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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Iraqi Nerve Agents
Filename:0503wp.00d
Subject: Iraqi Nerve Agents
[   (b)(2)   ]
[   (b)(6)   ]
In response to your questions the following is submitted:
1A. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]DIA estimates on the number of 
Iraqi chemical warheads for SCUD missiles: 
	DIA estimates that Iraq has 20-40 chemical warheads for its 
SCUD-B SSM's. A recent report [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]    that 
Iraq has 20 chemical warheads for its SCUD missiles, enough for 
five or six salvos employing chemical warheads.  [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ]
1B. What is the basis for DIA's assessment that Iraqi nerve agents 
will be militarily ineffective after 31 March?
	Iraq is not able to make good-quality chemical agents. 
Technical failures have reduced their agent purity and caused 
problems in storage and handling. This is a particular problem for 
the sarin-type nerve agents (GB and GF). Lower purity causes 
internal decomposition of the agent, significantly limits shelf 
life and reduces toxic effects when the munition is employed. We 
estimate the shelf life of these nerve agents to be 4-6 weeks. 
Mustard and binary agents have somewhat longer shelf lives.  
Mustard is also judged to be of poor quality, but it has less 
corrosive impurities, thus a longer shelf life.  The chemicals 
used in a binary weapon are not true chemical agents.  They must 
mix while the munition is in flight and result in the toxic binary 
agent dispersed when the munition is burst.  These precursor 
chemicals have lower toxicity, so they are easier to produce with 
good quality than unitary agents, and therefore have a longer 
shelf life.
	A chemical weapons production run probably was conducted at 
Samarra from mid-December 1990 through mid-January 1991.  The 
nerve agent recently produced should have already begun to 
deteriorate, and decomposition should make most of the nerve agent 
weapons militarily ineffective by the end of March 1991.
POC [   (b)(6)   ][   (b)(2)   ]
 



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