Collateral Risk Due to Allied Air Strikes on Iraqi Biological
Warfare (BW) Facilities
Filename:003pgv.00p
SUBJECT: Collateral Risk Due to Allied Air Strikes on Iraqi
Biological Warfare (BW) Facilities
PURPOSE: To provide US Army DCSINT, LTG. Eichelberger, with
information concerning the potential collateral risk due to allied
air strikes on Iraqi biologiCal warfare (BW) production plants and
storage sites.
DISCUSSION:
1. BW Facilities: At the onset of the war two confirmed BW
production plants were the fermentation plant at Taji and the
Clostridium Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghurayb. Additionally, the R&D
center at Sal man Pak was confirmed as a BW site. Three suspect BW
production plants, the infant formula plant" at Abu Ghurayb, the
plant at salman Pak, and the plant at Latifiyah were identified.
Furthermore, nineteen environmentally-controlled, 12-frame bunkers
capable of storing BW agents/munitions as well as other
heat-sensitive materials such as chemical warfare agents, fuel air
explosives and precision munitions were identified. To date,
both Abu Ghurayb facilities have been rendered inoperable, as has
the production facility at Taji. A number of key buildings at the
Salman Pak location have incurred moderate to severe damage.
Within the past few days, the location of the Latifiyah suspect BW
Production Plant has been determined with certainty. Twelve of the
nineteen 12-frame bunkers have been either severely damaged or
totally destroyed. Early in the war, four bunkers located at
Qabitiyan, Kai-bala, and Salman Pak (two) which maintained special
security and were considered the most likely to contain BW agents
were destroyed.
2. Anthrax spores and botulinum toxin are the two confirmed
Iraqi BW agents. Anthrax, which is more resistant to environmental
factors than botulinum toxin, presents the greater risk. Botulinum
toxin degrades quickly, and even if released, would most likely
affect only the immediate area of the attack. Anthrax spores in a
dry form represent a greater risk of broad dissemination than a
liquid suspension of anthrax. In the dry form more anthrax spores
would be aerosolized in the optimal particle size (1-5
micrometers) for weaponization.
3. Plannina and Monitoring: Considerable planning went
into determining the best method of attacking these facilities
while minimizing the prospects of collateral damage to coalition
Forces and Iraqi citizens. After the attacks, the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DlA) acquired meteorological data for the day
and time of the attacks near populated areas to assess the
likelihood of collateral damage. The DIA has also asked AFMIC, to
be particularly vigilant and report any indications of widespread
outbreaks of disease which might result from the attacks. To date,
there have been no such indications.
4. Risk Assessment:
a. BW Facilities: Attacks on the BW facilities
continue. Therefore, the possibility of collateral damage still
exists until all the facilities have been destroyed. Destruction
of the production facilities, which contain mostly liquid agent,
represents less risk collateral damage due to tha aerosolization
of agent than the storage facilities, which probably contain dry
agent. The lraqis have likely responded to the methodical
destruction of the environmentally-controlled bunkers by moving BW
agents/munitions to more secure locations. We would assess that an
anthrax release from a central location in Iraq resulting from air
strikes would probably not extend beyond the KTO.
b. Missile Attacks: The lraqis are assessed to have the
technical capability to produce BW warheads for ballistic
missiles, but there is no evidence to confirm that they have done
so. If
such warheads exist and a missile were intercepted, the number of
casualties would depend on a number of factors including: type of
BW agent, type of fill (cluster or bulk), height and location of
intercept, protective posture, time of day and meteorological
conditions. In the best case, no casualties would occur.
Alternatively, in the worst case an fully successful release of
cluster submunitions with impact fuzes containing anthrax in an
unprotected, densely populated area could result in considerable
casualties. Possibly, agent could be dispersed over an area
greater
than 1,000 square kilometers. We believe that a high altitude
intercept of a missile containing only bulk fill of agent would
most probably result in the spores being spread by upper level
winds with uncertain consequences. A cloud of dry anthrax spores
dispersed in the evening or at flight could travel long distances
before sun light (ultraviolet radiation), diffusion and other
factors would inactivate the agent or render it ineffective. We
can only estimate that a low attitude intercept (approximately 300
meters) of a missile containing bulk fill of agent would
result in the dispersion of agent within a area of one to many
square kilometers. However, the effectiveness of dissemination
depends on several factors, including amount of surviving agent,
meteorological conditions and time of day.
The POCs for this action are [ b. 6]
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