Nuclear, Missile, Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities of
Iraq Before, During and After DESERT STORM
Filename:003bk.00d
IBackground Paper for JS
SUBJECT: Nuclear, Missile, Chemical and Biological Warfare
Capabilities of Iraq Before, During and After DESERT STORM
l. PURPOSE: To provide J5 with information on Iraqi nuclear,
missile, and chemical and biological warfare capabilities before,
during and after Operation DESERT STORM.
2. POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE:
a. The bombing campaign against the chemical and biological
warfare (CBW) target set progressed generally In three stages,
although with a great overlap between the stages. The first stage
targeted both biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW)
R&D/production and CW filling capability. The second stage
targeted BW storage, followed by CW storage. During the second
stage, much of the R&D/production capability that survived the
first stage was revisited and destroyed. The third stage targeted
delivery systems in the field, while targets not destroyed in the
first two stages were revisited.
BIOLOGICAL:
a. Initially, there were four facilities in the area of
BW R&D/production--the Abu Ghurayb Suspect BW Production Facility,
the Abu Ghurayb Clostridium Vaccine Plant, the Taji Suspect BW
Production Facility, and the Salman Pak R&D/Suspect Production and
Support Facility. A fifth facility, the Latifiyah BW Production
Facility, was added to the 1st in February 1991. At these five
facilities, there were a total of 13 major buildings assessed to
associated with BW R&D and production. As a result of coalition
bombing, 11 of the 13 buildings were destroyed and two severely
damaged. All five facilities were assessed to be unable to
support BW R&D and/or production.
b. BW storage initially include 19 twelve-frame
environmentally controlled bunkers at 11 locations and the Taji
Suspect BW Storage Facility. During February 1991, two
additional twelve-frame bunkers were Identified, bringing the
total to 21 such bunkers. Of these targets, the original 19
bunkers
and theTaji Suspect BW Storage Facility were all destroyed or
severely damaged. The final two bunkers were discovered too late
in the campaign to be attacked.
CHEMICAL:
a. CW production included the Samarra Chemical Weapons
Production and Storage Facility, and the Habbanlyah I, II
and III precursor production facilities. Production at Samarra
occurred in six un-bunkered buildings and four bunkered buildings.
Five of six unbunkered buildings and none of the bunkered
buildings were destroyed. Of the four surviving bunkered
production buildings the most significant was P-6, which is
capable of producing 50-70 MT of nerve agent per month. About 70
percent of Samarra's total production capacity was destroyed. The
three Habbaniyah facilities were destroyed and with them most all
ability to produce CW agent precursor chemicals. Three buildings
at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions filling and all three
buildings were destroyed.
b. CW storage capability was in the form of eight cruciform
bunkers at Samarra and 22 "S"-shaped bunkers at 14 locations. Of
the eight cruciform bunkers, one was destroyed and the remaining
seven sustained only superficial damage. Of the 22 "S"-shaped
bunkers, 16 were destroyed and six suffered serious damage.
Although these bunkers were Identified as CW-related bunkers and
included in the CW target set, bunker architecture is not relevant
to its ability to store agent or weapons, which would have an
important impact on Iraq's ability to reconstitute its CW storage
system in that Iraq would not need to reproduce the 22 "S"-shaped
bunkers to have significant CW storage capability.
3. EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS:
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Biological Warfare: It is extremely difficult to verify or
establish effective international controls on BW development and
production since the same technologies and techniques are used in
legitimate biological/medical R&D as that used for BW. The
capability to perform BW R&D exists at the University of Baghdad
and other universities and at various pharmaceutical facilities.
A BW agent production capability could be re-established in a
matter of weeks to months utilizing equipment at pharmaceutical
facilities such as Samarra Drug Industries. Production, however,
would be at a much reduced and limited capacity and unsafe compare
to dedicated BW plants. In order to reproduce the entire BW
system as it existed on 15 January 1991, including the facilities
at Salman Pak, Abu Ghurayb, Taji, Latifiyah and all the destroyed
bunkers, Iraq would need to spend 100-200 million dollars and 5-8
years. However, the complete BW system was a multi-facility R&D
and production system with redundancy and back-up capabilities.
Additionally, not all the bunkers would be required to store a
militarily significant amount of BW agent. Iraq could
re-establish a significant BW capability with dedicated labs,
containment facilities, storage and filling capacity without
duplicating the prewar system. Such a BW system without the
prewar redundancy and back-up could be built within 3-4 years for
less than 100 million dollars.
Chemical Warfare: Iraq's ability to produce chemical
agent has been severely degraded but not eliminated. It is
assessed to have the equipment necessary to produce 50-70 MT of
nerve agent per month and about five metric tons of precursor
material or mustard agent per month. In order to produce this
agent, Iraq will need to import several precursor chemicals. It
will also need to bring the system back into a rational order,
e.g. powering up production lines, getting chemical precursors
into the system, supplying casings for weaponizing, etc. Iraq
could be making chemical munitions as soon as the electrical power
grid is
back In operation. Some munitions, such as aerial bombs and
missile warheads, could be filled by hand. To reproduce the
Samarra facility, Iraq would need at least several hundred million
dollars and 3-5 years. To rebuild the three Habbaniyah
facilities would take 200-400 million dollars and 3-5 years. This
is
assuming that Iraq has access to the required materiel on the
international market.
PREPARED BY: [ (b)(6) ]
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