . . 21
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
