Q&A's
Filename:0106pgv.91p
[ (b)(2) ]
Respond to Task 3864
PASS TO THEITF OPS OFFICER
31 JAN 91, 1625 HRS, SENT BY; [ (b)(6) ]
Subject: Q&A's
Question 1: Launching and dispersal capability:
A. What is DIA's assessment regarding the possibility of the
weaponization of anthrax an botulinum in air bombs (unitary and
cluster)?
Answer 1A: It is possible that anthrax and botulinum toxin has
been weaponized in aerial bombs. We have no positive information,
however, to indicate that the Iraqis have done this. In our
opinion, cluster munitions would be the choice of munitions for
best dispersal. Cluster munitions would give wider area coverage
and could be dropped from altitude around 8,000 meters.
B. Have there been field tests in the disperal of BW elements in
air bombs in addition to the tests carried out in the Al Hadrah
site during May-August 1989 (where botulinum was apparently
dispersed)?
Answer 1B: We have no information beyond that provided at the [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] CBW exchange.
C. Were powder or liquid agents dispersed during these field
tests and are there data regarding the results of the tests and
the size of the infected area?
Answer 1C: We have no additional information beyond what was
presented during the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] .
D. Are structural data available regarding these bombs (opening
altitude, number of bomblets.)?
Answer 1D: There are no positive data available on any type of BW
munition. It is known, however, from previous experience that
cluster bombs can contain 500-550 individual cluster munitions.
The larger munition with clusters inside can be dropped from
altitudes around 12,000 meters with release of clusters as high as
9,000 meters. This gives a distribution of cluster munitions over
10-11 hectares.
E. What is DIA's assessment regarding BWA dispersal capability by
means of an SSM warhead, on the basis of current Iraqi Operational
SSM's?
1E: We believe that Iraq has the technical capability to have
produced BWA warheads for SSM's but have no positive information
to indicate that this has been done. We operate under the
assumption that such warheads are available. In our judgment,
cluster munitions with contact fuzes would be the best method of
dissemination. Expected height opening of the warhead for cluster
release could be in the range of 7,500-15,000 meters for good
distribution.
F. Have there been any SSM launching attempts with a BWA warhed
(or BWA simulant)? If positive, details regarding these
launchings and their degree of success would be appreciated.
Answer 1F: There have been no launches of SSM's known to have a
BW warhead containing either actual BW agent or simulant. We
would consider any launch with a detonation above 7-8,000 meters
suspicious, but design jproblems in the SSM cause unintentional
warhead separation and possible detonation below 15,000 meters.
G. What are the sizes of the particles which can be dispersed by
the aerosol generators procured by Iraq? Who is the procurement
body in this case.
Answer 1G: The particle size varies depending upon whether the
agent is wet or dry. Liquid suspensions of acillus globigil
spores can only be placed in aerosol particlesin 100-200
micrometer diameter atteh highest pressure setting and smallest
orifice size (0.8 mm). This, of course, is of no use for covering
large areas with aerosols. It could be used to contaminate soil
by spraying it on the ground but seconary aerosolization is not
considered a problem with anthrax. Preliminary study indicates
that dry BG spore aerosols can be generated in the 1-2 micrometer
range at teh rate of approximately one kilogram per minute. More
testing is required, however, before we are certain of this. The
procurement body is not known.
Question 2: BW elements and production capability. As far as is
known to us, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] the supplier was
asked to develop a dryer according to the special requireemtns set
by TSMID. We know that the newly designed spray dryer is
different from the one in Taji Facility, it is not clear to us
whether the Taji spray dryer is clear cut evidece for DIA's
conclusion that spores are being dried at the Taji Facility. We
would be grateful for your comment.
Answer 2: We have no reason, at this time, to assume the [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] is different from the one at the Taji
Production Facility but at the same time do not consider ti clear
cut. Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge the Taji fermentor
had a dedicated spore drier believed to be used for anthrax
spores.
Question 3: BWA production and storage faciilties:
A. There are a number of facilities in the Abu Gharib site. As
far as is inown to [ (b)(1) ] only the production facility for
clostridial vaccines served as a BWA production facility. Near
this facility is another vacine production facility which in
practice produces veterinarian and human vaccines and is not
connected to BW[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] has no knowledge
of any type of involvement of the infant formula plant in the BW
project. What information is there regarding the infant formula
plant which was hit? Since when has DIA considered this facility
to be involved in the BW project? What equipment is installed in
this facility?
Answer 3A: We have considered the infant formula a suspect
BW facility for several years but were never able to locate it. We
believe the facility served as a back-up BW production plant.
Since the last [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] , we were able to
locate it preisely. The presence of four guard towers, a fence,
and controlled access strengthened our suspecions. Just prior to
the outbreak of war, the Iraqis camouflaged the facility which
indicated they considered it of high value. Review of the plant
from 1983 to the present indicates little day-to-day activity
further indicating its back-up function. It also indicates that
the plant was not producing large quanities of infant formula as
depicted in the news media other wise heavy vehicular traffic
would be expected as supplies were imported and product
transported from the plant. After the plant was attacked, large
18-wheeler trucks were noted at the facility probably trying to
salvage equipment considered important.
Question 3A: continued: Was the production facility for
clostridal vaccines (suspected of being connected to the BW
project) been point located? Has it been hit during coalition
air sorties? If positive-what is the extent of the damage? We
would appreciate the precise location of this production facility,
if available.
Answer 3A continued: Since the last [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
, we were able to locate the Clostridium Vaccine Plant. There is
no damage as of this date to the facility.
B. We estimate that the production of anthrax was also
carried out at the production facility at Abu Gharib since the
production facility at Taji is not enough to achieve the
production of hundreds of kilograms in 3-4 years of production.
We have no information regarding any production at the Salman Pak
facility. Answer 3B: We have no information to indicate that the
Clostridial Vaccine Plant has produced anthrax but agree with your
assessment that anthrax production could have occurred there. We
also have no firm information regarding any production at Salman
Pak but believe it possible. In early Januarny 1991, a stake bed
truck was noted leaving the Salman Pak facility with material.
Two objects may have been large vessels, possibly fermentors.
This, however, has not been confirmed. LIkewise, the five
refrigrerated trucks departed Salman Pak sometime during the last
two weeks of December 1990. It is not known if this was to
protect them or for BW agent dispersal to other sites. Since the
last [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] , seventeen refrigeration units
have turned up at the new area of construction south of the
research and engineering area. Some of the refrigeration units
have been connected to the buildings. It may be possible these
are the refrigeration units involved in project 324 which in our
mind would tie these buildings to TSMID and BW.
D. We provided [ (b)(2) ] a drawing of the cast
infrastructure of the Taki deep freeze storage and b.1 assessment.
Does DIA still stand by its designation of this facility? Was
this facility bombed and what was the extent of the damage? We
would appreciate the precise location of this facility?
Answer 3D: We believe we have determined the location of the deep
freeze facility depicted in the [ (b)(1) ] sketch. We are
uncertain of what your understanding is of our designation of this
facility.
So that you understand--we have no information which ties the deep
freeze storage directly to BW. This is why we asked if the [
(b)(1) ] had additional information. Its proximity to the Taji
production facility makes it suspect for storage of liquid agent.
There is, however, no evidence of increased security measures.
E. Does DIA know for certain, as previously reported, of cooling
equipment having been installed in all the nineteen bunikers
suspected os storing BWA? What is the extent of the hits in each
of these bunkers?
Answer 3E: We are certain that refrigeration has been installed
at nineteen 12-frame bunkers scattered throughout Iraq. The
collective storage capacity of these bunkers is far in excess of
what we believe the Iraqis need for BW. Our position is that
these bunkers are capable of storing BW agents/munitions but can
also be used to store other heat-sensitive materials as well.
Four of the refrigerated bunkers (two at Salman Pak, one at
Karbala, one at Qabitiyah) has [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
associated with them. All four with special security have been
destroyed along with three others (one additional at Karbala and
two at Ad Biwaniyah).
F. What types of vaccines are produced in Iraq and which of them
can be related to BW.
Answer 3F: The answer to this question has not yet been
determined.
G. According to [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], the production
of veterinarian anthrax vaccines has been taking place in Iraq
since 1970's. Does DIA have any information regarding the
production of human anthrax vaccines?
Answer 3G: The answer to this question has not yet been
determined.
POC: [ (b)(6) ]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
