Gulf War Syndrome as an Intelligence Question
Filename:0181pgv.00d
Subject: Gulf War Syndrome as an Intelligence Question
[ (b)(6) ]
In trying to resolve recent reports of unexplained medical
problems suffered by Gulf War veterans, it has been speculated
that these problems might be due to exposure to chemical or
biological warfare agents (CBW) during the War. Based on available
information, it is DIA's assessment that CBW was not used during
the Gulf War, and that information available does not support the
conclusion that Coalition troops were exposed to air borne plumes
of CBW agents caused by bombing Iraqi CBW targets.
DETAILS
Reliable information obtained since the war argues strongly that
there was no Iraqi intent to use CBW against Coalition Forces. The
fear of massive retaliation and the belief that the coalition was
far better prepared than Iraq to fight in a CBW environment were
the most likely primary deterrents. Even if Iraq intended to use
CBW weapons against the Coalition, its ability to deliver them was
largely eliminated by the air campaign and pace of the ground war.
Immediately after the war, a massive effort to collect and destroy
remaining Iraqi equipment throughout occupied Iraq and Kuwait
began. Not one chemical or biological munition, nor any bulk
agent, has been found in occupied Iraq or Kuwait as a result of
that effort. Moreover, the primary U.S. contractor for unexploded
ordinance removal in Kuwait stated recently that, to date, the
company had discovered and removed more than 15,000 tons of all
types of ordinance --including 350,000 mines -- and found no CBW
weapons. Even if Iraq moved CBW munitions into Kuwait -- a
judgement supported by very little reliable evidence - it is
difficult to believe that under the most intensive air bombardment
in history, Iraq was able to move these munitions out of Kuwait,
undetected, and without leaving a trace. Since no munitions have
been found, we judge they were never in the KTO.
CBW agents are designed to kill or injure quickly, and in large
numbers. US medical personnel stationed in the Gulf were
especially watchful for symptoms associated with CBW agents.
During the entire Persian Gulf crisis not one person, military or
civilian, was treated, hospitalized or died as a result of CBW
exposure. If CBW had been used, even on a limited basis, this most
certainly would not have been the case.
An army private who received the Bronze Star and Purple Heart
after experiencing burns while searching bunkers is the only known
injury with symptoms similar to CBW exposure. However, advanced
laboratory analysis of his flak jacket, shirt, the swab used to
clean his wound, subsequent urinalysis, and a subsequent
reexamination of the bunker, all cast considerable doubt that the
burns were the result of contact with a CW agent.
There were no confirmed CBW agent detections during the entire
crisis. Standard operating procedure to determine the presence of
CW agents requires a two step process involving l) detection and
2) confirmation. In the detection phase, automatic detectors alert
troops by sounding alarms. Because the equipment is very sensitive
by design, false alarms are often registered. This was the case
during the Gulf War. Despite the large number of initial
detections, however, the second step, confirmation, using
equipment and techniques available at the platoon level, never
resulted in a single confirmation of CBW during the Gulf War. If a
real confirmation had been made, standard operating procedures
require certain defensive tactics, decontamination efforts,
medical responses, and follow-up reports, all of which would be
mentioned in official logs. Our investigation shows none of this
to have occurred in any case.
In addition to all the unconfirmed detections investigated and
registered as false alarms, a variety of soil, liquid and air
samples suspected of containing CW agents were analyzed at state-
of-the-art labs in the U.S. and UK. These samples were taken
before, during and after the war from suspected "hot" areas in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. The results from all samples tested
were negative. Likewise, air samples checking for the presence of
Biological Weapons agents (BW) were continuously taken and
analyzed at state-of-the-art labs. As with the CW samples, all
tests for BW agents were negative.
Only one set of data, the highly publicized Czech reports of CW
detections on 19 and 24 January 1991, appears to be credible. The
U.S. cannot independently verify the Czech detections, but places
a measure of confidence in their findings, [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]. On the 24th, after being notified by Saudi troops,
the Czechs found what appeared to be a one square meter wet spot
of Mustard agent, origin unknown, in the desert near King Khalid
Military City. There was absolutely no evidence of Iraqi military
activity in the vicinity. On the l9th, the Czechs reported
detection of extremely low levels of nerve agent in very localized
areas near Hafar Al Batin. Again, there was no evidence whatever
of Iraqi military activity. According to the Czechs, the nerve
agent detected on 19 January was present for less than forty
minutes. It is noteworthy that no other units in the area detected
the nerve agent.
A popular theory, which appears at first to be borne out by the
Czech detection, suggests the cause of Gulf War Syndrome to be
exposure of our troops to low, i.e. undetectable, levels of CW
which resulted from released agents when Coalition Forces bombed
Iraqi targets. This, however, would appear quite unlikely for
several reasons. The scientific Law of Diffusion states that any
gas or liquid naturally moves from areas of greater to lesser
concentration. Consequently, if, in one area or time, the
concentration of CW is low -- as in the Czech detection -- at some
other area or previous time the concentration must have been high.
Using the Czech detections as an example, we estimate that under
ideal conditions, it would require 80 tons of nerve agent to be
instantaneously released from the closest bombed CW target, An
Nasiriyah -- 140 miles north of Hafar Al Batin -- in order to
register at the low levels detected by the Czechs. Such an 80 ton
release of nerve agent -- one drop of which is considered a lethal
dose -- in Iraq would have resulted in an area of certain death or
casualty that covers hundreds of square miles. No evidence of such
widespread death or casualty exists. Moreover, detection equipment
throughout the area would have alarmed and additional
confirmations would have been expected. None of this happened.
This example was chosen because it uses as reference points one of
the three most southern Iraqi CBW targets and one of the most
northern held Coalition positions before the ground war. When one
considers that cases of Gulf War Syndrome have been reported by
soldiers stationed all over the Saudi Arabian peninsula, and that
the vast majority of CBW targets were much farther north than
Nasiriyah, it quickly becomes apparent that the lack of evidence
of massive Iraqi military and civilian deaths associated with
releases from bombed Iraqi CBW targets, argues very strongly
against the theory that coalition soldiers were exposed to
airborne CBW agents released from bombed Iraqi CBW targets
literally hundreds of miles away.
More to the point, even if there were exposures of the above type,
we would expect to see similar cases of Gulf War Syndrome
throughout the Saudi and Kuwaiti civilian population. Likewise, we
would expect the governments of both those nations to be more than
willing to lay the blame for such illness at the feet of the
Iraqis. Senior DoD officials, in meetings arranged and attended by
State Department representatives queried a myriad of Saudi and
Kuwaiti Health, Defense and other government officials on this
issue. The DoD delegation was told by all parties that no Saudi or
Kuwaiti military or civilians experienced any symptoms that could
be characterized as Gulf War Syndrome.
In addition to the Law of Diffusion, weather conditions further
argue against the theory. Of the 43 days of the war (17 Jan - 28
Feb), at least 18 days (42%) had winds blowing from the south.
Also, it rained at least 12 days (28%) during the war. These
physical facts render the possibility that airborne plumes of CBW
agents permeated the Saudi Arabian peninsula nearly, if not
completely, negligible.
COMMENT
Ironically, the Czech detections pose an intelligence mystery of
their own: if they are accepted as valid, what was their source?
The low concentration and short duration of the detection on the
l9th, the extremely localized area affected, the meteorological
conditions, the absence of other detections by other units nearby,
the topography of the area, and the fact that no military action
took place anywhere near the area, all suggest a SINGLE release of
a very small amount of agent. Regarding the wet spot of mustard
agent encountered by the Czechs on the 24th, its origins are
equally mysterious. At this juncture, the most logical
explanations for either incident would seem to be possible live
agent tests of the Czech equipment, or possible accidents
involving chemical agents among Coalition Forces. There is a
paucity of evidence to prove either explanation, however, and we
are unlikely, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] to acquire any
additional information.
CONCLUSION
The preponderance of information argues strongly that Iraq did not
use CBW during the Gulf War. Likewise, the preponderance of
information argues that there was no exposure of our troops to CBW
released from bombed Iraqi targets. Although the Czech CBW
detections may well be valid and are still unexplained, it seems
extremely doubtful if not impossible that they have any relation
to the cause of Gulf War Syndrome. Our conclusion then is that it
is safe to rule out chemical and biological agents as a possible
cause of Gulf War Syndrome.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
