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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

CZECH CW REPORT
Filename:0401pgf.93
	INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICAL AND 
	BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE GULF
	For the Defense Science Board investigating
	the Desert Storm Syndrome
	Presented by [   (b)(6)   ]
	[   (b)(2)   ]
	PRINCIPAL ISSUES
* WEATHER CONDITIONS FROM THE 17TH THROUGH 19 JANUARY 1991
* CZECH REPORTING
* FRENCH REPORTING
* COALITION ACTIONS AGAINST CW/BW TARGETS
* REPORTS OF EXPOSURE OF COALITION PERSONNEL
* DEARTH OF OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AND REPORTING
	CHEMICAL AGENT REPORTING
* U.S. REPORTING....M8A1,MM1,M256A1
* FRENCH REPORTING
* CZECH REPORTING....[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
	POSSIBLE SOURCES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS
* DELIBERATE USE BY THE IRAQIS - OVERT OR COVERT
* ACCIDENTAL RELEASES - "LEAKERS"
* UNINTENTIONAL RELEASE RESULTING FROM COALITION ACTIONS
* DELIBERATE RELEASE UNRELATED TO MILITARY OPERATIONS
	PARAMETERS OF CZECH DETECTIONS
* "ISOLATED" LOCATIONS IN DESERT AREAS
* ALL UNITS UNDER SAUDI COMMAND
* NO IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TIMING OF DETECTIONS
* NO SAMPLES TAKEN FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS
* EQUIPMENT, PROCEDURES, AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT ASSESSMENT THAT 
DETECTIONS ARE CREDIBLE
	PARAMETERS OF IRAQI TARGETS
* AN NASIRIYAH LOCATED 150 MILES FROM HAFR AL BATIN
* OTHER TARGETS AROUND BAGHDAD AND NEAR NORTHERN KUWAIT
* TARGETS WERE BOMBED ALMOST 48 HOURS BEFORE CZECH DETECTIONS
* THERE WERE NO MASS CASUALTIES SURROUNDING THE CW/BW TARGETS
	WEATHER CONDITIONS
	JANUARY 1991
* 17TH THRU 19TH: PREVAILING WINDS ARE FROM THE SOUTH-SOUTH EAST
* 18TH: OF JANUARY WAS WIDESPREAD PRECIPITATION
* 19TH: FRONT MOVED THROUGH THE AREA WITH WINDS VARIABLE DURING 
MID-DAY
* 20TH: WIDE-SPREAD SHOWERS THROUGHOUT AREA
	CONCLUSIONS
* IRAQ DID NOT RELEASE ANY CW OR BW WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION 
FORCES DURING ANY PHASE OF DS/DS
* ANALYSIS OF IRAQI CW AND BW TARGETS INDICATES THAT COALITION 
ACTIONS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CZECH DETECTIONS
* CZECH DETECTIONS OF GB AND H ON TWO OCCASIONS IS CREDIBLE 
REPORTING
* SOURCE OF THE AGENTS DETECTED REMAINS UNKNOWN, BUT THE FACTS 
INDICATE DELIBERATE AND LIMITED RELEASES IN VERY RESTRICTED AREAS.
* THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS ALLEGATIONS 
OF ANY CW OR BW EXPOSURES BY COALITION
BRIEFING FOR THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD DELIBERATIONS ON THE GULF 
WAR SYNDROME
[   (b)(2)   ]
TOPIC:    INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
IN GULF 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
		* AT THIS TIME, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHEMICAL 
AGENTS WERE EMPLOYED BY THE IRAQI FORCES DURING ANY 
STAGE OF DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM,
		* AT THIS TIME THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHEMICAL AGENT 
DETECTIONS BY THE CZECH FORCES DURING JANUARY 1991 WERE 
THE RESULT OF ANY COALITION ACTION(S) AGAINST IRAQI 
PRODUCTION, FILLING, STORAGE, OR TRANSSHIPMENT        
SITES,
		* DETECTION OF SARIN (GB) AGENT BY THE CZECHS APPEARS TO 
HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF A SMALL (APPROXIMATELY 4 FLUID 
OUNCE) RELEASE OF AGENT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE UNIT 
MAKING THE DETECTION, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO POSITIVE 
CONFIRMATION, CZECH DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENT MUSTARD 
(H) APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF DELIBERATE 
CONTAMINATION OF A LIMITED AREA IN A RELATIVELY REMOTE 
AND ISOLATED LOCATION IN THE DESERT,
		* AT THIS TIME THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF CONFIRMED 
CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTIONS BY ANY COALITION MEMBER,      
		* COALITION INTELLIGENCE SERVICES REPORT THERE IS NO 
INFORMATION OF ANY KIND THAT SUPPORTS THE ALLEGATION 
THAT CHEMICAL AGENTS AND/OR WEAPONS WERE EVER USED.
TEXT:
	The evaluation of the allegations of chemical agent use 
during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm by the 
Intelligence Community has been a thorough and broadly based 
effort.  Elements of the US Army Foreign Science and Technology 
Center, the [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ], and DIA have 
collaborated on this effort since late September.  A team has been 
formed which has [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]            , to 
review the data and to meet with the specialists which have first 
hand information and experience with these matters.  In addition, 
the US Air Force and the US Navy have assisted In providing 
detailed information on weather conditions during the period of 
operations which are of interest, and in locating the exact 
positions of troops on those occasions.  The US Army has been 
extremely helpful in providing logistical information, and also in 
providing data from log books detailing the communications which 
dealt with field reporting of chemical agent detections during 
these periods. DIA has hosted inter-agency meetings at the Defence 
Intelligence Analysis Center for all parties to have an 
opportunity to discuss the data and to evaluate theories.  This 
effort, led by DIA, has formed the foundations for the following 
assessment.
	The nature of this problem intrinsically involves many 
variables and uncertainties which combine to create a lens through 
which it becomes very difficult to focus on the individual 
elements of information, and consequently can lead to blurred and 
sometimes erroneous conclusions.  The main example of this latter 
point is association of the reported Czech detection of chemical 
agents in mid-January 1991 with coalition bombing actions hundreds 
of miles
distant of suspected Iraqi CW/BW sites and alleged exposure of 
coalition forces to unspecified "low-levels" of chemical agents 
for undetermined periods of time.  The analysis of this difficult 
Issue therefore has been done In a series of parallel operations. 
 The results of each of these separate efforts have then been 
overlaid to provide a complete view of the data, Its 
Interpretation, and subsequent conclusions regarding chemical 
agent and/or chemical weapons presence In Iraq, and more 
Importantly in the occupied areas of Iraq and Kuwait as well as 
Saudi Arabia.  This briefing will follow that methodology, and 
will present each element  separately,  and  then  combine  those 
 elements  into  a  single
macroscopic overview of the region.
	The principal issues which are discussed In this briefing 
are:
      *   the prevailing weather conditions prior to the 19th of 
January, 1991 when the Czech units reported the detection of 
cholinesterase Inhibiting chemicals, and the determination that 
one of those detections was In fact the nerve agent GB,
      *   the actual Czech detections for both GB and H in terms 
of location, situation, reporting, and protocol,
      *   the bombing of suspected or known CW and BW targets 
during the air campaign against Iraq,
      *   French reporting of chemical agent detection,
	 *   the reports of chemical agent detection by US Naval 
units stationed In Jubayal, and the lack of any physical evidence 
or confirmed Information relating to the presence and/or use of 
chemical agents or biological agents during the Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm.
WEATHER CONDITIONS:
	During the beginning of the air campaign against Iraq on the 
17th of January 1991, the prevailing winds were from the south and 
east blowing to the north and west.  Also during this period a 
frontal system was moving through the area, and on the 18th of 
January there was wide spread rain throughout the area.  During 
the 19th the wind directions changed and began blowing from the 
north and west to the south and east; two days after known/suspect 
CW and BW targets were struck In Iraq.  Following the change in 
wind direction associated with the frontal system, there were wide 
spread showers on the 20th.
	During the period from the beginning of the air campaign 
until the reports of the Czech units in the desert north and east 
of Hafr Al Satin the prevailing winds were blowing in a direction 
which would have carried any plume of chemical or biological agent 
back into Iraq rather than into Saudi Arabia.  Therefore, if the 
bombing had resulted In a release of chemical agent from the 
bunker at An Naslriyah the resulting agent would have had to have 
reached Saudi Arabia through diffusion into a moving air mass 
travelling in the opposite direction as well as overcoming the 
effects of rain. Modelling of agent releases from such a distant 
site as An Nasirlyah under ideal conditions eliminates the 
likelihood of such an event being responsible for the agent 
detections on the 19th. The prevailing weather conditions are just 
one of the Important facts which supports the assessment that such 
an event could not have In any way been associated with these 
detections.
CZECH DETECTIONS 
	The reporting of the Czech detections of Sarin and Mustard 
during January of 1991 occurred during different times, locations, 
and followed different paths.  The CENTCOM records, press reports, 
and [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
falls Into two categories: UNCONFIRMED and REPORTED, and 
UNCONFIRMED and UNREPORTED.  The detections Involve Sarin (GB) 
agent detected north and east of Hafr Al Satin, and mustard (H) 
agent detected north of King Khalid Military City (KKMC). 
UNCONFIRMED AND REPORTED:
	The unanimous conclusion of the team [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) 
  ] was that on the 19th of January two separate Czech detachments 
each made detection s of an active, cholinesterase inhibiting 
compound(s), of which compounds such as the organophosphate GB is 
a member.  The Czech NBC detachment assigned to the 4th Brigade 
was in convoy and made two detections, approximately 1-2 miles 
apart at nearly the same time, each of which lasted for about 1 
hour.  These detections were made [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
detectors which is sensitive to and specific for this type of 
chemical.  The chemical agent detection equipment, however, cannot 
provide specific Information on the exact nature of the chemical 
beyond the fact that It was such an inhibiting chemical. As a 
result of the operating characteristics of this equipment It was, 
however, possible for the Czech specialists to bracket the 
concentration levels at which the active chemical had to be, and 
that is reported to be between .05 and .003 mg/m3.
	Some 40 kilometers distant, the second Czech NBC detachment 
made a similar detection, but in addition to the information from 
the non-specific detectors alarms, an air sample was also taken 
and analyzed in a field mobile laboratory.  The analysis of this 
third sample is reported to be positive for GB. A more detailed 
description of this is provided in the attached annexes 1-6.  [   
(b)(2)   ] Is prepared to discuss the actual functioning and 
capabilities of the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] equipment, as 
well as the actual protocols which were executed. 
	The results of these detections of cholinesterase Inhibiting 
chemicals, and GB, were reported through the command network.  
Following the receipt of this information at CENTCOM, US teams 
were sent to the area to conduct chemical agent testing and 
analysis.  It is estimated four hours elapsed from the initial 
Czech unit detections until US specialists arrived to conduct 
testing, which proved to be negative for chemical agents.  Given 
the non-persistent nature of the agent sarin, the time elapse 
which occurred, and the extremely low levels detected and apparent 
localized nature of the plume of chemical(s), it Is not surprising 
that no confirmation of chemical agent resulted from the US team 
investigation.
	Additionally, there were Syrian, Egyptian, French, and 
English units throughout the immediate area where the Czech units 
were assigned, each of which was equipped with different, but 
equally sensitive, equipment to that of the Czechs.  Also at this 
time the large scale redeployment of forces had begun, and there 
was heavy traffic throughout this region, including many US forces 
moving West.  Not a single one of these forces reported any 
confirmed detections of chemical agents during this period.  There 
were no offensive military actions associated with this area at 
the time of the detections, to Include SCUD missiles attacks, 
artillery exchanges, Iraqi air sorties, etc.  The distance from 
the Czech positions to the Iraqi border was over 40 km.  
	During the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
                              that the agent which was detected 
was airborne residues of coalition attacks against CW related 
targets within Iraq.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] also indicated 
that the wind was blowing from the north-northeast at the time. 
This latter point seems to contradict the general weather 
information provided by the US Air Force, but can be explained.  
The macroscopic weather patterns were as reported by the Air 
Force, however, the Czech Unit which was in convoy was operating 
In a wide, deep wadi, or river valley, some 100 to 200 feet below 
the desert terrain on either side of the valley.   It is 
conceivable that the micro meteorological conditions in that wadi 
were influenced by the topography, and were in fact quite 
different from the large scale conditions observed for the region 
as a whole. The micro conditions in any event would not influence 
the assessment that the weather conditions were unfavorable for 
the transport of chemical agent plume(s) from bombed suspect CW or 
BW sites deep within Iraq. 
	Other possible explanations of these detections Include 
detection of crop protection chemicals such as insecticides; false 
alarms from interferents such as petroleum products; localized use 
of pesticides by the coalition forces, and fugitive emissions from 
chemical plants.  Each of these possibilities was ruled out  
systematically by a thorough review of the area  for  Industry, 
crop production, etc.   The area is a sparsely populated desert 
region with no agriculture, no industry, and no logical source of 
such unique manmade chemicals.  The only petrochemical facility at 
all in this vicinity is a fuel storage area which supplies oil to 
an adjacent power plant.  Based on information received from the 
Czechs, and which is supported by our own preliminary analysis of 
the equipment, chemistry, and procedures used, the detection of 
such an cholinesterase inhibiting chemical would not be interfered 
with by petroleum products, exhaust gases from heavy equipment, 
etc.  Also, the possibility that the use of pesticides by 
coalition forces for the positive detection made by the one NBC 
detachment which was not in convoy, was ruled out the team and by 
other specialists who have participated in this exercise; there is 
no possible other explanation for the Czech "confirmed" detection 
of GB by the second NBC unit. 
UNCONFIRMED AND UNREPORTED:
	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]               that on the 24th 
of January, a third Czech NBC detachment attached to Saudi forces 
based in KKMC was approached by a Saudi liaison officer and 
requested to investigate an area outside of KKMC for possible 
chemical agent.  They did so, under the direction of this liaison 
officer, and found, several kilometers to the north and outside of 
KKMC, a small area of what appeared to be wet desert soil.  As 
they approached the area the team was asked by the liaison officer 
if they shouldn't "suit up" which they did before actually 
approaching the area.  The contaminated area measured only about 
60 cm by 200 cm.   Using two separate protocols, they determined 
that the area had been contaminated with the mustard agent.  The 
Czech units filed a situation report with the Saudi forces, 
however there is no record of that report being filed with 
CENTCOM, and there is no record that any other units were called 
to provide Independent confirmation of this find.  Further because 
of the extremely limited nature of the contamination, the 
remoteness of the site, and the absence of any personnel stationed 
anywhere in the immediate location, the site was left as is, 
without even marking; no other samples were taken for additional 
testing at the field laboratory.
FRENCH DETECTION:
	As noted previously the Czech units did report the events of 
the 19th through channels.  Additionally there are CENTCOM log 
entries which indicate that French forces stationed in KKMC during 
the period of 20-21 January also detected mustard, and that they 
contacted the Czech unit there to confirm.  There is no situation 
report filed by the Czech units on their participation in this 
incident.  During the investigation of the Czech unit's detections 
in Prague In October of this year they were insistent that there 
were no other "detections or confirmations" made by them.  
However, during the Senator Shelby delegation trip to Prague In 
December, they did allege that they remembered this additional 
detection.   The CENTCOM log data indicate that the French liaison 
officer reported that the Czech unit detected several agents, 
including nerve agents, as well as blister agents.  However, there 
is nothing to substantiate this claim, and unlike the other Czech 
reports, this one is contradicted by what they "remember", what 
the log entry indicates, and the lack of any casualties or 
verifiable presence of chemical agents In KKMC during this period. 
  CENTCOM assessed that this report was a false positive, and the 
Intelligence community concurs. There is no new information which 
has been uncovered which would change that assessment.
COALITION ACTIONS:
	During the initiation of the air campaign, suspected and 
known CW and BW targets were on the first list of targets for 
destruction.  They include:
                 CW TARGETS ATTACKED DURING DESERT STORM
    TARGET NAME               GEO COORD
1.  SAMARRA                   3350N   04348E         1/17
2.  HABBANIYAH                3333N   04338E          2/1
3.  HABBANIYAH                3329N   O4340E          2/1
4.  HABBANIYAH                3329N   04349E          2/1
5.  AL QAIM                   3422N   04110E         2/10
6.  KIRKUK                    3533N   04358E          2/8
7.  HABBANIYAH                3322N   04331E         2/17
8.  TIKRIT                    3443N   O4339E         2/13
9.  KARBALAH                  3223N   O433OE          2/3
10. FALLUJAH                  3313N   04341E         2/21
11. QABATIYAH                 3353N   04239E         1/19
12. ASH SHUYABAH              3029N   04739E         1/29
13. AD DIWANIYAH              3158N   04454E          2/3
14. AN NASIRIYAH              3O58N   04611E         1/17
15. MOSUL AIRFIELD            3618N   04309E         1/28
16. TAJI                      3333N   O4414E         2/10
17. H-3 AIRFIELD              3256N   O3945E          2/9
18. K-2 AIRFIELD              3455N   04324E          2/9
19. KIRKUK AIRFIELD           3528N   04421E         2/15
20. AL TAQQADUM AIRFIELD      3320N   04336E          2/4
21. AL JARRAH AIRFIELD        3229N   04546E          2/5
22. QAYYARAH                  3552N   04307E         2/10
23. TALLIL AIRFIELD           3056N   04606E          2/9
Of these targets the closest was An Nasiriyah located over 150 
miles from the positions of the Czech unit detections north of 
Hafr Al Batin.  On the 17th of January a single bunker was struck 
at An Nasiriyah with 2000 pound bombs.  The prevailing weather 
conditions from the time of the bombing until after the detections 
were made included winds blowing from the south-south east, and 
heavy rains on the 18th.  The other targets were around Baghdad, 
and near Kuwait, In regions of heavy populations of civilians and 
military personnel.
	Predictive models indicate that under ideal conditions, to 
include favorable winds, terrain, etc., approximately 80 tons of 
GB would have had to have been released during this bombing to 
have resulted in levels comparable to those recorded by the 
Czechs.  This quantity of agent would have resulted in an area of 
total fatalities to protected personnel measured In 10's to 100's 
of square kilometers, and In total area of casualty producing 
concentrations measured In 100's to 1000's of square kilometers 
for unprotected personnel.  However, factors such as prevailing 
winds,  precipitation, and topography, would have had a 
synergistic effect, greatly increasing the amount of agent 
necessary to obtain the measurements made by the Czech units, 
which in turn would further Increase the area over which human 
casualties would have occurred.  There were no mass casualties 
observed around, or downwind from An Naslriyah, or from any other 
known or suspected CW or BW target struck during any phase of 
Desert Storm. 
	Coalition forces stationed around the area of the Czech 
detections made no detections or confirmations of chemical agent 
detections on the 19th, even though they were In relatively close 
proximity to them, and had comparable equipment to that employed 
by the Czech units.  If a large plume emanating from a point 
source at An Nasirlyah had been the source of this chemical agent, 
it Is unlikely that the plume could have been as well defined in 
terms of length and width as to be only detectable over the 
immediate area where the Czech units were located, and no where 
else in the vicinity.  Taken together, all these facts argue 
against any unintentional release of chemical agent in Iraq as 
being the explanation for the detection of agent by the Czech 
units. 
	Modelling of the facts, elapsed time of duration of the 
detection of the nerve agent, relative concentration of the agent, 
and using Ideal conditions, it appears that the chemical or 
chemical agent detected by the Czech units was released in close 
proximity to their positions.  Estimates of the quantity range 
upwards of 10's of fluid ounces of chemical, however, the best 
estimate given current Information is about 4 fluid ounces.   This 
quantity of GB would be expected to produce a plume of agent with 
the desired concentrations, for the desired length of time, 
without posing a significant risk of being detected by other units 
in adjacent areas, or to pose a health threat to personnel in the 
area any distance from the point of the release.  [   (b)(2)   ]
PERSONNEL REPORTING EXPOSURE:
	There Is only one known instance of a coalition soldier 
reporting Injury believed at the time to be the result of exposure 
to chemical agent.  This report was investigated thoroughly and is 
considered to be a false report of a chemical agent exposure.  The 
intelligence community followed up closely on the results of this 
soldiers claims, and bases it conclusions on the expert analysis 
of clothing and body fluid samples obtained from this person 
immediately following the claimed exposure.  While there is no 
doubt that this person experienced some injury as a result of 
exposure to some caustic substance, however the body of scientific 
evidence and intelligence information does not support the 
conclusion that the chemical was a chemical warfare agent. 
OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:
	During and after the conflict there was intense examination 
of all sources of information which might shed light on the extent 
of the chemical and biological weapons Iraq had in place, what 
their plans were for theIr use, and how and where they were stored 
and handled.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
Therefore, the Intelligence community Is well aware of the plans 
and operations of the Iraqi government as relates to chemical 
warfare, and to a lesser extent, biological warfare.  The nature 
of the chemical and biological agents which Iraq had developed and 
produced are unique, all cause death or injury over periods of 
minutes to days, and all are well known In the International 
community.  There were or are no known or suspected "special 
agents" which could cause surprise or confusion on the part of the 
attacked force.
	There were, as has been stated, no known chemical Injuries 
which are attributed to chemical warfare agents of any kind.  Iraq 
has three known nerve agents, GA. GB, and GF.  None of these is 
persistent, all are well known, and troops are protected against 
all three by their standard Issue protective equipment.  Each of 
these three nerve agents Is readily identifiable In the field 
using a variety of confirmation test methods and equipment which 
all of the coalition partners had.  There is some preliminary 
evidence that they may also have been developing a production 
capability for, or fielded, the persistent agent VX, however at 
this time there is no confirmation of this.  They elaborate the 
same physical symptoms, and the field medics, doctors, and 
personnel were instructed to look specifically for those symptoms 
during the war. There were no reported Instances of any troop 
elaborating symptoms of nerve agent poisoning.  The only blister 
agent Iraq if assessed to have is mustard agent, which it used In 
its war with Iran.  Again, with the sole exception of the soldier 
who claimed injury to his arm, there were no individuals any where 
in the theater of operations which developed physical injuries 
which could be attributed to blister agents.  
	The Iraqi military is accredited with having developed three 
biological agents for use in warfare.  However, there were no 
known or suspected uses of this during any portion of the 
operation.   Further, there were air sampling devices which were 
located throughout the theater, and which were regularly serviced 
and analyzed for presence of chemical toxins or agents which might 
have been released against the coalition forces.  There was not a 
single sample which showed any positive result for biological 
agent or toxin release in the theater. 
	There were reports of dead animals during operations DS/DS, 
however these reports were fully investigated and found to be the 
result of endemic disease in the region.  Some animal samples were 
collected and tested in laboratories in the U.S. and the test 
results corroborated the information obtained by trained 
specialists at the site of some of these instances.
ANNEX:
I.   Questions and Answers provided to Dr. Deutch
Question:  From the 19-24 Jan 91 time frame, the Iraqi CW targets 
attacked by allied forces, winds, distances and downwind modelling 
with regard to the Czech detection's.
Answer:   There were only three CW targets struck by the coalition 
air operation prior to the 24th:  Samarra CW production north of 
Baghdad which was bombed on the 17th of January, the Qabatiyah 
Ammo and Storage located about 60 miles 17th of January, the 
Qabatiyah Ammo and Storage facility, located over 100 miles to the 
west of Baghdad which was bombed on the 19th, and the An Nasiriyah 
Storage facility located over 150 miles north of the Saudi border, 
which was bombed on the 19th.  Of these, the closest was An 
Nasiriyah, the other two were hundreds of miles further removed 
from the Saudi
border.
The weather conditions during these operations were as follows:   
From the 17th through the morning of the 19th the winds were from 
the South and East, blowing to the North and West, when a front 
moved through the area.  From the afternoon of the 19th through 
the 22 the winds were variable from the East North East to North 
East, and returned to blowing from the South and East on the 23rd. 
 On the 18th there was general rain throughout the region, and 
again, there was scattered and sporadic rain from the 20th through 
the 23rd.  These weather conditions would have by themselves 
prevented any release of chemical agent, which resulted from the 
bombing of targets deep Inside of Iraq, from reaching the Saudi 
border.  Sarin vapors would have been blown back Into Iraq, and 
the rain conditions would have had a significant "decontaminating" 
effect on the gas, further reducing the spread of the escaping 
vapors had that occurred.
Nonetheless, modelling of a chemical release from An Nasiriyah has 
been done to determine what quantities of sarin would have to be 
released in order for the Czech units to be able to detect the 
agent In the quantities recorded. Using models developed for the 
purpose of modelling the deliberate release of chemical agents, it 
has been determined that under ideal conditions of wind, 
temperature, etc., and an ideal surface topography, over 80 tons 
of sarin would have to have been released to effect this detection 
as a result of the bombing of An Nasiriyah.  Had this release 
actually occurred, then all humans downwind of the target in an 
area of about 100 square kilometers, would have been killed 
regardless of access to protective clothing and masks, and the 
area downwind of the release where causalties would have occurred 
for unprotected personnel would have exceeded 1000 square 
kilometers.  The plume which would be detectable to the limits the 
Czechs detected this gas would extend over an area 240 kilometers 
downwind, and would be about 10 km wide!
Given the wind and weather conditions, however, it is impossible 
to model any conceivable scenario in which a release from this 
target, or any of the other two targets, singly or in conjunction, 
could have resulted in the detections made by the Czechs without 
catastrophic loss of life within Iraq.  This is known with 
certainty not to have happened.
Additionally, it should be noted, that had such an improbable 
release of chemical agent occurred and been the cause of the agent 
detected by the Czech units, then the plume of agent would have 
been so large that many of the other coalition units in the region 
would have had similar detections of this agent.  This did not 
occur.
Question:   What suspected storage areas might have ben close to 
Saudi Arabia?
Answer:   The only two sites which are known or suspected were 
those at An Nasirlyah and at Al Basrah.  There are no other 
depots, staging areas, or storage facilities closer than those.
Question:   How far south did the Iraqis bring chemical weapons?
Answer:  The Iraqis have claimed to have had chemical 
agents/weapons as far south as An Naslrlyah.  There has been no 
confirmation of chemical weapons, agents, etc., anywhere within 
the Kuwait Theater of Operations.  There have been no weapons 
found in any bunker, storage location, etc., anywhere within the 
captured   areas which resulted from the Operation Desert Storm.
ANNEX II:   Initial report on the Czech findings
26OCT93
                           SUBJECT: CZECH CW REPORT
1.  Responding to a Czech report of chemical agent detection 
during
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, DIA fielded a special team comprised 
of experts from FSTC, [    b.2.    ], and DIA, who visited Prague, 
Czech Republic, [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] coordinated 
discussion on the Czech findings of chemical agents.
2.  Incident 1:
      a.  On 19 January 1991 two Czech NBC detachments detected 
nerve agents at their positions north and northwest of Hafr Al 
Batin.  Each unit was operating [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
detectors, which use the active biochemical butyryl cholinesterase 
(BChE).  Following the initial alarm, each unit then used [      
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] units, which also use Bche, and 
determined through sampling protocol, the presence and limits of 
the concentration of the agent.   One detachment also collected an 
air sample which was analyzed in a mobile field lab and determined 
to contain the nerve agent Sarin (GB).
	b.  The concentration of Sarin In the air sampled was 
determined through basic sampling protocols to be between 0.05 and 
0.0005 milligrams per cubic meter.  The elapsed time from the 
Initial alarm to the all clear was about 40 minutes.  GB is 
considered a "non-persistent agent," which dissipates in the air 
In various periods of time.
     c.  This detection was made during a period in which there 
were no SCUD missiles launches, artillery exchanges, or other 
military action(s) observed by the Czechs in the area.  Further, 
there were no CW detections reported by other units In this area. 
 The Czechs observed that there were no identifiable physiological 
manifestations (such as eye, nose, or breathing problems) which 
might be associated with such an exposure to this chemical agent 
dosage.
      d.  The nearest location of any known Iraqi storage or 
production was some 150 km away from the area where the agent was 
detected.  In order for the detection that was made to have 
resulted from a collateral release of GB from this area, large 
amounts of agents would have had to have been released, which 
would then have drifted over troop concentrations causing 
casualties. Other units would have detected the presence of agents 
in these amounts.  No such events were reported.
      e.  The Czechs did not see any physical evidence that the 
chemical agents detected were the result of offensive or hostile 
actions by the Iraqi forces.  The Czechs filed a sitrep on their 
detection.
3.  Incident II:
      a.  Approximately five days after the detection of the GB 
agent, a Saudi liaison officer approached the 3rd Czech NBC 
detachment subordinated to the Saudi Royal Forces In King Khalid 
Military City and requested that they Investigate a "suspicious" 
area in the desert.  The liaison officer directed the NBC 
detachment from KKMC to a locatIon a few kilometers 
north-northwest of KKMC. As they approached the area he queried 
them if they shoudn't don their protective gear, which they did.  
Upon arriving at the site, they found a wet area on the desert 
floor, measuring about 60 cm by 200 cm In dimension.  They tested 
this with two separate methods, and determined that the soil was 
contaminated with sulphur mustard agent.
      b.  The Czech officers who had been on the scene said that 
there were no munitions fragments, craters, or other Indications 
of military Involvement with this site.  The Czechs also said 
there were no SCUD alerts for this area immediately prior to this 
finding.  Following the determination of the presence of mustard, 
the detachment left the area.  A sitrep was filed with the Saudi 
Command of the Joint Forces North Area HQ In KKMC.
4.  The only units to have detected and confrmed the presence of 
chemical agents during Desert Shield/Desert Storm were the three 
Czech detachments, all of which were subordinated to the Joint 
Forces North Area under the command of the Royal Saudi Liberation 
Forces.  The detectlons Involved each of the three units, and 
occurred within a single five day period.  No prior or subsequent 
detections were made, or confirmed by the Czech detachments.
5.  [   (b)(2)   ]
6.	At this juncture, the facts do not tie any known Iraqi or 
Coalition offensive military actions to these CW detections.
ANNEX III:  Technical procedures used by the Czech NBC UnIts
Subject:  Technical procedures used to Detect Chemical Agent 
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm
1.  Detection of nerve agent during Desert Storm was accomplished 
using a biochemical technique, while determination of mustard 
agent depended on wet chemical qualitative analytical procedures.
2.  Detection of nerve agent on the 19th of January, 1991 occurred 
at three separate locations by two separate Czechoslovak NBC 
Detachments.   The first Chemical detachment detected a G-type 
agent while on convoy about 37 kilometers north west of Hafr al 
Batin and 40 kilometers from the Iraqi boarder.  This unit 
detected chemical agents at two separate location.  The second NBC 
detachment was located approximately 45 kilometers north east of 
Hafr al Batin and 40 kilometers from the Kuwait border.
3.  Both units detected the Initial presence of nerve agent using 
the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] monitor/alarm which detects only 
organophosphate type agents.  These units were of [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ] manufacture,  and were operating In a 
semi-continuous mode:  This unit uses a wet chemlcal/colorlmetrlc 
procedure by which the enzyme system Butyryl Chollnesterase (Bche) 
containing solution Is deposited on a cotton tape, whIch Is then 
drawn through an air aspiration port exposing the enzyme to the 
possible agent.  Following this exposure, the tape Is then 
transported to another station, where a solution with the 
Indicator phenyl red Is deposited on the tape. Presence of a 
chemical agent In the air Inhibits the enzyme from further 
reaction which results In no color change; absence of an agent 
causes a reaction which is registered as a color change from red 
to yellow.  As operated, this unit has a reported sensitivity to 
nerve agent of 0.003 mg/M3 (of air sampled).
4. Following the initial alarm by the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   
], the troops donned their protective gear and made follow up 
tests using the Czechoslovak manufactured CHP-71 unit.  While this 
unit also uses Bche enzyme Inhibition for subsequent 
Identification, the unit is somewhat more sensitive due to the 
means of air sampling.  However, because the basic chemistry Is 
identical to the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] system, this test 
does not independently confirm the first nerve agent. This system 
could register a positive result for any cholinesterase inhibiting 
organophosphate compound, which would include many agricultural 
Insecticides.  There were no other independent tests performed at 
the site of the detection to indicated that the chemical detected 
was in fact a nerve agent.  An air sample was collected on a- 
dried silica gel substrate and preserved for subsequent testing at 
a field laboratory located in King Kahlid Military City (KKMC).  
There, two analytical procedures were used to show that the 
organophosphate compound in question contained fluorine and 
isopropyl groups. 
5.  The [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] could be operated for [  
 (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
                             . When the Czechoslovaks Initially 
attempted to verify the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] alarm using 
the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ], the results were negative,  and 
It was only after subsequent air sampling [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) 
  ] that they obtained the positive results.  This would place the 
concentration of the suspected nerve agent in the air between 0.05 
- 0.0005 mg/M5.  These concentrations are so low that they are not 
felt to represent any threat to personnel.
6. Following the initial alarm, there were four subsequent tests 
using the [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] unit.   Each test was 
conducted for [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ], minutes, and 
subsequent processing and refitting the unit lasted perhaps [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]. The first three of these tests continued 
to register positive for chemical agent.  The fourth test was 
negative, at which point the all clear was sounded.  A total time 
of approximately 40 minutes elapsed between the Initial alarm and 
the all clear.  The time between the initIal detectlons at the 1st 
and 2nd NBC detachments was about 30 minutes.
7. The reporting of these determinations was made through proper 
channels, up through the brigade headquarters to the joint command 
in KKMC.  A situation report was also forwarded through Saudi 
military to Riyadh.
8. Some four to five days following the detection of the nerve 
agents north of Hafr al Batin, the 3rd detachment located at KKMC 
was approached by the Saudi Liaison Officer with a request for 
them to bring their reconnaissance vehicle out Into the desert to 
inspect an area.  The location which they were taken to was about 
one to two kilometers north or west of KKMC.  When approaching the 
actual location, they were asked by the Saudi Liaison Officer If 
they shouldn't suit up in their protective gear.  The 
Czechoslovaks thought this was strange but they did suit up.  Upon 
disembarking their vehicles they found a "wet area" on the desert 
floor which was irregular in shape and measured about 60 
centimeters by 200 centimeters (60 cm x 200 cm), much like a 
"puddle" of liquid which Is poured onto the ground and then seeps 
Into the earth.  This area was tested using the [      (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)    ] and mustard agent was identified as present.  They 
then used the [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] portable laboratory 
which used a complex chemical molecule based on benzoic acid, 
phenol, and other aromatic chemicals.  This test confirmed the 
Initial detection of the mustard agent by the [      (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)    ].  Because these tests used different chemical 
Indicators for the determination, it Is likely that this detection 
of mustard was accurate and that the contamination of this oil was 
with mustard age.
9.  The situation report of this action was forwarded through the 
joint headquarters KKMC, as were the previous reports.  There were 
no indications that this contamination was the result of any 
military action; there was no debris, impact crater, or any other 
visible evidence that anyone had been to this site previously.  
There was no previous, nor subsequent, request like this one by 
the Saudi's.  There was no follow up action beyond the filing of 
the SITREP, and the notification of the Czechoslovak Ministry of 
Defense.
10.  Czechoslovak unit did not experience any problems with their 
detectors, in particular the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ], as a 
result of environmental contaminants. The Czech unit tested this 
equipment subsequently to determine its sensitivity after the time 
of the burning oil fires.  However, the chemical agents were 
detected prior to the oil fires. Moreover, In a test, the 
Czechoslovaks set up the [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] and the [   
   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] on a lab bench located less than 2 
feet from the top of a 55-gallon oil drum containing burning oil. 
The results of this test Indicated that there were no problems 
with the equipment, and that the emissions caused from these units 
did not result In any false positive detections.
Annexes IV-VI are [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ].
[    b.2.    ]
1st:
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMCAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
WARFARE IN THE GULF
For the Defense Science Board investigating 
the Desert Storm Syndrome
	Presented by [   (b)(6)   ] 
	[   (b)(2)   ]
	DIA
unclassified
2nd:  -
                                PRINCIPAL ISSUES
*  WEATHER CONDITIONS FROM THE 17TH THROUGH 19 JANUARY 1991
*  CZECH REPORTING
*  FRENCH REPORTING
*  COALITION ACTIONS AGAINST CW/BW TARGETS
*  REPORTS OF EXPOSURE OF COALITION PERSONNEL
*  DEARTH OF OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AND REPORTING
3RD:
	CHEMICAL AGENT REPORTING
            *  U.S. REPORTING....M8A1, MM1, M256A1
            *  FRENCH REPORTING
            *  CZECH REPORTING....[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
4TH:
                      POSSIBLE SOURCES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS
*  DELIBERATE USE BY THE IRAQIS--OVERT OR COVERT
*  ACCIDENTAL RELEASES- - "LEAKERS"
*  UNINTENTIONAL RELEASE RESULTING FROM
   COALITION ACTIONS
*  DELIBERATE RELEASE UNRELATED TO MILITARY
   OPERATIONS 
5TH:
                        PARAMETERS OF CZECH DETECTIONS
*  "ISOLATED" LOCATIONS IN DESERT AREAS
*  ALL UNITS UNDER SAUDI COMMAND
*  NO IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH
   TIMING OF DETECTIONS
*  NO SAMPLES TAKEN FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS
*  EQUIPMENT  PROCEDURES
6TH:
                          PARAMETERS OF IRAQI TARGETS
*  AN NASIRIYAH LOCATED 150 MILES FROM HAFR AL BATIN
*  OTHER TARGETS AROUND BAGDAO AND NEAR NORTHERN KUWAIT
*  TARGETS WERE BOMBED ALMOST 48 HOURS BEFORE CZECH DETECTIONS
*  THERE WERE NO MASS CASULITES SURROUNDING THE CW/BW TARGETS
7TH:
                           CONCLUSIONS
*  IRAQ DID NOT RELEASE ANY CW OR BW WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION
   FORCES DURING ANY PHASE OF DS/DS
*  ANALYSIS OF IRAQI CW AND BW TARGETS INDICATES THAT
   COALITION ACTIOS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR
   THE CZECH DETECTIONS
*  CZECH DETECTIONS OF GB AND H ON TWO OCCASIONS IS
   CREDIBLE REPORTING
*  SOURCE OF THE AGENTS DETECTED REMAINS UNKNOWN BUT
   THE FACTS INDICATE DELIBERATE AND LIMITED RELEASES IN
   VERY RESTRICTED AREAS.
* THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS
   ALLEGATIONS OF ANY CW OR BW EXPOSURES BY COALITION FORCES
 



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