Study on IZ Abilities to Conduct Chemical Warfare
Filename:0150pgv.91d
[ (b)(2) ]
[ (b)(6) ]
1530 8 FEB 91
[ b.2. ] Study on IZ Abilities to Conduct Chemical Warfare
[ (b)(2) ]
1. Probability of Binary - Agree with [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] comment that binary is tougher to do than unitary. DIA
continues to believe Iraq could use binary, but the extent of
binary introduction into the Iraqi force structure remains
unknown.
2. Storage of DF- The DF storage may be easier than the CWA.
First, DF is easier to make than agent due to lower toxicity; this
should allow them to make higher purity chemical which would have
better stability. Also, DF can be, stored in plastic containers
which can be used to separate binary component chemicals;
the plastic would be resistant to fluoride attack, extending
storage life. The stabilizers mentioned are good to help extend
the storage life of agents which are made in fairly high purity.
If the amount of stabilizer becomes too great, it Just dilutes the
agent and can't really retard degradation.
3. Quality of Other Agents - Agree that the greatest problem Iraq
has is with the sarin and GF. Information on the quality of
mustard is sketchy, but it is the easiest to make. Production of
good quality mustard is something Iraq has probably done. [
b.2. ] As for tabun quality, some
older reporting mentions quality problems for this agent.
Stabilization of tabun with chlorobenzene is a known Iraqi
capability. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
4. Cyanides - DIA has noted a growing body of information on
cyanide. It is possible that the cyanides possibly used at
Halabja came from Iraq rather than Iran. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
5. SSM Fuses- DIA has no confirmation that Iraq has best fusing
for their missile warheads with chemical fills. This may not be a
real consideration since Iraq is using these weapons as a terror
weapon, not as a military weapon.
6. Rocket-Propelled Grenades - DIA has received some reports on
employment of CWA using rocket-propelled grenades. These reports
remain unconfirmed. Our assessment is that, if the report is
true, Iraq was trying to experiment with this type of weapon for
chemical delivery. This device has probably not been adopted for
wide fielding within the Iraqi forces.
7. Chemical Mines - As for the grenades mentioned in paragraph,
the
reporting on the chemical mines is anecdotal. DIA can't confirm
this capability for Iraq.
8. Dusty Agent Threat - According to current estimates, dusty
agent can penetrate the protective ensemble and cause injury. For
a soldier wearing the mask, the type of injury would be an
irritation which would not develop for some time following
exposure. If not wearing a mask, the dust would have the effect
of speeding mustard injury on the lungs and could cause
rapid-developing mustard
casualties rather than delayed casualties.
9. Aerosol Generators - DIA has no information on Iraq's use of
aerosol generators to disseminate CWA. This is a potential
delivery means for biological agents.
10. Lowest Echelon with Chemical Munitions - DIA has no
information on which units have CWA available. The Republican
Guards are considered most likely to have chemical weapons
available, but all units in the KTO could have them.
11. Use of CWA by Special Forces - No information is available on
this method of employing CWA. It is ppossible that Iraqi special
forces could deliver either biological or chemical agents. This
is based on potential, not on any evidence that these forces would
do this, or that they are training to do it.
12. [ (b)(6) ]
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