CZECH CW REPORT
Filename:0401pgf.93
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE GULF
For the Defense Science Board investigating
the Desert Storm Syndrome
Presented by [ (b)(6) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
PRINCIPAL ISSUES
* WEATHER CONDITIONS FROM THE 17TH THROUGH 19 JANUARY 1991
* CZECH REPORTING
* FRENCH REPORTING
* COALITION ACTIONS AGAINST CW/BW TARGETS
* REPORTS OF EXPOSURE OF COALITION PERSONNEL
* DEARTH OF OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AND REPORTING
CHEMICAL AGENT REPORTING
* U.S. REPORTING....M8A1,MM1,M256A1
* FRENCH REPORTING
* CZECH REPORTING....[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS
* DELIBERATE USE BY THE IRAQIS - OVERT OR COVERT
* ACCIDENTAL RELEASES - "LEAKERS"
* UNINTENTIONAL RELEASE RESULTING FROM COALITION ACTIONS
* DELIBERATE RELEASE UNRELATED TO MILITARY OPERATIONS
PARAMETERS OF CZECH DETECTIONS
* "ISOLATED" LOCATIONS IN DESERT AREAS
* ALL UNITS UNDER SAUDI COMMAND
* NO IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TIMING OF DETECTIONS
* NO SAMPLES TAKEN FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS
* EQUIPMENT, PROCEDURES, AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT ASSESSMENT THAT
DETECTIONS ARE CREDIBLE
PARAMETERS OF IRAQI TARGETS
* AN NASIRIYAH LOCATED 150 MILES FROM HAFR AL BATIN
* OTHER TARGETS AROUND BAGHDAD AND NEAR NORTHERN KUWAIT
* TARGETS WERE BOMBED ALMOST 48 HOURS BEFORE CZECH DETECTIONS
* THERE WERE NO MASS CASUALTIES SURROUNDING THE CW/BW TARGETS
WEATHER CONDITIONS
JANUARY 1991
* 17TH THRU 19TH: PREVAILING WINDS ARE FROM THE SOUTH-SOUTH EAST
* 18TH: OF JANUARY WAS WIDESPREAD PRECIPITATION
* 19TH: FRONT MOVED THROUGH THE AREA WITH WINDS VARIABLE DURING
MID-DAY
* 20TH: WIDE-SPREAD SHOWERS THROUGHOUT AREA
CONCLUSIONS
* IRAQ DID NOT RELEASE ANY CW OR BW WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION
FORCES DURING ANY PHASE OF DS/DS
* ANALYSIS OF IRAQI CW AND BW TARGETS INDICATES THAT COALITION
ACTIONS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CZECH DETECTIONS
* CZECH DETECTIONS OF GB AND H ON TWO OCCASIONS IS CREDIBLE
REPORTING
* SOURCE OF THE AGENTS DETECTED REMAINS UNKNOWN, BUT THE FACTS
INDICATE DELIBERATE AND LIMITED RELEASES IN VERY RESTRICTED AREAS.
* THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS ALLEGATIONS
OF ANY CW OR BW EXPOSURES BY COALITION
BRIEFING FOR THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD DELIBERATIONS ON THE GULF
WAR SYNDROME
[ (b)(2) ]
TOPIC: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
IN GULF
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
* AT THIS TIME, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHEMICAL
AGENTS WERE EMPLOYED BY THE IRAQI FORCES DURING ANY
STAGE OF DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM,
* AT THIS TIME THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHEMICAL AGENT
DETECTIONS BY THE CZECH FORCES DURING JANUARY 1991 WERE
THE RESULT OF ANY COALITION ACTION(S) AGAINST IRAQI
PRODUCTION, FILLING, STORAGE, OR TRANSSHIPMENT
SITES,
* DETECTION OF SARIN (GB) AGENT BY THE CZECHS APPEARS TO
HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF A SMALL (APPROXIMATELY 4 FLUID
OUNCE) RELEASE OF AGENT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE UNIT
MAKING THE DETECTION, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO POSITIVE
CONFIRMATION, CZECH DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENT MUSTARD
(H) APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF DELIBERATE
CONTAMINATION OF A LIMITED AREA IN A RELATIVELY REMOTE
AND ISOLATED LOCATION IN THE DESERT,
* AT THIS TIME THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF CONFIRMED
CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTIONS BY ANY COALITION MEMBER,
* COALITION INTELLIGENCE SERVICES REPORT THERE IS NO
INFORMATION OF ANY KIND THAT SUPPORTS THE ALLEGATION
THAT CHEMICAL AGENTS AND/OR WEAPONS WERE EVER USED.
TEXT:
The evaluation of the allegations of chemical agent use
during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm by the
Intelligence Community has been a thorough and broadly based
effort. Elements of the US Army Foreign Science and Technology
Center, the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], and DIA have
collaborated on this effort since late September. A team has been
formed which has [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] , to
review the data and to meet with the specialists which have first
hand information and experience with these matters. In addition,
the US Air Force and the US Navy have assisted In providing
detailed information on weather conditions during the period of
operations which are of interest, and in locating the exact
positions of troops on those occasions. The US Army has been
extremely helpful in providing logistical information, and also in
providing data from log books detailing the communications which
dealt with field reporting of chemical agent detections during
these periods. DIA has hosted inter-agency meetings at the Defence
Intelligence Analysis Center for all parties to have an
opportunity to discuss the data and to evaluate theories. This
effort, led by DIA, has formed the foundations for the following
assessment.
The nature of this problem intrinsically involves many
variables and uncertainties which combine to create a lens through
which it becomes very difficult to focus on the individual
elements of information, and consequently can lead to blurred and
sometimes erroneous conclusions. The main example of this latter
point is association of the reported Czech detection of chemical
agents in mid-January 1991 with coalition bombing actions hundreds
of miles
distant of suspected Iraqi CW/BW sites and alleged exposure of
coalition forces to unspecified "low-levels" of chemical agents
for undetermined periods of time. The analysis of this difficult
Issue therefore has been done In a series of parallel operations.
The results of each of these separate efforts have then been
overlaid to provide a complete view of the data, Its
Interpretation, and subsequent conclusions regarding chemical
agent and/or chemical weapons presence In Iraq, and more
Importantly in the occupied areas of Iraq and Kuwait as well as
Saudi Arabia. This briefing will follow that methodology, and
will present each element separately, and then combine those
elements into a single
macroscopic overview of the region.
The principal issues which are discussed In this briefing
are:
* the prevailing weather conditions prior to the 19th of
January, 1991 when the Czech units reported the detection of
cholinesterase Inhibiting chemicals, and the determination that
one of those detections was In fact the nerve agent GB,
* the actual Czech detections for both GB and H in terms
of location, situation, reporting, and protocol,
* the bombing of suspected or known CW and BW targets
during the air campaign against Iraq,
* French reporting of chemical agent detection,
* the reports of chemical agent detection by US Naval
units stationed In Jubayal, and the lack of any physical evidence
or confirmed Information relating to the presence and/or use of
chemical agents or biological agents during the Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm.
WEATHER CONDITIONS:
During the beginning of the air campaign against Iraq on the
17th of January 1991, the prevailing winds were from the south and
east blowing to the north and west. Also during this period a
frontal system was moving through the area, and on the 18th of
January there was wide spread rain throughout the area. During
the 19th the wind directions changed and began blowing from the
north and west to the south and east; two days after known/suspect
CW and BW targets were struck In Iraq. Following the change in
wind direction associated with the frontal system, there were wide
spread showers on the 20th.
During the period from the beginning of the air campaign
until the reports of the Czech units in the desert north and east
of Hafr Al Satin the prevailing winds were blowing in a direction
which would have carried any plume of chemical or biological agent
back into Iraq rather than into Saudi Arabia. Therefore, if the
bombing had resulted In a release of chemical agent from the
bunker at An Naslriyah the resulting agent would have had to have
reached Saudi Arabia through diffusion into a moving air mass
travelling in the opposite direction as well as overcoming the
effects of rain. Modelling of agent releases from such a distant
site as An Nasirlyah under ideal conditions eliminates the
likelihood of such an event being responsible for the agent
detections on the 19th. The prevailing weather conditions are just
one of the Important facts which supports the assessment that such
an event could not have In any way been associated with these
detections.
CZECH DETECTIONS
The reporting of the Czech detections of Sarin and Mustard
during January of 1991 occurred during different times, locations,
and followed different paths. The CENTCOM records, press reports,
and [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
falls Into two categories: UNCONFIRMED and REPORTED, and
UNCONFIRMED and UNREPORTED. The detections Involve Sarin (GB)
agent detected north and east of Hafr Al Satin, and mustard (H)
agent detected north of King Khalid Military City (KKMC).
UNCONFIRMED AND REPORTED:
The unanimous conclusion of the team [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] was that on the 19th of January two separate Czech detachments
each made detection s of an active, cholinesterase inhibiting
compound(s), of which compounds such as the organophosphate GB is
a member. The Czech NBC detachment assigned to the 4th Brigade
was in convoy and made two detections, approximately 1-2 miles
apart at nearly the same time, each of which lasted for about 1
hour. These detections were made [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
detectors which is sensitive to and specific for this type of
chemical. The chemical agent detection equipment, however, cannot
provide specific Information on the exact nature of the chemical
beyond the fact that It was such an inhibiting chemical. As a
result of the operating characteristics of this equipment It was,
however, possible for the Czech specialists to bracket the
concentration levels at which the active chemical had to be, and
that is reported to be between .05 and .003 mg/m3.
Some 40 kilometers distant, the second Czech NBC detachment
made a similar detection, but in addition to the information from
the non-specific detectors alarms, an air sample was also taken
and analyzed in a field mobile laboratory. The analysis of this
third sample is reported to be positive for GB. A more detailed
description of this is provided in the attached annexes 1-6. [
(b)(2) ] Is prepared to discuss the actual functioning and
capabilities of the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] equipment, as
well as the actual protocols which were executed.
The results of these detections of cholinesterase Inhibiting
chemicals, and GB, were reported through the command network.
Following the receipt of this information at CENTCOM, US teams
were sent to the area to conduct chemical agent testing and
analysis. It is estimated four hours elapsed from the initial
Czech unit detections until US specialists arrived to conduct
testing, which proved to be negative for chemical agents. Given
the non-persistent nature of the agent sarin, the time elapse
which occurred, and the extremely low levels detected and apparent
localized nature of the plume of chemical(s), it Is not surprising
that no confirmation of chemical agent resulted from the US team
investigation.
Additionally, there were Syrian, Egyptian, French, and
English units throughout the immediate area where the Czech units
were assigned, each of which was equipped with different, but
equally sensitive, equipment to that of the Czechs. Also at this
time the large scale redeployment of forces had begun, and there
was heavy traffic throughout this region, including many US forces
moving West. Not a single one of these forces reported any
confirmed detections of chemical agents during this period. There
were no offensive military actions associated with this area at
the time of the detections, to Include SCUD missiles attacks,
artillery exchanges, Iraqi air sorties, etc. The distance from
the Czech positions to the Iraqi border was over 40 km.
During the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
that the agent which was detected
was airborne residues of coalition attacks against CW related
targets within Iraq. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] also indicated
that the wind was blowing from the north-northeast at the time.
This latter point seems to contradict the general weather
information provided by the US Air Force, but can be explained.
The macroscopic weather patterns were as reported by the Air
Force, however, the Czech Unit which was in convoy was operating
In a wide, deep wadi, or river valley, some 100 to 200 feet below
the desert terrain on either side of the valley. It is
conceivable that the micro meteorological conditions in that wadi
were influenced by the topography, and were in fact quite
different from the large scale conditions observed for the region
as a whole. The micro conditions in any event would not influence
the assessment that the weather conditions were unfavorable for
the transport of chemical agent plume(s) from bombed suspect CW or
BW sites deep within Iraq.
Other possible explanations of these detections Include
detection of crop protection chemicals such as insecticides; false
alarms from interferents such as petroleum products; localized use
of pesticides by the coalition forces, and fugitive emissions from
chemical plants. Each of these possibilities was ruled out
systematically by a thorough review of the area for Industry,
crop production, etc. The area is a sparsely populated desert
region with no agriculture, no industry, and no logical source of
such unique manmade chemicals. The only petrochemical facility at
all in this vicinity is a fuel storage area which supplies oil to
an adjacent power plant. Based on information received from the
Czechs, and which is supported by our own preliminary analysis of
the equipment, chemistry, and procedures used, the detection of
such an cholinesterase inhibiting chemical would not be interfered
with by petroleum products, exhaust gases from heavy equipment,
etc. Also, the possibility that the use of pesticides by
coalition forces for the positive detection made by the one NBC
detachment which was not in convoy, was ruled out the team and by
other specialists who have participated in this exercise; there is
no possible other explanation for the Czech "confirmed" detection
of GB by the second NBC unit.
UNCONFIRMED AND UNREPORTED:
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that on the 24th
of January, a third Czech NBC detachment attached to Saudi forces
based in KKMC was approached by a Saudi liaison officer and
requested to investigate an area outside of KKMC for possible
chemical agent. They did so, under the direction of this liaison
officer, and found, several kilometers to the north and outside of
KKMC, a small area of what appeared to be wet desert soil. As
they approached the area the team was asked by the liaison officer
if they shouldn't "suit up" which they did before actually
approaching the area. The contaminated area measured only about
60 cm by 200 cm. Using two separate protocols, they determined
that the area had been contaminated with the mustard agent. The
Czech units filed a situation report with the Saudi forces,
however there is no record of that report being filed with
CENTCOM, and there is no record that any other units were called
to provide Independent confirmation of this find. Further because
of the extremely limited nature of the contamination, the
remoteness of the site, and the absence of any personnel stationed
anywhere in the immediate location, the site was left as is,
without even marking; no other samples were taken for additional
testing at the field laboratory.
FRENCH DETECTION:
As noted previously the Czech units did report the events of
the 19th through channels. Additionally there are CENTCOM log
entries which indicate that French forces stationed in KKMC during
the period of 20-21 January also detected mustard, and that they
contacted the Czech unit there to confirm. There is no situation
report filed by the Czech units on their participation in this
incident. During the investigation of the Czech unit's detections
in Prague In October of this year they were insistent that there
were no other "detections or confirmations" made by them.
However, during the Senator Shelby delegation trip to Prague In
December, they did allege that they remembered this additional
detection. The CENTCOM log data indicate that the French liaison
officer reported that the Czech unit detected several agents,
including nerve agents, as well as blister agents. However, there
is nothing to substantiate this claim, and unlike the other Czech
reports, this one is contradicted by what they "remember", what
the log entry indicates, and the lack of any casualties or
verifiable presence of chemical agents In KKMC during this period.
CENTCOM assessed that this report was a false positive, and the
Intelligence community concurs. There is no new information which
has been uncovered which would change that assessment.
COALITION ACTIONS:
During the initiation of the air campaign, suspected and
known CW and BW targets were on the first list of targets for
destruction. They include:
CW TARGETS ATTACKED DURING DESERT STORM
TARGET NAME GEO COORD
1. SAMARRA 3350N 04348E 1/17
2. HABBANIYAH 3333N 04338E 2/1
3. HABBANIYAH 3329N O4340E 2/1
4. HABBANIYAH 3329N 04349E 2/1
5. AL QAIM 3422N 04110E 2/10
6. KIRKUK 3533N 04358E 2/8
7. HABBANIYAH 3322N 04331E 2/17
8. TIKRIT 3443N O4339E 2/13
9. KARBALAH 3223N O433OE 2/3
10. FALLUJAH 3313N 04341E 2/21
11. QABATIYAH 3353N 04239E 1/19
12. ASH SHUYABAH 3029N 04739E 1/29
13. AD DIWANIYAH 3158N 04454E 2/3
14. AN NASIRIYAH 3O58N 04611E 1/17
15. MOSUL AIRFIELD 3618N 04309E 1/28
16. TAJI 3333N O4414E 2/10
17. H-3 AIRFIELD 3256N O3945E 2/9
18. K-2 AIRFIELD 3455N 04324E 2/9
19. KIRKUK AIRFIELD 3528N 04421E 2/15
20. AL TAQQADUM AIRFIELD 3320N 04336E 2/4
21. AL JARRAH AIRFIELD 3229N 04546E 2/5
22. QAYYARAH 3552N 04307E 2/10
23. TALLIL AIRFIELD 3056N 04606E 2/9
Of these targets the closest was An Nasiriyah located over 150
miles from the positions of the Czech unit detections north of
Hafr Al Batin. On the 17th of January a single bunker was struck
at An Nasiriyah with 2000 pound bombs. The prevailing weather
conditions from the time of the bombing until after the detections
were made included winds blowing from the south-south east, and
heavy rains on the 18th. The other targets were around Baghdad,
and near Kuwait, In regions of heavy populations of civilians and
military personnel.
Predictive models indicate that under ideal conditions, to
include favorable winds, terrain, etc., approximately 80 tons of
GB would have had to have been released during this bombing to
have resulted in levels comparable to those recorded by the
Czechs. This quantity of agent would have resulted in an area of
total fatalities to protected personnel measured In 10's to 100's
of square kilometers, and In total area of casualty producing
concentrations measured In 100's to 1000's of square kilometers
for unprotected personnel. However, factors such as prevailing
winds, precipitation, and topography, would have had a
synergistic effect, greatly increasing the amount of agent
necessary to obtain the measurements made by the Czech units,
which in turn would further Increase the area over which human
casualties would have occurred. There were no mass casualties
observed around, or downwind from An Naslriyah, or from any other
known or suspected CW or BW target struck during any phase of
Desert Storm.
Coalition forces stationed around the area of the Czech
detections made no detections or confirmations of chemical agent
detections on the 19th, even though they were In relatively close
proximity to them, and had comparable equipment to that employed
by the Czech units. If a large plume emanating from a point
source at An Nasirlyah had been the source of this chemical agent,
it Is unlikely that the plume could have been as well defined in
terms of length and width as to be only detectable over the
immediate area where the Czech units were located, and no where
else in the vicinity. Taken together, all these facts argue
against any unintentional release of chemical agent in Iraq as
being the explanation for the detection of agent by the Czech
units.
Modelling of the facts, elapsed time of duration of the
detection of the nerve agent, relative concentration of the agent,
and using Ideal conditions, it appears that the chemical or
chemical agent detected by the Czech units was released in close
proximity to their positions. Estimates of the quantity range
upwards of 10's of fluid ounces of chemical, however, the best
estimate given current Information is about 4 fluid ounces. This
quantity of GB would be expected to produce a plume of agent with
the desired concentrations, for the desired length of time,
without posing a significant risk of being detected by other units
in adjacent areas, or to pose a health threat to personnel in the
area any distance from the point of the release. [ (b)(2) ]
PERSONNEL REPORTING EXPOSURE:
There Is only one known instance of a coalition soldier
reporting Injury believed at the time to be the result of exposure
to chemical agent. This report was investigated thoroughly and is
considered to be a false report of a chemical agent exposure. The
intelligence community followed up closely on the results of this
soldiers claims, and bases it conclusions on the expert analysis
of clothing and body fluid samples obtained from this person
immediately following the claimed exposure. While there is no
doubt that this person experienced some injury as a result of
exposure to some caustic substance, however the body of scientific
evidence and intelligence information does not support the
conclusion that the chemical was a chemical warfare agent.
OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:
During and after the conflict there was intense examination
of all sources of information which might shed light on the extent
of the chemical and biological weapons Iraq had in place, what
their plans were for theIr use, and how and where they were stored
and handled. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Therefore, the Intelligence community Is well aware of the plans
and operations of the Iraqi government as relates to chemical
warfare, and to a lesser extent, biological warfare. The nature
of the chemical and biological agents which Iraq had developed and
produced are unique, all cause death or injury over periods of
minutes to days, and all are well known In the International
community. There were or are no known or suspected "special
agents" which could cause surprise or confusion on the part of the
attacked force.
There were, as has been stated, no known chemical Injuries
which are attributed to chemical warfare agents of any kind. Iraq
has three known nerve agents, GA. GB, and GF. None of these is
persistent, all are well known, and troops are protected against
all three by their standard Issue protective equipment. Each of
these three nerve agents Is readily identifiable In the field
using a variety of confirmation test methods and equipment which
all of the coalition partners had. There is some preliminary
evidence that they may also have been developing a production
capability for, or fielded, the persistent agent VX, however at
this time there is no confirmation of this. They elaborate the
same physical symptoms, and the field medics, doctors, and
personnel were instructed to look specifically for those symptoms
during the war. There were no reported Instances of any troop
elaborating symptoms of nerve agent poisoning. The only blister
agent Iraq if assessed to have is mustard agent, which it used In
its war with Iran. Again, with the sole exception of the soldier
who claimed injury to his arm, there were no individuals any where
in the theater of operations which developed physical injuries
which could be attributed to blister agents.
The Iraqi military is accredited with having developed three
biological agents for use in warfare. However, there were no
known or suspected uses of this during any portion of the
operation. Further, there were air sampling devices which were
located throughout the theater, and which were regularly serviced
and analyzed for presence of chemical toxins or agents which might
have been released against the coalition forces. There was not a
single sample which showed any positive result for biological
agent or toxin release in the theater.
There were reports of dead animals during operations DS/DS,
however these reports were fully investigated and found to be the
result of endemic disease in the region. Some animal samples were
collected and tested in laboratories in the U.S. and the test
results corroborated the information obtained by trained
specialists at the site of some of these instances.
ANNEX:
I. Questions and Answers provided to Dr. Deutch
Question: From the 19-24 Jan 91 time frame, the Iraqi CW targets
attacked by allied forces, winds, distances and downwind modelling
with regard to the Czech detection's.
Answer: There were only three CW targets struck by the coalition
air operation prior to the 24th: Samarra CW production north of
Baghdad which was bombed on the 17th of January, the Qabatiyah
Ammo and Storage located about 60 miles 17th of January, the
Qabatiyah Ammo and Storage facility, located over 100 miles to the
west of Baghdad which was bombed on the 19th, and the An Nasiriyah
Storage facility located over 150 miles north of the Saudi border,
which was bombed on the 19th. Of these, the closest was An
Nasiriyah, the other two were hundreds of miles further removed
from the Saudi
border.
The weather conditions during these operations were as follows:
From the 17th through the morning of the 19th the winds were from
the South and East, blowing to the North and West, when a front
moved through the area. From the afternoon of the 19th through
the 22 the winds were variable from the East North East to North
East, and returned to blowing from the South and East on the 23rd.
On the 18th there was general rain throughout the region, and
again, there was scattered and sporadic rain from the 20th through
the 23rd. These weather conditions would have by themselves
prevented any release of chemical agent, which resulted from the
bombing of targets deep Inside of Iraq, from reaching the Saudi
border. Sarin vapors would have been blown back Into Iraq, and
the rain conditions would have had a significant "decontaminating"
effect on the gas, further reducing the spread of the escaping
vapors had that occurred.
Nonetheless, modelling of a chemical release from An Nasiriyah has
been done to determine what quantities of sarin would have to be
released in order for the Czech units to be able to detect the
agent In the quantities recorded. Using models developed for the
purpose of modelling the deliberate release of chemical agents, it
has been determined that under ideal conditions of wind,
temperature, etc., and an ideal surface topography, over 80 tons
of sarin would have to have been released to effect this detection
as a result of the bombing of An Nasiriyah. Had this release
actually occurred, then all humans downwind of the target in an
area of about 100 square kilometers, would have been killed
regardless of access to protective clothing and masks, and the
area downwind of the release where causalties would have occurred
for unprotected personnel would have exceeded 1000 square
kilometers. The plume which would be detectable to the limits the
Czechs detected this gas would extend over an area 240 kilometers
downwind, and would be about 10 km wide!
Given the wind and weather conditions, however, it is impossible
to model any conceivable scenario in which a release from this
target, or any of the other two targets, singly or in conjunction,
could have resulted in the detections made by the Czechs without
catastrophic loss of life within Iraq. This is known with
certainty not to have happened.
Additionally, it should be noted, that had such an improbable
release of chemical agent occurred and been the cause of the agent
detected by the Czech units, then the plume of agent would have
been so large that many of the other coalition units in the region
would have had similar detections of this agent. This did not
occur.
Question: What suspected storage areas might have ben close to
Saudi Arabia?
Answer: The only two sites which are known or suspected were
those at An Nasirlyah and at Al Basrah. There are no other
depots, staging areas, or storage facilities closer than those.
Question: How far south did the Iraqis bring chemical weapons?
Answer: The Iraqis have claimed to have had chemical
agents/weapons as far south as An Naslrlyah. There has been no
confirmation of chemical weapons, agents, etc., anywhere within
the Kuwait Theater of Operations. There have been no weapons
found in any bunker, storage location, etc., anywhere within the
captured areas which resulted from the Operation Desert Storm.
ANNEX II: Initial report on the Czech findings
26OCT93
SUBJECT: CZECH CW REPORT
1. Responding to a Czech report of chemical agent detection
during
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, DIA fielded a special team comprised
of experts from FSTC, [ b.2. ], and DIA, who visited Prague,
Czech Republic, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] coordinated
discussion on the Czech findings of chemical agents.
2. Incident 1:
a. On 19 January 1991 two Czech NBC detachments detected
nerve agents at their positions north and northwest of Hafr Al
Batin. Each unit was operating [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
detectors, which use the active biochemical butyryl cholinesterase
(BChE). Following the initial alarm, each unit then used [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] units, which also use Bche, and
determined through sampling protocol, the presence and limits of
the concentration of the agent. One detachment also collected an
air sample which was analyzed in a mobile field lab and determined
to contain the nerve agent Sarin (GB).
b. The concentration of Sarin In the air sampled was
determined through basic sampling protocols to be between 0.05 and
0.0005 milligrams per cubic meter. The elapsed time from the
Initial alarm to the all clear was about 40 minutes. GB is
considered a "non-persistent agent," which dissipates in the air
In various periods of time.
c. This detection was made during a period in which there
were no SCUD missiles launches, artillery exchanges, or other
military action(s) observed by the Czechs in the area. Further,
there were no CW detections reported by other units In this area.
The Czechs observed that there were no identifiable physiological
manifestations (such as eye, nose, or breathing problems) which
might be associated with such an exposure to this chemical agent
dosage.
d. The nearest location of any known Iraqi storage or
production was some 150 km away from the area where the agent was
detected. In order for the detection that was made to have
resulted from a collateral release of GB from this area, large
amounts of agents would have had to have been released, which
would then have drifted over troop concentrations causing
casualties. Other units would have detected the presence of agents
in these amounts. No such events were reported.
e. The Czechs did not see any physical evidence that the
chemical agents detected were the result of offensive or hostile
actions by the Iraqi forces. The Czechs filed a sitrep on their
detection.
3. Incident II:
a. Approximately five days after the detection of the GB
agent, a Saudi liaison officer approached the 3rd Czech NBC
detachment subordinated to the Saudi Royal Forces In King Khalid
Military City and requested that they Investigate a "suspicious"
area in the desert. The liaison officer directed the NBC
detachment from KKMC to a locatIon a few kilometers
north-northwest of KKMC. As they approached the area he queried
them if they shoudn't don their protective gear, which they did.
Upon arriving at the site, they found a wet area on the desert
floor, measuring about 60 cm by 200 cm In dimension. They tested
this with two separate methods, and determined that the soil was
contaminated with sulphur mustard agent.
b. The Czech officers who had been on the scene said that
there were no munitions fragments, craters, or other Indications
of military Involvement with this site. The Czechs also said
there were no SCUD alerts for this area immediately prior to this
finding. Following the determination of the presence of mustard,
the detachment left the area. A sitrep was filed with the Saudi
Command of the Joint Forces North Area HQ In KKMC.
4. The only units to have detected and confrmed the presence of
chemical agents during Desert Shield/Desert Storm were the three
Czech detachments, all of which were subordinated to the Joint
Forces North Area under the command of the Royal Saudi Liberation
Forces. The detectlons Involved each of the three units, and
occurred within a single five day period. No prior or subsequent
detections were made, or confirmed by the Czech detachments.
5. [ (b)(2) ]
6. At this juncture, the facts do not tie any known Iraqi or
Coalition offensive military actions to these CW detections.
ANNEX III: Technical procedures used by the Czech NBC UnIts
Subject: Technical procedures used to Detect Chemical Agent
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm
1. Detection of nerve agent during Desert Storm was accomplished
using a biochemical technique, while determination of mustard
agent depended on wet chemical qualitative analytical procedures.
2. Detection of nerve agent on the 19th of January, 1991 occurred
at three separate locations by two separate Czechoslovak NBC
Detachments. The first Chemical detachment detected a G-type
agent while on convoy about 37 kilometers north west of Hafr al
Batin and 40 kilometers from the Iraqi boarder. This unit
detected chemical agents at two separate location. The second NBC
detachment was located approximately 45 kilometers north east of
Hafr al Batin and 40 kilometers from the Kuwait border.
3. Both units detected the Initial presence of nerve agent using
the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] monitor/alarm which detects only
organophosphate type agents. These units were of [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] manufacture, and were operating In a
semi-continuous mode: This unit uses a wet chemlcal/colorlmetrlc
procedure by which the enzyme system Butyryl Chollnesterase (Bche)
containing solution Is deposited on a cotton tape, whIch Is then
drawn through an air aspiration port exposing the enzyme to the
possible agent. Following this exposure, the tape Is then
transported to another station, where a solution with the
Indicator phenyl red Is deposited on the tape. Presence of a
chemical agent In the air Inhibits the enzyme from further
reaction which results In no color change; absence of an agent
causes a reaction which is registered as a color change from red
to yellow. As operated, this unit has a reported sensitivity to
nerve agent of 0.003 mg/M3 (of air sampled).
4. Following the initial alarm by the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
], the troops donned their protective gear and made follow up
tests using the Czechoslovak manufactured CHP-71 unit. While this
unit also uses Bche enzyme Inhibition for subsequent
Identification, the unit is somewhat more sensitive due to the
means of air sampling. However, because the basic chemistry Is
identical to the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] system, this test
does not independently confirm the first nerve agent. This system
could register a positive result for any cholinesterase inhibiting
organophosphate compound, which would include many agricultural
Insecticides. There were no other independent tests performed at
the site of the detection to indicated that the chemical detected
was in fact a nerve agent. An air sample was collected on a-
dried silica gel substrate and preserved for subsequent testing at
a field laboratory located in King Kahlid Military City (KKMC).
There, two analytical procedures were used to show that the
organophosphate compound in question contained fluorine and
isopropyl groups.
5. The [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] could be operated for [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
. When the Czechoslovaks Initially
attempted to verify the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] alarm using
the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], the results were negative, and
It was only after subsequent air sampling [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
] that they obtained the positive results. This would place the
concentration of the suspected nerve agent in the air between 0.05
- 0.0005 mg/M5. These concentrations are so low that they are not
felt to represent any threat to personnel.
6. Following the initial alarm, there were four subsequent tests
using the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] unit. Each test was
conducted for [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], minutes, and
subsequent processing and refitting the unit lasted perhaps [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. The first three of these tests continued
to register positive for chemical agent. The fourth test was
negative, at which point the all clear was sounded. A total time
of approximately 40 minutes elapsed between the Initial alarm and
the all clear. The time between the initIal detectlons at the 1st
and 2nd NBC detachments was about 30 minutes.
7. The reporting of these determinations was made through proper
channels, up through the brigade headquarters to the joint command
in KKMC. A situation report was also forwarded through Saudi
military to Riyadh.
8. Some four to five days following the detection of the nerve
agents north of Hafr al Batin, the 3rd detachment located at KKMC
was approached by the Saudi Liaison Officer with a request for
them to bring their reconnaissance vehicle out Into the desert to
inspect an area. The location which they were taken to was about
one to two kilometers north or west of KKMC. When approaching the
actual location, they were asked by the Saudi Liaison Officer If
they shouldn't suit up in their protective gear. The
Czechoslovaks thought this was strange but they did suit up. Upon
disembarking their vehicles they found a "wet area" on the desert
floor which was irregular in shape and measured about 60
centimeters by 200 centimeters (60 cm x 200 cm), much like a
"puddle" of liquid which Is poured onto the ground and then seeps
Into the earth. This area was tested using the [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ] and mustard agent was identified as present. They
then used the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] portable laboratory
which used a complex chemical molecule based on benzoic acid,
phenol, and other aromatic chemicals. This test confirmed the
Initial detection of the mustard agent by the [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]. Because these tests used different chemical
Indicators for the determination, it Is likely that this detection
of mustard was accurate and that the contamination of this oil was
with mustard age.
9. The situation report of this action was forwarded through the
joint headquarters KKMC, as were the previous reports. There were
no indications that this contamination was the result of any
military action; there was no debris, impact crater, or any other
visible evidence that anyone had been to this site previously.
There was no previous, nor subsequent, request like this one by
the Saudi's. There was no follow up action beyond the filing of
the SITREP, and the notification of the Czechoslovak Ministry of
Defense.
10. Czechoslovak unit did not experience any problems with their
detectors, in particular the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], as a
result of environmental contaminants. The Czech unit tested this
equipment subsequently to determine its sensitivity after the time
of the burning oil fires. However, the chemical agents were
detected prior to the oil fires. Moreover, In a test, the
Czechoslovaks set up the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] and the [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] on a lab bench located less than 2
feet from the top of a 55-gallon oil drum containing burning oil.
The results of this test Indicated that there were no problems
with the equipment, and that the emissions caused from these units
did not result In any false positive detections.
Annexes IV-VI are [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ].
[ b.2. ]
1st:
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMCAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE IN THE GULF
For the Defense Science Board investigating
the Desert Storm Syndrome
Presented by [ (b)(6) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
DIA
unclassified
2nd: -
PRINCIPAL ISSUES
* WEATHER CONDITIONS FROM THE 17TH THROUGH 19 JANUARY 1991
* CZECH REPORTING
* FRENCH REPORTING
* COALITION ACTIONS AGAINST CW/BW TARGETS
* REPORTS OF EXPOSURE OF COALITION PERSONNEL
* DEARTH OF OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AND REPORTING
3RD:
CHEMICAL AGENT REPORTING
* U.S. REPORTING....M8A1, MM1, M256A1
* FRENCH REPORTING
* CZECH REPORTING....[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
4TH:
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS
* DELIBERATE USE BY THE IRAQIS--OVERT OR COVERT
* ACCIDENTAL RELEASES- - "LEAKERS"
* UNINTENTIONAL RELEASE RESULTING FROM
COALITION ACTIONS
* DELIBERATE RELEASE UNRELATED TO MILITARY
OPERATIONS
5TH:
PARAMETERS OF CZECH DETECTIONS
* "ISOLATED" LOCATIONS IN DESERT AREAS
* ALL UNITS UNDER SAUDI COMMAND
* NO IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH
TIMING OF DETECTIONS
* NO SAMPLES TAKEN FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS
* EQUIPMENT PROCEDURES
6TH:
PARAMETERS OF IRAQI TARGETS
* AN NASIRIYAH LOCATED 150 MILES FROM HAFR AL BATIN
* OTHER TARGETS AROUND BAGDAO AND NEAR NORTHERN KUWAIT
* TARGETS WERE BOMBED ALMOST 48 HOURS BEFORE CZECH DETECTIONS
* THERE WERE NO MASS CASULITES SURROUNDING THE CW/BW TARGETS
7TH:
CONCLUSIONS
* IRAQ DID NOT RELEASE ANY CW OR BW WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION
FORCES DURING ANY PHASE OF DS/DS
* ANALYSIS OF IRAQI CW AND BW TARGETS INDICATES THAT
COALITION ACTIOS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE CZECH DETECTIONS
* CZECH DETECTIONS OF GB AND H ON TWO OCCASIONS IS
CREDIBLE REPORTING
* SOURCE OF THE AGENTS DETECTED REMAINS UNKNOWN BUT
THE FACTS INDICATE DELIBERATE AND LIMITED RELEASES IN
VERY RESTRICTED AREAS.
* THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS
ALLEGATIONS OF ANY CW OR BW EXPOSURES BY COALITION FORCES
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