Desert Storm Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Facilities
Filename:0139p6v.91d
RESPOND TO TASK 3888
PASS TO THE ITF OPS OFFICER
28 JAN 91 2240 BY: [ (b)(6) ]
SUBJECT: Desert Storm Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare
Facilities
PURPOSE: To assess the bomb damage that has occurred to date to
Iraq's chemical and biological warfare production and storage
facilities and to prioritize targeting of remaining facilities to
reduce Iraq's capacity to use chemical and biological weapons in
the Desert Storm conflict.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE With the destruction of all processing
capability at Abu Gharib BW Production Facility, along with the
complete neutralization of the Taji BW Production Facility, Iraq's
biological production capacity has been reduced by 40 to 50
percent. The production capability at Salman Pak and at the Abu
Gharayub clostridium Vaccine Plant remains intact. It has been
reported that some of the equipment at Salman Pak has been moved
to the Najaf area. Countrywide, seven of nineteen (37 percent)
known refrigerated 12-frame bunkers capable of storing biological
agents and other heat sensitive materials have been destroyed.
CHEMICAL WARFARE Countrywide, chemical agent production
capability has been reduced by 40-50 percent and two-thirds of the
filling capacity has been eliminated. Four of 10 production
buildings at Samarra have been destroyed. The above ground P10
(high capacity mustard) production building and above ground P7
(low capacity mustard or sarin) production building at Samarra
should be targeted along with the P3, P4, P5, and P6 production
bunkers to negate Iraq's chemical agent production capability.
Chemical precursor production buildings at two of the Habbaniyah
facilities (II and III) have probably sustained moderate damage.
Habbaniyah I and II are recommended for re-strike. One (Mosul
Airfield) of the 22 known S-shaped chemical storage bunkers has
been destroyed to date. It is likely that Iraq has dispersed its
chemical weapons to increase their survivability.
TARGET PRIORITIES Elimination of CW delivery means are now
most critical because there has been time and good reason to
disperse CW munitions. Destruction of the SCUD launchers would
eliminate the possibility of chemical attacks from missiles.
Interdiction of airfields will effectively negate the threat of
air delivered bombs. Helicopter-delivered 90-mm rockets, however,
would remain a threat. MRL's and 155-mm field artillery are the
most likely means of delivering binary CW agent by ground troops.
AS unitary CW agents deteriorate, binary munitions will become
increasingly important. Attacks on the Iraqi chemical and
biological production facilities should be continued. This will
prevent replenishment of Iraqi stocks. The remaining CW
production and filling facilities at Samarra and the chemical
precursor plants at Habbaniyah should be given priority for
destruction. Additionally, the production areas at Salman Pak and
Abu Gharib (Clostridium Vaccine Plant) need to be destroyed.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers at airfields should
be attacked to eliminate aerial bombs. This should be followed by
attacks on bunkers at ground force depots to eliminate artillery
and MRL ammunition. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Destruction of the twelve remaining 12-frame refrigerated
bunkers capable of storing biological weapons and other heat
sensitive materials should likewise be given high priority.
POC: [ (b)(6) ]
ANNEX:
A. THE FOLLOWING CBW FACILITIES ON THE TARGET LIST ARE NO LONGER
FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD NOT BE RESTRUCK:
1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] QABATIYAH SPECIAL 12 FRAME
STORAGE BUNKER. THIS BUNKER IS COMPLETELY DESTROYED AND IS NON-
OPERATIONAL. NO RE-STRIKE NEEDED.
2. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] ABU GHURAYB SUSPECT BW
PRODUCTION FACILITY. BOTH PRODUCTION BUILDINGS AT THIS FACILITY
ARE DESTROYED AS ARE SUPPORT FACILITIES. THIS FACILITY IS
INCAPABLE OF PRODUCING BW AGENTS. FURTHERMORE THREE EIGHTEEN WHEEL
TRUCKS WERE PRESENT A DAY AFTER THE ATTACK ON 22 JAN 91 PROBABLY
REMOVING ANYTHING SALVAGEABLE.
3. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THE TAJI SUSPECT BW PRODUCTION
PLANT HAS BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED AND HAS BEEN INOPERABLE SINCE THE
FIRST STRIKE ON 17 JAN 91.
4. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] MOSUL AIRFIELD, THE S-SHAPED CW
BUNKER HAS BEEN DESTROYED. NO FURTHER STRIKES REQUIRED.
B. THE FOLLOWING TARGETS HAVE SUFFERED PARTIAL OR NO DAMAGE, OR
HAVE NOT YET BEEN STRUCK. TARGETING RECOMMENDATIONS IN PRIORITY
ORDER FOLLOW.
1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SAMARRA CHEMICAL WARFARE
PRODUCTION AND STORAGE FACILITY.
A. TWO OF THREE FILLING BUILDINGS ARE DESTROYED BUT THE
THIRD BUILDING REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND NEEDS TO BE ATTACKED.
B. PRODUCTION FACILITIES P-1/2, P-8, P-9, AND P-11/12
SUSTAINED MODERATE TO SEVERE DAMAGE AND ALL ARE ASSESSED AS
NONFUNCTIONAL. THEY DO NOT REQUIRE RESTRIKE.
CRITICAL ELEMENTS TO RETARGET AT SAMARRA [ b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
A. PRODUCTION FACILITY P-10 AT [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
HAS CRATERS NEARBY BUT IS STILL FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE
RETARGETED.
B. THE FILLING AREA HAS ONE FUNCTIONAL BUILDING THAT NEEDS
TO BE TARGETED. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
C. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-6, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
D. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-4, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
E. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-5, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
F. PRODUCTION FACILITY P-7 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
G. PRODUCTION BUNKER P-3, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
REMAINS FUNCTIONAL AND SHOULD BE TARGETED.
H. EIGHT CRUCIFORM BUNKERS LOCATED IN [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
HAVE NOT BEEN STRUCK TO DATE. THESE BUNKERS HAVE BEEN
USED EXTENSIVELY IN THE PAST TO STORE CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. IT IS
NOT KNOWN IF THE BUNKERS STILL CONTAIN CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
2. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THE ABU GHURAYB CLOSTRIDIUM
VACCINE PLANT. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
3. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SALMAN PAK BW RESEARCH,
PRODUCTION AND STORAGE FACILITY
A. ALL FOUR 12-FRAME BUNKERS IN THE STORAGE AREA HAVE BEEN
DESTROYED AND SHOULD NOT BE RETARGETED.
B. PRIME TARGETS FOR THE SALMAN PAK FACILITY SHOULD BE THE
HIGH CONTAINMENT LABORATORY AND POSSIBLE PRODUCTION BUILDINGS IN
THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
C. THIS IS A POSSIBLE PRODUCTION BUILDING WITH ASSOCIATED
DRYING TOWER. THE BUILDING WAS BERMED JUST PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF
HOSTILITIES INDICATING IT WAS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE IRAQIS:
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
D. REFRIGERATION UNITS ACQUIRED BY IRAQI'S BW FRONT
ORGANIZATION AND A ORGANIZATION INVOLVED AT LEAST IN PART WITH THE
IRAQI MISSILE PROGRAM ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO THIS
AREA AND SOME INSTALLED AT THIS BUILDING. BW ASSOXIATION LIKELY
BUT EXACT NATURE OF BW INVOLVEMENT IS UNKNOWN. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
E. RATIONALE SAME AS "D". [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
F. RATIONALE SAME AS "D". [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
G. BUILDING PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CHEMICAL AGENTS TO POSSIBLY
INCLUDE BINARIES. PILOT SCALE CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION MAY HAVE
OCCURRED IN THIS BUILDING. BUILDING WAS CAMOUFLAGED JUST PRIOR TO
HOSTILITIES INDICATING THAT IT IS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE IRAQIS. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
H. BUILDING PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CHEMICAL AGENTS TO POSSIBLY
INCLUDE BINARIES. BUILDING WAS CAMOUFLAGED JUST PRIOR TO
HOSTILITIES INDICATING THAT IT IS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE IRAQIS. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
4. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HABBANIYAH POSS CW PROD FAC II.
(PHOTO REFERENCE S-58) STORAGE TANKS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED.
EASTERN END OF THE PRODUCTION BUILDING WAS DAMAGED. NEED TO RE-
STRIKE THE CENTER OF THE PRODUCTION BUILDING. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] CHLORINE PRODUCTION [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
AND FOUR DRIVE THROUGH WAREHOUSES [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
5. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HABBANIYAH POSS CW PROD FAC I.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THIS FACILITY HAS NOT SUSTAINED ANY
DAMAGE AND NEEDS TO BE RESTRUCK. HOWEVER THIS FACILITY IS OF A
LOWER PRIORITY THAN HABBANIYAH II. RECOMMEND RE-STRIKE OF
PRODUCTION BLDG. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AND AGAINST THE
FOUR WAREHOUSES: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
6. THE FOLLOWING 12-FRAME REFRIGERATED BUNKERS CAPABLE OF STORING
BW AGENTS AND "S"-SHAPED BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
STORAGE ARE LISTED IN RECOMMENDED PRIORITY ORDER FOR ATTACK.
A. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], ASH SHUAYBAH AMMO STOR DPT NE, [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] REFRIGERATED BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] S-SHAPED BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
B. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TALLIL AFLD, [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] ONE S-SHAPED BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
C. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRAH AFLD,
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TWO S-SHAPED BUNKERS, [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
D. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AL TAQQADUM AFLD, [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ], ONE S-SHAPED BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
E. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], BAGHDAD AMMO OPT TAJI, ONE
S-SHAPED BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
F. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] H-3 AIRFIELD, [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] ONE S-SHAPED BUNKER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
G. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], H-3 AMMO STOR FAC,
FOUR S-SHAPED BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
H. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STOR FAC SW,
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] FOUR REFRIG BUNKERS [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] AND ONE S-SHAPED [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
I. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STOR FAC SW,
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TWO REFRIG BUNKERS ALREADY DESTROYED
AND DO NOT REQUIRE RESTRIKE. ONE REFRIG BUNKER REQUIRES STRIKE
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
J. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] KARBALA DPT AND AMMO STOR FAC,
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TWO; REFRIG BUNKERS ALREADY DESTROYED
AND DO NOT REQUIRE RESTRIKE. ONE REFRIG BUNKER REMAINS AND
REQUIRES STRIKE [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
K. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HABBINIYAH AMMO DPT, ONE REFRIG
BUNKER AT COORD 332225N0433OOOE.
L. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] FALLUJAH AMMO DPT S, TWO REFRIG
BUNKERS, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
M. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TIKRIT AMMO DPT, ONE REFRIG
BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
N. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] KIRKUK AMMO DPT W, ONE REFRIG
BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] ALSO THREE S-SHAPED BUNKERS
BUT DO NOT HAVE GRID REFERENCES.
Q. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] QAYYARAH WEST AMMO, FOUR S-SHAPED
BUNKERS, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
R. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] KIRKUK AIRFIELD, ONE S-SHAPED
BUNKER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
S. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] QAYYARAH W AIRFIELD, ONE S-SHAPED
BUNKER, NEVER OPERATIONAL, NO STRIKE REQUIRED.
T. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] MOSUL AIRFIELD, ONE S-SHAPED
BUNKER DESTROYED. NO ADDITIONAL STRIKES REQUIRED.
7. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HABBANIYAH POSS CW PROD FAC III.
ALTHOUGH THIS FACILITY RECEIVED ONLY MINOR DAMAGE, IT IS STILL
UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND HAS NEVER BEEN OPERATIONAL.
AS A RESULT, IT SHOULD HAVE A LOWER PRIORITY AND NOT BE RESTRUCK.
8. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], AL HADRE POSS CW TEST FACILITY,
FACILITY PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH POSSIBLE CW TESTING. NO
STRIKES NECESSARY. NOTHING REALLY TO DESTROY.
9. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] BANI SAD BARRACKS AREA. THIS IS
A CBW TRAINING AREA THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE STRIKE. NOTHING OF
VALUE.
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