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Filename:0093pgv.91p
[ (b)(2) ]
2100\23 JAN 91 SENT BY [ (b)(6) ]
ITF Commander: SECDEF XO [ (b)(6) ] has requested a copy of this
paper ASAP.
Assessment of threat at Salman Pak based upon most
Current air campaign and BDA:
Since the attacks at Salman Pak upon the two refrigerated
and one non-refrigerated bunkers on 17 Jan and 19 Jan 1991, there
have been no reports in intelligence channels or the open press of
widespread outbreak of disease in Baghdad or the surrounding area.
After nearly seven days from the first attack, most all
casualties should have already occurred. The 19 Jan 91 occurred
between
2340 and 2400 (Iraqi local). Meteorological conditions for at that
time for the Baghdad area indicate winds to the southwest at about
15 km/hr with neutral conditions. The area to the immediate
southwest is not highly populated. If any significant amount of
anthrax was released, there should already be casualties. None
have so far been reported in intelligence channels or the open
press.
The attack on the BW plant at Abu Ghraib occurred on 21
January 1991. This facility is considered a back-up BY production
plant. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] following the
attack showed numerous vehicles in the area while television
coverage showed people in and around the plant. If the plant
contained BW agent, it would not be safe to have been in the
immediate area. It's highly that any collateral damage
will result from this attack.
The suspect BW production plant at Taji was attacked on 21
Jan 91 at 1011 (Iraq local). This facility is believed to have
been associated with anthrax spore production. The facility is in
close proximity to Baghdad. No more than ten kilograms of dry
anthrax spores are assessed to have been present within the
building at any one time. With this amount present, which is the
worst case,
approximately 1-5 percent or 100-500 grams of spores could have
been released. At the time of attack, the winds were blowing to
the southeast into Baghdad at about 8 km/hr with slightly unstable
conditions. Unstable conditions would help make any anthrax spores
rise into the atmosphere, whereas the sunlight would begin killing
the spores. A release of 100 grams of spores under these
conditions is estimated to result in less than 5,000 casualties.
It has been
nearly 3 days since the attack and casualties should already have
started. To date none have been reported in intelligence channels
or the open press.
Baghdad has already shown a propensity for using U.S. air
strikes for propaganda purposes. With disruption of water and food
supplies, and normal hygiene some diseases become more prevalent.
Saddam may take such disease outbreak to accuse the U.S. of
waging BW or as a result of attacks on Iraqi BW facilities. The
following assessment has been prepared by the Armed Forces Medical
Intelligence Center (AFMIC):
Food and waterborne disease have the greatest potential
for outbreaks in the civilian and military population over the
next 30-60 days. Increased incidence of diseases will be
attributable to degradation of normal preventive medicine, waste
disposal, water purification/distribution, electricity, and
decreased ability to control disease outbreaks. Any urban area in
iraq that has received infrastructure damage will have similar
problems. The following
[ (b)(2) ]
1800 HOURS/21 JAN 91/SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]
PASS TO THE ITF OPS OFFICER
Assessment of threat at Salman Pak--based on most
current air campaign and BDA:
Since the attack on the refrigerated bunkers at Salman
Pak on 17 January 1991, there have been no reports [ (b)(2) ] or
the open press of widespread outbreak of disease in Baghdad and
the surrounding area. After nearly four days post attack some
casualties should have already occurred suggesting that collateral
from the 17 January attack may not be a problem. On 19 January
1991, the two refrigerated and one nonrefrigerated bunkers at
Salman Pak were attacked again. Meteorological data for this
attack are not yet available to fully assess the situation.
Other known suspect or confirmed biological warfare
facilities have been attacked. The refrigerated 12-frame bunker at
Qabatiyan was attacked on 19 January 1991 resulting in a large
explosion and total destruction. BW munitions would not result in
such an explosion. It is assessed that based the lack of a crater
and the debris pattern surrounding the bunker that it may have
contained fuel air explosives. Collateral from this target is not
considered likely.
The suspect BW production facility at Taji was attacked
on 21 January 1991 with approximately fifty percent of the
building blown away. This facility is believed to have been
associated with anthrax spore production. No more than ten
kilograms of dry anthrax spores are assessed to have been present
within the building at any one time. Destruction of the 450 liter
fermentor, even if operating, would not be a problem outside the
immediate area due to the difficulty in aerosolizing liquid agent.
The facility is in close proximity to Baghdad. Meteorological data
for this target are not yet available to assess the prospects for
collateral.
The Infant Formula Plant at Abu Ghraib was attacked on
21 January 1991 with moderate damage. This facility has been
associated with the Iraqi BW program but reportedly served as a
backup facility. The facility was maintained but reportedly not
operating. This would make it unlikely that collateral would
result from the attack on this facility.
[ (b)(2) ] the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence
Center have been contacted and asked to report immediately any
widespread outbreak of disease, especially in Baghdad. AFMIC has
been tasked to determine which diseases are most likely to occur
when water and food supplies are disrupted, and when normal
hygiene is not possible. This is to help distinguish what diseases
can be
expected to occur "normally" during wartime and those that might
occur from attacks on BW facilities.
POC: [ (b)(6) ]
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