Interim Report on Iraq Biological Warfare (BW)
Filename:001me.90d
17 December 1990
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Subject: Interim Report on Iraq Biological Warfare (BW)
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
1. BACKGROUND: An Interagency Intelligence Community
working group has been formed to examine various issues related to
Iraqi BW capabilities, and intentions. This memorandum represents
an interim report of that group. This report reflects the key
judgments on capabilities, intentions, and some general
considerations which impact on the BW problem. These judgments,
will continue to be refined as the group continues its work. The
judgments rendered here in are for the moss part consistent with
work previously accomplished within the Intelligence Community.
2. IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PRODUCTION `FACILITIES: There
are several facilities associated with the Iraqi BW program.
There are at least three known and three suspect biological
warfare (BW) production facilities in Iraq. Anthrax and botulinum
toxin are confirmed BW agents which are believed to have been
weaponized. Based upon the technical capability of the Iraqis, it
is well within their capacity to have produced 1,000 kilograms of
dried anthrax spores. The Iraqis have shown interest in the
development of a number of other infectious agents and toxins for
BW purposes but the status of development is not known. It also
is not known what types of munitions have been filled with BW
agent but could include missile warheads, aerial bombs with and
without cluster submunitions, artillery, and spray and aerosol
generating devices.
3. Salman Pak, Abu Ghraib Vaccine Plant, and Taji Pilot
Plant,
are considered to be the three primary BW-related production
facilities. We believe that Salman Pak is currently involved in
only BW activities. Intelligence indicates that the Clostridium
vaccine plant was completed in 1984, and that the plant is
operational. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], this plant is
located in the Abu Ghraib area and is disguised as a legitimate
vaccine plant. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] a plant in the
Taji area is producing anthrax. This plant may have been producing
for several years.
4. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] since the early 1980s
the Abu Gharaib infant formula plant may be involved in the
production of BW agents. The plant has unusually high security,
and state of the art fermenters and driers. Indications are that
the facility is not in operational use, but may be maintained for
back up purposes. We believe this facility is capable of producing
large amounts of anthrax or botulinum toxin. Another plant, at
Samarra built by the Soviets in the 1970s is known to produce
numerous
biological products. Although the plant does produce legitimate
antibiotics, the equipment there would allow the Iraqis to produce
a variety of BW agents. Finally, there are some indications that
the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center may have some role in the BW
program. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] continues to suggest
that BW-related virus research takes place at Tuwaitha.
5. IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STORAGE FACILITIES: There are 35
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers at 17 facilities which
may be associated with the Iraqi BW program. Of the 35, at least
17 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers are refrigerated/air
conditioned and are believed capable of storing BW
agents/munitions. With the exception of four[ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers at Salman Pak (only two are
refrigerated and air conditioned), the remainder are located at or
near large general purpose ammunition storage depots. We cannot
rule out the possibility that these bunkers are used for purposes
other than BW, such as storing components of fuel air explosives,
and electronic equipment. Iraq's [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
bunker storage capability far exceeds any conceivable BW
requirement. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] indicates another
possible, unlocated, BW storage site in the Taji area utilizing
large scale liquid nitrogen cooling.
6. IRAQI POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS: Baghdad
probably believes that the greatest benefits it derives from
biological warfare are its deterrent value and the escalatory
option it provides. Iraq would consider using BW as a weapon to
save the regime from falling.
7. Saddam is most likely to use biological weapons in a
strategic role as a terror weapon against military and civilian
targets. It is less likely to use BW in tactical situations,
although the threshold for use of toxic agents would be lower than
for infectious agents.
8. The initiation of biological warfare would be based on
Saddam Husayn's determination that it would achieve significant
national security objectives, inflict major damage against his
enemies, or fulfill his own sense of mission. Saddam probably
would retain control over all of his strategic weapon systems,
including BW, through at least the initial stages of hostilities.
9. IMPLICATIONS: Previous use of chemical weapons by Iraq
and statements by Iraqi officials, justifying the use of any
weapon to defend their country, suggests that Baghdad would
consider using biological weapons under certain circumstances.
Iraq has the technical capability to produce sufficient amounts of
anthrax spores to pose a highly credible threat of death to
unprotected individuals. In addition, Iraq is capable of
producing
sufficient quantities of botulinum toxin to pose an equally high
threat of death to exposed individuals (smaller amounts and more
rapid onset).
10. Detailed vulnerability studies are ongoing to determine
options available to either destroy or contain the BW agents, or
to deny access to them. We believe, any planning for military
action against Iraqi BW production and storage sites should
consider a multiple set of probable outcomes ranging from no
release of agent to the liberation of many hundreds of kilograms
of live agent resulting in significant collateral loss of life.
Unless the total and complete destruction of all agent is assured,
then one
must presume the release of, at least some, BW agent into the
atmosphere. If the storage bunkers are attacked and a plume
results, the spores will be carried into the plume to a height
depending upon the size of the explosion and any resulting fire.
Once in the air, the spores will be carried to a distance
depending upon a number of meteorological conditions. However,
there is a mitigating factor. Exposure to the sun's ultra-violet
rays accelerates the breakdown of both anthrax and botulinum toxin
BW agents.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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