Subject: Development of Non-Conventional Warheads by Iraq
Filename:0424pgf
Development of Non-Conventional Warheads by Iraq
by Daniel Leshem
The low accuracY of the surface-to-surface missiles in Iraq's
possession. and those which it is developing or
converting/improving increases even more the importance and
priority - already high - attached by Iraq to the development of
non-conventional warheads (chemical, biological and nuclear). It
can ba reasonably assumed that Iraq has been investing greater
efforts in developing chemical warheads for the various types of
surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface rockets from
the moment the plans for converting, developing and manufacturing
surface-to-surface missiles and rockets gathered momentum. These
efforts by the Iraqi military industry probably began with the
development of chemical warheads for long-range artillery rockets
(40-100 km.) such as the "Frog" and the "Lit" as well as for the
Astros II/Seagill and "Ababil" 50/100 rocket launchers. This forms
a natural continuation of the development, manufacture and
extensive use that they made of medium and short range rocket
launchers with chemical warheads, such as the BM-21 rocket
launchers (with 20 km. range). An unconfirmed report states that
the Iraqis developed and manufactured a chemical warhead for the
"Frog-7" rockets (and/or the "Lit"). This report also stated that
the chemical warheads for the "Frog" which were loaded with
mustard gas (chemical warfare blistering agent) were evidently
used in the Iraq-Iran war - a claim unsubstantiated by other
sources.79
The Iraqi military industry possesses the technological base for
developing various types of warheads, including chemical warheads
for surface-to-surface missiles. This is based on the rich
experience gained in projects for converting the "Scud" missiles
to intermediate range missiles ( the "El Hussein" and "El Abbas"
), which involved. inter alia, considerable development work to
reduce the explosive warhead of the missiles; in other projects
for developing surface-to-surface missiles such as the "Condor 2",
which involved developing various types of warheads, apparently
including chemical warheads; as well as in projects for developing
chemical and other warheads (cluster and certainly also
incendiary) for artillery rockets. The Iraqi military industry
thus possesses the technological capability to complete the
development and to manufacture chemical warheads for
surface-to-surface missiles of the "Scud" family (the "Scud" the
"El Hussein" and the "El Abbas" ), and it is possible that these
chemical warheads are already in the manufacturing and equipping
stages 80 At the same time, the effectiveness of these warheads
remains unclear in terms of the dispersal of the chemical warfare
agent, and it is possible that the Iraqi military industry is
seeking ways to improve their effectiveness.
Saddam Hussein, in his various utterances since April 1990, stated
clearly that he has authorized the commanders of the missile bases
(surface-to-surface missiles) and air force bases of the Iraqi
armed forces to launch chemical weapons (whether by means of
missiles or attack aircraft) at Israel in response to an Israeli
nuclear or chemical attack against Iraq or "Arab countries from
Mauritania to Syria".81 These expressions raise the possibility
that Iraq possesses surface-to-surface missiles equipped with
chemical warheads. With that, it could be expected that the Iraqi
president would express himself in a similar manner even if the
missile development has not been completed as yet, since it
appears that for him it is most important to demonstrate might and
deterrent ability against Israel, Iran, Syria and other countries.
He stresses the fact that the missiles and chemical weapons in his
possession constitute means of deterrence and maintaining the
balance against the nuclear and chemical weapons which he claims
are in Israel's possession. For this reason, it is important to
Saddam Hussein to be able to declare that Iraq has developed
binary chemical weapons - which according to him are in the
possession of the great powers and Iraq alone - in spite of the
fact that his claim is unreasonable in view of the great technical
difficulties encountered in the development of binary chemical
weapons as experienced in various development programs in the
United States, particularly in developing the Big Eye aerial bomb
which was not completed (the only binary chemical ordnance whose
development was completed in the United States is a 155mm shell).
Moreover, binary chemical weapons do not at all increase the
lethality of chemical warfare agents dispersed by chemical
ammunition, so that a weapon of this type does not augment the
might of the Iraqi army. It is possible that the "binary" chemical
weapon which the Iraqis have is nothing more than a "cocktail" of
two types of chemical warfare agents, instead of a single chemical
warfare agent that is used to load the chemical ammunition.
It should be stated that the reduced warhead of the "El Hussein"
and "El Abbas" missiles will also reduce the effectiveness of the
chemical warhead for these missiles. It appears that the chemical
warhead for the "El Hussein" will be unable to contain chemical
warfare agents in excess of 150 kg.8~ Such a chemical load is much
smaller than the chemical load carried in the original "Scud"
warhead in the possession of the Soviet army (filled with about
500 kg. of chemical warfare agent of the VX type, which is more
lethal than the nerve gas in Iraq's possession). Thus the Iraqi
surface-to-surface missile units will have to launch greater
quantities of "El Hussein" and "El Abbas" missiles to deliver more
substantial quantities of chemical warfare agents on the targets,
which undoubtedly are the large population centers of Israel,
Iran, or other adjacent countries. It should be stated that the
quantity of chemical warfare agents required to attain 507.
casualties over an area of 1 sq.km., varies from one type of
chemical warfare agent to another. For example, at the.stage when
the chemical warfare agent is still in the air (after being
dispersed by the missile), a quantity of 4 tons of mustard gas
(blistering agent), ~ tons of Tabun nerve gas, or 0.5 tons of
Serin nerve gas would be required (these figures are apparently
correct for a population located in the open and not equipped with
any chemical warfare protective equipment whatsoever, as the
chemical warfare protective equipment substantially reduces the
number of casualties and the severity of injurieS).83 When the
chemical warfare agent is already covering the ground (surface
contaminant) much larger quantities are required in order to
attain an equivalent number of casualties. Thus, in order to
obtain a considerable number of casualties in a large unprotected
urban center by means of missiles equipped with a small warhead
and very low degree of accuracy, the Iraqis would apparently need
to launch dozens of missiles equipped with chemical warheads. For
this reason, it could be expected that the Iraqi military industry
would strive to develop a relatively large chemical warhead for
the "Tammuz 1" missile, which would be capable of delivering a
relatively large payload at a range shorter than their maximum
range (2000 km.). Iraq doesn't even require half of this maximum
range in order to hit the large civilian population centers of
Israel, Iran, Syria or other countries in the region, however, it
will undoubtedly need heavier warheads, both conventional and
non-conventional (at the expense of range). In addition to the
"Tammuz 1", it is possible that relatively heavy warheads are also
being developed for the "Condor 2" missiles (warheads weighing
500-1000 kg.), and possibly also for the "Fahd". Moreover, it can
be expected that Iraq will strive to produce the more lethal VX
nerve gas, requiring smaller quantities (relative to the Serin and
Tabun nerve gases) to attain the same effectiveness.
It appears that Iraq, already very active in research, development
and manufacture of biological warfare agents, has been and is
engaged in developing suitable delivery means for them, among
these, warheads suitable for surface-to-surface missiles and
rockets. A suitable warhead must assure that the biological
warfare agents (microorganisms) remain alive under flight
conditions (temperature and high acceleration) and under effective
dispersal conditions. Iraq may view biological warfare agents as
effective and appropriate payloads for the surface-to-surface
missiles in its possession (with a reduced payload), since
relatively smaller quantities of biological weapons are required
to achieve effective results, on condition that the dispersal. is
reasonably efficient. It should be mentioned that among the
biological warfare agents which are being dealt with by the Iraqi
Research and Development (and manufacturing) Center located at
Salman Faq84 southeast of 8aghdad, is anthrax, a highly resistant
and highly lethal bacteria. which may be suitable, inter alia, for
delivery by surface-to-surface missiles.
Besides microorganisms, the Iraqis may use toxins (poisonous
products of bacteria, fungi, plants and various animals) of
various types - such as the botulism bacteria toxin a. the
possible payload of non-conventional warheads. This especially in
light of the fact that toxins similar in many characteristics to
chemical warfare agents will apparently prove suitable for
dispersal by means of the warheads s..~s were or are being
developed for chemical warfare agents.
The Iraqi effort to develop nuclear weapons is evidently directed
both toward the development of a nuclear bomb (aerial bomb) as
well as- a nuclear warhead (for surface-to-surface missiles).
Reports that the Iraqi nuclear program is engaged in the
accelerated development of a nuclear warhead surfaced during
1989-85 These reports linked this development effort to the
project to develop the "Condor 2" surface-to-surface missile,
although there exists also an evaluation which casts doubt on the
suitability of this missile for this purpose.86 It can be assumed
that one of the operational requirements of the Iraqi military
industry in developing the long range "Tammuz l"
surface-to-surface missile is its ability to deliver a warhead
which will be suitable from the aspect of its carrying capacity
and its dimensions (almost certainly a warhead of about 100~ kg.)
for the nuclear warhead which is in developmental stages.
Noteworthy among reports which indicate the possibility of an
Iraqi effort to develop a nuclear warhead are reports from the
U.S. and Britain dealing with the seizure of a shipment of
capacitors which were illegally acquired in the U.S. through
Britain, in April 1990. It transpires from these reports that the
Iraqis asked (by means of a dummy Iraqi British company, Euromac)
the U.S. manufacturer CSI to supply them with capacitors which
meet special requirements, indicating the intention to use them
for a triggering device in a nuclear warhead and not for
laboratory use (for developing lasers) as claimed by the Iraqis.87
The immediate effort to develop a nuclear bomb and nuclear warhead
is based evidently on the Iraqi intentions to use a quantity of
12.5 kg. of high grade enriched uranium which remained in their
possession from the nuclear reactor transaction with France. It
can be assumed that this quantity will suffice the Iraqis for
building one nuclear bomb or warhead only. The development efforts
are evidently concentrating on a nuclear weapon of the implosion
type,83 permitting the use of a relatively small quantity of
fissionable material and achieving relatively good utilization of
the material during the explosion (naturally according to design
quality and accuracy). It is possible that the effort to develop a
nuclear bomb will succeed over a period of 3 to 5 years. It can be
assumed that the development of a nuclear warhead will require a
longer time scale (5-10 years).
The development of nuclear weapons based on the above mentioned
quantity of enriched uranium will provide Iraq with the prestige,
power and standing resulting from such and will of course
substantially augment the Iraqi deterrent or threatening
capability. However, in order to attain true nuclear capability,
the Iraqis need to obtain the capability to manufacture weapon-
grade fissionable material. To this end, the Iraqis are working
intensively in another direction: the establishment of a uranium
installation - an installation which will obviate the need to
reconstruct the "Osiris" research reactor which was destroyed by
Israel in June 1981, or the construction of a new research reactor
of military significance. The Iraqi effort, being carried out at
Sawitha, south of 8aghdad in cooperation with the "Sa'ad-16"
defense research center in Mosul, is presently concentrating on
the manufacture or the attempt to manufacture extremely high speed
gas centrifuges. The knowhow and the equipment for the manufacture
of the centrifuges were supplied to Iraq by the West German H and
H Metalform company, and an expert from the MAN Technology
company, who were questioned in mid-l990 by West German
authorities in this connection. Iraq apparently receives
additional knowhow, parts and materials in this sphere from China,
Pakistan and Brazil.89 Iraq also attempted to obtain materials,
parts and essential technologies for this purpose from West
European and U.S. sources. ThiS involved, inter alia, special
steels "maraging steel-350" and the technology for manufacturing
composite materials.9¡ It can be estimated that Iraq will be able
to commence serial manufacture of centrifuges, complete the
erection of the enrichment installation and attain a high
enrichment percentage (90%) within a time span of 5 to 10 years.
In order to finance its nuclear program, Iraq was apparently
partly assisted by Saudi Arabia, which promised assistance in
rebuilding the reactor, allegedly for peaceful purposes only. It
is possible that the rebuilding of the "Osiris" reactor will t,e
carried out to some extent, with the help of west European
countries, among others (mentioned in this connection were
companies such as K.W.U. of West Germany and possibly also St.
Gobain of France).91 It can be estimated that Iraq will be able to
find covert ways of obtaining the required foreign assistance for
rebuilding the reactor, just as North Korea succeeded in erecting
a militarily significant research reactor and a plutonium
separation plant. This was evidently accomplished with the
assistance of several East European countries such as Rumania and
East Germany and unidentified West European and .Japanese
companies and Experts, in addition to Chinese assistance.92
In this connection, various reports should be mentioned regarding
nuclear cooperation between Iraq, Egypt and Pakistan.93 A nuclear
cooperation agreement between these countries has been in force
since 1985, and they have or had a joint program for the erection
of a nuclear reactor (apparently a research reactor) at Wadi El
Gedid in Egypt. It is possible that this cooperation included,
inter alia, the rehabilitation of the "Osiris" reactor (or the
erection of a new research reactor) and uranium enrichment. It
should also be mentioned that the chairman of the Egyptian Atomic
Energy Authority stated in a newspaper interview at the beginning
of 1990, that recently a "development (or progress) in the area of
nuclear fuel system (or circuit)" has taken place in Iraq and that
one of the possibilities is that he was referring to the project
to manufacture the centrifuges and the erection of the uranium
enrichment installation in Iraq.94
Appendix: Surface-to-Surface Missiles and Long-Range Artillery
Rockets in Arab Countries
Missile/ Supply Status No. of Maximum
rocket source launchers range
Comments
Tammuz-1 Local develop- In dev- 2000km
ment with foreign elopment
assistance
The project will evidently be executed with the assistance of
experts and companies from Western Europe and possibly also
Brazil. - There is a possibility of Egyptian involvement in
development, a series of trial firings in Mauritania is expected
soon.
Scud B U.S.S.R. In svc 24-36 280 km
It is evidently possible to adapt the launchers for transport and
launching of "El-Hussein" and "El-Abbas" missiles.
El- Local conversion In svc Approx. 600-650km
Hussein 50 (or more)
fixed & mobile launchers
(inc. El-Abbas)
Egypt participated/participates in the "Scud" conversion project
("El-Hussein" and evidently also "El-Abbas") (together with North
Korea) and evidently also the East German Research Institute, in
addition to German efforts employed in Iraq.
El-Abbas Local conversion Evidently See El- 850-900 h.
insvc Hussein
Possibly a chemical warhead has been developed and is being
manufactured for "El-Hussein".
Condor 2 Development with In devel- 800-1000km
foreign asst. opment
International ioint project by Iraq, Egypt, Argentina and West
European companies. Iraq is trying to complete development by
itself with the assistance of West European experts.
Frog 7 U.S.S.R. In svc 24 Approx. 70km
Rocket; possibly a chemical warhead has been developed and
manufactured.
Astros II Brazil + local In svc Several Up to 68km
manufacture with tens
foreign assistance
Rocket launcher; local production under Brazilian license and
assistance.
Ababil 50 Local manufacture In svc Several 50km
with foreign asst. tens(?)
Local manufacture uith Yugaslav assistance. The rocket and rocket
launcer were developed in Yugoslavia. The rocket includes a
cluster bomb warhead.
Ababil 100 Local manufacture In svc(?) Unknown 100km
with foreign asst.
Local manufacture with Yugaslav assistance. Unclear as yet
whether the rocket and launcer have reached the production stage.
The rocket is equipped with cluster bomb warhead.
Lit 90 Local develoment In svc(?) "Frog 90km
with foreign asst. launchers"
- The rocket was developed as the improved version and replacement
for the "Frog 7" rocket, including development of a cluster bomb
warhead and possibly also a chemical warhead.
* The table lists surface to surface missiles and long-range
artillery rockets (range exceeding 40 km.) which are in service in
Arab armies or in advanced development stages (at least) or in
production in Arab countries. This table makes no mention of the
transaction or negotiations between Syria and Libya and China for
the purchase of the M-9 surface-to-surface missiles with 600 km
range, as there is no evidence whatsoever that this transaction is
being implemented, if indeed it was concluded. The table also
makes no mention of Libyan projects for developing
surface-to-surface missiles with ranges between 500-1000 km.,
assisted by West German experts, the project for development of
the "Fahd" missiles in Iraq and a possible project for development
of a surface-to-surface (?) missile in Saudi Arabia, also assisted
by German experts, due to the fact that these projects are still
in their early stages. Also no mention is made of various contacts
between Syria and Argentina regarding the establishment of plants
for the development and manufacture of surface-to-surface missiles
of the "Condor 2" type.
Note regarding the sources: This table is based on available
information sources, some of which are quoted in the Memorandum on
the Military Balance in the Middle East 1988-89, published by the
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.
Endnotes:
79. In the chapter on artillery rockets in Jane's Armour and
Artillery 1989-1990, it is written that Iraq is manufacturing
chemical warheads for the "Frog 7" rockets (possibly for both
"Frog 7" and the Iraqi "Improved Frog", the "Lit"). In addition,
the director of the CIA testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in April 1989, that regarding Iraq, Syria and
Iran, certain cases are known where the warheads of
surface-to-surface missiles have been loaded with chemical warfare
agents. He used the term "battlefield surface-to-surface
missiles", which may mean long-range artillery rockets (over 40
km.) and short-range surface-to-surface missiles). It is possible
that he was referring, for example, to the test firings which were
conducted with chemical warheads. It should be mentioned that
during 1988 it was reported that Iran conducted test firings of a
surface-to-surface missile with a chemical warhead containing
nerve gas. In this case also, it could possibly have been a
surface-to-surface missile or a long-range artillery rocket.
80. An assistant or consultant to a U.S. Senator or Congressman
whose name was not mentioned, claimed that the Iraqi missiles
stationed at H-2 are indeed equipped with chemical warheads
(MidEast Markets, April 16, 1990). In a report dealing with
surface-to-surface missiles stationed at the H-2 and H-3 bases, it
was said, based on U.S. intelligence sources, that Iraq has
"warheads capable of delivering chemical warfare agents"
(Washington Times, May 18, 1990). Senator John McCaine wrote in
the summer of 1989 that chemical warheads are being developed and
in practice may already be in service with the Iraqi army.
("Proliferation in the 19908: Implications for U.S. Policy and
Force Planning," Strategic Review, Summer 1989).
The commander of the Israeli Air Force stated in July 1989 that in
his opinion, the Syrians and Iraqis will succeed in developing
surface-to-surface missiles with chemical warheads, however, he
was of the opinion that they would not dare to use these weapons
against Israeli civilian targets. On the other hand, it is
possible that such missiles may fall on Air Force bases which will
have to absorb an attack of such nature (Yediot Aharonot, July 17,
1989).
Deputy Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak stated in April 1990 that
"it is possible that Saddam Hussein has a surface-to-surface
missile warhead that can be loaded with gas, and if he doesn't
have it today, he will certainly acquire such capability in the
future. His capability has not changed, but it is also known that
our deterrent capability has not changed" (Hadashot, April 8,
1990).
Following the beginning of the gulf crisis, official sources,
among them the Minister of Defense, Moshe Arens, stated that "our
estimate is that the Iraqis do not have chemical warheads, however
they have suitable aircraft" (Davar, August 13, 1990). On the
other hand, in an interview given by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
in the second half of AugUSt 1990, he very carefully answered a
question asking whether Iraq does or does not have chemical
warheads for missiles, and in fact avoided giving a clear answer.
A senior military source was quoted in the Jerusalem Post of
September 10, 1990 as saying that contrary to previous estimates
by the defense establishment, "It is possible that the Iraqis have
chemical warheads for their missiles. They have the ability to
manufacture them." In addition, American and Arab sources recently
stated that as early as 1989, Iraq conducted a successful firing
trial of a medium-range surface-to-surface missile with a chemical
warhead in northwest Iraq. (International Herald Tribune,
September 15-16, 1990).
81. BBC SWB, April 18, 1990, ME!0741 A/2, quoting Baghdad Radio,
April 16, 1990.
82. The chemical warfare agent capacity of the chemical warheads
in Soviet possession is at a rate of about 50% of the weight of
the missile warhead (according to data published by the Soviets
themselves). It is thus estimated that the warhead of "El Hussein"
which weighs about 250 kg. or 300 kg. at most, could be loaded
with 125-150 kg. of chemical warfare agents. In any case, it is
clear that the weight of the chemical agent will be less than the
weight of the warhead, which is estimated at about 190 kg. (the
weight of the warhead is based on data from the Iranians who
examined parts and fragments of the "El Hussein" missiles that
fell in their territory, some of which did not explode).
83. W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East", Policy
Focus, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December
1988, p. 7.
84. W. Seth Carus, "The Genie Unleashed: Iraq's Chemical and
Biological Weapons Program", Policy Papers, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, p. 30.
85. Washington Post, March 30, 1989.
Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, August 28 - September 3, 1989.
86. MidEast Markets, December 11, 1989.
87. Time, April 9, 1990; Newsweek, April 9, 1990. Leonard S.
Spector, Nuclear Exports: The Challenge of Control. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, April 1990, p. 24.
88. Mideast Markets, December 11, 1989.
89. Ibid.
90. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Exports, p. 23, Mideast Markets,
February 5, 1990.
91. Mednews, April 2, 1990.
92. Sunday Times, June 17, 1990.
93. "Alathad", December 4, 1985, quoted by the Gulf News Agency.
African Defence Journal, February 1986.
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