Iraqi's SRBM Capabilities and Options for Use
Filename:0182pgv.00d
Subject: Iraqi's SRBM Capabilities and Options for Use
Key Judgments
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
- Chemical or biological SRBM warheads (if available) will be
withheld as a potential response to battlefield reverses or as
retaliation for attacks on Baghdad. They will be aimed at military
targets or at civilian locations (possibly including Israeli as
well as opposing Arab) as weapons of terror or retribution.
- Possible deployment areas in southern Iraq and Kuwait put US
forces in range of Iraqi missiles.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
could force Saddam Hussein into a 'use or lose' situation for the
missiles, and create pressure for their employment with chemical
or biological warheads.
I. Background
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
II. Operational Capability
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
In addition to high explosive (HE) warheads, Iraq is
assessed to have chemical warfare (CW) warheads for their SCUD, Al
Abbas, and Al Husayn missiles. While unitary agents (mustard,
Tabun, and possibly VX) are most likely, Iraq may also have a
binary SRBM chemical warhead (Sarin or GF). Chemical-tipped SRBMs
would most likely be fired during the early morning hours probably
from 0300 to 0600 local to ensure that the meteorological
conditions will keep the CW agent from rising into the atmosphere.
Such weapons are not assessed as posing a significant threat to
Iraq's military forces opposing Iraq due to the probable limited
quantity of binary warheads available, reduced payloads of
deliverable CW agents, and missile inaccuracy. However, they could
pose a 'terror weapon' threat to large population centers in the
region.
Iraq also is assessed as having the technological
capability to produce biological warfare (BW) agents -- anthrax
and botulinum toxin -- as well as develop air and ground munitions
delivery capabilities. A SRBM BW warhead cannot be discounted,
although very few would be available.
While Iraq is assessed to have fuel air explosive (FAE)
aerial bombs and possibly multiple rocket rounds, no such warheads
are believed available for any SRBM. Likewise, nuclear SRBM
warheads are not believed likely until sometime after the year
2000, despite an active, long-established nuclear program.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
IV. Iraqi SRBM Employment: An Assessment
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
We assess the Iraqis probably will refrain from using chemical
weapons against opposing military forces unless the military
situation seriously deteriorates, or Baghdad is directly attacked
on a significant scale. In such a case, Saddam Hussein could order
SRBM CW/BW attacks on distant airfields or assembly areas with
salvos of four to six missiles. However, even this use of SRBMs
will not significantly affect military operations because of the
low levels of agents in Iraqi weapons and missile inaccuracy. In
the face of further reverses, Saddam Hussein could seek to repeat
his apparently successful use of SRBMs as weapons of terror during
the Iran war by, as a last resort, ordering HE-, CW-, or possibly
BW-armed SRBM attacks against densely populated areas such as
Dhahran or Riyadh. Such an attack would probably involve all of
Iraq's SRBM assets within range of these civilian areas, and could
include Israeli targets. While such SRBM attacks could be costly
in the loss of civilian life and economic impact, they, too, would
have little effect on the final outcome of the war.
V. Conclusions
The Iraqis can employ their SRBM force in a variety of
ways:
-- With conventional warheads against military targets
-- With CW/BW warheads against military targets
-- With CW/BW warheads as 'Terror Weapons' against civilian or
economic targets.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
While use of CW/BW warheads would greatly increase the
destructiveness of a small number of missiles, the resulting
resentment and outrage may establish a consensus among Gulf states
and in the Arab world to destroy the Iraqi regime and its military
potential.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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