Estimated Collateral Damage from Attacks on Iraqi Biological,
Chemical and Nuclear Facilities
Filename:0502bkg.00d
SUBJECT: Estimated Collateral Damage from Attacks on Iraqi
Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Facilities
1 PURPOSE To provide background information on the collateral
damage that could result from an attack on Iraq's biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons facilities.
2 POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST
a. An attack on the Iraqi biological agent storages could
result in the release of virulent microorganisms and/or toxins
that could result in exceedingly high casualties/fatalities. If
biological agents are released from storages in the southern part
of Iraq, there is a risk friendly forces could become casualties.
b. Attacks on chemical or nuclear facilities are not
expected to cause significant injury or death beyond the limits of
the facility.
c. Destruction of the nuclear facility could result in 3 -
5 percent of the core radionuclide release, depending on core
proximity to weapon detonation, structural fallback and blockage,
etc Iodine, cesium, and radioactive gases would be the most
volatile. Overall, the site will probably experience some level
of local contamination with the highest activity around reactor
core material concentrations. Minimal impact is expected outside
of the research facility boundary.
d. Contamination caused by destruction of chemical
facilities would likely be contained within the destroyed
structure. Release of chemical agent would be retarded by
absorption in the debris and rubble resulting from the destruction
of the facility, subsequent fires and the gradual release of the
chemical agent from the vessel or munitions in which it had been
stored.
3. EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS: A complete evaluation of the
consequences of an attack requires a rigorous evaluation of a
great deal of information about population density, weather, and
current information on activity in the facilities: expect to be
completed NLT 4 January 1991.
COORDINATION: None
PREPARED BY: [ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ] APPROVED BY:
4 Enclosures
1. Working Paper: Biological Facilities 1 Cy
2. Working Paper Iraq-Chemical Warfare Facilities 1 Cy
3. Working Paper: Implication of an Attache on Iraqi Nuclear
Research Facility 1 Cy
4. Working Paper: Chemical Agent Persistence Isotherms 1 Cy
BIOLOGICAL FACILITIES
OVERVIEW
There are at least three biological warfare (BW) production
facilities in Iraq and seventeen refrigerated bunkers capable of
storing BW agents/munitions. Anthrax and botulinum toxin are
confirmed BW agents which are believed to have been weaponized.
The Iraqis have shown interest in the development of a number of
other infectious agents and toxins for BW purposes but the status
of development is not known. It also is not known what types of
munitions have been filled with BW agent but could include missile
warheads, aerial bombs with and without cluster submunitions, the
super gun, artillery, and spray and aerosol generating devices.
BW agents are likely stored in bulk and spray and aerosol
generating devices. BW agents are likely stored in bulk
containers and in munitions as dried powders and/or liquids.
The Iraqis have had cultures of the anthrax bacterium
(Bacillus anthracis) and the bacterium (Clostridium botulinum)
which produces botulinum toxin since early 1986. The necessary
equipments for production of the agents has been in place for a
longer period. In the interim, significant quantities of these BW
agents, and possibly others, are believed to have been produced.
Anthrax spores would pose the greatest risk to humans of any of
the confirmed or suspect Iraqi BW agents due to its ability to
survive in the environment. Based upon the technical capability
of the Iraqis, it is well within their capacity to have produced
and stored 1,000 kilograms of dried anthrax spores. This will be
used as the amount of agent which could be stored in bulk
containers or munitions in any one of the seventeen refrigerated
bunkers for the purpose of estimating collateral damage.
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
PHYSICAL TARGET VULNERABILITY
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
IRAQ- CHEMICAL WARFARE Facilities
Iraq has three primary chemical facilities: the production
plant at Samarra, another at Habbaniyah/Al Fallujah, and the
research center at Salman Pak. The Samarra facility is well known
as the world's largest chemical agent production complex. At
Habbaniyah, precursor chemical and possibly chemical biological
warfare research. There are also at least 26 bunkers which may
store chemical weapons located throughout Iraq.
Current Status At present, Iraq is most likely not producing
significant amounts of nerve agent. Their product quality has
been very poor, and has limited their shelf life for their agents
to a period of 4 to 6 weeks. Their production cycle has
typically been to gear up production about a month prior to
anticipated use. This pattern was observed prior to the
offensives in the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Based on the activity
seen at Samarra, it is likely that Iraq does not have a
significant in-process inventory of chemical agent in its
production facilities at this time.
The Binary Factor in April 1990, Saddam made a speech
threatening to "burn half of Israel" with his "dual chemical
weapon", implying he had a binary weapon. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]that Saddam has made good on this boast, and what he
now has at least a limited binary capability. This would give
Iraq a chance to improve their agent quality, and thus its shelf
life for demilitarization of the poor quality chemical ammunition
now in the Iraqi arsenal. These significant logistical advantages
would more than compensate Iraq for the reduced amount of agent in
each shell. Weapons which might be good candidates for the binary
would be multiple rocket launchers, artillery and missile
warheads.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. Iraq may have a combination of
both high-tech and low-tech binary at this time, trying to move
toward an exclusively high-tech stockpile. The high-tech is
essential for small fill weight munitions such as artillery and
MRL's; the low-tech can be used for missiles and aerial bombs. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Both high-tech and low-tech binary are easy to demilitarize since
neither contains complete chemical agent. However, low-tech can
be extremely nasty to handle once militarization of the round has
begun. In the low-tech weapon, reaction mixture becomes quite hot
since the reaction to form sarin from the DF and isopropyl is
exothermic (emits heat). There is a significant amount of free
hydrofluoric acid (HF) in the low-tech munitions as well, which is
corrosive to most common metals and glasses. The combination of
nerve agent, free acid and heat is a particularly deadly
combination.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
If Iraq anticipates an offensive, or determines that a friendly
force attach is imminent, they will probably resume production and
filling operations at Samarra and at Habbaniyah.
ESTIMATED DAMAGES
At present, we estimate that little or no chemical agent
would be released as a result of an attack on the chemical agent
production and filling lines at Samarra and Habbaniyah. If the
plants become active, and begin to produce agent, naturally more
agent would be present. However, any attach on operating plants
would still be unlikely to result in significant agent release to
the environment. The rubble of the collapsed building would help
to contain any agent release, and fires which would be likely
consequence of an attack would consume the chemical agents. All
the chemical warfare agents have high fuel values and will burn
quite well. In any event, destruction of the production building
is not comparable to the explosive detonation of a munitions. The
agent in the building is in unpressurized tanks which would
release agent over a period of time through cracks or other
physical means of tank failure.
Filling buildings are also unlikely to release significant
amounts of chemical agent if attacked. Little agent is kept in
these buildings. Any release would likely be contained in the
immediate area of the building.
An attack on chemical facilities at Salman Pak is also
estimated to result in minimal risk of collateral damage due to
chemical release. Agent quantities are probably limited to
kilograms in this facility since it is a research facility.
Storage Facilities There are at least 26 bunkers located
throughout Iraq which have been associated with chemical weapons
storage. These bunkers have been [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] as
earth-mounded reinforced concrete (EMRC) drive-through bunkers.
Due to the large amount of earth covering these bunkers, its is
likely most released agent would be absorbed in the dirt if the
bunker were to be attached. The offset doors would also help to
contain agent inside the bunker. While these bunkers could
contain a significant quantity of chemical agent and weapons, most
of the agent in these bunkers would probable remain in the bunker
following destruction of the bunker rather than being released.
The munitions themselves ,are relatively immune to a series of
sympathetic detonations following bunker destruction, and would be
most likely to release agent through cracks in the shell casings
rather than an explosion. The agent would have to leak from a
damaged munitions and then get through the dust, debris and fire
that would be the probable result of an attack. Therefore, escape
of chemical agent from a storage bunker is not likely.
Effects of an Attack
Assuming Samarra and Habbaniyah are the primary chemical
agent production plants in Iraq, elimination of both plants would
stop Iraqi production of unitary and binary chemical weapons. The
introduction of binary weapons could complicate location of
production plants in the future, but it is likely these are the
only two at this time. If binaries are integrated into the Iraqi
arsenal, the chemicals needed for binary are easier to make, and
could be made at many locations without the need for extensive
additional security and safety and hygiene features.
Successful attacks on storage facilities would eliminate
Iraq's ability to launch chemical attacks. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ].
Subject: Implications of an Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Research
Facility
1. Purpose: To provide information on implications of an attack
on Iraq's Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Facility
2. Discussion.
a. Conventional destruction of the Iraqi nuclear research
facility would probably result in extremely small amounts of
plutonium and some radioactive fission products being released
into the environment, causing some local site contamination and
minimal effects outside of the research facility.
b. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
c. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
d. Some very minor release might occur from the destruction
of associated laboratory facilities.
3. Expected Developments: Destruction of either reactor
facility could result in 3 - 5 percent of the core radionuclide
release, depending on core proximity to weapon detonation,
structural fallback and blockage, etc Iodine, cesium, and
radioactive gases would be the most volatile. Overall, the site
will probably experience some level of contamination with the
highest activity around reactor core material concentrations.
Minimal impact is expected outside of the research facility
boundary.
PREPARED BY:[ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ]
14 December 1990
Chemical Agent Persistence Isotherms
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Other important factors in determining persistence are the
type of weapon used, the fuzing of the weapon, and the general
condition of terrain and vegetation. there is some general
information on these factors in [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
POC is [ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ]
IRAQI BW STORAGE FACILITIES
AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STOR FAC SW
3 BUNKERS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STOR JAC SW
4 BUNKERS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
ASH SHUAYBAH AMMO STOR DEPO NE
1 BUNKER
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
FALLUJA AMMO DEPO SOUTH
2 BUNKERS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
KARABALA DEPO & AMMO STOR FAC
2 BUNKERS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
KIRKUK AMMO DEPO WEST
1 BUNKER
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
QABATIYAH SPECIAL 12-FRAME STOR BNK
1 BUNKER
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
SALMAN PAK CBW RSCH, PROD A STOR FAC
2 BUNKERS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
TIKRIT AMMO DEPO
1 BUNKER
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
PROBABLE IRAQI CW STORAGE SITES
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Mosul Afld
Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Qayyarah West Afld
Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Kirkuk Ammo Depot West
3 Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Kirkuk Afld
Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Baghdad Ammo Depot Taji
Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Al Taqaddum Afld
Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Ubaydah Bin Al Jarrah Afld
2 Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
An Nasiriyah Ammo Stor Fac SW
Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Tallil Afld
Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Ash Shuaybah Ammo Stor Depot NE
Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
H-3 Afld
4 Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Qayyarah West Ammo Depot
4 Bunkers
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Qayyarah West Airfield
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Salman Pak CBW Rsch Prod & Stor Facility
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Samarra CW Rsch Prod & Stor Facility
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Samarra Chemical Weapons Storage
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Biological Storages
17 special storage bunkers have been identified at a total of
9 different locations which could function as BW storages. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
This would be helpful in maintaining favorable storage for the
organisms or toxins. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
The most likely bunkers to be used for BW storage are the two at
Salman Pak Research Center.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Chemical Bunkers
There are two types of CW-associated bunkers- a cruciform
storage and an S-shaped bunker. The cruciform storage is found
only at the primary chemical production facility at Samarra (8 of
these bunkers are located here). There are about 22 S-shaped
bunkers throughout Iraq. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. These bunkers are large enough
to accommodate a large truck. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
BAGHDAD NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER
BAGHDAD NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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