IRAQ BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT
Filename:0408pgf.90
22 October 1990
IRAQ BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT
Prepared by [ (b)(6) ] and [ (b)(2) ]. [ (b)(2) ]
The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
OVERVIEW
Iraq's biological and toxin weapons program is the most extensive
in the Middle East. Large quantities of anthrax bacteria and
botulinum toxin have likely been produced. We believe that these
agents have been weaponized and that biological and toxin
munitions already exist. We further believe that deployment of BW
munitions in significant numbers will take place by the end of
this year, if not already implemented.
U.S. and allied forces are assessed to be at significant risk if
BW operations are undertaken by Iraq. This assessment is based on:
1. Our belief that Iraq has the capability to tactically and
strategically deploy biological weapons
2. The presence of significant intelligence gaps including:
a Lack of knowledge of Iraqi BW release and use
doctrine
b. Absence of details on specific agents
c. Probable existence of unidentified agents
d. Minimal information which specific BW delivery
systems would be used
3. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
4. And the expected mass allied causalities resulting from a
successful BW attack.
BW PROGRAM EVOLUTION
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
All key BW policy decisions are made by Saddam Husayn. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION
Despite signing the 1925 Geneva Protocol the Iraqi's repeatedly
violated this agreement by their use of CW agents during their
conflict with Iran. During the conflict Iraq achieved military
success and has greatly expanded its CW capabilities subsequently.
Other than some specific embargoes of CW agent related material,
virtually no punitive responses from the world community has
resulted. Iraq is a signatory to the 1972 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibiting the development, production,
stockpiling and weaponization of biological and toxin agents.
However. their attitude regarding BW is believed to be similar to
that of CW which supports its unrestrained development and
production.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITY
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
KEY PROGRAM LEADERS
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
KEY FACILITIES
Salman Pak
The highly secure BW Research, Development and Production Facility
at Salman Pak is assessed to be the major BW production and
storage facility. Salman Pak is located approximately 30
kilometers Southeast of Baghdad along the Tigris River.
Located at the facility are several buildings. The probable main
research building at the site is a modern building, composed of
twenty four rooms, housing a major BW research facility. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
facility capable of providing the highest possible level of
biohazard protection for the handling of highly dangerous
organisms and toxins. Using current technology the research area
alone has sufficient floor space to accommodate several
continuous-flow or batch fermenters that could produce daily
sufficient anthrax bacteria to lethally assault hundreds of square
kilometers.
Adjacent to the research building is a storage area which contains
four munitions type storage bunkers with lightning arrestors. Two
of these bunkers have [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] storage of
temperature sensitive biological material.
Approximately a mile down the road from the research area is a
complex we believe to be an engineering area. One building in this
complex may contain a fermentation pilot plant capable of scale up
production of BW agents.
A construction project comprising several buildings was begun in
early 1989 adjacent to the engineering area, and is now complete
or near completion. This new complex has been assessed [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ] as a pharmaceutical production plant. As such,
this facility would have an extensive capability for biological
agent production.
Taji
The pilot production plant at Taji which is located in the
northwestern suburbs of Baghdad. This facility contains a
fermentation plant that has the capability for pilot scale
production of BW agents. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] indicates [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] installed a 450 liter fermenter
with a dedicated bacterial spore drier at the facility in 1987. An
April 1989 TSMID request for purchase of lubricant for the spore
drier and recent attempts to acquire spare parts for the fermenter
through TSMID indicates that the fermenter is operational. The
fermenter and drier are likely dedicated to the production of dry
anthrax spores. The location of this facility at a military site
would afford the Iraqis the necessary security for agent
production. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Abu Ghurayb
Several years ago a facility at Abu Ghurayb. which is located a
few kilometers west of Baghdad, was identified by [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] as the location of a BW production site. Based on [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] we believe that this facility is a
Clostridium vaccine plant which was completed in 1984. This plant
may be a key production site for the bacteria Clostridium
botulinum which is the source of botulinum toxin.
Within the past few years an Italian firm supplied several
fermenters to the facility. The total fermentation capacity of the
facility likely exceeds 13,000 liters. Each day these fermenters
could produce sufficient toxin to cover an area greater than 60
square kilometers. Efforts over the past year by TSMID to obtain
spare parts from an Italian firm support our assessment that the
plant is fully operational. Based on open literature and [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] much is known about this facility,
however
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
Tuwaitha
The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) Facility located near
Baghdad at Tuwaitha is likely one of the major Iraqi institutes
exploring genetic engineering/biotechnology. For the past several
years the IAEC has been seeking to acquire the necessary reagents
and material, including state-of-the-art equipment, required to
establish and maintain an advanced molecular biology program.
Although there is some possibility that more advanced BW agents
are being developed by the Iraqi's, we have no evidence that new
methodologies are currently utilized for the production of such
agents. However, because of its high level of security and
scientific research and development potential in the advanced
biotechnical area, we believe that this facility is a prime
candidate for such a neoteric BW program.
Storage Sites
As a result [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
we have been unable to determine specific locations of agent or
weapons storage. Additionally, we have extremely limited
knowledge of the type or amount of agent in storage.
CONSIDERATION FOR TACTICAL ACTION RESULTING IN DESTRUCTION OF
AGENT STORAGE SITES
We believe that any planning for military action against the
putative Iraqi BW agent/weapons storage site at Salman Pak or
other BW facilities should consider a multiple set of probable
outcomes ranging from no release of agent to the liberation of
many hundreds of kilograms of live agent resulting in significant
collateral loss of life. Unless the total and complete destruction
all agent located at a site is an absolute certainty a planner
must presume that release of, at least some, deadly concentrated
BW agent into the atmosphere in the form of a plume would likely
occur following explosive destruction and subsequent overpressure.
Depending on the concentration of agent, the elevation of agent
plume. and environmental factors such as wind speed and inversion
conditions. as little as 100 kilograms of anthrax bacteria
(representing less than twenty percent of the amount of agent
carried in a single Scud B warhead) could travel several hundred
miles. Considering the above factors and wind direction many
thousands of fatal causalities could be realized in neighboring
countries such as Syria, Saudi Arabia. Jordan, lebanon. Turkey,
Israel, Iran, and the Soviet Union.
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS
Agents believed to be in inventory and weaponized by Iraq include
Bacillus anthracis, or Anthrax, and botulinum toxin. In 1988
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] reported that the Iraqis had already,
or were developing anthrax as a BW agent. Additionally, anthrax
was reported to be an Iraqi agent that would be disseminated by
aerosol. Since 1988. through [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] we have
followed TSMIDs search for anthrax cultures. We believe it is
possible they are attempting to acquire the anthrax to use as
reference cultures for already existing agent stock. In the past
few years they have been seeking cell driers and other material
which could be used for the production of anthrax spores.
Average concentrations of weaponized anthrax developed for the
U.S. offensive BW program. which was disestablished in 1969, were
sixty trillion anthrax spores or 8 billion human lethal doses per
gallon.
The incubation period of anthrax introduced through the aerosol
route is approximately one to three days. Treatment is ineffective
following the appearance of the first symptoms and 95 percent of
those that have not been vaccinated or treated with antibiotics
prior to presentation of symptoms will die.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that the Iraqis
were developing, or had already developed. botulinum toxin for
military purposes. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] has provided
information to support [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
reported that SEPP sought special incubators and
tons of growth media necessary for the production of the bacteria
used as the source of botulinum toxin. Additionally, an
inferential assessment has been made that the Iraqis have pursued
the acquisition of cluster bombs for the dissemination of
botulinum toxin. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
revealing that the Baghdad office of the Chilean arms
manufacturer Cardoen has discussed parameters for aerosol testing
of botulinum toxin with the home office. Cardoen and Iraq are
known to be co-producing 250 and 500 kg cluster bombs. Cluster
bombs are particularly well suited for disseminating BW agents
because they greatly widen the zone of coverage compared to a
single warhead.
The concentration of botulinum toxin produced during the tenure of
the U.S. BW program was roughly a billion lethal doses per pound.
The incubation period resulting from exposure to aerosolized
botulinum toxin ranges from approximately six hours to two days.
Following demonstration of the first symptoms virtually all target
personnel will die if they have not been vaccinated in advance
against botulinum toxin or pretreated with antitoxin prior to
presentation of symptoms.
We assess that under the climatic conditions of the Persian Gulf
area significant concentrations of anthrax spores would probably
persist for no toxin would persist for only a few hours.
Additional agents that may be in advanced stages of development or
available for weaponization include: Staphylococcus Enterotoxin.
Clostridium perfringens bacteria or its toxin, and Cholera
bacteria. Although some specific agents have been identified, we
cannot rule out the possibility that the Iraqis have or are
developing other agents for BW purposes.
Field tests with harmless anthrax agent simulants, undertaken
during the former U. S. BW program, to determine the amount of
anthrax agent required to achieve fifty percent causalities when
released 10 miles upwind of a target using a 15 mile release line
and with a 10 mile per hour wind was 107 gallons during near
neutral inversion conditions; 34.6 gallons during a moderate
inversion; and only 6.7 gallons during a strong inversion.
WEAPONIZATION
The Iraqis possess a wide variety of weapons systems that could be
used for the delivery of biological and toxin agents. At this time
we believe that dedicated biological and toxin weapons [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Reportedly, special groups of Iraqi were formed and trained to
deploy chemical and biological weapons. The decision to use
specific systems will likely be dependent on strategic or tactical
requirements. Weapons deployment will likely be in the aerosol
form, possibly at night or in the early morning to take advantage
of favorable military and meteorological conditions.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Since the invasion of Kuwait extensive activity at Scud-related
facilities [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that
many of these missiles have been dispersed. Iraq likely has an
undetermined number of chemical warheads for the Scud in its
inventory. There is a possibility that biological or toxin
warheads are also in the current Iraqi inventory, [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Currently we can only surmise as to the Iraqi doctrine for the use
BW missiles. The most likely targets for the modified Scuds would
be cities, large industrial areas, airfields, and rear areas. If
launched from southern Iraq or Kuwait, the missiles can reach
Riyadh and Qatar. As a result of the poor accuracy of these
missiles, agents with a greater theoretical area of lethal
contamination will provide a greater cost benefit ratio. As such,
biological and toxin agent have a significant advantage over
chemical agents. A modified Scud filled with approximately 200
kilograms of VX is estimated to produce a minimum theoretical area
of lethal contamination of one square kilometer. However, under
optimal conditions the same amount of fill with anthrax could
represent a coverage area of lethally of several thousand
kilometers.
Conventional Delivery Systems
The Iraqis can potentially disseminate biological and toxin agents
in a variety of conventional ways. They are reported to have
successfully tested shells which appear suitable for the
battlefield delivery of BW agents. These shells are capable of
generating and releasing aerosolized materials above ground prior
to impact without causing heating or extreme pressurization of the
agent during dispersal. Existing information indicates that shells
of this type have been developed for use with chemical warfare
agents, however, the functional capabilities described for these
devices appear to render them equally well suited for BW agent
delivery. Specific conventional munitions that could be used for
the delivery of BW agents are many of the same systems used for
chemical agents. Such munitions include 250 kilogram aerial bombs,
250 or 500 kilogram cluster bombs, 90 millimeter air to ground
rockets, 160 mm or 240 mm mortars, 122-mm, 130-mm, 152-mm and
155-mm howitzers. Although FROG rockets and air to surface
missiles could be used, we have no information regarding the BW
weaponization of these systems.
Aerosol Generators
Aerosol generators which can be transported by truck, boat,
helicopter and other conveyances and spray tanks for high
performance aircraft provide very effective methods for the line
dissemination of biological agents. The Iraqis have obtained dry
powder and liquid aerosol generators capable of dispersing
hundreds of pounds or gallons of agent over several hundred square
miles at rates of hundreds of cubic feet of fog per minute.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Results of a series of marine environment field tests conducted in
the 1950s and 1960s during the past U.S. offensive BW program
demonstrated that ships not equipped with chemical and biological
collective protection systems were totally vulnerable to a BW
attack. For example, one field test using a line spray of 80
gallons of Bacillus globigii, a nonpathogenic bacteria very
similar to anthrax, extending 15 miles at a distance of 10 miles
from a target ship resulted in extensive penetration of the ship
by the biological agent simulant. Furthermore, the tests
demonstrated that the penetration was particularly high in the
engine room and that "buttoning up" the ship and turning off the
ventilation did not prevent the aerosol from penetrating all
interior sections. Some slight interior and exterior surface
contamination took place, however the primary threat was
inhalation of the invisible, moving, aerosol cloud by crew
members. Based on this and other field tests the predicted
causalities ranged from 60 percent to 70 percent if an actual
pathogenic agent were used. Other tests demonstrated that dry
agent was 10 times more effective than liquid. Although the travel
distance of the aerosol cloud for this test was 10 miles,
variables such as the use of an increased amount of agent,
increased elevation of dispersal, or more favorable environmental
conditions could have could have increased significantly the
travel distance to 50 miles or greater.
UNCONVENTIONAL BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Iraq could clandestinely attack targets by using special forces,
civilian government agents, or foreign terrorists to deliver BW
agents. The use of such A delivery mode would be an especially
attractive option if Iraq wished to conduct such an attack without
an official acknowledgment or to maintain plausible deniability.
BW DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
In the absence of specific information on Iraqi BW doctrine we
cannot predict reliably the time or circumstances in which Iraq
might use biological weapons. However, based on technical
requirements, biological weapons could be used effectively
tactically, on land or sea, or strategically, preemptively, on the
battlefield, or as a last resort.
Information used for the preparation of this paper was in part
obtained from original analysis by the authors. Additional
original analysis has been derived [ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
