Iraqi Chemical Warheads
Filename:035pgv.91d
Subject: Iraqi Chemical Warheads
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Question 1: Details regarding Iraqi SSM chemical warheads with
emphasis on:
a. The type of CWA in the warhead and its quantity?
Answer 1a: We do not know with definition the type of CWA in the
SSM warheads. If the warhead is binary, GF and sarin are the only
two agents suitable for binary delivery. If the warheads are
unitary, then we would expect Iraq to use the most persistent
agents available--mustard and possibly VX. Quantity for a
unitary warhead containing mustard would be approximately 600
kilograms for a Scud B at maximum range. Payloads for the Al
Husein and
Al Abbas would be inversely proportional to the range.
b. The type of fuse?
Answer 1b: There is no information [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
c. The number of warheads in the Iraqi ORBAT?
Answer 1c: We continue to believe chemical warheads are available
in limited numbers but do not know with definition the number of
CY missile warheads. To provide a number could be interpreted to
mean that we know the precise number--we do not. A [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] the number of CW warheads at no more than twenty.
d. Characteristic markings of these warheads?
Answer Id: We have no information.
Question 2: Where are the chemical warheads stored?
Answer 2: We have no information.
Question 3: Details regarding the process of preparing chemical
warheads for operation? Do the Iraqis already have missiles with
chemical warheads ready for launching? If positive, details
including location, quantity, other.
Answer 3: We have no information regarding any of these
questions.
Question 4: Which chemical air bombs are in the Iraqi ORBAT?
In this connection:
a. The types of CWA filled in the bombs?
Answer 4a: Both 250 and 500 kilogram bombs are available.
Mustard, GF, Tabun, and Sarin are believed available in both type
bombs.
b. The quantity of CWA in each bomb?
Answer 4b: According to FSTC--for 250 kg bombs, 50 kilograms
of nerve agent or 60 kilograms of mustard; for 500 kilogram
bombs, 100 kilograms of nerve agent or 120 kilograms of mustard.
c. Special markings for these bombs?
Answer 4c: We have no information.
d. Storage sites for these bombs?
Answer 4d: The most likely storage site is at the [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers previously associated with
chemical weapons during the Iran/Iraq War. As long as runways are
inoperable, these munitions would not be able to be delivered.
Question 5: Does the Iraqi CW ORBAT include cyanide CWA,
powder CWA, filter penetrating agents?
Answer 5: We have isolated reports of Iraqi interest in
cyanide CWA but have not been able to confirm the reports. As
discussed in previous [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
, we believe the Iraqis certainly have the capability to produce
dusty agents, and probably have it in their inventory. We do not
know how much. We have no information on filter penetrating
agents.
Question 6: Which CWA facilities (production, filling and
storage) were damaged during the allied attacks and what was the
extent of the damage? Are there any remaining armaments at the
bunkers in Samarra? Is production at the Samarra and Fallujah
facilities continuing?
Answer 6: Approximately 40-50 percent of the nerve and
mustard agent production capacity at Samarra has been destroyed
(Pl/2, PS, P9, and P11/12).
Two-thirds of the filling lines have been destroyed. There has
been no damage to the cruciform bunkers at Samarra. The bunkers
may still contain CW munitions but this can not be confirmed. We
do not know if production is continuing at the remaining plants at
Samarra and Fallujah.
Question 7: What are the types of biological weapons in the
Iraqi ORBAT?
Is the BW produced in liquid or powder form?
Answer 7: We still do not know the types of weapons with
definition except for the forty aerosol generators acquired in the
spring of 1990. It is known that the aerosol generators can not
dispense liquid spore suspensions in particle sizes less than
100-200 micrometers thereby making them useless for this
purpose. The generators can dispense spores in the 1-2 micrometer
range but it is not known to what distance. We assess that there
could be at least one metric ton of dried anthrax spores and 15-20
kilograms of dried botulinum toxin. The presence of a dedicated
spore drier at Taji for the 450 liter fermentor would strongly
indicate that some of the spores are dried. We can not exclude
that some are in wet suspension. We do not know if the botulinum
toxin is dried or wet. We believe, however, that dried toxin
would be more of a aerosol threat when mixed with the appropriate
filler.
Question 8: Where×is the BWA produced and stored? What is the
production rate?
Answer 8: Per previous [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] , the
Abu Ghurayb Clostridium Vaccine Plant is believed to produce
botulinum toxin. Since the October 1990 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] , it has been located. Production is
assessed at 15-20 grams per day. The Taji BW Production Plant and
dedicated spore drier are assessed to be capable of producing
approximately one kilogram of dried spores per day. The second
Abu Ghurayb plant was believed to be a back-up BW production
facility and advertised by the Iraqis as an infant formula plant.
The Salman Pak facility may have a production capability but
this has not been confirmed.
Question 9: Which dispersal means have been adapted to the BW?
The quantity?
Answer 9: Other than the aerosol generators, we have no firm
evidence to suggest any particular munition.
Question 10: Details regarding the preparation process of
biological weapons.
Answer 10: We have no information as to where BW weapons are
filled.
Question 11: Is there storage of BW fitted in dispersal means?
Answer 11: We believe BW agents have been placed in munitions.
The refrigerated bunkers discussed [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
are the strongest candidates for storage. Nonetheless, the
collective capacity of these nineteen bunkers far exceeds the
amount needed and are therefore
likely used for purposes beyond BW. This is assessment and not
based upon positive information.
Question 12: Is the BW ammunition marked: How?
Answer 12: We have no information.
Question 13: Point locations of the storage facilities at Taji
and Habbaniyah.
Answer 13: We carry no storage facility for BW agents at
Taji'. The only possible facility to our knowledge is the one[
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] which uses [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] liquid nitrogen. A positive connection has not been made by us
between this
facility and the BW program. One refrigerated bunker has been
located in the Habbaniyah area, another is closeby at Palluja.
Question 14: Were BW storage/production facilities damaged at
Salman Pak, Taji, Abu Churayb, Tuwaitha, Latifiyah? The extent of
damage?
Answer 14: All refrigerated bunker storage at Salman Pak has
been destroyed. Two other refrigerated bunkers with special
security fences at Karbala and Qabatiyah have been destroyed. The
suspect BW Production Plant at Taji has been severely damaged and
is considered inoperable. The suspect BW Production Plant at Abu
Ghrvyb has been destroyed. Although we know biological research
is conducted at Tuwaitha, we have never made a positive linkage
between this facility and the BW program. The location of a
facility at Latifiyah has not been determined.
Question 15: Has the population of Iraq been immunized against
anthrax, plague or other BW?
Answer 15: Not to our knowledge.
Question 16: Are vaccines produced in Iraq? If positive,
details.
Answer 16: Vaccines are produced in Iraq. It will require
more time, however, to acquire this information.
Question 17: Details regarding the operational combat doctrine
of biological/chemical weapons: What type of CWA/BWA will be
employed against which targets?
Answer 17: There is no experience and no information on BW
combat-doctrine. In general, toxins might be expected to be used
in tactical situations where delayed (hours) action of agent is
permissible. Infectious agents such as anthrax could be used for
large area coverage and non-tactical targets such as airfields and
oil fields. For CWA, we can only draw from the Iran/Iraq War.
Persistent agent such as mustard would be used during withdrawals.
File on the offensive, non-persistent nerve agent was used on the
axis of attack, and agents such as mustard and GF against
artillery batteries and reserves.
Question 18: Details regarding the units operating chemical
and biological weapons in Iraq-ORBAT, location, subordination,
other.
Answer 18: Iraqi ground units equipped to fire 155mm, 152mm,
and 130mm artillery, 122mm rockets, 82mm and 120mm mortars are
generally assessed to be capable of firing chemical rounds. By
far the most numerous system is the 130mm N46 field gun with over
1,000 in the Iraqi inventory this gun and others assigned to corps
and division artillery units typically are deployed in 18 gun
battalions. During the Iran-Iraq War, the 155mm gun was the
preferred system for chemical delivery. The use of chemical
weapons would probably be limited to especially equipped and
trained troops, such as the Republican Guard units.
Chemical weapons are likely stored at echelons higher than
division. While Iraqi air forces are equipped to deliver chemical
bombs, the air superiority of the allied forces has diminished
their threat. Use of chemical warheads on Scud missiles are a
possibility, but the limited numbers and poor accuracy of these
weapons make them ineffective aginst militlary point targets.
They are a good terror weapon against civilian population centers.
We have no knowledge of Iraqi forces having biological weapons at
their disposal for use in combat. Use of such weapons would need
to be authorized at the highest political level.
Question 19: What are the codes for operation of
chemical/biological weapons?
Answer 19: There is no information on this subject.
Question 20: Is an integration of CWA, BWA and explosives
operation a possibility?
Answer 20: Chemical weapons are an integral part of Iraqi
offensive and defensive operations. In a ground operation, it is
likely that the Iraqis would use CW in tactical battlefield
situations. Their use would be integrated with Iraqi conventional
weapons, possibly with fuel air explosives, and high explosives.
We have no information on how Iraq might use biological weapons.
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