Subject: SITUATION REPORT
The Czech newspaper "MLkDA FRONTA DNES" reported on 29 July
that Minister of Defense BAUDYS had confirmed that the
Czechoslovak anti-chemical unit sent to the Persian Gulf
during Operation Desert Storm had, at the beginning of the
conflict, measured trace concentrations of the nerve paralytic
agent SARIN. He flatly denied that the delay in confirming
earlier press reports of the incident was in any way due to an
alleged U.S. prohibition on publishing information on
Operation Desert Storm without prior consultation. The MoD
explained that only during the current week had the ministry
received reliable information on this score, and this was the
reason that the ministry on 7 July had stated that there was
no indication that the nerve paralytic agents SARIN and
YPERITE had been employed in the Gulf.
On 2 Sep, Congressman BROWDER met with [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] to discuss the Czechoslovak detection of nerve
agents. It was at this meeting that BROWDER asked that the MoD
provide the US a copy of the report concerning detection of
the agent, substantive supporting documents, and that the
Czechs continue to cooperate with the USG on this matter. [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] agreed.
On 1 October, the MoD passed a copy of their investigative
report to the [ (b)(2) ]. Both the [ (b)(2) ] issued
messages on the report.
On 12-14 Oct 93, a group of three individuals[ (b)(1) sec
On 25 October 1993, at 0900, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]who
was commander of chemical troops in the Gulf. The intent of
the meeting was to reach a final determination of the time and
location of the chemical detections during Desert Storm.
reported GB agent was detected at three locations, within 45
minutes, sometime between 1500 and 1700, Saudi time, between
19 and 21 January 1991, inclusive. The 2nd Detachment, with
the 4th Saudi Brigade, detected the agent at two locations, 46
degrees, 10 to 12 minutes east, 28 degrees, 43 minutes north,
and 46 degrees, 12 to 13 minutes east, 28 degrees, 44 minutes
north. The 3rd Detachment, traveling with the 20th Saudi
Brigade detected GB at roughly 46 degrees, 30 minutes east, 28
degrees, 45 minutes north. According to [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ], this location is an approximation, because of
difficulties associated with determining precise location
while on the move.
The time of 1500 to 1700 hours is in disagreement with the
time, 0845 (Central European Time), 19 January, which was
recorded on the Czechoslovak General Staff logs, handwritten
in Prague from telephone/radio transmissions. These logs are
part of the official Czech Ministry of Defense report, which
was released by Minister of Defense BAUDYS on 1 October.
However, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] is adamant that the
entries are incorrect.
According to [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] the detection of
mustard agent by the 1st Detachment
occurred 7 to 10 days after the GB detection, sometime between
1000 to 1100, Saudi time. The reported location was 45
degrees, 34 minutes east, 28 degrees, 2 minutes north. Again,
this date and time are in conflict with the log entry in the
official MoD report, which lists the detection as occurring 19
January, 0800, Central European Time. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] is adamant that the log entry is incorrect.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] offered an explanation for errors
in the log entries. This log was maintained in Prague, and the
information is third hand at best. The original information
was recorded in a local log maintained by the Czechoslovak
unit in Saudi Arabia. This information, however, was given to
Czechoslovak communicators, encrypted, sent to Prague,
decrypted, and then recorded in the Prague log. [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] believes that this process could lend itself to
the recording of incorrect data in the Prague log.
[ (b)(2) ] Prague places more credence in [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] recollection, who was on the spot at the time,
than on the third hand recording in the Prague maintained
However, because of the importance in determining the correct
time and date, [ (b)(2) ] Prague requested a determination
if any logs originally recorded on the ground in Saudi Arabia
still existed. At 1620L on 25 October, the Foreign Liaison
Office reported that these logs were located in the personal
safe of the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], who is out of the
country. On 26 October, an attempt will be made to gain access
to these records.
On 26 October, the safe containing the logs was opened, but
revealed the exact same records as those already secured by [
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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