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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

RII 1877-IZ CW/BW Capabilities [   (b)(2)   ]
Filename:0187pgv.91d
[   (b)(2)   ]
2245\1 FEB 91 SENT BY [   (b)(6)   ]
FROM DIA WASHINGTON DC
VIA NMIST
TO: CENTAF
[   (b)(6)   ][   (b)(2)   ]
SUBJECT: RII 1877-IZ CW/BW Capabilities [   (b)(2)   ]
       BW PRODUCTION WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL PROCESSING 
CAPABILITY AT THE ABU GHARIB BW PRODUCTION FACILITY [   (b)(2)   ] 
ALONG WITH THE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF THE TAJI BW PRODUCTION 
FACILITY [   (b)(2)   ], IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY HAS 
BEEN REDUCED BY 40 TO 50 PERCENT. THE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AT 
SALMAN PAK [   (b)(2)   ] AND AT THE ABU GHURAYB CLOSTRIDIUM 
VACCINE PLANT [   (b)(2)   ] REMAINS INTACT.  IT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
THAT SOME EQUIPMENT FROM SALMAN PAK HAS BEEN MOVED TO THE NAJAF 
AREA.
       CW PRODUCTION: COUNTRYWIDE, CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION 
CAPABILITY HAS BEEN REDUCED BY 40-50 PERCENT AND TWO-THIRDS OF THE 
FILLING CAPACITY HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. FOUR OF 10 PRODUCTION 
BUILDINGS AT SAMARRA [   (b)(2)   ] HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE ABOVE 
GROUND P10 (HIGH CAPACITY MUSTARD) PRODUCTION BUILDING AND ABOVE 
GROUND P7 (LOW CAPACITY MUSTARD OR SARIN) PODUCTION BUILDING AT 
SAMARRA SHOULD BE TAGETED ALONG WITH THE P3, P4, P5, AND P6 
PRODUCTION BUNKERS TO NEGATE IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION 
CAPABILITY.  CHEMICAL PRECURSOR PRODUCTION BUILDINGS AT TWO OF THE 
HABBANIYAH FACILITIES (II AND III) HAVE PROBABLY SUSTAINED 
MODERATE DAMAGE.  HABBANIYAH I AND II ARE RECOMMENDED FOR RE-
STRIKE.
PRIORITIZATION OF TARGETS FOR CW AND BW PRODUCTION
1. [   (b)(2)   ] SAMARRA CW RSCH PROD AND STOR FAC
PRODUCTION FACILITIES P-1/2, P-8, p-9, AND P-11/12 SUSTAINED 
MODERATE TO SEVERE DAMAGE AND ALL ARE ASSESSED AS NONFUNCTIONAL. 
THEY DO NOT REQUIRE RE-STRIKE.
CRITICAL ELEMENTS TO RETARGET AT SAMARRA [   (b)(2)   ]:
A. PRODUCTION FACILITY P-10 [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]   HAS 
CRATERS NEARBY BUT IS STILL FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE RETARGETED.
B. THE FILLING AREA HAS ONE FUNCTIONAL BUILDING THAT NEEDS TO BE 
TARGETED. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ].	(OTHER TWO FILLING 
BUILDINGS DESTROYED. )
C.  PRODUCTION BUNKER P-6, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] REMAINS 
FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
D.  PRODUCTION BUNKER P-4, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] REMAINS 
FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
E. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-5, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] REMAINS 
FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
F. PRODUCTION FACILITY P-7 [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] REMAINS
G. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-3, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] REMAINS 
FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
2. [   (b)(2)   ] THE ABU GHURAYB CLOSTRIDIUM VACCINE PLANT. 
TARGET THE CENTER OF THE LONG SIDE OF THE L-SHAPED BUILDING, [   
(b)(2)   ] 
3. [   (b)(2)   ] SALMAN PAK BW RSCH, PROD AND STOR FAC:
A. ALL FOUR 12-FRAME BUNKERS IN THE STORAGE AREA HAVE BEEN 
DESTROYED AND SHOULD NOT BE RETARGETED.
B. PRIME TARGETS FOR THE SALMAN PAK Facility SHOULD BE THE HIGH 
CONTAINMENT LABORATORY AND POSSIBLE PRODUCTION BUILDINGS IN THE 
FOLLOWING PRIORITY: [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
C. THIS IS A POSSIBLE PRODUCTION BUILDING WITH ASSOCIATED DRYING 
TOWER. THE BUILDING WAS BERMED JUST PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF 
HOSTILITIES [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
D. REFRIGERATION UNITS ACQUIRED BY IRAQI'S BW FRONT ORGANIZATION 
AND A ORGANIZATION INVOLVED AT LEAST IN PART WITH THE IRAQI 
MISSILE PROGRAM ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO THIS AREA 
AND SOME INSTALLED AT THIS BUILDING. BW ASSOCIATION LIKELY BUT 
EXACT NATURE OF BW INVOLVEMENT IS UNKNOWN. [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ]
E. RATIONALE SAME AS "D". [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
F. RATIONALE SAME AS "D". [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
G. BUILDING PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CHEMICAL AGENTS TO POSSIBLY INCLUDE 
BINARIES. PILOT SCALE CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION MAY HAVE OCCURRED 
IN THIS BUILDING. BUILDING WAS CAMOUFLAGED JUST PRIOR TO 
HOSTILITIES [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
H. BUILDING PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CHEMICAL AGENTS TO POSSIBLY INCLUDE 
BINARIES. BUILDING WAS CAMOUFLAGED JUST PRIOR TO HOSTILITIES [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
4. [   (b)(2)   ] HABBANIYAH POSS CW PROD FAC II. [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ] STORAGE TANKS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. EASTERN END OF 
THE  PRODUCTION BUILDING WAS DAMAGED. NEED TO RE-STRIKE THE CENTER 
OF THE PRODUCTION BUILDING [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] CHLORINE 
PRODUCTION [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ], AND FOUR DRIVE THROUGH 
WAREHOUSES [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
5. [   (b)(2)   ] HABBANIYAH POSS CW PROD FAC I. [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ]. THIS FACILITY HAS NOT SUSTAINED ANY DAMAGE AND 
NEEDS TO BE RESTRUCK. HOWEVER THIS FACILITY IS OF A LOWER PRIORITY 
THAN HABBANIYAH II. RECOMMEND RE-STRIKE OF PRODUCTION BLDG [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ], AND AGAINST THE FOUR WAREHOUSES: [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
BW STORAGE: TO DATE, TWELVE OF IRAQ'S 19 [      (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)    ] 12-FRAME REFRIGERATED BUNKERS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. 
THESE BUNKERS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE STORAGE OF BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPONS, BUT COULD ALSO BE FOR THE STORAGE OF OTHER HEAT-SENSITIVE 
MATERIEL SUCH AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ELECTRONIC GEAR, FAE, AND SMART 
WEAPONS. THIS BOMB DAMAGE REPRESENTS A 63 PERCENT DEGRADATION IN 
IRAQ'S KNOWN MILITARY CAPABILITY TO STORE THESE SENSITIVE 
MATERIALS. THE [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] BUNKERS DESTROYED 
ARE:
ONE AT ASH SHUAYBAH AMMO STOR DEPOT NE [   (b)(2)   ]
TWO AT SALMAN PAK RSCH, PROD. STOR FAC [   (b)(2)   ]
(TWO NON-REFRIGERATED 12-FRAME BUNKERS ALSO Destroyed)
TWO AT KARBALA DEPOT ~ AMMO STOR FAC    [   (b)(2)   ]
ONE AT QABATIYH AMMO STOR FAC          [   (b)(2)   ]
TWO AT AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STOR FAC SW    [   (b)(2)   ]
FOUR AT AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STOR FAC SW   [   (b)(2)   ]
CW STORAGE: TWO OF IRAQ'S 22 S-SHAPED BUNKERS SUSPECTED OF STORING 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN Destroyed. THE Destroyed BUNKERS ARE 
AT:
MOSUL AIRFIELD                         [   (b)(2)   ]
UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRA AIRFIELD          [   (b)(2)   ]
THE EIGHT CRUCIFORM BUNKERS AT THE SAMARRA RESEARCH, PRODUCTION 
AND STORAGE Facility [   (b)(2)   ]                   . Any DAMAGE 
AND SHOULD RECEIVE HIGH PRIORITY FOR ATTACK. THE BUNKERS HAVE BEEN 
USED Extensively IN THE PAST TO STORE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IT IS 
UNKNOWN IF They STILL CONTAIN CHEMICAL WEAPONS. [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ]
OTHER HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS SUSPECTED OF STORING CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
ARE:
H-2 AIRFIELD                       [   (b)(2)   ]
	(THREE BUNKERS) [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
QUBAYSAH AMMUNITION DEPOT          [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] (NO SPECIFIC BUNKERS IDENTIFIED)
THE REMAINING SEVEN SPECIAL REFRIGERATED BUNKERS ARE AT THESE 
AMMUNITION DEPOTS LISTED IN Priority ORDER FOR ATTACK:
AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STOR FAC SW      [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
KARBALA DEPOT & AMMO STOR FAC      [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
HABBANIYAH AMMO DEPOT	BE [   (b)(2)   ]
FALLUJA AMMO DEPOT S	BE [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
TIKRIT AMMO DEPOT                  [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
KIRKUK AMMO DEPOT W                [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
THE 20 SURVIVING S-SHAPED BUNKERS ARE LISTED IN Priority ORDER FOR 
ATTACK:
ASH SHUYBAH AMMO STOR DEPOT NE	  [   (b)(2)   ]
     [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
TALLIL AFLD (1 BUNKER)	  [   (b)(2)   ]
     [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] (ONE BUNKER)	
UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRA AFLD (1 BUNKER)	  [   (b)(2)   ]
     [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
AL TAQQADUM AFLD	  [   (b)(2)   ]
     [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
BAGHDAD AMMO DEPOT TAJI	  [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
H-3 AFLD                                   [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
H-3 AMMO STOR FAC           [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STOR FAC SW              [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
QAYYARAH WEST AMMO DEPOT                    [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
KIRKUK AMMO DEPOT WEST                     [   (b)(2)   ]
	(THREE BUNKERS: [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
KIRKUK AFLD                                [   (b)(2)   ]
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
K-2 AFLD                                   [   (b)(2)   ]
	ONE BUNKER [   (b)(2)   ]
THE FOLLOWING IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE TARGETS ARE NOT CONSIDERED 
VIABLE THREATS AND SHOULD NOT BE STRUCK:
AL HADRE POSS CW TEST Facility           [   (b)(2)   ]
BANI SAD BARRACKS AREA                   [   (b)(2)   ]
HABBANIYAH POSS CW PROD FAC III          [   (b)(2)   ]
POC: [   (b)(6)   ][   (b)(2)   ]
 



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