Responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94
Filename:006me.94
2 Mar 94
From: DIA/PAGAlD
To: ASD(AE)
Subj: Responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94
The following responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94
are provided for review and forvarding to [ (b)(6) ]
ASDaPRfaIRM).
Q1. What constituted the Iraqi chemical/biological arsenal?
Chemical
A: Iraq was assessed to,possess roughly 1000 MT of
chemical agent equally split between the blister agent mustard and
the nerve agents sarin (GB) and GF. Small amounts (tens of tons)
of the persistent nerve agent VX were assessed as probably
available. The nerve agent soman (GD) and the psychochemical BZ
were assessed to be in the R&D stage. Much of the above 1000
MT of agent was assessed to be weaponized in the following
munitions with the remainder stored as bulk agent:
Artillery Mortars Aerial Missiles
155mm * 82mm 25Okg bomb SCUD
152mm 120mm SoOkg bomb Al Husayn
130mm Cluster bombsAl Abbas
122mm rocket * 90 mm rocket
Note: (1) * Preferred weapon for artillery
(2) Landmines were assessed as possible.
(3) Frog missiles are capable of CW delivery but no evidence
existed for such a warhead in Iraq.
(4) The above table and notes are Biological
A: Biological agents assessed to have been developed by
Iraq
are Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax; botulinum
toxin; and Clostridium perfringens. assessed that Iraq had
weaponized Bacillus anthracis and botulinum toxin in missile
warheads and aerial bombs. The number of BWafilled munitions held
by Iraq is unknown.
Q2. What were Iraq's chemical/biological capabilities, including
ability to produce, deliver and weaponize biological agents?
Chemical A: Iraq was assessed to be capable of producing
as much as 300 MT. .of chemical agent per month equally divided
between mustard and nerve agent. This production took place at
the enormous $amarra CW facility about 60 Em northwest
of Baghdad. Historically- Iraq had purchased empty napalm and
white phosphorus munitions which it filled with CW. However,
there were many reports that Iraq was purchasing equipment to
indigenous ly produce many of the above munitions.
As a result, it was fairly safe to assume that Iraqi CW munitions
were a combination of both imported and indigenously produced
munitions. Finally, Iraq was capable of delivering CW with
munitions listed in Ql.
Biological
Iraq was producing biological warfare (BW) agents at
the Salman Pak BW facility, located approximately 32 km southeast
of Baghdad. Other sites suspected of producing BW agents were the
Taji suspect BW Facility just north of Baghdad, the Abu Ghurayb
Vaccine Plant, Al Kindi in the west Baghdad suburbs, and a plant
at Latif iyah, within the Al QaQaa Military Complex just southwest
of Baghdad. Iraq had the capability to deliver BW munitions by
aircraft or by missile.
Q3. Where were these chemical/biological agents stored? In what
form were they stored?
Chemical and Biological
A: At least 22 sites, located all over Iraq, were
identified as suspected chemical and biological agent storage
areas. This number does not include additional sites where
chemical and biological weapons were assessed to
be produced. With the exception of two suspect storage locations
these sites were all attacked. All sites attacked were either
significantly damaged or destroyed. As stated above, much of the
Iraqi CW agent was believed, to be weaponized and stored in the
munitions listed in Q1.
Assessed BW agents' would have been stored as liquids or solids
either in bulk or in munitions. It was not" known to what extent
the BW agent stocks were weaponized, but. Iraq was assessed to
have BW bombs. and SCUD warheads.
Q4. Were any biological agents stored in the sites bombed by
Allied Forces?
A: There is insufficient information to determine if BW
agents were stored in the sites referenced in Q3 which were bombed
by coalition forces. It is known however that Iraq moved key BW
agent production equipment out of $alman Pak, Taji, Abu Ghurayb
and Latif iyah prior to bombing of those sites. We assess
that BW agents a& as well as some CW production and filling
equipment from Samarra AA also were moved from these sites to
unknown locations.
Q5. Could any chemical/biological agents have been accidently or
purposefully released?
Chemical
A: Regarding chemical agents, there is no intelligence that
indicates CW was accidently released. However the evidence
surrounding the Czech detection of 19 and 24 Jan 9l, i.e. the
meteorological conditions, the low concentration and short
duration of the detection, the extremely localized area affected,
the
absence of other detections by other units nearby, the topography
of the area and the fact that no military action took place
anywhere near the area allow us to rule out the possibility that
the agents detected were released as a result of combat
operations.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Biological
A: At this juncture, there is no intelligence information
that BW agents were accidentally or purposefully released during
the Persian Gulf War. Additionaly, the effects of any such
releases were not observed either in Iraqi civilian or military
populations or in coalition forces or civilian populations.
In our opinion, no such incident could have occurred without
animal
and human casualties.
Q6. Could biological/chemical agents stored in Iraqi sites bombed
by Allied forces have been carried by wind patterns to troop
locations?
Chemical and Biological
A: Based on meteorological data, the distance from Iraqi CBW
sites to Allied positions, the fact that no Iraqi or Coalition CBW
casualties (military, civilian or animal) were observed between
the bombed sites and troop locations, and that no conf irmed
detections of CBW were made, we assess that CBW agents were not
carried by wind to troop locations. As stated in QS, we believe
that no such incident could occur without related casualties or
conf irmations of the presence of agent.
Q7. What were US/Allied forces capability in detecting biological
agents? When were these detection capabilities deployed?
A: There were three countries that fielded biological
detection capabilities, US, UK, CA. Canada had the simplest
capability, which was comprised of one or several mobile aerosol
detection stations. Each station had an aerosol particle sampler
(APS) designed to detect increases in the amount of respirable
particles in the air. A diagnostic lab would then be used to
identify suspect air samples. The UK fielded roughly eight mobile
BW reconnaissance systems. This system included a range rover as
a platform, APS, an enzyme based manual test to determine the
presence of biological material vs. dust in air samples, and an
immunodiagnostic machine for identifying BW agents. The US
detection capability and when the equipment was deployed will be
addressed by Operational Forces.
Q15. What is/was known to DoD about Iraqi chemical/biological
capabilities based on US export licenses to Iraq?
A: Prior to Desert Storm, the CBW intelligence community
did not routinely review export license applications.
Additionally, nearly all of the equipment, seed stocks, or
precursor chemicals imported by Iraq have legitimate civilian uses
and, at the time, would very likely have been approved. Today, a
much more
stringent review regime is in place.
APPENDIX I
Salman Pak BW Facility
33-l9-26N/O44-lO-22E
R&D, storage and Production (Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin,
Clostridium perfringens)
Taji suspect BW Production Facility
33-33-l6n/044-l7-46E
Possible site of anthrax spore production
Abu Ghurayb Vaccine Plant, Al Hindi
33-l8'-28N/O44-l5-49E
Probable site of botulinum toxin production
Latifiyah
33-OO-56n/O44-l3-l7E
Possible Production (agent unknown)
Abu Ghurayb suspect BW Facility
33-l9-26N/044-lO-22E
Possible Production and Munition filling
Note: The Iraqis reportedly were not successful in filling
artillery shells with BW agents at this site.
APPENDIX II
BW TARGETS ATTACKED DURING DESERT STORM
Facility Geo Coords
Date
Salman Pak BW Research and Production (#) 335ON 04348E
1/17
Abu Ghurayb Suspect BW Production 3319N 04410E
1/23
Abu Ghurayb BW Production 3318N 04412E 2/3*
Taji Suspect BW Storage 3330N 04414E - 2/l0*
Taji Suspect BW Production 3333N 04418E 2/8*
Latifiyah Suspect BW Production 330lN 04413E 2/8*
KEY:
(#) Multiple Targets, Multiple Attack Dates
* Approximate date of attack
Note: 12-Frame Storage Bunkers bombed are denoted on DIA list
CBW
Targets Attacked During Desert Storm" furnished to Dr. Deutch'S
office by [ b.6. ]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
