IRAQ'S PERFORMANCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (U)
Filename:002mc.91
Subj: IRAQ'S PERFORMANCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (U)
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Throughout the entire Gulf crisis, Saddam Hussein made serious
errors in political, strategic, and tactical calculations that
ultimately resulted in his forces being driven from Kuwait
leaving the Iraqi military and economy in virtual ruin.
- Seriously misjudged international response
Political and military
- Unsuccessful attempt to link Kuwait with Palestinian issue
- Military-industrial base devastated
SRBM and CBW capability decimated
The Arab coalition's contribution to the overall effort was
superb. Although numerous problems were initially encountered,
these problems were eventually overcome allowing the Arab
forces to contribute significantly to Desert Storm/Shield in
accomplishing all assigned objectives.
Desert Storm left the Iraqi Air Force totally ineffective as a
military force and the Iraqi Navy was virtually destroyed 15
days into the air campaign.
Iraq's chemical and biological production capabilities were
near entirely destroyed and it will take years and millions of
dollars to rebuild its capability back to pre-war levels.
- Numerous theories could explain Baghdad's failure to use
these weapons
Although initial expectations that the Iraqi SRBM force could
be quickly subdued, it remained a powerful threat throughout
the crisis period.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability and Response
Coalition air forces struck Iraqi biological weapon research,
development, and storage facilities and chemical weapon
research and development, production, filling, and storage
facilities through the duration of the air campaign.
Coalition forces initially identified and targeted four BW
R&D/production facilities. A fifth facility was identified in
February. Coalition bombing destroyed 11 of the 13 buildings
associated with BW R&D/production and severely damaged the
other 2 buildings. All five facilities are assessed to be
unable to support BW R&D or production. Additionally, BW
storage initially included 19 12-frame refrigerated bunkers at
11 locations. In February, two more bunkers were identified.
All of the original 19 bunkers were destroyed, however, the
final two bunkers were discovered too late in the campaign to
be attacked.
CW production facilities were located at two sites. Of the 10
buildings located at Samarra, 6 were destroyed, incapacitating
Iraq's CW production capability by 70 percent. Additionally,
all three facilities at Habbaniyah were destroyed. CW storage
facilities consisted of 8 cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22
S-shaped bunkers at 13 locations. One of the 8 cruciform
bunkers was destroyed while the remaining 7 sustained only
superficial damage. Of the 22 S-shaped bunkers, 16 were
destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage.
Reproducing Iraq's entire prewar BW system would require
spending $100-200 million and a minimum of 5-8 years. Iraq
could, however, reestablish a significant BW capability within
3-4 years for less than S100 million. To rebuild Iraq's prewar
CW capabilities would take $400-600 million and 3-5 years.
Iraq's failure to use its chemical weapons cannot be
completely understood without a full accounting of the Iraqi
military and political leadership's plans in preparation for
the war and the execution of those plans. Information on this
subject remains limited, and analysis of the reasoning is
still preliminary. The following is an estimate of the
influence of several factors that may have contributed to
Iraq's failure to use these weapons:
If Iraq did not deploy its chemical weapons to the KTO, two
possible explanations are likely. First, Iraq believed that
both Israel and the Coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons
and would use them if provoked. Iraqi leaders also realized
that these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq with
accuracy. Saddam probably concluded that the consequences of
attacking with chemical weapons would be too severe to justify
their use, and this may have led to an early decision not to
use them. Saddam may also have assumed that Iraqi use of CW
weapons would cause Coalition forces to seek his removal as a
top priority including the liberation of Kuwait.
Second, it is just as likely that the leadership made a
fundamental miscalculation about how the Coalition would
prosecute the war and how effectively its own forces would be
able to respond. Baghdad may have expected the Coalition
forces to fight much like the Iranians did (attacking first
with infantry followed by mobile armor). They perceived that
this would have given them days or even weeks to move chemical
munitions into the KTO once the offensive had begun.
Based on the initial assumption that Baghdad did not move
chemical weapons into the KTO prior to the offensive, the most
likely reason for their non-use was the speed and violence of
the Coalition advance reaching objectives deep in Iraq in four
days which precluded their movement much less their use. Iraqi
forces were kept constantly off balance, and Coalition air
supremacy made effective concentration of artillery against
Coalition ground forces virtually impossible.
Also, Iraq's C3 system had been heavily damaged at this point.
Iraqi commanders could not control their forces, in part
because of their intelligence system's complete failure. This
inability to accurately depict the disp~ planning extremely
difficult could also have added to the reasons that chemical
weapons were not used.
Additionally, destruction of Iraqi CW production and storage
centers may also have precluded their use. The chemicals made
earlier may have deteriorated in storage and/or been
destroyed. Iraq may also have miscalculated that its defenses
would allow time to produce and deploy chemicals later in the
conflict. Loss of their production facilities prevented them
from making the agents as needed, which was the practice
during the Iran-Iraq War.
Other factors which could have deterred their use are:
o Loss of their ability to be delivered by air due to
Coalition air supremacy.
o Artillery and MRL losses were extremely high by the time the
ground offensive began limiting their use fcr chemical
delivery.
o SCUD technical problems in their long range versions made
the use of chemical warheads extremely inexact, and again the
speed of the Coalition advance may have precluded their use of
the SCUD-B for delivery.
o Damage to the logistics infrastructure may have made their
transportation impossible.
o Weather conditions at the outset of the ground offensive was
poor for chemical usage. Winds were strong, generally from the
south, and there was rain in the area.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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