ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM COALITION
Filename:015me.91d
DATE: 09 JAN 1991
TO: DISTRIBUTION LIST
FROM: IRAQ INTERAGENCY BIOLOGICAL WARFARE WORKING
GROUP, FUSION COMMITTEE
SUBJ: ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM COALITION
AIR STRIKES ON IRAQI BW RELATED FACILITIES
1. Ongoing analysis of this issue leads us to believe
that the original estimates of potential Iraqi casualties
resulting from U.S. and coalition air strikes on BW related
facilities was far too high. Further, we now believe that contrary
to these original estimates, that there is little liklihood that
there would be any threat to coalition forces as a result of these
strikes.
2. One of the areas of greatest concern in attacking
Iraqi BW facilities has been the amount of collateral damage that
could be inflicted on the Iraqi' population, and potentially
coalition forces, as a result of inadvertent aerosolization of
Biological spores and toxins: It is believed that based on a
thorough review of the information and exploitation of
expertise available the original estimates, those appearing in the
IIBWWG final report, are far to high and are the result of the
very, even overly, conservative methodology applied. The original
estimate assumed a total Iraqi anthrax inventory of about 3000
kgs. After a review of the available information, and the
methodology used to derive that figure, it is believed that the
estimate was three times too high, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] would indicate the actual size
of agent inventory. Additionally, the methodology assumed
virtually all of the Iraqi stockpile to be located at any one
facility at any given time (a highly unlikely scenario), thus the
absolute worst case situation is derived, in terms of collateral
casualties, for the area surrounding that facility.
Finally, two alternate cases were developed where it was assumed,
lacking better data at the time, that either 1O% or 1% of the
agent present would be aerosolized. Such factors as wind
direction, inversion conditions, spore degradation due to
environmental factors, etc., were then cranked into the model and
the resultant high and low casualty figures were derived for each
BW facility. Here unfortunately, more as a result of presentation
than anything else people seeing the data assumed that the figures
for each location were cumulative and interpreted them
accordingly. Unfortunately what in fact happened as a result of
the method of presentation is that the entire Iraqi inventory is
placed in each facility, casualty figures are derived for each,
but then added up cumulatively. The resultant figure is
representative of the entire Iraqi Anthrax inventory x the number
of facilities used, a far from accurate picture.
3. To further complicate the issue it turns out that
the figures used for aerosolization of agent that would result
from a coalition-strike, 1 to 10 %, is much to high based on
experience with the U.S. BW program in the 196Os. In consultation
with individuals with considerable experience in this area it was
determined that the actual amount of anthrax spore that
would likely be released, and then aerosolized, as a result of an
attack by high explosive munitions using an optimized attack
profile would be no greater than 0.001 - 0.1, (10 grams - 1 kg),
and probably less.
4. The attached chart shows a comparison of the newly
derived figures which represents the official position of the
IIBWWG with the previous worst case model. Note that the figures
are not cumulative, but are stand alone for each facility noted.
The holders of the IBBWWG final report should add this chart to
the Collateral Risk Assessment section of that report and either
remove the existing charts or accurately reflect that the
collateral casualty estimates are not valid
[ (b)(2) ]
CA, Senior Intelligence
Officer: Chairman IIBWWG
Fusion Group
DIST: HOLDERS OF IIBWWG FINAL REPORT
DIA- DR
DD
ED
CA
VP
JS/J2
[ (b)(2) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
AFXX
AFMIC
Facility Estimated Casualties*
Worst case** Probable case***
Bunkers/No.
Salman Pak (2) 39-61,000 Hundreds
Al Fallujah (2) 24-56,000 Hundreds
Ash Shuaybah (1) 10-17,000 Hundreds
Ad Diwaniyah (3) 5-17,000 Hundreds-
thousands
Kirkuk (1) 4-10,000- Hundreds
An Nasiriyah (4) 2-3,000 Hundreds-
thousands
Karbala (2) 1-6,500 Hundreds
Qabatiyann (1) 500-2,500 Hundreds
Tikrit 500-3,000
Tens-hundreds
Habbaniyah (1) DNA DNA
Production
Taji 120-224-, 000 Less than
5,000
*Assumes uniform population distribution outside of Baghdad.
**A night time attack with high explosive weapons resulting in
heavy damage/total destruction with the release of 10-100 kg
anthrax spores.
"`Pre-dawn attack with high explosive guided muntion through the
entrance of the bunkers with 0.001-0.1% (10 grams-I kilogram)
anthtax spore release.
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