CZECH CW REPORT
Filename:604rpt.93o
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220CT93
SUBJECT: CZECH CW REPORT
1. Responding to a Czech report of chemical agent detection
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, DIA [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]
for a [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] on the Czech findings of
chemical agents.
2. Incident I:
a. On 19 January 1991 two Czech NBC detachments detected nerve
agents at their positions north and northwest of Hafr Al
Batin. Each unit was operating [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] detectors, which use the active biochemical butyryl
cholinesterase (BChE). Following the initial alarm, each unit
then used [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] units, which also
use BChE, and determined through sampling protocol, the
presence and limits of the concentration nf the agent. One
detachment also collected an air sample which was analyzed in
a mobile field lab and determined to contain the nerve agent
Sarin (GB).
b. The concentration of Sarin in the air sampled was
determined through basic sampling protocols to be between 5 x
l0-5 and 5 x 10-7 milligrams per liter. The elapsed time from
the initial alarm to the all clear was about 40 minutes. GB is
considered a "non-persistent agent," which dissipates in the
air in various periods of time.
c. This detection was made during a period in which there were
no SCUD missiles launches, artillery exchanges, or other
military action(s) observed by the Czechs in the area.
Further. there were no CW detections reported by other units
in this area. The Czechs observed that there were no
identifiable physiological manifestations (such as eye, nose,
or breathing problems) which might be associated with such an
exposure to this chemical agent dosage.
d. The nearest location of any known lraqi storage or
production was some 150 km away from the area where the agent
was detected. In order for the detection that was made to have
resulted from a collateral release of GB from this area, large
amounts of agents would have had to have been released, which
would than have drifted over troop concentrations causing
casualties. Other units would have detected the presence of
agents in these amounts. No such events were reported.
e. The Czechs did not see any physical evidence that the
chemical agents detected were the result of offensive or
hostile actions by the Iraqi forces. The Czechs flled a sitrep
on their detection.
3. Incident II:
a. Approximately five days after the detection of the GB
agent, a Saudi liaison officer approached the 3rd Czech NBC
detachment subordinated to the Saudi Royal Forces in King
Khalid Military City (KKMC) and requested that they
investigate a "suspicious" area in the desert. The liaison
officer directed the NBC detachment from KKMC to a location a
few kilometers north-northwest of KKMC.
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As they approached the area he queried them if they shouldn't
don their protective gear, which they did. Upon arriving at
the site, they found a wet area on the desert floor, measuring
ahout 60 cm by 200 cm in dimension. They
tested this with two separate methods, and determined that the soil was
contaminated sulphur mustard agent.
b. The Czech officers who had been on the scene said that
there were no munitions fragments, craters, or other
indications of military involvement with this site. The Czechs
also said there were no SCUD alerts for this area immediately
prior to this finding. Followinq the determination of the
presence of mustard, the detachment left the area. A sitrep
was filed with the Saudi Command of the Joint Forces North
Area HQ in KKMC.
4. The only units to have detected and confirmed the
presence of chemical agents during Desert Shield/Desert Storm
were the three Czech detachments, all of which were
subordinated to the Joint Forces North Area under the command
of the Royal Saudi Liberation Forces. The detections involved
each of the three units, and occurred within a single five day
period. No prior or subsequent detections were made, or
confirmed by the Czech detachments.
5. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
6. DIA has assembled a team of experts and military
officers to completely review and analyze all the information
within the Department for relevance to these Czech findings.
They are currently reviewing CENTCOM's logs and records, troop
dispositions and order of battle, and battle damage
assessments. At this juncture, the facts do not tie any known
Iraqi offensive military actions to these CW detections.
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